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THE WISDOM THAT IS MARY *

> Mary must shine forth more than ever in these latter times, in mercy, in strength and in grace.
>
> —GRIGNON DE MONTFORT

HOW may we truly apply to the Blessed Virgin all that is said of Wisdom in the Sapiential Books? In answering this question we are attempting no innovation. This will be evident from the constant use made of the Doctors of the Church. In composing this study, whose main purpose is to assemble a certain amount of pertinent quotations relating to the Mother of God as Wisdom, we have been prompted rather by the miseries of our time which indicate more than ever our need to keep our eyes steadily fixed upon the most outstanding manifestations of the Wisdom and Mercy of God.

Those texts which the liturgy devotes in their mystical sense to the Mother of God will be utilized merely to illustrate the conclusions deduced from the literal sense of other passages of

* Editors' Note: The present article, in the French, is to form part of Prof. DeKoninck's forthcoming book, *Ego Sapientia*, Editions de l'Université Laval, Quebec.

Scripture. Such an illustration, nevertheless, supported as it is by the liturgy, has a truly illuminative quality.[1]

The words which the Church places in the mouth of the Blessed Virgin are not "I, the wise," nor "the wisest of all mere creatures," but "*I, wisdom—Ego Sapientia.*"[2] Of a very good person we say that that person is goodness itself, but this attribution is to be understood in a purely metaphorical or parabolical sense. There are only two cases in which one may predicate an abstract term of a concrete term in an essential proposition: when it is question of God and of the transcendentals. "Abstract things," says John of St. Thomas, "cannot be truly predicated of concrete things, nor concrete things of abstract things, because of the mode of signifying, . . . although sometimes they are really identical, as in divine things Divinity and God, Paternity and the Father."[3] Whence, then, can the Blessed Virgin claim the sovereign affinity to God which such a mode of attribution implies?

What is proper to wisdom? The adage says: "*Sapientis est ordinare*—To order pertains to him who is wise." How are we to understand the term, "to order"? To start with, what is "order"? Two things are included in the notion of order; distinction and principle. Principle is that from which something proceeds in any way whatsoever. Principle implies proceeding. Proceeding or procession is movement from a principle, movement which can be understood in the broad sense of any action, the action of thinking as well as of physical motion. Accordingly as the principle is a principle of place, a principle of time, or a principle of nature, order will be divided into local order, temporal order and the order of nature. Of these three orders the last is the most profound, since it implies the notion of origination, inasmuch as nature is "that from which is born

[1] Cf. Cornelius a Lapide, *Commentaria in Ecclesiasticum*, cap. XXIV, verse 1 and 2, (edit. Crampon, Vives), T. IX, p. 617 b: *Mystice, apte Ecclesia in Officiis divinis B. Virginis haec omnia (quidquid frustra obstrepat Lutherus, et occlament haeretici) accipit de B. Virgine, idque justissimis et gravissimis de causis.*

[2] Ecclus. 24: 40.

[3] John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus*, (edit. Reiser), T. I, II P., Q. V, a. 4, p. 364b.

first the thing which is born: *ex qua pullulat pullulans primo.*" Under another aspect order is divided into universal and particular order accordingly as the principle is absolutely first, or first in a given genus only.

What order is in question in the adage: " It is the part of the wise man to set things in order "? It belongs to the wise man to set things in order, says St. Thomas, " Because wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, to which it properly pertains to know order." [4] Since order implies principle, and principle implies relation, the intellect alone can grasp order as order. " Since the intellect (in opposition to the will) draws things to itself, and proceeds by passing from one to the other, it can compare and formally grasp the relation of one thing to another; the intellect therefore possesses within itself the primary root and reason necessary for ordering things—comparing them among themselves and establishing a relation of one to the other." [5] However, the mere knowledge of an order is not, as such, sapiential. Simple apprehension can attain order, and every science involves a certain order. Wisdom will only be the highest perfection of reason in so far as it implies an order proceeding from a principle which is wholly first. The verb, " to order," expresses this originative primacy. " It is not to be ordered," says Aristotle, " but to order, which belongs to a wise man." [6] That is why wisdom is radical. It not only shows the interlocking of one thing with another, but it grasps things in their primary root, wherein all the things that proceed therefrom are, in a certain way, pre-contained; and it grasps this root under its proper formality of origin. If this root was not at the same time origin, the absolutely first principle would be in dependence upon that of which it is the first principle; the multiple would then be, as such, the nature of a first principle.

Wisdom may only be predicated substantially of a thing which in its being and operation is of the nature of the first

[4] St. Thomas, *In I Ethic.*, lect. 1, (edit. Pirotta), n. 1.

[5] John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, (edit. Vivès), T. VII, disp. 21, a. 1, p. 744b.

[6] Aristotle, *I Metaph*, cap. I, 982 a 15.

principle whence proceed in a certain way all things by way of origination. It would not suffice for it to attain the primary root solely according to knowledge, because then it would be wise only; but it must substantially possess the nature of a first principle, and know itself as such.

In order for the Blessed Virgin to be called Wisdom, she must be first principle in this sense. She must be herself first principle, not merely according to intellect and will, but also according to its substance and being. But who is first principle according to his very being except God? To be truly a first principle would not Mary have to be such a first principle even in her relation to God, would she not have to be so close to God that she would somehow participate even in His nature of first principle, be as the root of the universal order, even in a certain manner that from which God Himself proceeds in a certain manner, the origin and genetrix of God?

Fear not, Mary, for thou hast found grace with God. Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a son: and thou shalt call his name Jesus. He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the most High; and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of David his father; and he shall reign in the house of Jacob forever.[7] The Virgin gives birth to the God-man, the branch of Jesse has flowered,[8] She is henceforth truly the *mother of God*,[9] she who has engendered God.

Generation means vital origin and assimilation. It is the procession of a living thing from within a living thing conjoined as a principle of life and which assimilates the product of generation to its proper nature by virtue of this very procession. Generation consists therefore in expressing a likeness propagative of the nature of the generator. The generator draws that which is generated from its own substance while forming it. If the Blessed Virgin is truly a generator, this definition of generation must fully apply to her. Let us here note that although in the act of conception the mother is solely a passive principle which, while properly a nature, does not of itself imply an active and expressive assimilation, nevertheless, considered in

[7] Lk. 1: 30. [8] Num. 17: 8. [9] Lk. 1: 43.

her relation to the one engendered, the mother is properly an active principle which vitally assimilates the one engendered. An assimilative action takes place formally in the production of the passive principle of conception, a production which results from the active generative power of the woman, in view of the one engendered. For this reason, the mother participates actively in the vital assimilation of the one engendered. She is properly a genitrix.[10]

Birth regards primarily and principally the being of the hypostasis and the person. Hence, since the Blessed Virgin is the mother of Christ according to the hypostasis, she is truly the mother of God and of the man, of the God-man.[11] In relation to that in Him which is born, the Blessed Virgin is properly cause and origin of God, *causa Dei et origo Dei*.[12]

Being the cause of the cause of all things, the mother of God is consequently the mother of all things. " She is the mother of all things," says St. Albert, " and God the Father is the origin of all things: but whatever is *per se* the origin and cause of the cause, is *per se* origin and cause of that which is caused. But she is the mother of Him who is the cause and origin of all things: therefore she is *per se* the mother of all things." [13] Is she not under this aspect an absolutely universal cause? Is there any work of God which is not to be related to her as to its principle?

Insofar as she is the substantial principle of Him who made her—*genuisti qui te fecit*—she fulfills by her divine maternity an essential condition of the appellation " Wisdom." Since she is truly mother of the Son, and the Son is incarnate Wisdom, she is the mother of Wisdom engendered entitavely both of the eternal Father and the temporal mother. " She is the mother,"

[10] St. Thomas, *III a P.*, q. 32, a. 4—Cajetan, *Comment., ibid.*

[11] St. Thomas, *III a P.*, q. 35, a. 4, c; J. a S. Thoma, *Curs. Phil.*, T. II, III P., q. 1, a. 4, p. 569 a 45.

[12] Albertus Magnus, *Mariale, sive quaestiones super Evangelium*, q. 141; Opera Omnia, (edit. Borgnet), T. 37, p. 200a. *S. Albert le Grand, Docteur de la Mediation Mariale* (Paris-Ottawa, 1935). by M.-M. Desmarais, O. P., has been our guide in the Mariology of St. Albert.

[13] Albertus Magnus, *Mariale*, q. 145, p. 206a.

says Cornelius a Lapide, " of the eternal Wisdom incarnated in her. Just as the Son is Wisdom engendered and incarnate, so she is the Wisdom which engenders and incarnates." [14]

Nevertheless, Wisdom implies knowledge, a procession according to knowledge. In order that the Blessed Virgin be truly Wisdom, she must, even in relation to God, in addition to her divine maternity according to the flesh, attain to the nature of a first principle according to intellect. This she accomplished in her *Fiat—Be it done to me according to thy word.*[15] The *Fiat* of Mary is as the echo of the *Fiat* of Genesis, the word whence proceeds the new order to which the old was ordained. *For behold I create new heavens, and a new earth: and the former things shall not be in remembrance, and they shall not come upon thy heart.*[16] " God who made all things," says St. Anselm, " is Himself made from Mary (*ipse se ex Maria fecit*) and thus all that He made He had made again." [16a] *My heart hath uttered a good word.* " When the angel had spoken," says St. Augustine, " Mary, full of faith and conceiving Christ in spirit before conceiving Him in her womb, said: Behold the handmaid of the Lord, be it done unto me according to thy word." [17] " The Blessed Virgin," adds St. Albert, " would not have engendered Christ in the flesh if she had not first of all conceived and preserved the Word in the ear of her heart (*aure cordis*), bearing Him so to speak in the womb of her heart (*in cordis utero*)." [18]

From this word is suspended the entire new order, this word in the beginning of the conception of the eternal Word by Whom all things are made. Judge, Mary, wisdom, and the whole universe will be remade. " Hasten, O Virgin," cries St. Bernard, "to give your answer. O my Sovereign, pronounce the word which the earth, hell, and heaven await, . . . Say but one

[14] Cornelius a Lapide, *In Ecclesiasticum*, c. XXIV, vers. 1 et 2, T. IX, p. 617b.
[15] Lk. 1: 38.
[16] Is. 65: 17.
[16a] Oratio 52, Tome 158, col. 956, P. L.
[17] St. Augustine, *Sermo* 215, n. 4, P. L., T. VII, col. 1074.
[18] St. Albert, *In Lucam*, c. 11, vers. 27, T. 38, p. 158b.

word, and receive the Word; give your word and receive the divine Word: pronounce a passing word and embrace the eternal Word." [19] *Be it done unto me according to thy word. Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth.*[20] Let the Holy Spirit take my flesh and unite it intimately to the Son of God. Let the Word that is the Light become flesh.

M. Olier, in the most express way, tells us that in her *Fiat* the Blessed Virgin imitated the procession of the Son in God according to knowledge:

> . . . Just as (the eternal Father) engenders his Word through all eternity by His knowledge, by a return upon and vision of Himself, so He wills that Mary, the supremely perfect and holy image of His virginal fecundity, should engender the Word with knowledge; and for that reason He decrees that she shall give her consent to the generation of the word in the flesh in an express and solemn way presupposing knowledge and reason. Whereas other mothers will not know the one who is to be born of them, He wishes that Mary should know previously what manner of son she shall conceive: an angel will make known to her that this son will be Son of the Most High, both God and man, the Redeemer of the world, and that His reign will endure forever.[21]

This God, whose mother she is, is the God Redeemer who as Redeemer is the final, and consequently absolutely first cause of the entire universe, for Christ was never efficaciously willed as the end of all things except as the Redeemer.[22] Mother of the Redeemer, Mary is inseparably united to this final cause as co-principle. *The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made any thing from the beginning. I was set up from eternity, and of old before the earth was made.*[23] Mother of Emmanuel, this is to say, of "the Mighty with us," she is the first one predestinated among all pure creatures.

[19] St. Bernard, *De Ladibus Virginis Matris, homilia* IV, *Opera Omnia* (edit. Charpentier Vivès), T. II, p. 619.

[20] Lk. 1: 38 and Cant. 1: 1.

[21] *Vie intérieure de la Très Sainte Vierge*, ouvrage recueilli des écrits de M. Olier, Paris, 1875, pp. 5-6.

[22] John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Theol.*, T. VIII, disp. 3, a. 2, n. 52, p. 108b.

[23] Prov. 8: 22-23.

"She came from God in the beginning," says St. Albert, "because from all eternity she was predestined to become the mother of the Son of God."[24] The mother is inconceivable without the Son, and the Son Redeemer without the mother. She proceeds from Him who made her in order that He might proceed from her. It is as principle that she proceeds from the Principle: her procession from the Principle is ordained in the procession of this same Principle, and she envelops the Principle in her procession from Him, she is held by Him in his procession from her. *I came out of the mouth of the most High, the firstborn before all creatures.*[25] In coming out of the mouth of the most High she is herself the mouth which profers the Word. *Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth.*[26] She proceeds from the true light, from Him who is the unfailing light. *Ego feci ut in coelis oriretur lumen indeficiens.*[27] The Son, who in the bosom of the Father precontains all things, including the Virgin, causes Himself to be contained in the womb of the Virgin. *He whom the whole universe cannot contain has enclosed Himself in your womb, becoming man.* The Son and the mother thus constitute from the very beginning a kind of circular motion wherein the principle is the term, and the term, principle, a motion which is the symbol of Wisdom *which reaches from end to end.*[28] This circular motion of Wisdom which is more mobile than all mobile things,[29] is like unto play: *playing before him at all times.*[30]

Being truly the mother of God,[31] the Blessed Virgin is bound to the hypostatic order in the most intimate way possible to a pure creature. "Hence," says St. Albert, "since birth primarily and principally has respect to the being of the hypostasis and the person, and secondarily to the nature, the Blessed Virgin is

[24] St. Albert, *Sermones de Sanctis*, Sermo 38, T. 13, p. 563a.
[25] Ecclus. 24: 5.
[26] Cant. 1: 1.
[27] Mass, "*Salve Sancta Parens.*"
[28] Wisd. 8: 1.
[29] Wisd. 7: 24.
[30] Prov. 8: 30.
[31] St. Thomas, *III Pars*, q. 35, a. 4, c.

called the mother of Christ according to the hypostasis, which hypostasis is God and man, and this is why she is the mother of God and of the man—although she is not consubstantial with God except with respect to His human nature, since consubstantiality taken in itself means nothing other than *convenientia* in substance. Birth, then, belongs primarily and of itself to the person, and to the nature by consequence and secondarily." [32] She alone among all pure creatures thus occupies the very summit: *I dwelt in the highest places, and my throne is in the pillar of a cloud,* wherein is hidden the glory of God. She is herself, in a certain sense, this pillar of the cloud wherein the incarnate Wisdom is hidden.[33] Starting out from the summit of heaven, her course terminates upon the same summit.[34] She alone has compassed the circuit of heaven, of all mere creatures she alone is the Wisdom which has penetrated into the bottom of the deep.[35]

It would be impossible for a pure creature to be raised any higher. By the grace of her maternity, she exhausts, so to speak, the very possibility of a higher elevation.

> The plenitude of the Blessed Virgin deprives her of all emptiness. As long as a vessel can receive anything, it retains some emptiness. That is why every creature includes a certain emptiness, because it can also always receive a greater grace. But she alone is full of grace, because she could have no greater grace. She would have to be herself united to the divinity in order to conceive a grace greater than that according to which that is drawn from her which is united to her. Unless she was herself God, it is impossible to conceive a greater grace than that of being the mother of God.[36]

In order to be praised and glorified in Mary, God was not content to express Himself in her maternity alone in which Mary herself does not accomplish in the fullness of her being a complete return to the principle. "Thus, maternal parenthood,"

[32] St. Albert, *In III Senteniarum*, dist. 4, a. 5, ad 2, T. 28, p. 85b.
[33] Cornelius a Lapide, *In Ecclesiasticum*, c. XXIV, vers. 7, T. IX, p. 623.
[34] Ps. 28: 7.
[35] Ecclus. 24: 8.
[36] St. Albert, *Mariale*, q. 33, paragr. 4, T. 37, p. 73a.

says St. Augustine, " would have been of no advantage to Mary if she had not experienced more joy by bearing Christ in her heart than in her flesh." [37] She was full of grace even before her consent to maternity. The angel called her full of grace before the Holy Spirit had come upon her.

The Holy Spirit descended upon Mary in order that she might be the mother of God, and in order that she might thus attain to the hypostatic order since she was already full of grace. Because she belongs to the hypostatic order which of itself carries with it a higher form of sanctity, her maternal dignity demands sanctity by fittingness and connaturality. If by God's absolute power there had been maternity without sanctity, then the Holy Spirit would not have descended upon her after the manner of a mission in the absolute sense, because the Holy Spirit would not have dwelt in her, but would have descended upon her according to a mission in the relative sense.[38]

Fullness of grace thus becomes the root of her consent to maternity, of the most free and liberal act that a pure creature can accomplish, of the most radical human act, upon which all the works of God are made to depend. *For her thoughts are more vast than the sea, and her counsels more deep than the great ocean.*[39] Chosen in the beginning of all the works of divine Wisdom, the strength and sweetness of the power of premotion caused to spring up in her a vast determination wherein she is established and establishes herself as first principle. *There is none that can resist thy will, if thou determine to save Israel.*[40] Because she herself becomes a sapiential principle, it is fitting that in her quality as Wisdom she be indued with immutability. *And so was I established in Sion.*[41] " Confirmation in good was fitting for the Blessed Virgin," says St. Thomas, " because she was the mother of divine Wisdom, in which there is nothing defiled, as it is said in Chapter VII of the Book of Wisdom." [42] Just as our liberty is so much the

[37] St. Augustine, *De sancta Virginitate*, c. 3, T. IX, col. 398.
[38] John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Theol.*, T. IV, d. 17, a. 2, p. 465.
[39] Ecclus. 24: 39. [40] Esther 13: 9. [41] Ecclus. 24: 15.
[42] Wisd. 7: 25; St. Thomas, *B. D. de Veritate*, q. 24, a. 9, ad 2.

more our own as it is received universally both with regard to act and modality so the fact of being first principle, as with the Blessed Virgin, since it is entirely received according to this properly divine modality, is all the more truly her own. There is thus established, between the grace of maternity and her sanctification, a certain circular motion which it has pleased God to arouse within her. It is God, the origin of all things, Who gives her the power of giving herself as origin of God. "Behold all things are subject to the command of God, even the Virgin, behold all things are subject to the command of the Virgin, even God." [43] By her free consent to the maternity which properly comes from her nature, God gives the Blessed Virgin the means to raise herself further to the dignity of her maternity which both fittingly (*congrue*) and connaturally demands sanctity.

In this exhaustive superabundance of grace and glory expressed in her, the Blessed Virgin accomplishes the return to the principle under the very aspect of principle of all grace and all glory. To her in her quality of Wisdom it has been confided to place in the elect the principle of their conversion to God, to place in them the divine roots. *Then the creator of all things commanded me and said to me: and he that made me, rested in my tabernacle, and he said to me: Let thy dwelling be in Jacob, and thy inheritance in Israel, and take root in my elect.*[44] In this Wisdom dwells *all the grace of the way and of the truth,* in her *all hope of life, and of virtue.*[45]

A House built by Wisdom—"Mary is the sanctuary and the place of repose of the Holy Trinity, where God is present more magnificently and divinely than in any place in the universe, not excepting his dwelling above the Cherubim and Seraphim." [46] This indwelling is so full and so complete that as Wisdom the Blessed Virgin is the *brightness of eternal light,*

[43] Grignon de Montfort, *La vraie dévotion à la Sainte Vierge,* édit. canadienne, 1940, p. 61.

[44] Ecclus. 24: 12-13.

[45] Ecclus. 24: 25.

[46] Grignon de Montfort, *op. cit.,* n. 5, p. 3.

and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of his goodness.[47] This image is so perfect that it in turn fulfills the function of root and exemplar for all creatures. This image was the sapiential exemplar that God followed in the composition of all things: *I was with him forming all things.*[48] By this she is united to the consubstantial image of the Father, to the incarnate Wisdom, to the Word by which all things were made, and without Whom was made nothing that was made. Being the image of Goodness, she imitates the original in universal diffusion of goodness, and she gives to things their first impetus and motion: as spouse of the Holy Spirit who is compared to the waters and who *moves over the waters*[49] herself a spirit of Wisdom, she too can say: *I, wisdom, have poured out rivers. I, like a brook out of a river of a mighty water; I, like a channel of a river and like an aqueduct, came out of paradise.*[50] Her diffusion is so universal that she reaches God and imitates the manner in which God himself is found in every diffusion of His goodness: *And behold my brook became a great river, and my river came near to the sea.*[51] An unspotted mirror of the majesty of God, this created Wisdom resembles a formal sign in the effusion of her graces: no limitation is imposed upon her mediation. That is why she is called *subtilis. She reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity. She is a vapor of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the glory of the almighty God and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her.*[52] This same tabernacle of the Holy Trinity, this dwelling built by Wisdom, this holy city, this new Jerusalem, this new heaven which renews the earth, becomes the tabernacle of God with men.[53]

Order is implied in wisdom. Wisdom is at once one and manifold, steadfast and mobile.[54] Wisdom may be predicated of the principle of the sapiential order insofar as this principle

[47] Wisd. 7: 26.
[48] Prov. 8: 30.
[49] Gen. 1: 2.
[50] Ecclus. 24: 40, 41.
[51] Ecclus. 24: 43.
[52] Wisd. 7: 22-25.
[53] Apoc. 21: 2, 3.
[54] Sap. Wisd. 7: 22-23.

is the root of and pre-contains the order of which it is the principle. Together with her Son at the very origin of the universe, she is in a way the root of the universal order: *I am the root.* That which God principally desires in the universe is the good of order. This order is better in proportion as its principle which is interior to the universe is the more profoundly rooted in God. But Mary is the purely created principle of this order, the purely created principle which is the nearest to God and the most perfect that can be conceived. As a principle of the sapiential order, she participates in the unity and the unicity of this principle, she is at once an *emanation* and an *indwelling*,[55] her power extends to all things which hold from her their constant renewal. We conceive vital emanation as a constant renewal, and in their relation to the first principle things receive being in an ever new procession. Whatever being they might have of themselves would be nothingness. *One is my dove, my perfect one.—And being but one, she can do all things, and remaining in herself the same, she reneweth all things.*[56] Daughter of the eternal Father, mother of the Son, spouse of the Holy Spirit, she is rooted in the order of the Trinity, and she links up the order of the universe in a radically new way to the order which is in God according to the processions. *Thy neck is as a tower of ivory.*[57]

As the principle whence comes the good of the universe, as *Regina et Domina* of all things, she is a good separated from the universal order, a good which is properly universal, a good which in its indivisible and superabundant unity is the good of all things. This good is better than the good which exists as a form in the order of the parts of the universe, it is anterior to it and is its principle, as the leader who is the principle of the order in an army. Her good does not even imply a material dependency upon the things which are ordained or upon their order-form. Being wisdom, *all her glory is from within.*[58] Because she carries with her the notion of the properly universal common good, because she is for us the principle of every

[55] Wisd. 7: 25-27.
[56] Cant. 6: 8 and Wisd. 7: 27.
[57] Cant. 7: 4.
[58] Ps. 44: 14.

spiritual good, it is not enough to love the Blessed Virgin as one loves oneself, nor to love her as much as oneself. Just as it is necessary to love Christ more than oneself, so too it is necessary to love the Blessed Virgin more than oneself.

> Each loves himself after God, more than his neighbor. One must love others as oneself, hence one's own self is so to speak the primary exemplar of those one must love; oneself as participating in the divine glory and others as associated in this participation. I except however, the Lord Christ, even as man, and the Blessed Virgin the mother, because they take on the character for us of a principle diffusive of grace and blessedness. Christ as man is the head (*caput*) of glory, and the Blessed Virgin is the mother of this head, and she is the neck through which grace descends from this head down to us, and for this reason we should love them more than ourselves.[59]

When from another point of view, we consider the Blessed Virgin as interior to the universe, we can compare her to the intrinsic good of the universe, a good which consists in the form which is none other than the order of its parts. This form is comparable to the visage and the face. In this form consists the highest dignity of pure creation, that is to say, that which by God's will is the most desired for itself and most perfectly ordered to Him. Considered as a separate good of the universe, the Blessed Virgin is more worthy than the order of the universe whose transcendental principle she is. On the other hand, when we consider her as interior to the universe as a part, the dignity of the universe is greater than that of the Blessed Virgin considered, not absolutely, but formally insofar as she is a part, a consideration which in her case is secondary.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that even under this aspect she remains the intrinsic root of the dignity inherent in the universe as a form and at the same time she has the greater share in this dignity. The dignity of the whole depends materially upon the dignity of its parts and upon the relation that these parts constitute with one another. But the excellence of the inferior parts is contained in a more eminent way in the

[59] John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Theol.*, T. VII, q. 23, p. 403.

superior parts than in the inferior parts themselves. The superior parts are to the inferior parts as a form: the splendor that the inferior parts derive from the subordination to the superior is greater than that which they themselves have of themselves absolutely. This derivated splendor is foremost in the ordination of the parts to the whole. Considered from the aspect of the parts, the excellence of the principal part is of the nature of a form for all the subordinated parts. Consequently the Blessed Virgin is, as a part, the form and the purely created principal cause of the dignity which ordains them most proximately and most perfectly to the dignity of the whole. As the prior and principal part, she draws all the other parts after her towards the dignity of the whole. *Draw me, we will run after thee.*[60]

Among all the purely created parts of the universe, she participates in a greater degree in the order of the universe, and she is invested in a greater way with its splendor and variety. Her splendor is that most comparable to that of the whole—*decora sicut Jerusalem,*[61] she is surrounded with the variety of all the other parts.[62] She is that purely created part of the universe thanks to which it can be indued with a great dignity. *A spring rose out of the earth, watering all the surface* (*the face*) *of the earth.*[63] " Face of the earth, that is to say, dignity of the earth," St. Augustine comments, " is a name very rightly (*rectissime*) applied to the Virgin Mary, Mother of God, she whom the Holy Spirit, who is called in the Gospel by the name of fountain and water, waters so that out of the clay there might be formed the man who is placed in the paradise to dress and keep it, that is, in the will of the Father, in order to accomplish it and keep it." [64]

If she is already so beautiful and so worthy of praise as a part of the universe *besides that which is hid within,*[65] how much more so she is as a separate principle and good. Under

[60] Cant. 1: 3.
[61] Cant. 6: 3.
[62] Ps. 44: 10.
[63] Gen. 2: 6.
[64] St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manicheos,* Lib. II, c. 24, T. III, col. 216.
[65] Cant. 4: 1, 3.

this latter aspect she is absolutely anterior to her character as part and a principle in relation to this character as a part. Her position as a part is ordained to her position as a separate principle. She is born within to be a separated principle, she is born in the universe to become the mother of all things. That which is without proceeds from that which is within, and that which is within proceeds thence in order to proceed without. As separate principle she is more within the universe than when considered within as a part. There is thus established a circular motion between her dignity as a separated principle and her dignity as the noblest part of pure creation, a circular motion which embraces the very order of the parts of the universe. The order and dignity inherent in the universe are thus all the more intimately linked to the separated principle insofar as this principle is at the same time the principal intrinsic part of the universe. This circular motion imitates in a way the circular motion between the incarnate Wisdom and the mother of this Wisdom, which in turn imitates more deeply still the circular motion between the Father and the perfect and consubstantial image of the Father: *as it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel.*[66]

The fact that her Son infinitely surpasses her in privileges and dignity manifests again the sovereign dignity of the mother. It is her Son, *the fruit of her womb,*[67] the word whom she has drawn from her heart, who surpasses her infinitely.

We grant that her Son surpasses her in all privileges: but this, far from diminishing the praise of the mother, exalts it in that she has not only engendered a Son equal to her, but a Son infinitely better than herself. Under this aspect the goodness of the mother is rendered, in a sense, infinite. Each tree is known by its fruit: hence, if the goodness of the fruit makes the tree good, the infinite goodness of the fruit manifests an infinite goodness in the tree.[68]

In his admirable commentary on the Sapiential Books, Cornelius a Lapide expresses in the most formal way the primary reason for this appellation of Wisdom from the point

[66] Ezech. 1: 27. [67] Lk. 1: 42. [68] St. Albert, *Mariale,* q. 197, p. 287b.

of view of the end, which is the cause of the causes. How can the Blessed Virgin be made to say the things which Wisdom says of itself: *I made that in the heavens there should rise light that never faileth—I have poured out rivers?* [69] To this

I answer, first, that in the mystical sense these words should be understood as follows: I made that in the heavens, that is, in the Churches, Christ should be born, He who is the sun of justice; I have made that in the Church there should rise the light of faith. Furthermore, the Virgin, comparable to a sea of graces, pours out her rivers upon the Church and the faithful. Secondly, according to the literal sense, one should read: I have been the cause for God to create the light, the heavens, the sea, the rivers and all the universe. The creation of God is ordained, as to its end, to the justification and glorification of the Saints, accomplished by Christ through the Blessed Virgin; for the order of nature was created and instituted for the order of grace. Thus, then, it is because the Blessed Virgin was the mother of Christ that she subsequently becomes the mediatrix of all the other graces instituted by Christ; whence for the same reason, she was the final cause of the creation of the universe. In effect, the end of the universe is Christ and his mother and the saints, that is to say, this universe was created for the Saints to enjoy grace and glory through the intermediary of Christ and the Blessed Virgin. That is why the final cause of the creation of the universe was the predestination of Christ, the Blessed Virgin and the Saints. Although, Christ and the Blessed Virgin are parts of the universe and consequently posterior to it in the order of material causality, nevertheless they are anterior to it in the order of final causality. There is thus a certain reciprocal dependency between the creation of the universe and the birth of Christ and the Blessed Virgin. God did not wish Christ and the Blessed Virgin to be born except in this world; nor did He wish that this universe exist without Christ and the Blessed Virgin, on the contrary, it was for them that He created it. He wished that the whole universe, no less than the order of grace, should be referred and ordained to Christ and the Blessed Virgin as to its complement and end, Christ and the Blessed Virgin are thus the final cause of the creation of the universe at the same time they are its formal, that is, exemplary cause, namely, the idea. In effect, the order of grace in which Christ with the Blessed Virgin, occupies the first place, is the idea and exemplar according to which

[69] Ecclus. 24: 6, 40.

God created and disposed the order of nature and of all the universe.[70]

If we are amazed at the supereminent *beauty* of this pure creature, of this purely created Wisdom, is she not called "Mother most admirable," that is Mother, principle, whose cause is unfathomable. Mary, the most astounding of all mere creatures, allows us, in a manner most proportioned to us, to surmise the incomprehensibility of Wisdom which precedes all things. *Who hath searched out the wisdom of God that goeth before all things?* (Ecclus I: 3). To what purely created work could she be compared? *There was no such work made in any kingdom.*[71] Is she not so astounding that, according to St. Bernard, even the princes of the celestial court are filled with astonishment: *Who is this that cometh up from the desert, leaning upon her beloved?* [72] *Who is she that cometh forth as the morning rising, fair as the moon, bright as the sun, terrible as an army set in array?* [73]

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[70] Cornelius a Lapide, *In Ecclesiasticum*, c. XXIV, vers. 1 ct. 2, T. IX, p. 618a.
[71] 3 Kings 10: 20.
[72] Cant. 8: 5.
[73] Cant. 6: 9.

A REPLY: THE DEMONSTRATION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

" She knoweth the subtilties of speeches, and the solutions of arguments." *Wisdom*, VIII, 8.

I HAVE written this refutation of Mr. Adler's essay on the *Demonstration of God's Existence* [1] for three reasons. First, to confirm those of the faithful who might well have been dismayed by the thought that the teaching of St. Thomas, who is eminent among the Doctors of the Church, was open to such radical criticism as Mr. Adler has directed to it, and this in a matter which is a necessary preamble to the very Faith itself. Secondly, to correct Mr. Adler and any others who might be obstructed in their quest of truth (which truth is the Living Truth Who is Christ) by errors of natural reason concerning the teaching of the Church, in so far as that teaching is accessible to the natural light of reason. Thirdly, I have been moved to write these pages out of a sense of filial gratitude and reverence for St. Thomas, as well as for the other holy Doctors of the Church, in the hope that what is written here might, in some small measure, dispel the erroneous, but widespread, notion that adherence to Catholic doctrine begets sterility of thought. Whatever there is of truth, I have received from that inexhaustible Spring: whatever there is of intellectual error, and pride of spirit, is my own.

For prudence, as it is subordinated to the Faith, determines the proper disposition to the truths which we have inherited from men notable as much for their sanctity as for their learning and intellectual powers. Just as we venerate not only the Blessed Trinity of Persons in One Divine Nature, but also Christ and His Blessed Mother, as well as their saints, so our

[1] Pp. 188-218 in both *The Maritain Volume of The Thomist*, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1943, and THE THOMIST, Vol. V (January, 1943).

reverence for truth, as it comes from God Himself, is participated in by our reverence for the teachings of the Doctors of the Church, and even of those outside the Visible Church whom tradition has established to be of sound doctrine. Experience, reason, and the admonitions of the Holy Ghost manifest that such reverence, far from being opposed to intellectual vitality, is the indispensable requirement for a truly healthy intellectual condition. It appears otherwise only in contrast with a ruthless pursuit of what is called reason, or when we have failed in the difficult task of perpetuating and therefore renovating tradition.

My only misgiving is in the conviction that what I have written is entirely unworthy to be associated with the teaching of St. Thomas. May he forgive me my presumption, for it was expedient that this work should be done.

Mr. Adler's article, excluding a short introduction and conclusion, is divided into two parts. In the first he intends to prove that God's existence cannot be demonstrated as He is a first cause in the order of becoming (*causa fiendi*). In the second he considers the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God as a cause of being (*causa essendi*). In the latter, although he admits the possibility in this line of causality as opposed to the order of becoming, he ends on a note of doubt principally because of difficulties concerning the premises of that demonstration (p. 209, III).

The first part is divided into three parts. In the first he argues against the possibility of demonstration by any temporal succession of causes, which he calls " series," and this indeterminately, i. e., not specified as causes per se or causes per accidens (p. 197, #2). In the second he argues against the possibility of demonstration through a temporal succession (" series ") of " essentially diverse causes," i. e., causes which are causes per se of a given effect (p. 198, #3). In the third part he argues against the possibility of demonstration through a simultaneous plurality, i. e., " set " as opposed to " series " of " essentially diverse causes."

For convenience of reference I have adopted the following

system: Since the article is divided into three parts which are numbered I, II, III, the first reference will be to the part of the article, designated by the roman numeral; the second will indicate the arabic numerals which Mr. Adler has used for the main divisions of his outline, e. g., II, #2, indicates the second main division in the second part of the article. This is followed by the page reference, so that the complete reference will be: II, #2, pp. 197, 198.

Mr. Adler—First Argument, II, #2, pp. 197, 198.

Any demonstration of God's existence through a "series," i. e., a temporal succession of causes, presupposes the non-eternity of the universe. But the latter cannot be known by natural reason. Therefore no demonstration of God's existence through such a "series" of causes is possible.

The major is proved as follows: Any demonstrations of God's existence requires a finite number of causes. But if the universe were eternal, the number of causes in temporal succession would be infinite. Therefore, etc. The minor is an admitted truth of the tradition.[2]

Refutation—

St. Thomas never attemps to demonstrate the existence of God through a temporal succession of causes. To the contrary, he says: "But it is manifest that when something moves because it is moved, the mover is moved simultaneously with this moveable; as when the hand by its motion moves a stick, the hand and the stick are moved simultaneously." [3]

Mr. Adler—Second Argument, II, #3, pp. 198, 199.

The existence of God cannot be demonstrated through any "series" of causes which is not finite in number. But a "series" of "essentially diverse causes" is not necessarily finite in num-

[2] *II Contra Gentiles*, cc. 31-38; *In XII Met.*, l. 5, #2497, 2498; *In VIII Phys.*, l. 13, #8, l. 2, #17; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 46, a. 2, corpus.

[3] *In VII Phys.*, l. 1. Cf. *in VII Phys.*, ll. 3 and 4, where it is demonstrated that mover and moved are simultaneous in every species of motion.

ber. Therefore the existence of God cannot be demonstrated from such a " series " of causes.

The major is evident from the nature of demonstration, and besides it is an accepted truth of the tradition. The minor is shown from examples: two sticks are used to move a stone; the two sticks are not " essentially diverse," i. e., different in kind, yet they are simultaneous and therefore finite in number. The man trains the dog to carry a burden, which the dog carries at a later time; these two causes, the man and the dog, are essentially diverse, and yet they are in temporal succession, and therefore could be infinite in number. Therefore " essentially diverse causes " are not necessarily finite in number.

Refutation—

1. St. Thomas does not demonstrate the existence of God through any temporal succession of causes.

2. A temporal succession (" series ") of causes per se of an effect (" essentially diverse causes ") is impossible. For, if causes per se of an effect could be, as the author asserts here, in a temporal relation, the existence of a first cause could be demonstrated through a temporal succession of causes, and the universe, contrary to Mr. Adler's repeated assertion, could be demonstrated to have had a beginning in time. For unless a " series " of " essentially diverse causes " (causes per se) has a first cause, none of the other causes will be a cause, and it is false to call them a *series* of causes, for none of them is a cause. " Thus, therefore, if the moving causes proceeded to infinity, there would be no first cause; but the first cause was the source of all (the causes): therefore it would follow that all the causes as a whole would be removed: for when the cause is taken away, those things of which it is the cause are removed." [4] There must, then, be a first cause of such a " series."

But if it is said that this first cause is outside the temporal order, but the number of such causes in the temporal order is infinite, thus again, there will be no first cause of the whole

[4] *In II Met.*, l. 3.

" series," and they will not be causes. For, since it is held that these causes are infinite, there will not be a cause among them which can itself be caused by a cause outside the temporal succession. For whichever one is acted upon by the extra-temporal cause must be a determinate cause, and therefore it will be separated from the ultimate effect by a finite number of steps. It will therefore be in fact the first cause in the temporal order, and the remaining " causes " after it will be causes in no way. Therefore it is necessary that a " series of essentially diverse causes " should have a *first* cause in the order of time. Now the absolutely first efficient cause per se in the temporal order could not be caused by anything else in the temporal order, since, in that case, it would not be absolutely first in that order. Either, then, it is itself uncaused, or it is caused by higher causes which are not in the temporal order, for it is absolutely first, it has no efficient cause, not only no efficient cause which is before it in time, but no efficient cause which is before it in any way.

But if it has no efficient cause in any way, it must have its being of itself, which is impossible; for the first cause per se in temporal order must be a body. Otherwise it would not be in time at all, except per accidens, as a soul is in time because it informs a body: but in this way it would not be a first cause per se in the order of time.

But it is impossible for one body to be the cause of itself: for this would require that it should be both mover and moved at the same time, and this in one respect, in respect of the thing caused. Therefore no efficient cause per se which is first in the order of time can be the cause of itself; consequently it must have its being from a cause which is outside the temporal order.

Now either all the things in the universe were produced in this way, i.e., the whole creature, and therefore the universe would have had a beginning in time, or they were not all produced in this way. If they were not, the other things in the universe would have no cause which was first in the temporal order. Therefore they could always have been. Let it be supposed, then, that they always were, for if they were not, again

the whole universe had a beginning in time. This body, then, which is a first cause in the order of time, could have been produced by the bodies which existed before it, since these always were. But the cause of both, i. e., the eternally existing bodies, and the body which was first in the order of time relative to the things produced by it, must be some intelligence, since both require a cause which is outside the material order. This was shown for a cause which would be first in the temporal order, and it is easily shown for eternally existing bodies, as follows: Such bodies or causes could not be caused by a first cause in the corporeal order, inasmuch as, by the hypothesis, there is no such first cause in the temporal order; otherwise they would not be eternal. Therefore they must have their first efficient cause outside the material order, and such a cause must be an intelligence, as is evident from the nature of intellect, i. e., that it is immaterial per se. But it would be vain to produce a body to be a first cause in the order of time when it could have been produced by bodies already existing. An intellect, however, does not act in vain. Therefore all bodies would have had a beginning in time, if one did. From this it is seen that the whole universe could be demonstrated to have had a beginning in time, if there could be an efficient cause per se which is first in the order of time. But Mr. Adler holds that it is impossible to demonstrate this. Therefore, neither could there be a single cause per se which is first in the order of time.

3. In this argument Mr. Adler attempts to prove that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated through a " series," i. e., a temporal succession of " *essentially diverse causes.*" But the first argument, according to his intention, eliminated the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God through *any* temporal succession of causes, i. e., " series." Therefore it is a violation of the method of demonstration to prove this again for a " series " of " essentially diverse causes." For this is like demonstrating first that triangle as triangle has angles equal to two right angles, and then demonstrating it for isosceles; and such demonstration is defective since the end of demonstration is to know the cause; but the cause is in what is com-

mensurately universal with the effect, e. g., triangle and angles equal to two right angles, not isosceles and equal to two right angles, " series " of causes and the impossibility of demonstrating God's existence, not " series " of " essentially diverse causes " and that impossibility.

If it is argued that this objection is valid only in the demonstrative order, whereas in the dialectical order there may be many arguments proving the same conclusion, and that Mr. Adler's arguments are dialetical; we admit the major, but deny the minor. For St. Thomas's arguments are intended to be demonstrations. This is manifest from the fact that the first three ways end with the assertion of the consequent necessity of positing God to be, as well as from the following: " Since nature operates for a determinate end from the direction of a superior agent, it is *necessary* that those things which are done by nature should be reduced to God as to a first cause." [5] Now the conclusion may not be stated to be necessary unless the argument is demonstrative. The demonstrative intention is, besides, apparent in the last book of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*, and in many other places. But it would be again a defect in method to overthrow demonstrative arguments by dialetical ones. Further, Mr. Adler states his demonstrative intention in this article: " The analysis to follow does, I think, determine the answer which must be given " (I, p. 193). And again: " Our analysis so far has eliminated two possibilities of demonstrating the existence of God as a cause required for effects known to exist " (II, #5, p. 200).

But it may be argued that St. Thomas's proofs are merely dialectical, inasmuch as he proves the same thing in five ways. Thus the present author says: " If there can be *only one* logically adequate demonstration of any proposition that is established with certitude—which seems to be St. Thomas's opinion on the matter—then we must ask whether the five arguments stated by St. Thomas are five *ways* of stating the same argument, or whether one of these is the valid proof and the others not, or whether none of these *as written* is strictly a demon-

[5] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2, italics mine.

stration but only an indication of where a demonstration might lie" (I, p. 193).

To this we answer that the five proofs of St. Thomas are not five proofs of the same conclusion formally, but only materially. For the first proof demonstrates the necessity of a first mover, the second demonstrates the necessity of a first efficient cause, the third demonstrates the necessity of a necessary being, the fourth demonstrates the necessity of a perfect being, the fifth demonstrates the necessity of a ruler of the universe. It happens that God is each of these, or, in the proofs, that we understand God by each of these terms which stand in the place of the definition. In this respect the demonstrations are imperfect, i.e., as not proceeding from the formal definition, and, for this same reason, more than one demonstration is possible, according to the number of things that stand in place of the definition and can be known from known effects. But this in no way affects the necessity of the conclusion *that* God exists, since it is known with necessity that *only* God could be a prime mover, first efficient cause, etc. Thus the imperfection in this mode of demonstration does not reduce it to dialectical proof.

And this explains the passage from St. Thomas which the present author adduces: "In speculative things the medium of demonstration which perfectly demonstrates the conclusion, is one only." [6] For the demonstration of God's existence is not perfect demonstration. But it in no way follows that a proof which is not a perfect demonstration is only dialectical, as we have explained. St. Thomas, it is true, opposes perfect demonstration to probable proof in the cited passage adduced by Mr. Adler. But he adds: "And similarly in operative things, when that which is for an end adequates, if I may use the expression, the end, there is only required one medium of demonstration. *But the creature is not so related to the end which is God*; whence it was necessary for creatures to be multiplied" (*loc. cit.*, italics mine). From this it is seen how the multiplicity of the creature founds the possibility of more than one demon-

[6] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 47, a. 1, ad 3.

stration of God's existence, and at the same time how each demonstration is imperfect without affecting the necessity of the conclusion.

4. "Essentially diverse causes," i. e., causes which are in a per se line of causality with respect to a given effect, contrary to the assumption of Mr. Adler's second argument, *must* be simultaneous, and for that reason, and this precisely as causes and causing. The cause per se of an effect is that which produces the effect in virtue of its proper nature, and not in virtue of something which it has received and which it may or may not have, its nature remaining the same. "The cause of the statue per accidens is indeed Polycletus, but per se the cause of the statue is making the statue (*faciens statuam*): for Polycletus is the cause of the statue in so far as it happens to him (*accidit ei*) to be making the statue."[7] For it is making the statue which of itself produces the statue, not Polycletus as that in virtue of which the statue is made, but only as a subject. Likewise the stick which is moving is the cause per accidens of the motion of the stone when it is moved by the stick, because it is the motion of the stick which moves the stone. But this is only because the stick *happens* to be moved. For just as making the statue is the cause per se of the statue being made, so motion is the cause per se of a thing being moved. But motion does not subsist in itself; therefore, as a subsisting agent, that is a cause per se which has the act by which it causes in virtue of its own nature, as e. g., the hand moves of itself as a living thing, not in virtue of being moved by something outside itself, and therefore the motion of the hand is a cause per se of the motion of the stick. But the virtue which the hand has of moving itself, granted it has this in virtue of its nature, is something which it received from a higher principle, i. e., the soul. Therefore the soul is a cause per se of the motion of the stick by the hand. Again the virtue of the soul to move the body is something it has by its proper nature; nevertheless it does not have this of itself as from an ultimate principle, for it does not have its being of itself.

[7] *In II Phys.*, l. 6, n. 4.

Further, that is a cause of a thing's being which acts as an agent; and since what comes to be receives its act from the agent, it must be moved simultaneously with the agent, and this is necessary whether the mover causes the motion per se or per accidens, as the motion of the hand is the cause per se of the motion of the stick, and is moved simultaneously with the stick; or if the stick moves a stone, the stick is a cause per accidens of the motion of the stone, yet it too is moved simultaneously with the stone. For this reason, i. e., that action and passion are simultaneous, it is impossible that causes in temporal succession should be causes of one effect. For example, if water is first heated, it is used later to heat a bed, then again later the bed is used to heat a body. But the temporal succession is brought about by the duration of the effect which subsequently acts as a cause in another motion.

Now although it is not necessary for causes per accidens to be in temporal succession, inasmuch as all the causes of a single motion must be simultaneous, as we have explained, nevertheless this is necessary, that causes which are in temporal succession should be causes per accidens, which can be seen in the following way: By temporal succession, that which first receives the heat now heats. Evidently, therefore, it does not heat per se, that is, in virtue of itself, but in virtue of what it has received. But this is, by definition, what it is to be a cause per accidens. Therefore, it is impossible for causes per se, what Mr. Adler calls "essentially diverse causes," to be in temporal succession, upon which assumption the whole of his present argument is founded. For if it is impossible for causes per se to be in temporal succession, it is futile to attempt to prove that the existence of God could not be demonstrated from such a succession of causes. For such a succession of causes could not exist.

Hence it is entirely irrelevant to the demonstration of God's existence whether the universe be eternal or not. For, on the former hypothesis, the infinite succession of causes would be causes per accidens, as it has been explained; but *at any moment* the causes per se of any change would be necessarily

finite, and this, not because they are simultaneous, as Mr. Adler asserts, but for the following reason: Whatever the causes may be of a single effect, whether per se or per accidens, e. g., the movement of a stone by several sticks, the first of which is moved by a hand, the causes per accidens must themselves be caused by a cause per se, and this is necessary from the nature of cause per accidens. For a cause per accidens causes the effect not in virtue of itself but in virtue of something which it has received. The motion of the hand, in turn, must be caused by another cause per se. But there must be a first cause in this order: otherwise the effect would have no cause, since the intermediary causes are only causes in so far as they are caused. Consequently, the number of causes must be finite, not because they are simultaneous, and not even because they are all causes per se, but because they are reducible to causes which are causes per se and therefore necessary to the effect by definition. But the number of accidental causes in a single motion cannot be infinite since they must receive their effect from a cause per se; but if the causes per accidens were infinite in number, there would be no first one to receive its act from the proximate per se cause, and consequently the so-called causes per accidens would not be causes at all.

The principle of simultaneity of causes, therefore, is the singleness of the motion or effect, which causes are ultimately reduced to causes per se of that effect, which must be finite in number as necessary to that effect and to the intermediary causes, since a first is essential to the causality of the intermediary causes. Corresponding to this, an infinite number of causes has its principle in this, that there must be a succession of motions or effects, since the infinite number of causes requires a temporal succession of causes (on the assumption that an actual infinite cannot exist which is only absolutely certain for the corporeal order). A succession of effects is necessary because the causes of a single motion must be simultaneous. But to be in temporal succession, the causes must be causes per accidens, as has been shown. Thus, as the principle of a finite number of causes is, ultimately, causality per se, the

principle of an infinite number of causes, i. e., the principle of its possibility, is causality per accidens. "But in causes *which do not act simultaneously*, this (infinitude of causes) is not impossible, following those who posit perpetual generation. But this infinitude *befalls* (*accidit*) causes: for it is accidental to the father of Sortes that he is or is not himself the son of someone else. But it is not accidental to the stick, in so far as it moves the stone, that it is moved by the hand: for it moves in so far as it is moved." [8]

The true doctrine in this matter, as well as the indubitability of St. Thomas's teaching, is manifest in the following passage:

It is impossible in efficient causes per se to proceed to an infinite: as if, for example, the causes which are per se required for some effect should be multiplied in infinitum; as if the stone should be moved by the stick, the stick by the hand, and so on in infinitum. But it is not reputed impossible to proceed in infinitum in agent causes per accidens; as if, for example, all the causes which would be multiplied in infinitum would only have the order of one cause, but their multiplication would be per accidens; as the artisan operates with many hammers per accidens, because one is broken after the other. Therefore it happens to this hammer that it acts after the action of another hammer. And similarly it happens to this man insofar as he generates, that he should have been generated by another man. For he generates insofar as he is man (inquantum homo) and not insofar as he is the son of another man. For all men generating have one grade in efficient causes; namely the grade of particular generator. Whence it is not impossible that man should be generated by man in infinitum. But it would be im-

[8] *II Con. Gent.*, c. 38, ad 5, italics mine. In respect of the motion of the stone, i. e., of the effect, the motion of the stick is not accidental, but in respect of the nature of the stick, it is accidental, for the motion *befalls* the stick. Cf. the above. On the part of the effect, that is a cause *per se* without which the effect would not be produced, as the stone would not be moved unless the stick, as it was moved, moved it. But on the part of the cause, that is a cause *per se*, in virtue of whose nature the effect proceeds, and in this sense the stick is not a cause *per se*. Again, the cause *per se*, as it is a created cause, must be reduced from potency to act by a higher cause, either in the order of nature, or operation, and this is the *ratio* for demonstration through motion, and through efficient cause respectively, consequently the term, cause *per se*, must be understood analogically: for all the causes *per se*, except the first cause, cause in virtue of an act received.

possible if the generation of this man depended on this man, and on the elementary body, and on the sun, and so on in infinitum.[9]

5. The act of training the dog is not a cause per se of the subsequent carrying the burden; but the habit of being trained is a cause per se of this operation; as the generation of the father is not a cause per se of the generation of the son, but man is the cause of the generation of the son, since to be a man is per se required to generate a son, as having a habit is per se required to perform an operation proceeding from such a habit. Two things cause per se: being in act; and the cause of what acts being in act, in the respect in which it acts, when it acts. But what caused the coming to be of the thing which acts, causes per accidens. Unless the same thing is at once the cause of a thing's being in act and having come to be, e. g., the sun is the cause both of the generation of a man and his act of generating another. But the act of training the dog is per se the cause of the dog's being trained, since it is per se required for someone to be training the dog when it is being trained. And these are simultaneous. Likewise in every motion, for motion is one with action and passion, and action and passion must be simultaneous. In the order of particular causes, it is true, *this* dog is able to carry the burden in virtue of having been trained previously, just as *this* man is able to generate in virtue of having been generated himself. But to be trained does not per se require to have come to be trained, just as to be a man does not per se require to have come to be a man. Thus it is evident that the cause per se, and the effect, must be simultaneous. Therefore it is impossible, as Mr. Adler supposes, for there to be a " series," i. e., a temporal succession of causes per se of one effect, " essentially diverse causes."

Hence Mr. Adler's example supporting the minor does not exemplify; for the cause as causing, i. e., the man training the dog, is *simultaneous* with its effect; i. e., the dog being trained.

Mr. Adler—Third Argument, II, #6, b, pp. 201, 202.

The existence of God cannot be demonstrated by a set of

[9] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 46, a. 2, ad 7.

causes which are the cause of an effect which is not proper to a single ultimate cause. But " a set of essentially diverse causes " (causes which are simultaneous and in a per se line of causality with respect to a given effect) is constituted of causes of an effect (becoming) which is not proper to a single ultimate cause. Therefore the existence of God cannot be demonstrated by " a set of essentially diverse causes."

The major is known from the nature of demonstration *a posteriori*. The minor is proved as follows: Becoming is the effect of physical causes (instrumental) and, hypothetically, of God (principal cause), each of which is a total cause of the effect according to St. Thomas.[10] Therefore there is not one ultimate cause, but two, at least in possibility, the ultimate instrumental cause, and the principal cause which would be God.

Refutation—

As is evident, the only difficulty can be with the minor of this argument which, in Mr. Adler's statement, rests chiefly on the authority of St. Thomas, who ascribes the totality of the cause both to the instrumental and to the principal cause. Arguing dialectically first, then, since the adduced proof is from authority, it should be said that if this were indeed St. Thomas's teaching, he would have had to be either stupid or maliciously dishonest, inasmuch as he would have failed either intellectually in respect of an elementary inference, that God's existence could not be demonstrated from physical effects, or, seeing this, he would have adduced sophistic reasoning to save a truth of the Faith. Now since neither of these conclusions is tenable, it follows that Mr. Adler's interpretation is not according to the authority of St. Thomas.

But indeed neither the fact nor the teaching of St. Thomas accords with Mr. Adler's interpretation. For the instrumental cause and the principal cause are not independent lines of causality, as St. Thomas manifests in many places, but the instrumental is subordinated to the principal cause, as the term,

[10] *III Con. Gent.*, c. 70.

instrument, is intended to show. The instrumental cause is a total cause in the sense that from it, proximately, the whole effect proceeds, as the movement of the pencil may be said to be the total cause of the writing which is produced by that movement. But the pencil, since it is only an instrument, must itself be moved:

> For in any agent there are two things to consider, namely, the thing itself which acts, and the virtue by which it acts: as fire heats through heat. But the virtue of an inferior agent depends on the virtue of the superior agent, in so far as the superior agent gives this virtue to the inferior agent through which it acts; or conserves it, or even applies it to action, as the artisan applies the instrument to its proper effect; to which he does not give the form through which the instrument acts, nor does he conserve it, but only gives it motion. It is necessary, therefore, that the action of an inferior agent should be not only from it through its proper virtue, but through the virtue of all the superior agents: for it acts in virtue of all of them. And just as the lowest agent is found to be active without any intermediary, so the virtue of the first agent is found to be without any intermediary with respect to producing the effect: for the virtue of the lowest agent does not have the virtue to produce this effect of itself, but from the virtue of the proximate superior; and thus the virtue of that (superior) has it from the virtue of (its) superior; and thus the virtue of the supreme agent is found to be productive of the effect of itself, as if immediate; as appears in the principles of demonstration, of which the first is immediate. Therefore, just as there is no difficulty in this, that one action should be produced (both) by some agent and its virtue, so there is no difficulty in this, that the same effect is produced by the inferior agent and by God: by both immediately, although by each in a different way.[11]

The author's difficulty here is twofold: in the first place he fails to understand the analogy of causality, through which causes are not ultimate until we arrive at what is first without qualification; secondly, through a rationalistic proclivity to ontologize every distinction, he fails to see how a thing can be formally many (according to the relations which things have to it) and in itself one, as there is no contradiction in this, that

[11] *III Con. Gent.*, c. 70.

God is the first *causa movens* and *causa efficiens* in the order of becoming, as well as the first cause in the order of being (*causa essendi*). In this, as in other places, he applies too readily the law of excluded middle.

Mr. Adler—Fourth Argument, II, #9, pp. 206-209, and III, pp. 209-216.

This argument is divided into three parts. In the first Mr. Adler intends to show that there is a single remaining possible way to demonstrate God's existence (II, #9), having eliminated, in his view, the traditional ways; in the second he states what he thinks is the only possible demonstration (III, pp. 209, 210). In the third part he raises difficulties and doubts concerning this proposed demonstration (III, pp. 210-216). For the sake of clarity we shall follow each of these parts with its refutation.

Mr. Adler—Fourth Argument, first part, II, #9.

The existence of God can be demonstrated from a known effect which is the proper effect of God. But preservation in being is a known effect which is the proper effect of God. Therefore, etc.

The major is evident. The minor is established by the authority of St. Thomas.

Refutation—

The whole difficulty, evidently, lies in the minor of the argument. The refutations, consequently, are all directed to this premise.

1. No demonstration should rest formally on a premise accepted from authority; and Mr. Adler neither demonstrates the necessity of the proposition that preservation in being is the proper effect of God, nor does he manifest or even assert that it is self-evident.

2. The authority of St. Thomas can have little weight with Mr. Adler inasmuch as he has dismissed all the ways by which that authority claims to have demonstrated the existence of

God, as well as many of his conclusions in other matters, e. g., in politics, in law, in logic; so that the dialectical weight of his authority must be negligible for the present author. In fact, in the very act of determining the basic teaching of St. Thomas, Mr. Adler accuses him of contradicting himself: " The contradiction could be easily resolved, were it *merely* apparent and due to verbal ambiguity " (II, #9, c, p. 207). Yet he goes on to say: " Since the contradiction is not apparent, but real, we must resolve it by making a choice between conflicting texts." Now this procedure is altogether unintelligible; for, if St. Thomas is so untrustworthy as he appears to be to Mr. Adler, how could a demonstration be founded on what is at best a probable determination of his more fundamental teaching?

3. There is no authority whatsoever in St. Thomas for the proposition that God is the *unique* cause of conservation of being. The one citation which Mr. Adler gives for this opinion (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 65, a. 9, ad 1) is, unfortunately, incorrect; there are only four articles in question 65 of the first part.

Now the teaching of St. Thomas is manifest in the other passages cited by Mr. Adler. Thus, St. Thomas says that what is proper to God in relation to the creature is not to sustain in being but to be the cause of being absolutely, i. e., universally: " But that which is properly the effect of God creating, is that which is presupposed relative to all the other (causes), namely, being absolutely. Whence nothing else can operate dispositively and instrumentally to this effect; since creation is not from something presupposed which could be disposed through the action of the instrumental agent. Thus, therefore, it is impossible that it should convene to some creature to create; neither by its proper virtue, nor instrumentally or by ministering." [12]

In this it is seen that, in St. Thomas's doctrine, it is proper to God to cause being in its universality. And this may be seen again: " For being itself is the most common (*communissimus*)

[12] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 45, a. 5, corpus.

first effect and more intimate than all the other effects; and therefore it belongs to God alone according to the proper virtue of such an effect." [13] But lest it be thought that conservation could also be the proper effect of God, it should be said that conservation is the proper effect of God not as such, but as it is the continuation of creation: " It should be said that the conservation of things by God is not by any new action, but by the continuation of the action which gives being; which action indeed is without motion and without time." [14] But if it is argued that this is the only conservation of being in St. Thomas's teaching, we may adduce this passage from many to show that he taught that there are secondary causes of the preservation of being:

> And therefore, principally indeed, the first cause is conservative of the effect; but secondarily all the mediate causes; and in proportion more so as a cause is higher and more proximate to the first cause. Whence the conservation and preservation of things is attributed to the superior causes also concerning corporeal things.[15]

It is clear, therefore, that, in the teaching of St. Thomas, the conservation of things is proper to God only in respect of the conservation of immaterial things. But immaterial things, *qua* immaterial, are not contingent but necessary, i. e., considered naturally they cannot not be. Therefore, in order to know that they are sustained in being, we should have to know that they could not sustain themselves in being, i. e., the mere fact that such things exist does not imply that God exists; but when God is known to exist, it becomes manifest that even such beings depend on God for their existence. Consequently, although in fact the existence of such things is preserved by God, we do not know this from the knowledge that such things exist, but only when we understand that the existence of such beings is received, through the analogy of potency and act in the order of efficient cause, which is in fact St. Thomas's second way of demonstrating the existence of God. For, as the above cita-

[13] *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 7, corpus.
[14] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 104, a. 1, ad 4.
[15] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 104, a. 2, corpus.

tion[16] makes clear, there is no distinction on the part of God between the efficient cause of a thing in the order of production and in the order of conservation, and this not even by a distinction of reason *cum fundamento in re* with respect to the production of immaterial things, since these are necessarily created, not generated.

Mr. Adler, consequently, cannot intend by the "unique effect" the existence of immaterial things, for, as such, his proposed demonstration would be at best nothing more than an almost unintelligible version of St. Thomas's second way; whereas he has dismissed that way as untenable. Further this is clear from the minor of the final demonstration he proposes: "Minor: Corporeal substances do exist." From this it is evident that the unique effect of God is not, in his intention, the preservation of the being of incorporeal substances, but of corporeal substances. And it is precisely this effect, the preservation of corporeal substances, which is not the unique effect of God in St. Thomas's teaching.

The root of Mr. Adler's difficulty with St. Thomas in this question, and the reason why St. Thomas, in his view, appears to contradict in one place what he says in another, may now be manifested. For Mr. Adler, evidently, has again applied the law of excluded middle in an uncritical fashion. Indeed, if we start with this disjunction: either God is the unique cause of conservation, or the creature, as well as God, conserves the being of things, what Mr. Adler has concluded would follow. For at one time St. Thomas is explaining the dependence of all things for their being on God, i. e., as God is the principal and universal cause of the being of things inasmuch as His nature is to be and His alone; at another time he is explaining how lower causes cooperate in the conservation of corporeal things, when those causes are universal with respect to the effects, and therefore equivocal causes:

> But sometimes the effect is not apt to receive the impression of the agent according to the same ratio which it has in the agent, as

[16] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 104, a. 1, ad 4.

appears in all agents which do not produce something similar according to species; as the celestial bodies are the cause of the generation of inferior bodies dissimilar according to species: and such an agent can be the cause of the form according to the ratio of such a form, and not only according as it is acquired in this matter; *and therefore it is the cause not only of the becoming (fiendi), but of the being (essendi).*[17]

Relative to the absolute disjunction postulated, this would appear to contradict the statement that God is the universal cause of the conservation of being. But when the proper qualifications are made, i. e., that God is the unique cause of conservation as the universal and principal cause, but the creature is also a cause of conservation in so far as it too is universal in respect of a more particular effect, the contradiction is seen to be only apparent. But to resolve this contradiction the causes must be seen analogically, according as causes in their universality approach the universality of God's causality, and not univocally as Mr. Adler has regarded them.

From this we may see, too, why a demonstration of God's existence as the cause of being seemed feasible to Mr. Adler where the other demonstrations seemed to fail of their end. For it seemed as if only in the order of being was God a unique cause: this intention is evident from the following where he is preparing the way for "the one possible demonstration":

> Furthermore, in creation there are no intermediary causes, no secondary principal and no instrumental causes. Hence, to say that being is the *proper* effect of God means that God is the *unique and exclusive* cause of being, as He is the sole creative cause. If these things be so, then it should be possible to prove God's existence as the cause of the being of whatever needs to have its being caused, for here we are dealing with an effect which can have only one cause. Hence we should not be involved in all the problems about finite and infinite series, primary and secondary, principal and instrumental causes, which arise whenever a plurality of causes is possible (II, #7, c, d).

But, both in the order of becoming and in the order of being, God is not a unique cause, in the sense that He is the only cause,

[17] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 104, a. 1, corpus, italics mine.

cause being taken indeterminately as something common. Rather His uniqueness is as a principal cause, i. e., as a first cause; and this problem, i. e., the problem of analogy, is no more obviated in the order of being than it is in the order of becoming. The principal cause of Mr. Adler's error, then, is his insistence on a univocally distinct causality on the part of God, e. g., a sense in which God is a cause as man is risible, whereas in fact, because the creature participates in and imitates the Divine causality, no such distinction can be found: the causality of God is necessarily analogically common with the causality of the creature. But causality is proper to God as it is absolutely principal and most universal. Indeed, Mr. Adler's procedure presupposes this theological impossibility, that God should create a creature that should not imitate its Creator.

In the second part of this argument Mr. Adler presents what he considers the only possible demonstration of God's existence. It is evident from what has been said in the refutation of the first part of his argument why the existence of God cannot be demonstrated in the way he intends, namely, because God is not a unique cause in the order of being, as this demonstration presupposes. Further, inasmuch as he himself finds this demonstration dubious, it is difficult to conceive in what a refutation of it would consist. Proceeding formally, we shall assume a positive intention, i. e., that Mr. Adler's intention is that what he presents as a demonstration is *probably* a demonstration. But probability is opposed to impossibility. Therefore the refutation will consist in showing that it is *impossible* to demonstrate the existence of God in the way Mr. Adler proposes. From this it will follow that, contrary to the declaration of faith in the demonstrability of God's existence, it cannot be demonstrated in any of the ways indicated by Mr. Adler; and since these are exhaustive of all possible ways, in his view, the existence of God is altogether indemonstrable according to his position.

As we have said, this has been shown already; for the whole demonstration depends, as the author admits, on the proposition that God is the unique cause of the preservation of being

in things, and this has been shown to be false, both according to St. Thomas's teaching and demonstratively. But for the sake of completeness we shall adduce the supposed demonstration, refuting it, as we said, by manifesting further its impossibility.

Mr. Adler—Fourth Argument, second part, III, pp. 209, 210.

Mr. Adler states this argument in two ways. The first way is as follows:

If anything exists whose continuation in existence requires the operation of an efficient cause at this very moment, then a being exists whose existence is uncaused. But corporeal substances do exist. Therefore, etc.

In its second form, which, in Mr. Adler's opinion, is equivalent to the first, the argument reads:

The existence of a contingent being implies the existence of a necessary being. But a contingent being exists. Therefore, etc.

The minor of both forms is evident from experience, and is universally admitted. The major is supported by the previous proof (part one of the fourth argument) wherein Mr. Adler attempted to establish that God was the unique cause of preservation in being of other things.

Refutation—

1. The major presupposes the truth of the proposition that God is the unique cause of the preservation of things. But this has been demonstrated to be false (refutation of first part of Mr. Adler's fourth argument). Therefore the major is false, and the demonstration is impossible.

2. Again, against the major: no proposition of the form, A implies B, or if A then B, when A and B are in the real order, can be self-evident formally. This follows from the nature of a self-evident proposition; for a proposition is self-evident when there is no middle term necessary or possible to manifest the material identity of subject and predicate. But in a proposition of logical form, such as the major of the above proof, the illation being logical, a self-evident proposition would require the sub-

ject and predicate to be in the logical order; as it is self-evident that the differentia is predicable of the species which it differentiates. But when A and B are in the real order, as in the present case, the proposition cannot be self-evident formally, inasmuch as it would have to be shown, and understood, that the real being fell under the logical formality required by the logical nature of the proposition; and this would require a middle term; as risible implies rational because risible is a property of rational, and the property necessarily implies the subject of which it is the property; and likewise for the differentia or any predicable necessarily predicated of a subject.

If the major in Mr. Adler's supposed demonstration, then, is true and materially self-evident, as he must think possible (for otherwise it would be meaningless to suggest it as a demonstration), it is not in virtue of the logical relation, but because of the real material identity of the terms, i. e., that the very notion of contingent existence contains the idea of dependence in being on an existent which is absolutely necessary. But this is patently false in respect to the human idea of contingency as such; otherwise God would enter into the definition of every created thing, which is not only contrary to the authority of St. Thomas, and known to be false from experience, but is contrary to reason. For this would imply that that which is furthest removed from the sensible order is known first by abstraction from sense; or again, that that which is most intelligible in itself is most intelligible to us. But in fact, just as the existence of God is self-evident in that Knowledge of God which is God's and is God, but not in our knowledge of what we mean by the term, God (before we know that He exists), so, in God's knowledge of contingent things, contingent things depend for their being on the necessary Being which is God; but this cannot be known in our knowledge of contingent being as such.

The major of Mr. Adler's intended demonstration, therefore, cannot be self-evident; for self-evidence is understood according to the objective relation between the terms of a proposition as they are known according to their proper formality, and the immediate relation between "contingent" and "dependence on a

necessary being " is not verified for these terms as they are adequately and formally known to us. Nevertheless, in fact there is a necessary connection between these terms, inasmuch as God necessarily exists and everything else necessarily depends on Him for its existence. But this necessity is in fact, and is known as a conclusion, not as a principle of demonstration, i. e., when God is known to exist, it is known that everything else depends on Him for existence.

3. Again, against the major, if contingent being implied a necessary being who is God, far from having to demonstrate the existence of God, that would be self-evident; but it would be necessary to demonstrate the existence of everything else, i. e., contingent beings.

Mr. Adler—Fourth Argument, third part, III, #3, pp. 212-216.

In the third and last part of the fourth argument Mr. Adler raises doubts concerning the demonstration he has proposed and which he considers the only possible one. This section is divided into two parts, in the first of which he raises doubts concerning the major premise of the demonstration; in the second, assuming that the major is either self-evident or demonstrable, he questions whether the necessary being demonstrated to exist is God. He attacks the self-evidence of his major in two ways: first by showing the difficulties attending the manifestation of the immediate relation between the terms; second by showing the difficulties which arise when one attempts to prove its self-evidence by proving that it can *only* be argued through *reductio ad absurdum*, taking this as a property of a self-evident proposition. In the second part he raises doubts concerning the nature of the being whose existence is hypothetically assumed to be demonstrated, namely, that if it is God, it must be known to be one only, and to have no composition of potency and act, no composition of matter and form, no composition of subject and accident.

Refutation—

Inasmuch as Mr. Adler's proposed demonstration has been

shown to be impossible, it will not be necessary to defend it against the doubts which its author raises against it. However, for the purpose of clarifying the question generally, it may prove useful to manifest a few of the more important errors in this section. To facilitate following this part of the argument, we shall order the doubts Mr. Adler raises concerning his demonstration in outline form:

I. Is the major of the demonstration self-evident?
   a. Do the terms manifest their immediate relation?
   b. Does the method of proving the self-evidence by proving that it can only be argued through *reductio ad absurdum*, defend its self-evidence?

II. Assuming the major to be self-evident or demonstrable, does the demonstration demonstrate the existence of God, or only the existence of a necessary being, whose essence is its existence?

We may now answer the difficulties raised by Mr. Adler in order.

I. a) Mr. Adler sees that, for his major to be self-evident, the term, contingent, would have to mean: *needing a cause for its existence*, and *unable to cause the existence of another*. Likewise, the term, necessary being, would have to mean: *having no cause for its existence*, and *causing the existence of contingent being* (III, #3, b, pp. 212, 213). He is entirely right in raising this difficulty, for reasons which have been adduced in the refutation of the previous part of this argument; for the proposition is not self-evident. But he fails to conclude, properly, that this proposition *cannot* be self-evident, since the formal meaning of these terms cannot include these notes.

I. b) Here Mr. Adler attempts to demonstrate the self-evidence of his major in order to raise difficulties with that proof. But it seems apparent that the self-evidence of a proposition cannot be demonstrated, and Mr. Adler in no way explains how this can be done. He seems to employ the major: A proposition which can be proved *only* through *reductio*, is

self-evident. That is true enough as a judgment; but how is one to know that it cannot be proved directly, except by an infinite number of attempted direct proofs, all of which are shown to be invalid? But this is manifestly impossible. Mr. Adler's method of establishing this step is clearly fallacious. It is needless to repeat the arguments by which he attempts to establish that it cannot be proved directly. If the occasion should arise, any number of objections could be raised to his procedure here; but the matter is not important enough to warrant close analysis. Let it suffice to state that, when he attempts to prove the major by *reductio*, he does not prove it at all. What he does prove is the principle presupposed by his demonstration, which he attempted to establish in the second part of the fourth argument. For the major of the demonstration reads: The existence of a contingent being implies the existence of a necessary being. Therefore the contradictory of this, from which a *reductio* should properly proceed, should read: the existence of a contingent being does not imply the existence of a necessary being. Instead of this, Mr. Adler begins: A contingent being can efficiently cause the existence of another being, which is the contradictory of: The cause of existence in a contingent being is the proper effect of God, i. e., the contradictory of the principle presupposed in the demonstration proper. From here on, consequently, the doubts which Mr. Adler raises are unintelligible.

II. Here Mr. Adler attempts to show that, even assuming the validity of his demonstration, the existence *of God* is not necessarily demonstrated. But this difficulty proceeds from a misconception of what a demonstration is intended to demonstrate. In Mr. Adler's view, ostensibly, a demonstration of God's existence must demonstrate all of God's attributes. By the same reasoning, Euclid, in demonstrating the existence of an equilateral triangle, failed because he did not demonstrate at the same time all the properties of the triangle. Mr. Adler complains that he knows no place where it is demonstrated that this necessary being has no composition of potency and act, of matter and form, of subject and accident. This is founded

indeed, if the demonstrations of God's existence are rejected as he rejects them. But when they are understood and presupposed, the requisite demonstration of the other negative attributes can be derived from them as principles. Thus St. Thomas demonstrates that there is no composition of potency and act in the Being demonstrated to exist, i. e., in the Being which he, and, as he says, all men, understand to be God,[18] that there is no composition of matter and form,[19] that there is no composition of subject and accident.[20]

* * * * *

In conclusion we may say, then, that, far from attacking the demonstrations of St. Thomas, Mr. Adler has only shown his inability to understand them thus far. His difficulties are in fact his own and not those of the Angelic Doctor. For the " possibilities " he has considered, both in the order of becoming and in the order of being, are in fact impossible ways, and not at all supposed by St. Thomas or his commentators. In fact, if not in Mr. Adler's mind, the demonstration of God is impossible as he conceives it, and, I am afraid, that is the effect his words would have on an undisciplined reader. For he appears convinced that he has exhausted all possible ways of demonstration, and he ends with grave doubts concerning the one way which seemed possible to him. But what he has shown, really, is that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated from any connection of causes in the univocal order, i. e., as things temporally or simultaneously related in the order of becoming, employing here a logically univocal notion of *causa efficiens fiendi* (his first three arguments), or in the order of being, employing here a logically univocal notion of *causa efficiens essendi* (his fourth argument). His search has been for a causal relation which is univocally distinct as it is verified in God, and not analogically common; and this is impossible *qua* univocally distinct, i. e., as found in God but not found in any way in the creature.

In this he manifests a failure to grasp the concept of order, not as it is in St. Thomas merely, but as it is in the universe.

[18] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 3. [19] *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 2. [20] *Ibid.*, a. 6.

For that order is realized in an assimilation of the creature to God. Therefore it is precisely as cause, taken indifferently, or efficient cause, taken in this way, that God is not unique. His uniqueness is as a first and most universal cause. But He is unique, and utterly diverse from the creature in His Incommunicable Nature which is known only to Himself, to the blessed, and in the darkness of Faith to those who believe what He has revealed of Himself as He is, the Blessed Trinity of Three Persons in One Divine Nature.

In the last part of his essay Mr. Adler asks, as one of " those gentiles in the modern world who desire natural wisdom," for instruction, " if my discourse rests upon any erroneous dismissal of traditionally accepted arguments." I have tried sincerely, and not without a measure of painstaking effort, to understand his difficulties and to clarify the essential points of the doctrine in relation to them, having in view not only the defense of traditional teaching but also the obligation to manifest these preambles to the Faith for those who might be denied that most precious of all gifts through a misunderstanding of truths accessible to the natural light of reason. Neither do I ignore the great service Mr. Adler has done the Church by rousing her servants, the theologians, to a greater awareness of their shortcomings in relation to the perennial truths which it is their vocation to defend, and to look for means they had hitherto neglected to bring the power of Christ's doctrine to bear on the difficulties of our times.

For these reasons, it does not seem unfitting to suggest that it is not enough to " desire natural wisdom " after Christ. For history has shown abundantly that " He that hath, to him shall be given, and he shall abound: but he that hath not, from him shall be taken away that also which he hath." It would be misleading therefore, in the name of Christ, to impart instruction in natural wisdom, except as it leads to the Faith. But, for that, the principal means is not study. For we are exhorted to " seek first the kingdom of heaven, and everything else shall be given to you." The firm conviction in the existence of God, which Mr. Adler protests at the beginning of his essay, is surely

sufficient foundation to pray to that God for the light to know His true Faith. By that Faith we know that such a prayer must be answered, albeit in God's own good time. And, by the teaching of Christ and His saints, we know that a certain interior quiet is necessary to hear the answer, such quiet as is not secured by the intense pursuit of natural wisdom. Therefore, by any instruction requring undue activity of reason, we should only lead one seeking the truth more and more astray, confirming him in the erroneous conviction that the path of reason alone is pleasing to God. In this we do him a grave injustice, and more harm to ourselves.

This counsel, indeed, is not irrelevant to the plea for instruction in natural wisdom. For the Faith proves itself by its works: the quest of truth is a human act, and subject, therefore, to the movement of the passions, the more so because the good at stake is a greater good. Without that detachment and tranquility in relation to created truth, therefore, which the Faith alone assures when it is properly cultivated, it is most unlikely that men will be able to free themselves of that subjectivity which foredooms philosophical inquiry to failure; particularly inasmuch as the truths of philosophy bear most directly on the human appetite.

If, then, a man would have natural wisdom, he must bear with the generosity of God, who will only give more than natural wisdom, and with His Justice, for, if He is rejected, He will not give even what is natural.

In conclusion, by way of pointing out a confusion which, I think, is a source of much of Mr. Adler's difficulty, I would suggest that he consider the following passages from St. Thomas's commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius:

" Nevertheless it should be known that, since that material something whence the genus is taken, contains in itself both form and matter, the logician considers the genus only on the part of that which is formal in it, whence his definitions are called formal, but the natural philosopher considers the genus on the part of both (the form and the matter). And therefore it sometimes happens that some things communicate in a genus

according to the logician, which do not communicate according to the natural philosopher. For it sometimes happens, with respect to the similitude of first act, that that which a thing attains when it is in *such* matter, another thing attains without matter, still another attains it when it is in matter altogether diverse. E. g., it is evident that stone in matter which is (matter) according to the potency to existence, tends (*pertingit*) to this, that it should subsist, to which same thing the sun tends according to the matter which is potency to place, but not to existence, and (likewise) the angel lacking all matter. Whence the logician, finding in all these that from which the genus was taken, posits all these to be in one genus of substance. But the natural philosopher and the metaphysician, who consider the principles of things, finding that they do not all convene in matter, say that they differ in genus, according to that which is said in the tenth book of the *Metaphysics*, that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus, and that those things convene in genus of which the matter is one and which are generated one from the other." [21]

"And although, logically considered, they (immaterial substances) convene with these sensible things in the remote genus which is substance, nevertheless, naturally speaking, they do not convene in the same genus, just as neither do the heavenly bodies with the inferior (bodies). For the corporeal and the incorporeal are not of the same genus, as is said in the tenth book of the *Metaphysics*. For the logician considers intentions absolutely, according to which nothing prevents material things convening to immaterial things, and incorruptible to corruptible. But the natural philosopher and the first philosopher consider essences according as they have being in things, and therefore where they find a diverse mode of potency and act, and through this a diverse mode of being, they say that the things are diverse in genus." [22]

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[21] *In Boeth. De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2, corpus.

[22] *Ibid.*, q. 6, a. 3, corpus.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Part IV

The Principles of Justice: Constitutionality

(Continued)

IT HAS been our aim, in this Part of our work, to prove that Constitutional government is *absolutely* superior in justice to the Royal regime. Before undertaking that demonstration, we deemed it necessary to consider two special problems—the problem of the mediaeval *regimen regale et politicum* and the problem of the mixed regime—two problems which, by the way, have frequently been confused by writers in the Thomistic tradition. In Section 4, we dealt with the first of these problems. Now, in Section 5, we shall examine the theory of the mixed regime in all its ramifications. That done, we can attain our objective in Section 6—the absolute consideration of regimes as less and more just.

5. The essential distinction between the Royal and the Political regime has been, so far, the controlling principle of our analysis of the forms of government. It has determined our interpretation of the anomalous *regimen regale et politicum* as an intermediate, rather than a mixed, regime—a defective embodiment of the principle of constitutionality. And now we must apply it to the "traditional" account of the pure and mixed regimes, which, as we shall show, is thoroughly un-Aristotelian because it fails to examine these subordinate distinctions in the light of the primary and controlling distinction between Royal and Political.[462] We have previously said that all of these subordinate distinctions divide only *accidental modes* of the two essential forms of government.[463] This implies

[462] Vd. Part IV, Section 2, *supra*, in The Thomist, IV, 3, pp. 461-3.

[463] Vd. *ibid.*, and cf. esp. fn. 349 *supra*. A correct statement of these matters is made, however, in Part I. Vd. The Thomist, III, 3, p. 425.

that there is no question of greater or less justice with regard to the subordinate modes of government, but only a question of greater or less expediency. But a careful study of Aristotle's theory of *the* mixed regime—and, for all practical purposes, there is *only one*—will show that this mixed regime is more just than the two pure regimes it unites. Our previous statement of the relation of the subordinate *modes* of government to the two basic *forms* has been too simple. To remedy its inadequacy we must now correct our own account of the traditionally named six types of government, as well as show the grave error in the traditional account of the mixed regime as resulting from a union of three of these six types.

It will be helpful to begin with a brief statement of the so-called " traditional theory." This theory results from a reading of Chapters 7 and 8 in Book III of Aristotle's *Politics*, completely divorced from the basic distinction between Royal and Political developed in Book I, and totally unrelated to the elaborate discussion of democracy and oligarchy which occupies the largest part of Books IV, V, and VI. If these other sections of the *Politics* contain fundamental truths relevant to the problem of the forms of government, then, we maintain, a solution of that problem in terms of the two chapters mentioned, read in isolation, must be regarded as an absurd travesty on the Aristotelian analysis. Yet it is such a travesty which has prevailed through the centuries, not only among Thomists and other disciples of Aristotle, but even among political theorists who have much less regard for his authority.

The classification of the forms of government which Aristotle presents in Book III, Chapter 7, is not his own. He is there reporting, though not without some modifications, the analysis which Plato gives in *The Statesman*. In that dialogue, Plato distinguished *seven* forms of government. Of these seven, the one that Plato regarded as the ideal or perfect form he also admitted had no reality whatsoever in the actual world. It is the form of government which he describes in a myth about the life of man in the age of Kronos, when the god himself was shepherd of the human flock and performed the duties of an

earthly king in the government of men. The myth enables Plato to define " perfect government " as that in which the ruler possesses an art or science adequate for the administration of absolute justice in every particular case. In contrast, " imperfect government " is that in which it is necessary to have laws for the guidance of rulers, precisely because they lack the political art that only a god could have. Since men are not gods, and since there are no godlike men, all the *real* forms of government that can exist in the human community are imperfect—not imperfect *as* human, but imperfect *because* human. *As* human, these imperfect forms of government can be either good or bad, just or unjust. The criterion of this distinction is whether a human government, which *requires* laws because it is human, proceeds with or without laws. Since only a god could govern justly *without* laws, a human government which proceeds without laws will be unjust or injurious to the common good; whereas a human government which involves laws can be just or beneficial to the common good. There are three forms of just human government and three forms of unjust human government, according as governmental power is exercised by the one, the few, or the many. These six imperfect forms of government are monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (the three just forms), and tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy (the three unjust forms). Plato points out that these names are somewhat confusing, because it really makes no difference whether the rulers are rich or poor, and therefore just as the word " democracy " can be used to name a just and an unjust rule by the many, so the words " oligarchy " and " aristocracy " could be used indifferently to name a just and an unjust rule by the few. The only criterion here is *number*. There is, according to Plato, no difference in kind between the *king* and the *statesman*. The difference is simply that when *one* man rules we call him a " king," but when the *few* or the *many* rule, we call each man who rules a " statesman." The three good forms differ only in *efficiency*, not in *type of justice*: government by one is, according to Plato, more efficient than government by the few, and government by the few is more efficient than by

the many. Similarly, government by the many is less efficiently injurious to the common good than government by the few, and that in turn is less efficiently injurious than unjust government by one man. Hence Plato concludes that democracy is the least desirable form of government when it is just compared with the other two just forms, and the most desirable form of government when it is unjust compared with the other two unjust forms.[464]

[464] We have briefly summarized here only those sections of *The Statesman* that are relevant to the problem of the forms of government. The reader will find the myth of divine rule in the age of Kronos at 271C-275C; he will find the distinction between the mythical ideal of perfect government and the real forms of human or imperfect government at 292D-297B; that in addition to the six imperfect forms there is a seventh and perfect form will be found at 303; that no man can be a perfect ruler in the sense defined is explicitly stated at 301E; that the only distinction among the just or among the unjust forms of imperfect government is numerical, resulting in different degrees of efficiency but not in different modes of justice, and that the distinction between the just and unjust forms of imperfect government is determined by only one criterion (viz., benefit or injury to the common good), will be found at 298-303. On this last point, cf. 291D-296.

Since Plato does not distinguish between absolute and limited forms of *actual human* government—reserving "absolute" to signify only the mythically perfect or ideal form—it is difficult to say whether all his good forms of human government can be called "constitutional" in the sense in which Aristotle uses this word to signify limited as opposed to absolute human government. It is usually supposed, however, that Plato's understanding of imperfect human government as government in which laws are necessary for the guidance and regulation of the rulers themselves implies the basic principle of constitutional government. Whether or not this is true, it is certainly true that for Plato the forms of human government are either *all* constitutional or *all* non-constitutional; whereas, in the sharpest contrast, for Aristotle some forms of human government are absolute (i.e., Royal) and some are limited (i.e., Political or Constitutional).

The *bi-columnar* classification of the six human forms of government, three just and three perverted, as given in *The Statesman* does not differ radically from the *linear* classification of the six forms of government in *The Republic*, unless it be supposed that what Plato there means by "monarchy" is the perfect, the mythical ideal of divine, government. Supposing, on the contrary, that all of the six forms of government mentioned in *The Republic* are capable of actual human institution, we see that the continuous linear disposition of these six forms from best to worst is merely another way of picturing what can also be set forth as an apparently discontinuous arrangement of the six into one column of three good forms and another column of three bad forms. The reason for this is that, when efficiency in serving or disserving the common good is the only criterion, we can order forms of government from best to worst according as they serve the common good more or less efficiently or disserve the common good less or more efficiently—a certain degree

Can there be any doubt that it is a modified version of the Platonic bi-columnar sixfold classification that Aristotle is presenting in Book III, Chapter 7? We say "modified" because the omission of the *seventh*, or *perfect*, form of government violates the basic point in the Platonic analysis. Strictly speaking, the picture presented in Chapter 7, while it resembles the Platonic picture *more* than the Aristotelian, is neither Platonic nor Aristotelian, but a bad confusion of both. It is this confusion that has become traditional.

Can there be any question that Aristotle has and gives many reasons for rejecting this *confused* analysis in so far as he regards its Platonic principles as inadequate and false? In the very opening chapter of the *Politics*, he takes issue with Plato for saying that there is no distinction *in kind* between the king and the statesman.[465] He holds, on the contrary, that the most fundamental distinction in kind is that between Royal and Political government; and, as we have seen, by Royal government he does not mean constitutional monarchy, but absolute

of inefficient disservice of the common good being equal to a certain degree of inefficient service of the common good. Thus, for example, democracy in the column of good forms is the most inefficient government with respect to service of the common good, and democracy in the column of bad forms is the least efficient government with respect to disservice of the common good. Hence "good democracy" is *nearest* to "bad democracy" whereas "good monarchy" is furthest removed from "bad monarchy" (i. e., "tyranny"). These words "nearest" and "furthest removed" require a linear disposition of the six forms, for in no other way can the perversion of one form of government be said to be less or further removed than another perversion from the good form of which it is the perversion. The bi-columnar picture cannot show this, except by arranging the two columns in the shape of a V; the linear disposition merely carries the point to its logical conclusion, the arms of the V moving outward until they form a straight line. Nevertheless, the bi-columnar and the linear disposition of the forms of government are strictly equivalent ways of expressing the same analysis, because this analysis does not distinguish between good forms of government as less and more just, but only as less and more efficient. It fails to take into consideration the relativity of justice to inferior and superior conditions. Hence the Aristotelian analysis, which is founded upon this consideration, can never be presented as either a bi-columnar or a linear disposition of the forms of government. When Aristotle speaks of one perverted government as being further removed than another from a good form, it must be the *same* good form which both perversions corrupt, the one more completely than the other.

[465] Vd. *Politics*, I, 1, 1252ª7-20.

rule—rule by a man or by men who are not themselves regulated by law. Whereas in Plato's view, such absolute government must either be divine and perfect, or human, imperfect, and *also unjust or tyrannical,* Aristotle holds that human absolute government can be either just or unjust, though as just (relative to inferior circumstances) it is inferior to limited or constitutional government (which is more just because just relative to superior circumstances). Whereas Plato has only one criterion for determining the justice or injustice of human governments (namely, benefit or injury to the existential common good), Aristotle has two distinct criteria: whether the mode of justice is relative to inferior or superior political circumstances, and whether, in relation to such circumstances, the government is for or against the existent common good. Hence, as we shall see, it is absolutely impossible for the Aristotelian classification of the forms of human government to be set forth in a bi-columnar sixfold classification. That is why Aristotle explicitly rejects the Platonic notion that the word "democracy" can be used to name the least good of the three good forms of government as well as the best of the three bad forms.[465a] That is why Aristotle uses the word "polity" rather

[465a] "A writer who has preceded me," says Aristotle, "has already made these distinctions, but his point of view is not the same as mine. For he lays down the principle that when all the constitutions are good, democracy is the worst, but the best when all are bad; whereas we maintain that they (i. e., such forms as democracy or oligarchy) are in any case defective, and that one is not to be accounted good and the other bad, but only as less bad than one another" (*Politics,* IV, 2, 1289^{b}5-11). The reason why Aristotle takes this position against Plato will be seen by anyone who understands why Aristotle did not use "democracy" to name a good form of government, but used the word "polity" to name the *only* just form of constitutional government, with respect to which both "democracy" and "oligarchy" and even "despotism" and "tyranny" signify perversions. This will not be understood, however, by anyone who supposes that "polity" names a pure form of government. As we shall see, *it is always a mixed regime, and it is the only mixed regime.*

Unfortunately, Aristotle permitted himself, in the very paragraph preceding the one just quoted, to speak of tyranny as being furthest removed from monarchy, oligarchy as not so far removed from aristocracy, and democracy as nearest to polity. Such a statement has significance and truth only on the Platonic, not on the Aristotelian, theory. Vd. fn. 464 *supra.* What Aristotle should have said, in terms of his own principles, about the degrees of remotion of corrupt forms, will become apparent in the course of our discussion. Vd. fn. 531 and 532 *infra.*

than " democracy " for the third form in the good column when, in Chapter 7 of Book III, he modifies the Platonic classification in the very act of reporting it. Furthermore, he does not agree with Plato that such criteria as poverty and wealth are irrelevant. This is indicated in the opening sentence of Chapter 8, which says: " But there are some difficulties about these types of government and it will be necessary therefore to state a little more at length the nature of each of them." Aristotle then proceeds in Chapter 8 to correct the erroneous supposition that the number of rulers is the only, or even an important, criterion in the classification of the forms of government.[466]

Even as corrected by a consideration of qualitative as well as numerical factors, the bi-columnar sixfold classification violates the fundamental principles of Aristotelian theory. Aristotle does not mention in Chapter 8 all the objections he has to the Platonic classification, probably because he assumed that any reader who patiently followed his analysis from beginning to end could find them out for himself. Unfortunately, the history of political theory has shown his assumption to have been naively optimistic. The commentators have taken Chapters 7 and 8 of Book III as if they represented Aristotle's own views. They have ignored all the difficulties which he does not explicitly mention there.[466a]

[466] " The real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy " (*Politics*, III, 8, $1279^{b}40$-$80^{a}3$). That the poor are usually the many, the rich the few, is an accident. Furthermore, Aristotle goes on to say that there is one characteristic common to the poor and the rich, namely, that both are freemen, i. e., not natural slaves in domestic or civil servitude. This becomes an important point in the subsequent analysis. Regarding wealth as a positive trait, and poverty merely as its privation, we see that the two positive traits determinative of the distinction between oligarchy and democracy are wealth and freedom; in the one case, political power is in the hands of those who are both free and rich; in the latter, it is in the hands of the free, regardless of whether they are rich or poor. Vd. *Politics*, V, 1.

[466a] It is a great misfortune that Aristotle continued to use Plato's language, while at the same time disagreeing with the analysis which that language was used to express. To some extent, therefore, Aristotle is himself responsible for the traditional misinterpretation of the *Politics* which has everywhere prevailed. It is an even greater misfortune that Aristotle was so deeply influenced by *The Statesman*—not

Postponing for a moment the enumeration of these other difficulties, which completely destroy the too-simple picture here constructed, let us ask whether, in addition to wealth and poverty, there are any other characteristics that must be mentioned to qualify the distinctions made according to one, few, and many. From what is said elsewhere about monarchy, aristocracy, and tyranny, it seems that we must add *virtue* and *vice*, for monarchy and aristocracy are regimes by the one or the few who are *superior* in virtue, and tyranny is a regime by one who is vicious. But if the few rich rule for their own interests, they too are vicious; and this must be said also of

by *The Republic*—that he never succeeded in wholly discarding Plato's analysis, even when his own principles call for the complete rejection of a point that has truth and significance on Plato's premises, but is false or meaningless on his own. (Vd. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, p. 291.) There are many passages in the *Politics* which illustrate the early Platonism of which Aristotle never cured himself. The example given in fn. 465a *supra* shows the inconsistency into which Aristotle falls when in one paragraph he makes a typically Platonic statement and in the very next denies the Platonic principle that underlies that statement. The classification of the forms of government given in *Ethics*, VIII, 10, exemplifies even more strikingly Aristotle's occasional relapse into unamended Platonism.

But the worst error of this sort on Aristotle's part is his oft-repeated reference to " the perfect or divine form of government," without making clear whether he means what Plato means by such manner of speech (i.e., a mythical form of government that has no actual realization in the human community), or means what he himself should mean by it (i.e., the practicable ideal of the most just form of human government). In neither of these two possible meanings is the human form of government called " monarchy " the perfect or divine form; for in Plato's terms it is merely the best or most efficient of the imperfect human forms, and in Aristotle's terms either it is absolute government, in which case the least just of the good forms, or what is meant should be called " constitutional monarchy," in which case it is not even a distinct form of government. If Aristotle had not committed the Platonism of associating the words " perfect " and " divine," he would never have written passages in which he seems to be saying that monarchy is the perfect or divine form of government. If he had completely overcome his own youthful Platonism and always adhered rigorously to his own principles, he would always have called monarchy, in the sense of absolute government, *imperfect human* government, and would have said that it is divine *only metaphorically*, in that it has a theoretical, not a practical, resemblance to what is truly Divine government—which, properly understood, is government of the whole universe, not of the political community. The fact that most of his commentators have misunderstood Aristotle's fundamental position is not entirely their fault. Platonic reminiscences seem to have impaired the clarity of Aristotle's understanding of his own position. Vd. fn. 481, 489, 515, and 533 *infra*.

the many who are free but poor if they rule for their own interests. Furthermore, if the many who are free rule for the common good, they must be virtuous to that extent. So far as virtue is concerned, the only distinction which can be made between polity, on the one hand, and monarchy and aristocracy, on the other, is that in the latter, the one or the few have superior virtue, or have virtue lacked by the many who are ruled; whereas in polity, the many who are both rulers and ruled are equal in virtue. With respect to vice, as evidenced by disregard for the common good, there seems to be no similar distinction among tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Finally, it should be pointed out that, in every one of the six cases, the ruled are by nature freemen, for if that were not so, the three good regimes would not be just, nor would tyranny be unjust, since it is right to master natural slaves for the good of the ruler.

Let us now summarize in a table the *false* and *inadequate* analysis of the types of government which arises from these considerations, poorly understood because their implications are not developed in the light of Aristotle's basic insights.

"TRADITIONAL" BI-COLUMNAR SIXFOLD CLASSIFICATION

Just Regimes (for the common good)		Unjust Regimes (against the common good)	
Number	*Qualities*	*Number*	*Qualities*
1. One	Superior Virtue	4. One	Vice, (Wealth *or* Might)
Name:	Monarchy ------	---→ *Name*:	Tyranny
2. Few	Superior Virtue	5. Few	Vice, Wealth
Name:	Aristocracy -----	---→ *Name*:	Oligarchy
3. Many	Equal Virtue	6. Many	Vice, Poverty
Name:	Polity --------	---→ *Name*:	Democracy

Note: The direction of the arrow indicates the motion toward perversion. Monarchy degenerates into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and polity into democracy. Hence, according to this picture, each regime has one, and only one, perversion, which is its direct opposite in the column of unjust regimes. If it be asked whether there is any other quality involved in the corruption of monarchy into tyranny, two probable answers have been parenthetically indicated: (1) wealth here, as in the case of the corruption of aristocracy into oligarchy; and (2) force or might, whether or not based on the advantages of wealth.

This is the picture which has been handed down through the centuries, reflected (with some distortion) in the great books of political theory, and repeated *ad nauseam* in the textbooks and secondhand commentaries. It is not always presented with all the terms explicitly indicated, as, for example, in Cicero's version, which primarily emphasizes the numerical distinction of the regimes as by the one, the few, or the many.[467] The purely numerical aspect of the classification dominates the leading modern versions—as given by Hobbes, or Locke, or Rousseau.[468] In contrast, the Thomistic rendering explicitly

[467] Vd. *De Republica*, I, 26: "When the supreme authority is in the hands of one man, we call him a king, and the form of this state a kingship. When selected citizens hold this power, we say that the state is ruled by an aristocracy. But a popular government exists when all the power is in the hands of the people."

[468] With respect to the several forms of government, to which he attaches the traditional names, the main contention of Hobbes is that they are all *equally absolute* in their sovereignty. For Hobbes, legitimate government was impossible unless it was absolute, depriving the ruled of any juridical power whatsoever. Hence, though he distinguishes between monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, the fact that, in his view, they are all equally absolute enables him to argue, in a back-handed way, in defense of absolute monarchy, which is not surprising to anyone acquainted with the deviousness of Hobbes's reasoning as an apologist for Stuart despotism. "The difference of commonwealths," he writes, "consisteth in the difference of the Sovereign . . . And because the Sovereignty is either in one Man, or in an Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest there can be but three kinds of Commonwealth." And he names these accordingly as Monarchy, Democracy, and Aristocracy. "Other kinds of commonwealth there can be none, for either One, or More, or All, must have the Sovereign power (which I have shewn to be indivisible) entire." And it is significant that he goes on to say: "There be other names of Government, in the Histories and books of Policy. But they are not the names of other Forms of Government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under *Monarchy* call it *Tyranny*; and they that are displeased with *Aristocracy* call it *Oligarchy*; so also, they which find themselves grieved under a *Democracy* call it *Anarchy*" (*Leviathan*, Part II, Ch. 19). Not only does Hobbes deny any distinction in justice between what are traditionally distinguished as the just forms and their perversions, but he regards the three forms (which can be named either eulogistically or dyslogistically) as differing only in expediency: "The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of convenience, or aptitude to produce the Peace and Security of the people" (*ibid.*). Then he argues that monarchy is the most expedient of the three.

Vd. Locke, *Second Essay of Civil Government*, Chapter X; and Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Book III, Chapters 3-6. For all these writers—Hobbes along with

mentions the qualitative aspects, and so preserves enough of the Aristotelian elements to betray the essential falsity of the picture.[469]

Before we give all the reasons why the picture is false, we must now report the theory of the mixed regime which is developed out of this erroneous analysis. This theory cannot be found in Aristotle's *Politics*. One version of it is given by Cicero, another by the moderns, and a third by St. Thomas and later Thomists. All of these versions agree that the six types of government enumerated in the "traditional picture" are pure regimes, involving one aspect to the exclusion of the others, whether this be a numerical or a qualitative aspect. But though one aspect may be selected to the exclusion of others, the several elements by which the pure regimes are distinguished are not mutally exclusive, and hence they can be *mixed* or *fused* or *blended* into a *single*, more complex regime. This complex unity will not be a type intermediate between two pure forms, which, as our analysis of the *regimen regale et politicum* has shown, can combine pure forms *only* when each is imperfectly embodied in the resulting institutions (i. e., the king is absolute but also limited; there is a constitution but it is defective for want of political sanctions), because their perfect embodiments are incompatible. The mixed regime, in contrast, conjoins thoroughly

Locke and Rousseau—the problem of the forms of government *appears* to be of minor importance in their political theory. They devote one chapter, or at most a few brief chapters, to the problem, treating the matter almost out of condescension to traditional opinion; whereas Aristotle devotes the four major books of the *Politics* to the distinction and classification of governmental forms. This does not mean that the moderns are not really concerned with the problem of good and bad government. They deal with it in terms of what makes government legitimate, and in this connection they do treat of the fundamental distinction between absolute and limited government. But such treatment runs throughout their works. It interpenetrates all the rest of their discussion; so that when they come, in a single chapter or two, to treat explicitly of the "traditional forms," they tend to dismiss the problem briefly as of trivial import. Thus, for example, Rousseau's distinction of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy turns largely on the singularity or plurality, and degree of plurality, of the executive. Cf. fn. 476 and 477 *infra*.

[469] Vd. *De Reg. Princ.*, I, 1. Cf. *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 95, 4.

compatible elements and hence can unite them without defect on the part of any.[470]

The Ciceronian version, following Polybius, conceives the mixed regime as a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, each in turn being represented by the Consuls, the Senate, and the People of the constitution of the Roman republic.[471] Cicero insists that the excellence of the Roman constitution lies in the fact that it is a mixed regime, combining government by the one, the few, and the many. The combination of the numerical aspects of the pure regimes is accompanied also by a blend of the qualitative aspects, for the few are rich and of noble birth (the patricians), whereas the many are usually both of common birth and poor (the plebeians). What is most important to observe, however, is that Cicero has two distinct criteria by which he judges the superiority of the mixed regime over the pure types: (1) it is a more stable government

[470] Demongeot likes to apply the description of a natural mixture, as that is given by John of St. Thomas, to the problem of the mixed regime. Vd. *Le meilleur régime politique selon Saint Thomas*, Paris, 1928: pp. 134-35, and 153. In a mixture, John of St. Thomas writes, "the qualities ought not to persist in all their vigor and crudity . . . but to be tempered to one another" (*Cursus Philosophicus, Philosophia Naturalis*, II, 6). By this standard only the *regimen regale et politicum* is a mixed regime, and what Aristotle conceives as a fusion of democracy and oligarchy cannot be called a "mixture" because it retains the imperfect justice of each without alteration. In any case, it is clear that the Aristotelian *polity* (i.e., the mixed constitution) and the mediaeval *regimen regale et politicum* are not "mixed regimes" in the same univocal sense. We think that the mode of combination is so different in the two cases that we have called the latter an "intermediate regime" to distinguish it from what seems to us more properly to deserve the name "mixed regime." And we have explained why the *regimen regale et politicum* cannot be regarded as a fusion or blending: vd. Part IV, Section 4, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 756-70.

[471] Vd. McIlwain's comment on Polybius in his *Growth of Political Thought in the West*, pp. 100-101: "It is rather gratuitous to charge him as Rehm does with a misunderstanding of Aristotle, since it seems certain that he was unacquainted with the *Politics*." As McIlwain points out, Polybius's theory of the mixed regime rests on the notion of a combination of three distinct *organs* of government, which is radically different from the Aristotelian conception of the mixed regime as a combination of different political *classes* in the government. This will become plainer subsequently. Vd. fn. 494 *infra*. But it should be observed at once that the mixed regime for Polybius is *essentially* a constitutional or republican form of government. It involves no royal elements whatsoever. The consuls are constitutional office-holders, limited in juridical power as well as in function.

and this means that the mixed regime is a *more efficient* means for procuring and maintaining the common good;[472] (2) it is also more just than the pure forms, because under pure monarchy "the subjects have too small a share in the administration of justice and in deliberation"; under pure aristocracy, "the masses can hardly have their share of liberty, since they are entirely excluded from deliberation and from power"; and under pure democracy, even though the people exercise power with justice and moderation, "the resulting equality is unjust, for it allows no distinctions in rank."[473] What is extraordinary about this is not that the two criteria are inconsistent (for more just government may also be more efficient), but rather that the three pure regimes are not regarded by Cicero as differing in justice (i. e., one more just than another *absolutely*). It is only with respect to the mixed regime that Cicero plainly holds that one type of government is absolutely more just, as well as more expedient, than others (all the pure regimes).

To understand Cicero's account of these matters, we must remember that he, like Polybius, did not try to understand Aristotle, but only to adapt a nomenclature, which had become traditional, to the institutions of the Roman republic.[474] Simi-

[472] Vd. *De Re Publica*, I, 45: "The primary forms already mentioned degenerate easily into the corresponding perverted forms . . . This does not usually happen in the case of the mixed or evenly balanced constitution." Cf. *ibid.*, II, 30-33.

[473] Vd. *ibid.*, I, 37.

[474] The Ciceronian adaption involved the following points: (1) the mixed regime is purely constitutional government, in which (2) the several elements being mixed (whether numerical or qualitative) are associated with distinct *organs* of government, such as the consulship, the senate, the tribunate, etc., and (3) the mixture results in a constitution which is, absolutely speaking, more just than other constitutions, as well as in a disposition of governmental organs which is more efficient. The second of these three points is entirely a Roman innovation, which has no clear parallel in Aristotle. But on the first, Cicero and Aristotle are in complete agreement, as we shall show; and on the third there is a large measure of agreement also. These agreements must, however, be qualified by Aristotle's analysis of the pure regimes, so sharply different from the "traditional picture" that Cicero uncritically accepts.

We know that Cicero distinguished between absolute (Royal) and republican (Constitutional) government. Vd. *De Re Publica*, I, 27, 35, 37-45. But when Cicero, at an earlier point (*ibid.*, I, 26) defines the three "pure" forms of government, it is difficult to tell whether "monarchy" and "aristocracy" signify absolute

larly, modern political writers warp the same nomenclature to fit the position they take on the fundamental political issues of their day. Thus, though Hobbes really denies the validity of constitutional (i. e., *limited*) government and favors absolute rule exclusively, he repeats the classification of three types of government according to numerical criteria.[475] On the other

or constitutional regimes, though it seems to be clear that "popular government" is republican. Carlyle, bringing the later texts to bear, supposes that absolute government is meant. Vd. *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West,* vol. V, pp. 447-8; and *Political Liberty,* p. 10. But, then, there is a difficulty in understanding precisely what is involved in Cicero's mixed regime. We know that, in his view, it was purely Constitutional government; we know that he had the Roman republic in mind as his model; and we know that it could not have been a *regimen regale et politicum,* because no such regime existed in the ancient world—at least not to Cicero's knowledge. (Even though in the transition from the Republic to the Empire, Roman government appeared to combine absolute with constitutional elements, it was not truly a *regimen regale et politicum,* but rather the concealment of actual despotism by empty constitutional rituals.) This difficulty can be solved only by supposing that the monarchical element which Cicero included in his mixed regime was merely the existence of two men in the chief administrative *offices.* But then there is difficulty in understanding the distinction between the mixed regime and the "pure" form which Cicero calls "popular government," since the latter is, like the mixed regime, also purely constitutional. And if that is so, why did not Cicero regard the "pure" form of popular government as superior to monarchy and aristocracy, which were non-constitutional? No solution of these difficulties can be found within the inadequate terms of Cicero's analysis. In fact, they arise from its inadequacy, as we shall see when we compare it with Aristotle's theory.

[475] Vd. fn. 468 *supra.* The most emphatic statement of Hobbes's position is to be found in Part II, Ch. 21 of the *Leviathan;* for there he denies that any distinction can be made between despotic, paternal, and political dominion. Dominion, he says, is acquired by generation (i. e., paternal), by conquest and force (i. e., despotic), or by institution (i. e., political). But in all three the sovereignty is equally absolute, and there is no difference in the condition of the ruled, whether they be children, conquered slaves, or political subjects who have freely instituted a sovereignty. This certainly justifies McIlwain in insisting that Bodin and Hobbes are not both absolutists *in the same sense.* Vd. fn. 431 *supra;* and also fn. 436 wherein we reported Bodin's distinction between royal and seigneural monarchy, the latter being unjust because it gave the monarch quasi-paternal rights and despotic powers which do not belong to truly political sovereignty. When Locke and Rousseau attempt to differentiate absolute civil government from the paternal regime in the domestic community, they are not objecting to Aristotle's carefully developed analogy (which stresses the differences as well as the similarities) between royal and paternal regimes; rather they are quite Aristotelian in their attack on Hobbes's identification of royal and paternal government, for they point out that the character and justification of an absolute regime in a civil community can

hand, Locke and Rousseau, holding that constitutional or republican government is the only legitimate form, give the same numerical classification and conceive the mixed regime merely as combining somehow the one, the few, and the many. In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau says that each of the pure types has such grave practical defects that it never exists in its purity, the only practicable form of constitutional government being the mixed regime.[476] Locke and Rousseau seem to

never be the *same* as in the household. Vd. Locke, Second Essay *Of Civil Government*, Chapters VI, VIII, and XV; Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Book I, Ch. 2, and cf. *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, Part II, p. 225 (Everyman's Library edition). Vd. also his *Discourse on Political Economy* (same edition), pp. 249-252, where, after developing the differences between domestic and civil government, he concludes: "I have considered these few lines enough to overthrow the detestable system which Sir Robert Filmer has endeavored to establish in his *Patriarcha*. . . . Moreover, this error is of very long standing; for Aristotle himself thought proper to combat it with arguments which may be found in the first book of his *Politics*."

[476] Vd. Locke, Second Essay *of Civil Government*, Chapter X, where after naming the pure regimes as "monarchy" (elective or hereditary), "oligarchy," and "democracy"—according to the criterion of one, few, and many—Locke says: "And so accordingly of these, they make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good." Rousseau, on the other hand, after enumerating and describing the three so-called "pure forms," says: "Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as simple government. An isolated ruler must have subordinate magistrates; a popular government must have a head. There is, therefore, in the distribution of the executive power, always a gradation from the greater to the lesser number, with the difference that sometimes the greater is dependent on the smaller, and sometimes the smaller on the greater" (*The Social Contract*, Part III, Ch. 7).

In *Spirit of Laws*, Montesquieu, having divided just governments into monarchies and republics, then subdivides republics into democracies and aristocracies. Vd. *op. cit.*, Book II, Ch. 2. Thus Montesquieu preserves the three traditional names; but, as we have already observed (vd. fn. 455 *supra*), "monarchy" signifies for Montesquieu the *regimen regale et politicum*, and his description of aristocracy makes it obviously identical with oligarchy. Hence his subdivision of republics (*purely* constitutional regimes) into democracies and oligarchies closely parallels the Aristotelian analysis. It is, therefore, interesting to find Montesquieu saying: "The more an aristocracy borders on democracy, the nearer it approaches perfection; and, in proportion as it draws toward monarchy, the more is it imperfect" (*ibid.*, Ch. 3). Yet Montesquieu has no notion of a mixed constitution constructed by combining aspects of democracy and oligarchy. In fact, he nowhere discusses the mixed regime, though D'Alembert, in making an analysis of *Spirit of Laws*, adds this comment to his report of Book II: "Not that there are in the universe only these three kinds of government." In the greatest number of states, "the three forms are mixed or blended, the one with the other. Here monarchy inclines to despotism;

agree with Cicero that the mixed regime is always constitutional government, but they disagree with Cicero on the criterion by which to judge the superiority (or inferiority) of the mixed regime. They see here only a problem of governmental efficiency—practicability, stability, protection against corruption —but no question of justice. The criterion of justice does not enter into their comparison of the several pure regimes with one another, or of the mixed regime with these. If justice—or legitimacy—is appealed to at all, as it is by Locke and Rousseau, that occurs in the argument in favor of the exclusive rightness of constitutional as opposed to absolute (or despotic) government.[477]

there the monarchical government is combined with the republican; elsewhere it is not the whole people, it is only a part of them, which make the laws." D'Alembert understands Montesquieu's theory as little as some of the commentators on Aristotle's *Politics* understand his.

[477] Of course, as might be expected, these writers use the word "monarchy" ambiguously to name both an absolute, hence unjust or illegitimate, regime, and also one of the pure types of constitutional government which seldom, if ever, exists as such, but may enter as an element into the formation of a mixed regime. Unless this ambiguity is carefully noted, their treatments become most confusing to read. All that Rousseau means by the monarchical element in constitutional government is the presidency of one man in the executive or administrative functions of government, that man being nothing but an office-holder.

For Rousseau, as for Thomas Jefferson or James Wilson, the fundamental distinction among forms of government was between what they called "monarchy" and "republic"—the former signifying purely Royal, or absolute, government, and the latter signifying purely Constitutional, or limited, government. Thus, for example, Rousseau speaks of "an essential and inevitable defect, which will always rank monarchical below republican government" (*op. cit.*, Part III, Ch. 6); he gives "the name 'Republic' to every State that is governed by laws, no matter what the form of its administration may be. . . . Every legitimate government is Republican" (*ibid.*, Part II, Ch. 6). And here he adds a footnote to the effect that Republican government may be aristocratic, democratic, or even monarchical. Hence we see a treacherous ambiguity in Rousseau's use of the word "monarchy"—on the one hand, in sharp distinction from "Republic"; on the other, as an accidental mode of Republican government, when one man is at the head of the government. When one man is not merely the chief magistrate or first executive, but identifies himself with the sovereignty itself, then, according to Rousseau, you have the illegitimate sort of government (i. e., the despotism) which "monarchy" signifies when it is used in opposition to "republic." It is fascinating to observe how Hobbes employs the three traditional names (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) to refer to accidental subdivisions of absolute or Royal government (which is exclusively legitimate), whereas Rousseau employs the same three names

The Thomistic theory of the mixed regime is more like the Ciceronian version than any other. But it also departs therefrom for two reasons: first, because St. Thomas adapts his theory to the peculiar institutions of his day, as Cicero did before him, and as Locke or Rousseau did later; second, because though St. Thomas tended to be more Aristotelian in principle than Cicero was, his historical location prevented him from being as Aristotelian in his conclusions.[477a]

to refer to accidental subdivisions of limited or Constitutional government (which is exclusively legitimate). There is this difference, however: Rousseau has a name (monarchy) for the illegitimate government which he compares unfavorably with Republic, whereas for Hobbes, what is not absolute government is not government at all.

In contrast to both, and more like Montesquieu, Locke was neither a radical republican nor, certainly, an absolute monarchist. Though he himself never uses these words, a careful reading of his *Second Essay* reveals that he regarded the *regimen regale et politicum* as a legitimate form of government, along with the purely Constitutional form which Rousseau called a "Republic." Locke is far from being clear on these major distinctions, again largely because the word "monarchy" seems to be so uncontrollably ambiguous.

On the point that even the purely Constitutional form of Republican government (which they exclusively favored) can be (more than that, should be) monarchical in the organization of its executive department, vd. Jefferson's letter to De Tracy in 1811 (in *Democracy*, ed. by S. K. Padover, New York, 1939: pp. 91-94); and W. F. Oberling, *The Philosophy of Law of James Wilson*, p. 245: "To be effectively exercised, the executive power should be in the hands of only one." Clearest of all, perhaps, is the statement made by the writers of the *Fedralist Papers*. Defining Republican government as purely Constitutional, in contrast to either the aristocratic or monarchical modes of Royal, or absolute, government (No. 39 by Madison), they nevertheless oppose the notion that "a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. . . . A feeble Executive," they write, "implies a feeble execution of government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a Government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad Government" (No. 70 by Hamilton). They, therefore, find nothing to fear, and everything to praise, in the constitutional provision that "the Executive authority, with few exceptions, be vested in a single magistrate" (No. 69 by Hamilton).

[477a] As we shall subsequently show (vd. pp. 100-1 *infra*), the Ciceronian version of the mixed regime—with all its difficulties—is better than the Thomistic on the crucial point that it conceives the mixed regime as purely constitutional government, whereas for St. Thomas it was a *regimen regale et politicum*. Though both Cicero and St. Thomas include a monarchical element, that element is not the same in both cases; it is a chief administrative *offical* in the one case, a *sovereign man* in the other. This last fact has a bearing on the difference between Cicero and St. Thomas with respect to "pure monarchy." For Cicero it is always less just than the

On the first count, we must remember that St. Thomas thought primarily in terms of the *regimen regale et politicum* and so his mixed regime is, first of all, an intermediate regime. This is indicated by two facts: (1) his mixed regime always involves a monarchical element (like Cicero's, but unlike Aristotle's); and (2) this monarchical element is not *merely* a constitutional office-holder, limited both in juridical power and in governmental function, as are Cicero's consuls and the 18th century's chief executive, but always a quasi-royal sovereign man, absolute in power, though limited in function, according to the kingly status and office in the *regimen regale et politicum*. In so far as it combined royal and constitutional elements, what St. Thomas called " a mixed regime " was not a mixed regime at all, but the anomaly we have called an " intermediate regime." Nevertheless, looked at on its constitutional side, it was a mixed regime because it involved (in addition to the *regal one*, as representing the royal aspect) the *noble few* and the *common many*. St. Thomas tended to be more Aristotelian here than Cicero in that he distinguished between the aristocratic element (virtue) and the oligarchical element (wealth), regarding both as components of the mixed regime.[478]

mixed regime, and there are passages in which it is identified with despotic government. Vd. fn. 474 *supra*. But in the writings of St. Thomas, there are passages which seem to say that " pure monarchy " can be superior to the mixed regime. There are, of course, many difficulties to be faced in the interpretation of these passages. We shall deal with them presently.

[478] " There is a form of government made up of all these "—the royal element, which he calls monarchy, the aristocratic, the oligarchical, and the democratic, or popular, elements. Vd. *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 95, 4. It should be noted in this passage, that two of the pure forms are not included in the mixture: tyranny is excluded because corrupt; and no distinction is made between what Aristotle called " polity " and what Aristotle called " democracy." But if tyranny does not enter into the mixture, because corrupt, how about oligarchy, which, in the table of pure regimes, is in the same column with tyranny? And if St. Thomas means " polity " not " democracy "— excluding the latter along with tyranny because unjust—why is not oligarchy excluded for a similar reason? These difficulties cannot be resolved except in terms of the Aristotelian theory which St. Thomas follows only in part, and in part neglects or fails to understand, due to his mediaeval limitations.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the other leading text on the mixed regime (I-II, 105, 1) omits any mention of oligarchy, determining the mixture as

On the question whether the mixed regime is superior to the pure regimes, it is difficult to tell what St. Thomas's answer is; for, though he says of "the form of government made up of all these," that "it is best,"[479] he also says, not only that the kingdom is the best of the pure forms, but also that "a kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt."[480] This would seem to indicate that the mixed regime is superior to the pure forms only on one point of efficiency, namely, protection against corruption, whereas "monarchy" is the best of the pure forms, as is said in the *De Regimine Principum*, on all other grounds of efficiency.[481]

composed, on its constitutional side, by two elements: the aristocratic factor, or government by the best, and the popular or "democratic" factor, or some participation in government by the people. The regime is described as being "partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all"—and though this description is ambiguous, we know that the one is not a mere office-holder but a quasi-royal sovereign; "partly aristocracy in so far as a number of persons are set up in authority; partly democracy, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have a right to choose their rulers." These descriptions of the last two elements are also ambiguous. It is impossible to tell from the language whether St. Thomas's theory is, like Cicero's, a statement of the diverse governmental functions of the few and the many, or whether it is a peculiar mediaeval version of the composition of the few and the many on the constitutional side of the *regimen regale et politicum*, turning on the diverse political status and the responsibilities of the nobles or barons and the rest of the freemen—the landed gentry vs. the bourgeoisie. The many sharp differences between Roman republican society and the feudal social structure which St. Thomas had in mind suggest that the latter interpretation is probably right. But in any case, as we shall show, St. Thomas's theory resembles Aristotle's in its conventional vocabulary more than it does in its essential principles. The omission of oligarchy from the discussion in I-II, 105, 1, indicates how far it departs from the Aristotelian theory.

[479] *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 95, 4.

[480] *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 105, 1 ad 2.

[481] Vd. *loc. cit.*, I, 2. Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 42, where it is said that unity can be arrived at in regimes other than monarchy, but with more difficulty and always imperfectly; and *ibid.*, IV, 76, where it is said that, the end of a regime being peace, this can best be secured by one ruler. Yet in his Commentary on the *Politics* (Book IV, Ch. 10), St. Thomas says, without critical dissent, that "the best regime is that which admits fewest seditions, and such is the regime where the middle class rules." And although, in commenting on Book IV, Ch. 1, he says that "a kingdom is the best polity, and most according to right reason," he says, in commenting on Book III, Ch. 14, that "it is manifest that aristocracy is better than the kingdom." Furthermore, both monarchy and aristocracy are pure regimes, and yet St. Thomas says (commenting on Book III, Ch. 8) that each of the

The criterion of justice seems not to enter into St. Thomas's comparison of the good types of government, pure or mixed;

unmixed regimes is insufficient for truly solving political difficulties, and hence that it is expedient that the unmixed regimes be mixed (vd. commentary on Book II, Ch. 7). St. Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's *Politics*, it would seem, cannot be taken as an expression of his own views, as Demongeot (*op. cit.*) would have it; nor, as a matter of fact, can it be taken as solving the *apparent* difficulties—all the surface inconsistencies—in Aristotle's text. On the contrary, St. Thomas's commentary leaves all the major difficulties unresolved, so far as the analysis of the forms of government is concerned, and particularly with respect to the question, what is the best form of government, on which Demongeot tries to draw light from the commentary.

The apparent contradiction in Aristotle (between saying that monarchy is best and saying that polity, i. e., the mixed regime, is best) or the similar apparent contradiction in St. Thomas (substituting for polity the peculiar mediaeval notion of the mixed regime, i. e., the *regimen regale et politicum*) can be resolved by supposing two utterly incommensurable standards for determining the best regime, but such a resolution is utterly worthless from the point of view of politics as a practical science. The standard by which one judges the mixed regime (however conceived) to be best is derived from the nature of man as he is and from the nature of human society as it is found on earth, regarding both in terms of their greatest actual potentialities for development. But the standard which one must use to say that monarchy (obviously, the absolute monarchy of a purely Royal regime) is best can only be based on a self-contradictory supposition, that some men can be like gods in relation to other men. Not only is this supposition admittedly contrary to fact, but it is self-contradictory because if there were a difference between two beings, in any way like a difference between God and man, the two beings could hardly be conceived as essentially the same. Such a regime would not, in short, be human government, because it would not be by man over man; it would not be the government of a society whose members, rulers and ruled, were of the same essential nature. If, however, it be said that the godlike man differs from his fellows only in a way which can be overcome by the development of the latter, then the godlike ruler must seek to develop the ruled to a point of equality with himself, and then the Royal regime would abolish itself in favor of Constitutional government; hence it could hardly be said to be best.

The source of all the difficulty is, as we have seen, Aristotle's Platonic use of the word "ideal" to describe Divine government. Vd. fn. 466a *supra*, and cf Section 3, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 506 ff. Of course, it is true that Divine government is perfect government, and that human government is, by comparison, imperfect government, as all things human are in comparison with the Divine. But, in the first place, the Divine government of the universe of creatures is not "government" in the univocal sense of that word when it is used to name civil, or even domestic, regimes. And, in the second place, Divine government, albeit perfect, is not a political ideal, in the proper meaning of "ideal" as that form of government which is the best possible according to the nature and potentialities of man and temporal life. If absolute monarchy is good at all as human government, it must be good relative to certain actual circumstances; but it is not the ideal, or *the best absolutely*

and yet there is one passage which suggests the contrary—in which he says that regimes should be judged, not only as to

(which for practical politics is equivalent to *ideal*), unless it is the best that is practically possible relative to human conditions at their highest development. In political theory as a practical discipline, therefore, it can be truly said that absolute monarchy is the ideal *only if it can be proved* that the Royal regime is the best form of government absolutely, the best that is possible for human beings as they are or can be. The apparent contradictions about the best regime, in both Aristotle and St. Thomas, cannot be resolved within the orbit of political theory, properly conceived as practical. They can only be written off as confusions due to a failure to criticize the Platonic notion of ideal, which derives from a *purely theoretic* comparison between Divine and human government. Vd. our earlier discussion of "ideal" in Part I, Section 5, in THE THOMIST, III, 3, pp. 436-40; and our consideration of Democracy as ideal, in Part II, Section 6, in THE THOMIST, III, 4, p. 652.

If Aristotle had never called monarchy "the ideal and true form" or "the perfect form," but always "the Divine-like form of government," and if he had explicitly emphasized the point Plato made in *The Statesman*, that the Divine-like form of government is not the *actual best* for human beings and human society, then the language of the *Politics* would have revealed more plainly, and not have concealed, the true outlines of the Aristotelian analysis. The words "ideal" or "best form" or even "perfect form" would have been used only for that form of government which is *both* absolutely best and also practically possible. Then, of course, they would never have been applied to monarchy or Royal government, and there would have been no apparent contradictions in the language used to discuss the problem of the best form of *human* government; though it might still have been said that the best form of *human* government is imperfect in comparison with *Divine* government as perfect. Moreover, it would have been observed that the best form of human government is not made in the image of Divine government but, on the contrary, is that form which is most unlike the Divine form, for the human form which is most like the Divine form (absolute monarchy) is, as measured by the human and practicable ideal, the poorest of the good forms of civil government. Vd. fn. 489, 515, 516, and 533 *infra*.

St. Thomas's commentary fails to resolve the apparent contradictions in the *Politics* because it fails to see that the only meaning the word "ideal" can have when applied to absolute monarchy is a meaning that has no relevance whatsoever to the genuinely political and practical problem of the best regime for the civil government of men as they are or can be. Demongeot's attempt to solve this problem, according to the thought of St. Thomas, fails also for similar reasons and because, in addition, Demongeot minimizes or neglects the differences between what St. Thomas says as a commentator on Aristotle and what he says in his own person as an analyst of mediaeval political institutions. In the latter connection, there are passages which certainly seem to say that monarchy, not the mixed regime, is the best *human* government.

The apparent inconsistencies in St. Thomas's own formulations—quite apart from his commentary on the *Politics*—can, of course, be resolved on the supposition that the word "monarchy" always signifies for him a *regimen regale et politicum*, and

whether they *ensure peace*, or are *enduring and stable*, but also in terms of whether " all take some share in the government." [482] This at least reminds us of Cicero's discussion of the superiority in justice of the mixed over all the pure regimes.[483]

never purely absolutely Royal government. Vd. fn. 420 and 421 *supra*. But then it is difficult to understand how any distinction can be made, in Thomistic terms, between pure monarchy and a mixed regime. Moreover, St. Thomas obviously does suppose that " the king should be in his kingdom . . . what God is in the world " (*De Reg. Princ.*, I, 12). But God is an absolute, not a constitutional or limited, ruler. What Fortescue called a " political kingdom " should, therefore, be regarded by St. Thomas as a defective kingdom precisely because it is a *regimen politicum* as well as a *regimen regale*. Whenever the Divine government of the universe is regarded, not merely as perfect government in itself, but also as a measure of perfection in the human government of the political community, it is impossible to avoid the false conclusion that the least perfect among good forms of human government—i. e., absolute monarchy—is the best.

[482] *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 105, 1.

[483] Vd. fn. 473 *supra*. If now we compare the Thomistic theory of the mixed regime with Cicero's, according to the three basic points set forth in fn. 474 *supra*, we shall see that it is completely different on the first point, for the Thomistic mixed regime is never *purely* constitutional government; that it probably differs on the second point, according to the difference between Roman and mediaeval institutions; and that, on the third point, it is not quite clear whether St. Thomas holds, as Cicero does, that the mixed regime is always more just, *absolutely*, as well as more efficient, than the pure regimes.

What is most important to call to the attention of those who suppose that, wherever their language is the same, St. Thomas and Aristotle agree in thought, is the fact that when St. Thomas praises the mixed regime as best he is always referring to the *regimen regale et politicum*, whereas Aristotle always means by a mixed regime one which is purely Constitutional government, and has no Royal element in it whatsoever.

Writers on the history of political theory who, like Carlyle and D'Entréves, devote themselves primarily to mediaeval texts—and, curiously enough, make little or no effort to understand these texts in the light of their great source, Aristotle's *Politics*—tend to accept uncritically the mediaeval identification of the mixed regime with the *regimen regale et politicum*. Vd. fn. 416 *supra*. To McIlwain's credit it must be said that he has persistently fought against this confusion, recognizing that what we have called the " intermediate regime " is not a blend or fusion of Royal and Republican government. Vd. *The Growth of Political Thought in the West*, p. 362: " England was thus still a *dominium regale*, but it was now also a *dominium politicum*. . . . This is certainly a government ' under law ' but it is scarcely helpful to define it without qualification as a ' constitutional ' or ' limited ' rule, mixed of absolute monarchy and ' republican government.' " Nevertheless, even McIlwain permits himself to regard " modern ' constitutional ' or ' limited ' monarchy . . . as a mixture of absolute monarchy and republican government " (*ibid.*, p. 359). This, it seems to us, is a violent abuse of words, for absolute monarchy is thoroughly

Modern Thomists have tried to make much more out of the Thomistic theory of the mixed regime than St. Thomas's own writings would seem to warrant. They have done this partly by relying on St. Thomas's commentary on the *Politics*, forgetting or ignoring how mediaeval-minded are St. Thomas's interpretations of Aristotle on political matters. Hence the theory they thus construct, and attribute to St. Thomas, may be Thomistic, but it is not Aristotelian.[484] In part, however, they have rightly insisted that a true theory of the mixed regime must subordinate as accidental the numerical criterion (one, few, many) and emphasize the criterion of heterogeneous qualities, such as virtue, or freedom, or wealth. Thus they give a qualitative interpretation to aristocracy, democracy (*or* polity), and oligarchy. But, in order to be faithful to St. Thomas, they must try to get monarchy into the mixture. This they do by making it equivalent to the principle of *unity*, as democracy is equivalent to the principle of *freedom*, aristocracy to *virtue*, and oligarchy to *wealth*. In these terms, they present two versions of the mixed regime: one in which the mixture consists of unity, virtue, and freedom; and another in which it consists of freedom, virtue, and wealth.[485] Within each of these two,

incompatible with Constitutional government, except in the manner in which both are compromised to fit with each other in the *regimen regale et politicum*. Cf. *Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern*, pp. 90-94.

[484] Vd. M. Demongeot, *La Théorie du meilleur regime selon S. Thomas*, Paris, 1928. Cf. fn. 470 and 481 *supra*. That Demongeot's theory of the mixed regime, according to St. Thomas, is not according to Aristotle is plainly indicated by the fact that Demongeot accepts the "traditional picture" of the six pure regimes, three good and three bad, which the *Politics* so completely repudiates when Book III is read in the light of Book I and Books IV, V, and VI. Neither Demongeot nor St. Thomas seem to be aware how Platonic and un-Aristotelian is the bi-columnar sixfold classification.

[485] Vd. Maritain, *Freedom in the Modern World*, New York, 1936: p. 72, wherein the first version is stated; and Maritain, *The Things That Are Not Caesar's*, New York, 1931: pp. 133, 144-5, wherein the second version is indicated. On both, cf. Demongeot, *op. cit.*, with whom Maritain agrees. The reason for the two versions is that these writers find it necessary to account for the mixed regime which is more fundamentally an intermediate regime, the *regimen regale et politicum*—mixed only on its constitutional side; and also for the mixed regime which is a purely constitutional state, i. e., Aristotle's polity. This latter mixed regime is recognized by St. Thomas in his commentary on the *Politics*, but nowhere mentioned in his own

they find subordinate distinctions according as emphasis is primarily placed on unity or freedom, virtue or wealth, and so they speak of a mixed regime which is monarchical with aristocratic or democratic qualities, or one which is democratic with oligarchical aspects.

Though these modern Thomists are right in regarding the numerical criterion as accidental, their qualitative interpretation of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy makes it impossible for them to give an intelligible account of what they

political writings, because *purely* constitutional government had no political reality in the middle ages. Neither Demongeot nor Maritain observe that the essential distinction between royal and political government is basic to Aristotle's account of pure and mixed regimes; they do not seem to realize how special and anomalous was the *regimen regale et politicum*; and hence their modern versions are neither strictly Thomistic nor strictly Aristotelian.

All of Maritain's errors concerning the mixed regime and concerning the best regime flow from the same source—his fundamental failure to understand the Aristotelian distinction between Royal and Political government, and hence his failure to see that a *regimen regale et politicum* is primarily an intermediate, not a mixed, regime, and, as intermediate, inferior to any purely constitutional government, as well as superior to any purely absolute government. If he understood these things, he could not say that the *regimen regale et politicum*, which he calls a "mixed regime," is better than a polity, or purely republican government. Vd. *The Things That Are Not Caesar's*, 144-5; cf. *ibid.*, 131-3. Throughout his discussion of these matters, Maritain, like Demongeot, relies on St. Thomas's mediaeval version of what Aristotle thought rather than going directly to Aristotle's *Politics* to find the political theory which St. Thomas adapted to mediaeval conditions, which adaptation, by the way, is on many crucial points much more Platonic than it is Aritotelian.

In fairness to Maritain, it must be admitted that his political views have changed radically in the last fifteen years—between the writing of *The Things That Are Not Caesar's* and the writing of *Scholasticism and Politics*. Yet even in the latter book, Maritain vainly tries to reconcile his insight that Democracy, not democracy, is the best form, the most just constitution, of human government, with his earlier adherence to the Thomistic error that it is indifferent whether political authority is monarchic or democratic in type so long as it is justly derived. Vd. *op. cit.*, p. 105 ff. Even this statement must be qualified by the fact that Maritain's use of such words as "monarchy" and "democracy" is so ambiguous that it is possible for him to take what, with any precision of terms, would be apparently inconsistent positions. Such ambiguity is, of course, necessary if one tries to reach political truths the ancients did not know, while at the same time one is unwilling to say explicitly that the political theories of Aristotle or of St. Thomas were, in certain respects, both inadequate and false. For a sympathetic commentary on the development of Maritain's political views, vd. Waldemar Gurian, "On Maritain's Political Philosophy," in THE THOMIST, V, pp. 7-22.

regard as the three good pure regimes. By their own analysis, they are compelled to say that government which is *purely* monarchial has *only unity*, and lacks virtue and freedom; that one which is *purely* aristocratic has *only virtue*, and lacks unity and freedom; that one which is *purely* democratic has *only freedom*, and lacks unity and virtue. They would, of course, recognize this to be a *reductio ad absurdum*, because they know that every good government must involve the unity of peace, the virtue of ruling and obeying for the common good, and the freedom of men who are ruled as ends rather than used as means. Hence, by their own premises, no pure government for the common good is possible. If they try to avoid this by appealing to the numerical criterion for distinguishing the three pure forms of good government, they can be reduced to the further absurdity that monarchy is government by one for the common good, and hence necessarily involves unity, virtue, freedom; and similarly, with aristocracy and democracy as governments for the common good by the few and by the many.[486] Hence, governments which are pure

[486] There are only two possibilities here. Either the four terms (unity, virtue, freedom, and wealth) name qualities of government or ends of government. But, strictly speaking, every good civil government must have unity, must depend on virtuous rulers and citizens or subjects, must institute a dominion of freedom (either citizenship or subjection), and must be concerned with procuring and justly distributing the means of subsistence (and in no other sense is wealth involved in just government). Furthermore, the unity of peace, which is the common good, and the life of virtue, which is happiness, must be the ends of every just government. How, then, can just governments be distinguished as "pure forms" on the ground that they exclusively embody one of these qualities or aim at one of these ends, but not another? How can "mixed regimes" be conceived as resulting from the blending of qualities or the union of ends which belong to every just government? And how can one "mixed regime" be distinguished from another in terms of its placing greater emphasis upon one of these two ends? Within the bounds of justice, the only possible difference in emphasis seems to be with respect to freedom, as between imperfect and perfect freedom (subjection vs. citizenship), and this is involved in the distinction between Royal and Constitutional government. Beyond that, there is, of course, the oligarchical emphasis on wealth (as reason for special privileges) and the democratic emphasis on freedom (really nothing but an insistence on equality despite differences in wealth). But both of these emphases are, according to Aristotle, expressions of the injustices which are peculiar to oligarchy and democracy as perverted constitutions. Cf. fn. 500 and 508 *infra*.

and distinct by the numerical criterion are all similarly mixed by the qualitative criterion. Then they are forced either to the alternative that the mixed regime is mixed only in the sense that it combines the three numerical elements, or to the alternative that there are diverse mixed regimes which differ only in the emphasis that is placed on one or another of the three indispensable qualities. Neither alternative is satisfactory, either as a matter of interpretation or as a matter of fact, for neither agrees with the analyses of Aristotle or St. Thomas, and neither accurately describes any known political realities.

The truth of any solution of the problem of the forms of government is tested by the following demands: (1) it must account for all historically exemplified types of government; (2) it must separate essential from accidental distinctions in the classification of types, separating *forms* which are more and less just from *modes* which are only more and less expedient or efficient; (3) it must give an account of pure regimes which is compatible with its theory of a mixture of these pure regimes; (4) it must distinguish between mixtures which involve accidental elements, and so raise only a question of the efficiency of the mixed regime in comparison with the pure ones; and mixtures which involve essential elements, and so raise a question of the greater justice of the mixed regime; (5) it must agree at every point with the facts about political progress and corruption.

By these standards, the "traditional picture" of the six pure regimes and, with it, all the theories of the mixed regime which are developed out of this picture, are for the most part false. We have so far mainly criticized them as being un-Aristotelian, but now we shall show why that is tantamount to their being false. The *Politics* provides us with a measure for these subsequent departures in political theory because it provides us with a solution of this central problem that meets every demand except the first of those mentioned. There are two historical institutions which Aristotle did not account for, because he could not conceive them in his day. One was the

regimen regale et politicum of the middle ages, arising from an unpredictable concurrence of historical contingencies. The other is the form of constitutional government that we call Democracy, and recognize as essentially distinct from the Republican form of the political regime. But though Aristotle did not account for these types of government, his theory is capable of being extended to cover them, as we have already shown with respect to the intermediate regime (*regale et politicum*) and as we shall subsequently show (in Part V) with respect to Democracy.[487] Since we have already dealt with the anomalous case of the *regimen regale et politicum*, and since we are postponing until later the problem concerning Republic vs. Democracy, we can now proceed to show, on all other counts, the truth of the Aristotelian classification of governments. We shall do this, first, by criticizing the errors and inadequacies in the Platonic or traditional six fold classification of the pure regimes; and, then, by showing the mixed regime to be simply a *more just* form of constitutional government than those pure regimes which are also constitutional.[488]

Let us look back at the table presented on page 57. The following things are wrong with that picture.

(1) The sixfold classification conceals the basic distinction between the Royal and the Political or Constitutional regime. Its underlying presence, however, is betrayed by the qualitative difference between monarchy and aristocracy, on the one hand, and polity on the other. Where there is a radical inequality in virtue, as between ruler and ruled, there absolute government is justified. Thus we see that monarchy and aristocracy are

[487] The first of these extensions did not require us to violate a single principle of Aristotelian analysis; though it did require us to distinguish between perfect and imperfect embodiments of royal and political institutions. The second of these extensions will, however, involve us in the denial of what some may think is an essential Aristotelian tenet—his doctrine of natural slavery.

[488] As might be expected, the principle which corrects all the errors and inadequacies in the "traditional" view is the essential distinction between Royal and Political (or Constitutional) government. Neglect of this principle causes all the trouble. The very fact that the usual sixfold classification is undetermined by this distinction makes it so egregiously wrong that no slight emendations can rectify its failings.

two accidental modes of an essential form of government, i. e., the Royal regime; for they differ only in the accident of numbers: whether absolute government is by one man of superior virtue, or by a few. Aristotle makes this quite clear when, before beginning the discussion of constitutional government in Book IV, he says: "Of monarchy and of aristocracy we have already spoken, for the inquiry into the perfect state is the same thing with the discussion of these two types of government, since both imply a principle of virtue. . . . In what follows, we have to describe constitutional government." [489]

[489] *Politics*, IV, 2, 1289[a]30-35. Royal rule, Aristotle reminds us here, "if not a mere name, must exist by reason of some great personal superiority in the king" (1289[b]); but he has already told us that royal rule is justified wherever "there be some one person, or more than one (although not enough to make up the full complement of the state), whose virtue is so pre-eminent that the virtue or the political capacity of all the rest admits of no comparison with theirs" (III, 13, 1284[a]3-6). The discussion, in Book III, of what Aristotle calls the "perfect state" because of its resemblance to the Divine rule (vd. fn. 360, 361, 363, and 466[a], *supra*) pays very little attention to the distinction between monarchy and aristocracy as accidental modes of Royal or absolute government. In one place, however, Aristotle does say that aristocracy is better than monarchy because the judgment of several men is usually better than the judgment of one, on the supposition that the several are equal in virtue to the one. Vd. Book III, 15, 1286[b]5-7. This point must be understood in the light of Aristotle's arguments in favor of the principle of a decision by the majority in deliberative matters. Cf. Book III, 11, and Book IV, 4, 8. But Aristotle is not saying that aristocracy is more just than monarchy, either relatively or absolutely. He is saying only that one of these two accidental modes of absolute government is likely to be *more efficient* than the other because the judgment of several men of superior virtue has practical advantages over the judgment by one such man.

For the most part Aristotle seems to be clear that "royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy" (*Politics*, V, 10, 1310[b]3), and hence that "the term 'aristocracy' is rightly applied to the form of government which is described in the first part of our treatise" (IV, 7, 1293[b]4)—namely, Book III, Ch. 17 and 18, where purely Royal, or absolute, government is described in terms of the radical superiority in virtue of one ruler (or a few) over the many who are ruled as subjects. Nevertheless, in Book IV, Chapters 7 and 8, there are sentences in which Aristotle allows himself to use the word "aristocracy" as if it could name a purely Constitutional government, or a form of such government distinct in type from polity, democracy, or oligarchy. This, as we shall see, is absolutely impossible, quite apart from the unfortunate and confusing ambiguity that results for the word "aristocracy." Vd. fn. 482 *infra*.

There is another confusion throughout this discussion which must be clarified. Aristotle uses the words "perfect state" or "perfect form of government" to

Despite the tendency to use the word " royal " as if it were synonymous with " kingly rule " in the sense of " monarchy,"—a tendency unfortunately not resisted by Aristotle or his translators—it is absolutely necessary to make the Aristotelian vocabulary as rigorous as his analysis. The word " royal " must

signify Royal, rather than Constitutional government. We find him, in the passage quoted in the text, saying that " the inquiry into the perfect state is the same thing with the discussion of these two types of government "—namely, monarchy and aristocracy. So also he speaks of tyranny as " the perversion of the first and most divine " (*Politics*, IV, 2, $1289^{a}40$)—i. e., monarchy. And again he speaks of all constitutional governments (polity, democracy and oligarchy) as " falling short of the most perfect form of government " (*ibid.*, IV, 8, $1293^{b}25$). These remarks will not be understood—as for the most part they have not been by Aristotle's commentators—unless we remember that the word " perfect " here means " ideal " in the Platonic sense of a totally impracticable good—a mythical pattern of good government which cannot be realized on earth, because there are no godlike men or philosopher-kings who are vastly superior to all normal men. Plato himself, as we have seen, held that *limited* (i. e., characteristically *human*) government, though it is second-best to this mythical ideal of absolute government by a god, is the only good government practically possible on earth, men being as they are. And Aristotle differed with this judgment only to insist that, relative to primitive conditions, Royal, or absolute, government may be a good regime on earth; but then, of course, it is clearly second-best to Constitutional government. Cf. Section 3, *supra*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 506-10. Vd. fn. 466^{a} and 481 *supra*.

Hence it follows that when Aristotle uses the word " perfect " as in these passages, the word must be understood as having merely descriptive, and not evaluative, signification. It must be read as if Aristotle were using it as shorthand for " that form of government which resembles the perfection of an impracticable ideal but which, on earth, is the least perfect of the good forms of government, being just only in relation to the least desirable civil circumstances." Unless the word " perfect " is so interpreted, there is no way of lifting the *Politics* above the inconsistency which appears upon its surface—its calling the polity, or mixed regime, the best form of government, at the same time that it calls non-constitutional or Royal government (whether monarchy or aristocracy) the perfect form. Nor are the difficulties to be avoided by the sort of interpretation which St. Thomas makes, according to Demongeot. Vd. fn. 515 *infra*.

There is one other inconsistency to be noted. Aristotle says that " the perfect state is one in which the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen " (*Politics*, IV, 7, $1293^{b}5$). But this, as we have seen (vd. Section 2, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 493-5), is true only in the Constitutional commonwealth, and never in the Royal kingdom; for in the latter, there are no citizens; only the king, or the aristocrats, has the virtue needed for both ruling and obeying, whereas all the others (subjects) have only the virtue needed for obeying, and hence their virtue as subjects is not equivalent to the virtue of a good man. The true citizen, however, can both rule and obey, and so his virtue is that of a good man. Hence the Constitutional state is the perfect state.

be used as strictly synonymous with "absolute." And if a kingdom is a state under Royal government, then it is a kingdom even if there is no king, i. e., no monarch, the government being in the hands of a few men, rather than one, of superior virtue. One of the most treacherous ambiguities in the use of the word "monarchy," therefore, is to identify it with the Royal regime, for that ignores the fact that "aristocracy" also names a mode of the Royal regime. We shall subsequently show that both "monarchy" and "aristocracy" have still other meanings in connection with aspects of constitutional government, but these meanings also concern accidental, and not essential, elements in the classification of governments. Furthermore, not only are monarchy and aristocracy accidental modes of Royal government, but they include many subordinate accidental varieties, as, for example, whether the monarch is hereditary or elective.[490] As between these accidental modes of Royal government (monarchy and aristocracy), or with respect to all their subordinate accidental variations, there is only a question of the greater efficiency of one rather than another, never a question of greater justice.

(2) If we apply the primary essential distinction between Royal and Constitutional to the remainder of the sixfold classification, we find that three of the traditional names signify Constitutional government—"polity," "democracy," and "oligarchy." But this must remain unintelligible, and even contradictory, so long as we suppose that oligarchy, which is a Constitutional regime, is a perversion of aristocracy, which is a Royal regime. Crucial chapters in Book IV of the *Politics*, which we have already discussed, show how preposterous such a supposition is. In these chapters (4, 5, and 6), Aristotle describes the corruption of Constitutional government, and

[490] For Aristotle's discussion of the accidental variations in the accidental mode of Royal government which is monarchy, vd. *Politics*, III, 14. Cf. St. Thomas's commentary on this chapter, especially on the problem of hereditary vs. elected kings. Vd. also on this same problem, Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Pt. II, Ch. 19. It is not difficult to see how Hobbes could argue for hereditary succession, but it is difficult to see how Aristotle or St. Thomas could reconcile the facts of heredity with the principle of superior virtue essential to Royal government.

shows that both democracy and oligarchy, as modes of constitutional government, tend toward the same ultimate corruption: both can become Lawless, or non-Constitutional; in both the constitution can be supplanted by the rule of men exercising their own *de facto* power rather than the *de jure* power of constitutional offices. When this happens, Constitutional government corrupts into despotism and there is no essential difference between the despotism which is the perversion of oligarchy and the despotism which is the perversion of democracy, because that which makes the corrupt government unjust or despotic is precisely the same in both cases, namely, absolute or non-Constitutional government by some men over their equals in virtue.[491] Furthermore, it is a matter of indifference whether despotic power is wielded by one man, a few, or many. Furthermore, the injustice of despotism is not the same as the injustice of tyranny, for absolute government, even when unjust, does not necessarily reduce the ruled to the condition of servitude, as tyranny always does because it does not serve the common good of the ruled.

These things being so, the sixfold classification presented in the " traditional picture " is utterly erroneous in its account of the perversions. Since both oligarchy and democracy can degenerate into despotism and tyranny, they cannot be classified as regimes coordinate with tyranny, grouped together under the single criterion that each is a rule against the common good, differing only according as it is by one, or few, or many, or even according to wealth and poverty. To identify " tyranny " with " rule by one man against the common good " is to confuse the essential and the accidental, in the same way

[491] Vd. Part IV, Section 2 *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 500-2. Cf. *Politics*, IV, 4, 1292^{a}9-32: " In democracies which are subject to the law, the best citizens hold the first place, and there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people become a monarch and is many in one. . . . This sort of democracy, which is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of Law, seeks to exercise Royal power, and grows into a despot. . . . The decrees of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant; and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other. . . . Such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitutional government at all, for where the laws have no authority, there is no constitution."

that identifying " monarchy " with " Royal government " does. Properly to classify the perversions of government, we must separate two essentially distinct principles of injustice: (a) violation of the common good, which unjustly places the ruled in a condition of servitude; (b) violation of the equality between ruler and ruled, which unjustly places the ruled in a condition of subjection. Each must always be called by the same name, regardless of such accidental circumstances as the number of men committing the injustice, or their wealth or poverty. In every case, they are vicious men. This much is common to all the perversions—that vicious men are in power. But the ultimate end which politically vicious men seek—the exploitation of the common good for their private interests—can be readily attained only when the form of government they corrupt is Royal; it is usually not so directly attained when the form of government they corrupt is Constitutional. In the latter case, the partial injustice of despotism is a step toward the complete injustice of despotic tyranny, which we have already distinguished from simple tyranny, resulting from the corruption of Royal government.

Hence we must conclude, in terms of the analysis given in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of Book III, that oligarchy and democracy *can be* governments which are neither tyrannical nor despotic, and that, therefore, they do not belong in the right-hand column of the sixfold classification, if that column is determined by the injustice of tyranny (as is conventionally the case, since it is defined by " rule against the common good "), or even by the two principles of injustice which we have distinguished, and distinctly named by " tyranny " and " despotism." And we are obligated to refrain from using the words " democracy " and " oligarchy " to name modes of Constitutional government for the common good and also to name modes of despotism and despotic tyranny, simply because in the corruption of democracy or oligarchy into despotism and despotic tyranny, such accidental elements as the few and the many, or the wealthy and the poor, play a role. If principles of justice are involved in an essential classification of forms of government,

then it is of the greatest importance not to use the same words to refer to just governments and their perversions. By this rule of usage, oligarchy and democracy are not perversions of Constitutional government as such, but rather modes under that form.

(3) Now we come to the most difficult part of the Aristotelian analysis, the problem of the relation of oligarchy and democracy to polity, each a mode of Constitutional government. Are these three accidental modes of Constitutional government, as aristocracy and monarchy are accidental modes of Royal government? The Aristotelian answer is clearly negative. Democracy and oligarchy are each unjust, but their injustice is not the injustice of either tyranny or despotism. Although, as we shall show, democracy is not as bad as oligarchy, both are less just than polity. It is by fusing oligarchy and democracy that polity nullifies the opposite injustices of the two pure constitutional regimes. Polity is a *more just* constitution precisely because it is a mixed constitutional regime, whereas democracy and oligarchy are pure constitutional regimes.

The Aristotelian theory of the mixed regime is relevant only to Constitutional government. It has no application at all to Royal government. Failure to understand this point is the source of the greatest confusion in the sixfold classification, which is traditionally supposed to present *only* pure regimes. But the only regimes which should be called " pure " are those which can enter into a mixture, namely, democracy and oligarchy.[492] Moreover, polity is *always* a mixed regime, and yet

[492] The word " pure " is ambiguous, of course. It seems to be capable of two quite opposite uses—on the one hand, to signify regimes which can be united to form a mixture, such as democracy and oligarchy; on the other hand, to signify regimes which cannot in any way be blended because they are always actually contrary to one another, such as monarchy and aristocracy when regarded as accidental modes of government. Vd. St. Thomas's remark, in his commentary on *Politics*, V, 10, that " a kingdom and an aristocracy are contraries *per se*, each of which tends to replace the other."

The purity of monarchy and aristocracy as modes of Royal government (in the sense indicated) does not mean, however, that monarchical and aristocratic principles cannot be involved in Constitutional government. They do not enter it as

it is presented in the " traditional picture " as one of the pure regimes. These confusions necessarily lead to all the erroneous accounts of the mixed regime which we have previously surveyed. The theory of the mixed regime in Aristotle's

pure forms to be blended, in the way in which democracy and oligarchy fuse to make a polity, but rather appear as aspects of Constitutional government. The monarchical principle, as we have already seen (vd. fn. 477 *supra*), appears in Constitutional government wherever the chief magistracy, or the command of executive power, is given to *one* man. Similarly, the aristocratic principle appears in Constitutional government when, as in a "democracy according to Law, the best citizens hold the first place" (*Politics*, IV, 4, 1292^{a}10)—that is, are given the leading offices—for " the distribution of offices according to merit is the special characteristic of aristocracy " (*Politics*, IV, 8, 1294^{a}10).

The only sense in which we can consistently speak of an " aristocratic constitution," then, is this sense—referring to the fact that the better citizens (superior in *degree* of virtue *only*) occupy the more important offices. But this quality *can be* common to every form of Constitutional government, though it is more likely to occur in a polity than in a democracy or oligarchy. Hence there is no such thing, strictly, as an aristocratic constitution, that is, a constitution which is not a democracy, not an oligarchy, and not a polity. For precisely the same reason that Aristotle says " constitutional monarchy is not a distinct form of government "—because if it is Constitutional it is not Royal, though it can be monarchical in the accidental fact that it has one chief executive—we must say that " constitutional aristocracy " does not name a distinct form of government. For either the rulers are radically superior in virtue, and then the government is Royal, not Constitutional, or the office-holders are merely superior in the degree to which they possess the same virtue as the citizens, and then the government is generically Constitutional, and may be either a polity, a democracy, or an oligarchy, albeit aristocratic, not in form, but in an accidental feature of their character. If it be objected that aristocracy can be conceived as a distinct form of Constitutional government by defining it as the regime in which only the better men (superior in the degree to which they possess the same virtue as others) are admitted to citizenship, not merely chosen for governmental offices, the answer is that such a conception is absolutely self-contradictory; for it violates the essence of Constitutional government itself which is based on radical equality in virtue as between rulers and ruled. To limit citizenship to those who are superior *only in degree of virtue*, therefore, entails the injustice of an improper degradation of the rest, radically equal with their betters, to the status of subjection.

Despite Aristotle's confusions and inconsistencies on this point, which abound in Chapters 7 and 8 of Book IV, we find it necessary to insist that the word " aristocracy "—as the name of a type of government—be restricted to an accidental mode of the Royal regime; and that the word " aristocratic "—like the word " monarchical "—be used in connection with Constitutional government only to refer to a quality or feature that can be common to any form of such government (albeit usually present only in a polity), and so does not name a distinct constitution comparable in any way to polity, democracy, and oligarchy.

Politics is primarily concerned with a third criterion of injustice—distinct from the injustice of tyranny and from the injustice of despotism. It is an attempt to define, not the justice of Constitutional government in contrast to the justice of Royal government, but the justice of the constitution itself in contrast to the sort of injustice which can occur in a constitution when it is constructed democratically or oligarchically. Hence if what are merely accidental modes of a form of government cannot be compared with respect to justice, oligarchy, democracy, and polity must not be regarded as accidental modes of Constitutional government, as monarchy and aristocracy are accidental modes of Royal government.

(4) To understand what they are, it is necessary to examine the Aristotelian discussion of these three regimes, two pure and one mixed. " A Constitution," says Aristotle, " is an organization of offices which all the citizens distribute among themselves, according to the power which different classes possess, for example, the rich and the poor, *or* according to some principle or equality which includes both." [493] There are, as we have seen, two sorts of offices: the indefinite office of citizenship itself, and the definite offices of government. Hence one constitution will differ from another primarily according to the criterion by which men are admitted to or excluded from citizenship, and secondarily according to the criterion by which men are regarded as qualified to hold governmental office.[494]

[493] *Politics*, IV, 3, 1290^{a}7-10. And he goes on: " There will, therefore, be as many modes of (Constitutional) government as there are ways of arranging the offices "—according to these criteria.

[494] It should be observed at once that the way in which the governmental offices are themselves arranged, or grouped into different organs of government, has no bearing whatsoever on the justice of the constitution, though it may be quite relevant to the efficiency of the government. Thus, whether the government is set up with three principal organs, such as the Roman consulship, senate, and tribunate, or whether a legislature consists only of one house or is bicameral, or whether the chief executive is a prime minister, heading a body of ministers all of whom are seated in the legislature, or a president with a cabinet not seated in the legislature—all these are accidental differences in governmental organization that have no bearing whatsoever on the justice of the constitution. They do not enter, therefore, into Aristotle's theory of the mixed regime in relation to the pure regimes, for his

Now since a Constitutional regime is required, in justice, only where enough men are radically equal in virtue and have some capacity to rule as well as to obey, inequality in virtue cannot be the cause of diversity in constitutions. Only one qualitative criterion remains, namely, wealth, its possession or lack. Though this criterion is associated with vice in the simple-minded sixfold classification, in which oligarchy and democracy are classified as if they necessarily involved the injustice of tyranny, there is no necessary connection between vice (i. e., the cause of either despotism or tyranny) and wealth or poverty. By dissociating wealth and poverty from vice, we come to the true definitions of oligarchy and democracy as just governments, in that they are constitutional and neither tyrannical nor despotic, but governments which nevertheless involve *constitutional injustice*, i. e., injustice in the construction of their constitutions. " Democracy arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all: because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal in property, the wealthy suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. . . . These forms of government have a kind of justice but, measured by an absolute standard, they are faulty." [496]

analysis is concerned with the justice and injustice of diverse constitutions. Aristotle is concerned, not with how governmental offices are arranged, but with the qualifications of office-holders, and hence he is concerned with the qualifications for the most important of all offices—the basic office of citizenship. Failure to separate these considerations from the problem of governmental organization caused Polybius and Cicero to present a theory of the mixed regime which emphasized the accidentals rather than the essentials of the problem. Vd. fn. 471 *supra*. What is true of the Ciceronian version is also true to some extent of the Thomistic and the modern versions. But, unlike the modern versions, both the Ciceronian and Thomistic versions contain, though they conceal, the essential fact about the mixed regime—namely, that it is a mixture of diverse classes in the population (patricians and plebeians, nobles and commons), giving to each some share in the government, as well as admitting both to citizenship, though not on equal terms in either respect.

[496] *Politics*, V, 1, 1301^{a}29-37. Cf. *ibid.*, 1301^{b}36-1302^{a}7: " Men agree that justice is proportional, but they differ in that some think that if they are equal in any respect, they are equal absolutely; others that if they are unequal in any respect, they should be unequal in all. Hence there are two principal forms of government,

There are two respects in which the members of a constitutional state are equal: (a) political capacity, and (b) freedom. Precisely understood, freedom is based on equality in natural powers of all men who are not natural slaves. The respects in which the members of a constitutional state may be unequal are also twofold: either (a) in wealth, or (b) in the intensity of the virtue or political capacity which all possess to some degree. Now, abstracting for the moment from inequality in degree of virtue or political capacity, the *essential* distinction between democracy and oligarchy turns on whether citizenship and governmental office shall be open to *all* free men or whether citizenship and governmental office shall be restricted to *some* free men, who have more wealth (and with it, of course, more leisure) than the others. Subordinate to this *essential* distinction, there are many accidental variants of both democracy and oligarchy; the most extreme type of democracy is one which admits even artisans and mechanics to citizenship simply because they are not domestic servants;[496] the most extreme type

democracy and oligarchy, for good birth and virtues are rare, but wealth and numbers are more common. . . . The inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed: numerical in some cases, and proportionate in others." Cf. *Politics*, III, 9, 10, 13.

[496] Vd. *Politics*, IV, 6, 1293^{a}1-6. We must remember that, in Aristotle's opinion, all the laboring classes in the population should be regarded as servants of the state; if not actually enslaved, they should at least be disfranchised. Vd. *Politics*, VI, 4, 1319^{b}2-10; and VII, 8, 9. Aristotle, therefore, regarded the Periclean democracy as extreme, because it granted citizenship to all the native born who were not in domestic servitude. Even so, we must remember, the Athenian citizenship at the time of Pericles was approximately 40,000; whereas the disfranchised consisted of 25,000 metics or resident aliens, largely engaged in commerce or manufacturing, and upward of 100,000 slaves, private or public. Aristotle's disapproval of the Periclean democracy was not based merely on the fact that the poorer citizens had to be paid for service in public office, to recompense them for their loss of income; nor on the related fact that the poor lacked leisure and suffered from the demeaning effects of manual or menial labor (vd. *Politics*, IV, 4, 1291^{b}40). His most serious objection was directed against the democratic practice of selecting men for administrative or judicial office by a lottery which involved the entire citizenship. This practice presupposed that the equality which entitled all to be citizens also made it indifferent which were chosen for the various magistracies or official functions. Aristotle rightly criticized the selection of officials by lot as the crucial weakness, the typical injustice, of democracy, for it converted equality in one respect (free birth) into equality in all respects. Even if wealth or noble birth should not

of oligarchy is one which insists upon a very high property qualification for office-holders, and a fairly large amount of wealth as a condition of citizenship.[497] There are, in short, many types of both democracy and oligarchy, varying not only in terms of the definition of "freeman" or in terms of property qualifications, but also with regard to the way in which governmental offices are arranged, whether selection for office is determined by election or by lot, etc.[498] But though these sub-types seem to range somewhat continuously from the democratic extreme at one end to the oligarchical extreme at the other, they are all accidental variants, and do not alter the essential distinction in principle between democracy and oligarchy as two pure, and therefore *partly* unjust, forms of Constitutional government.

To understand how polity (i. e., the mixed constitution) remedies the injustice of the democratic and the oligarchical constitutions, we must see how the injustice of each is opposite to the injustice of the other. Under a democratic constitution, injustice is done to the rich—even when the poor, having the superior power of numbers, do not oppress them[499]—because inequality of wealth is not made a principle of distributive justice in the distribution of offices (both citizenship and magistracies).[500] Under an oligarchical constitution, injustice is done

be a qualification for office-holding, at least it can be said that differences in degree of competence should be considered in the selection of magistrates. To neglect such differences is unjust, even as it is unjust to treat equals unequally. For Aristotle's discussion of selection by lot, vd. *Politics*, II, 11, 1273^{a}17; II, 12, 1274^{a}4; VI, 2, 1317^{b}19-20, 1318^{a}2-3; VI, 3, 1318^{b}.

[497] Vd. *Politics*, IV, 6, 1293^{a}13-34. Cf. *ibid.*, 5, 1292^{b}4; and VI, 6.

[498] Books IV and VI are largely devoted to the description of all the accidental variations in type with which Aristotle was acquainted. Cf. fn. 494 *supra*.

[499] This qualification is very important. If it were not added, it might be supposed that the essential injustice of the democratic constitution consisted in a misrule of the rich by the poor. Such misrule does, of course, occur when democracy degenerates into despotism and tyranny, but since a democracy need not be tyrannical, and cannot be despotic so long as it is Constitutional government, the essential injustice of democracy must be separated from the other injustices which occur with democratic degenerations.

[500] Cicero, for example, said that democracy results in injustice because "it allows for no distinctions in rank"—according to wealth, or nobility of birth. Vd.

to the free who are poor—even when the rich, having the superior power of wealth, do not oppress them [501]—because radical equality in virtue (i. e., political capacity to rule as well as to obey) is not made a principle of distributive justice in the distribution of offices (both citizenship and magistracies). Now if we suppose, as Aristotle did, that inequality in wealth deserves political recognition and should be made a principle of distributive justice, i. e., the basis for a proportional, hence unequal, distribution of civil status and authority; and if, furthermore, we suppose that equality in natural powers deserves political recognition and should be made a principle of distributive justice, i. e., the basis for a numerical, hence equal, distribution of civil status and authority; then we can see that democratic injustice and oligarchical injustice are both opposite and complementary, for the one denies the proportional aspect of distributive justice, and the other denies the numerical aspect of distributive justice.[502] Hence, because they are com-

fn. 473 *supra*. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas shared this false oligarchical prejudice, which must not be confused with the truth of the aristocratic principle which should qualify every just form of Constitutional government, namely, that individual inequalities in merit be recognized by placing men of superior competence in the important offices of government. Vd. fn. 492 and 496 *supra*. But certainly neither the possession of wealth nor the accident of one's family position is a reliable sign of political merit, i. e., of the possession of political competence to a more than average degree. Cf. fn. 508 and 516 *infra*.

Throughout this discussion we must keep distinct two grounds for criticizing the peculiarly democratic injustice of regarding all who are citizens as equally qualified to hold almost any governmental office, choosing them for such offices by lot rather than by election. There is the criticism which is based on the oligarchical prejudice that wealth should be a qualification for office, if not for citizenship. And there is the criticism which appeals to the aristocratic principle that special competence should be the qualification for special functions, and therefore the election of officials should replace selection by lot. Although we think that only the second of these criticisms is based upon a just principle, the injustice of that which is criticized—the neglect or denial of inequalities in competence—remains. The fact that the oligarchical principle is not the proper corrective of the democratic error does not make the latter any less a violation of distributive justice.

[501] The significance of this qualification is the same as in the democratic case. Vd. fn. 499 *supra*.

[502] Two points should be observed here. In the first place, as already indicated (vd. fn. 500 *supra*), we do not accept the oligarchical ground for criticizing the democratic injustice. We do not think that inequality in wealth is, absolutely

plementary injustices, justice can be done by rectifying each through amelioration by the other, and this is accomplished by the mixed constitution of the polity.

Aristotle begins to consider the polity in Chapter 7 of Book

speaking, a principle of proportionality in distributive justice; though we can understand how, relative to Greek economic conditions, some exemption from labor and some possession of leisure could be justified as a qualification for citizenship or office holding. We shall return to a more general discussion of this problem in Part V. Aristotle's error about wealth in relation to justice is, along with his error about slavery, the obstacle which prevents the Aristotelian analysis from being a perfectly true statement of the principles of political justice. Vd. fn. 487 *supra*. We shall, however, proceed here without correcting that error, as we have so far proceeded on the false assumption about slavery, in order to make an accurate statement of the *Politics* in its own terms. We wish to do this, not merely for the sake of scholarly precision, but more fundamentally because the Aristotelian errors contain, in principle, truths which they conceal. We shall subsequently show that the whole truth of the Theory of Democracy is contained in the Aristotelian principles of analysis, when they are understood *formalissime* by abstracting them from the historical limitations of the Greek period, which limitations are the cause of Aristotle's own erroneous formulation of these principles.

In the second place, it is inaccurate and misleading to describe the democratic constitution as one which offers freedom to the many. Although Aristotle says something like this, he is reporting both the popular and the Platonic opinion on the matter, and not the precise analytical point of distinction between democracy and oligarchy. " The basis of the democratic state is liberty, which, according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state. This they affirm to be the great end of every democracy " (*Politics*, VI, 2, $1317^{a}40$-$1317^{b}2$). Cf. *Politics*, IV, 4, $1291^{b}35$; and V, 9, $1310^{a}25$-35. But this can only mean that more men have the perfect freedom of citizenship in a democracy than in an oligarchy. If subjection is also recognized as an imperfect dominion of freedom, as it must be, then all who are not natural slaves (domestic or civic) are free under any just form of government, for whether they be ruled as subjects or as citizens, men are free when they live under just government—i. e., government which serves the common good. Hence the ambiguity of freedom (as including both subjection and citizenship) makes imprecise the contrast between oligarchy and democracy in terms of freedom. It is much more accurately stated as a difference in the *number* who are admitted to citizenship, i. e., *some* or *all* of those who are not natural slaves. Moreover, according to Aristotle, giving perfect freedom (citizenship and eligibility for office) to all *equally* is unjust because it deprives the rich of the pre-eminence Aristotle thought was due to superior wealth. Hence, instead of using freedom and wealth to discriminate between democracy and oligarchy, we should say that the one emphasizes equality to the exclusion of inequality, and the other emphasizes inequality to the exclusion of equality. As we shall subsequently show, the perfectly just constitution is one which denies that wealth, or any similar accident, justifies inequality, but which nevertheless recognizes the inequality as well as the equality among men in the distribution of offices, even including that of citizenship.

IV, after he has defined monarchy and aristocracy as modes of Royal government (in Book III, Chapters 14-18),[503] and after he has defined democracy and oligarchy as the pure forms of Constitutional government (in Book III, Chapters 9, 10, and in Book IV, Chapters 2-6), concluding with observations about the corruption of both into despotism when their constitutions are overthrown, tending ultimately to a tyrannical use of despotic power (in Book IV, Chapters 4, 5, 6). When Aristotle says it is generally supposed that democracy and oligarchy are the two principal types of Constitutional government,[504] he is reporting an observation that is true in fact for the most part, because these were in his day the two most frequent embodiments of Constitutional government; but he does not intend to agree that the observation is true in principle. In addition to these two, he insists, there is a third type of Constitutional government. "This is not common, and therefore has not been noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the different kinds of government."[505] This is the regime "which retains the generic name of polity *or* constitutional government."[506] The fundamental character of the polity is to be understood in terms of the previous consideration of democracy and oligarchy as unjust constitutions, "for polity or constitutional government may be described as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy."[507] In other words, all three—polity, democracy,

[503] One passage in Chapter 7 of Book IV confirms, by the way, the previous classification of aristocracy as a mode of Royal government, rather than as a sub-form of Constitutional government. Cf. fn. 489 and 492 *supra*.

[504] *Politics*, IV, 3, 1290^{a}13.

[505] *Politics*, IV, 7, 1293^{a}40.

[506] *Politics*, IV, 7, 1293^{a}39. Italics ours. This fact about the name of the uncommon type is very significant. To call the mixed regime a "polity" is to name it, not as one mode of Constitutional government, but as embodying the very essence of Constitutional government. Oligarchy and democracy are, in a sense, perversions of polity because they each depart, in a different direction, from the justice proper to Constitutional government, as that is embodied in a mixed constitution. They are not, however, perversions in the same sense as are tyranny and despotism. Vd. *Politics*, IV, 8, 1293^{b}25-28. Cf. *Politics*, III, 7, 1279^{a}37-39.

[507] *Politics*, IV, 8, 1293^{b}32-34. "The fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich. . . . The mixture of

and oligarchy—agree in their fundamental character as Constitutional government, but polity, having the most just constitution, deserves to be called by the name which is common to all. Its greater justice results, as we have seen, from rectifying the opposed and complementary injustices peculiar to democracy and oligarchy. Aristotle describes three ways in which this rectification through fusion is accomplished.[508] But, how-

these two elements, that is to say, of the rich and the poor, is to be called a polity" (*ibid.*, 1294ª16-23).

[508] Vd. *Politics*, IV, 9, 1294ª35-1294ᵇ13. Oligarchy disfranchises the poor, and this *is* unjust if they are radically equal in competence with the rich. Democracy does not give special privileges to the rich, and this is *deemed* unjust by all those who suffer from the oligarchical delusion that wealth, or nobility of birth, is usually associated with a higher degree of competence. Vd. fn. 500 *supra*. Accepting this prejudice for the moment, we can understand how polity is, in Aristotle's view, a fusion of the justice of democracy with the justice of oligarchy, by ameliorating the injustice peculiar to each; for it both enfranchises the poor, which *is* just, and it gives special privileges to the rich, which is *deemed* just.

The fusion of democracy and oligarchy can also be formulated in terms of ways of combining the democratic extension of citizenship with the oligarchical selection of officials. Vd. *Politics*, IV, 15, in which Aristotle considers the determining factors in appointment to office. Appointment may be by all the citizens, or by some only; the magistrates may be chosen from all, or only from those "who are distinguished by a property qualification, or by birth, or merit" (1300ª17); and they may be appointed by vote or by lot. In terms of these factors, combined in different ways, Aristotle is able to characterize democracy and oligarchy, and to show how polity can be a compromise between them.

It may be asked why polity has to be a *compromise*. Why must the polity retain the oligarchical injustice of giving the wealthy or well-born some special privileges, offsetting this by retaining the democratic injustice of the lottery in the case of some offices? Another alternative is at least conceivable, namely, the retention of the democratic justice of admitting all the freeborn to citizenship, without regard to property qualifications, and the correction of the democratic injustice of making all citizens eligible for office by lottery. But though such a constitution is conceivable it is not a *mixed* constitution, because it completely repudiates oligarchy, refusing to recognize wealth or noble birth as a qualification either for citizenship or office. Furthermore, the Greek democrats would have opposed such a constitution on their side, almost as much as the oligarchs would have on theirs, because the principle of the lottery was regarded as a special mark of the democratic constitution, giving to all the citizens not merely the freedom of such status, but a freedom perfected by an opportunity for participation in the functions of governmental office. Aristotle's conception of the polity as a mixed constitution must first be understood in terms of the Greek situation, and only thereafter abstractly in terms of the principles of justice. A *mixed* constitution was needed to resolve the opposition between the oligarchical and democratic extremes, and it could not be

ever achieved, the result is the same. " We have a true union of oligarchy and democracy when the same state may be

mixed without being a compromise between them. Even though it is a compromise, the polity is more just than oligarchy or democracy, because, though neither the injustice of the one nor the injustice of the other is totally corrected, each is somewhat ameliorated: the oligarchical injustice of making wealth a qualification for citizenship can be eliminated without completely correcting the related injustice of making wealth a qualification for some offices; the democratic injustice of regarding all citizens as equally eligible for office can be diminished by restricting the number and character of the offices to which appointment occurs by lot rather than by election. We have suggested merely one of many ways in which the compromise can be effected. The main point here is that the polity by its very nature as a *mixed* constitution cannot be a perfectly just constitution. It is simply more just than democracy and oligarchy, and its superiority must be understood in relation to the democratic and oligarchical prejudices which actually prevailed in Greek political life and thought.

Let us suppose these prejudices to be overcome. Then we can conceive a perfectly just constitution, which considers both radical equality in habit and accidental inequality in degree of competence, in determining the distribution of political office: the basic office or status of citizenship must be given to all who are radically equal in their human powers as these are developed by political habits; the special governmental offices should be awarded to those who, through the accidents of individual differences, come to possess this common competence in a superior degree, the more important ruling offices going to the more competent, the less to the less. The constitution thus conceived is not the Aristotelian polity, not the Greek oligarchy, nor even the Greek democracy, for the latter did not question the disfranchisement of the slaves and the metics; and, what is more important, it persisted in the fallacy of egalitarianism—the complementary opposite to the oligarchical delusion—which sees only a radical equality among men, and denies or neglects their individual differences, or differences in degree of power or virtue. Cf. Maritain, *Ransoming the Time*, New York, 1941: pp. 8-16.

The Greek democracies anticipated the distributive justice of the perfect constitution to the extent that they extended the franchise by rejecting the false qualifications of wealth or noble birth. The Aristotelian polity approximated the just constitution on another count, namely, the introduction of special merit as a criterion for appointment to office by election rather than by lot. But even as the democratic constitution fell far short of justice with respect to the distribution of the franchise, so the polity represents a very imperfect approximation to the just constitution, because it is never completely free from the oligarchical delusion. The fundamental democratic insistence upon the radical equality of men must be tempered by the aristocratic, not the oligarchical, principle, that individual inequalities call for an unequal distribution of political honors—not with respect to the fundamental status of citizenship, of course, but with respect to the hierarchy of special functions allocated to diverse governmental offices. The just constitution, in short, combines equality and hierarchy, even as it preserves perfect freedom without loss of essential authority. The constitution in which distributive justice is both complete and

termed either a democracy or an oligarchy; those who use both names evidently feel that the fusion is complete. Such a fusion there is also in the mean; for both extremes appear in it." [508] The chief obstacle in the way of constituting a polity is extremes of wealth and poverty—a small number of very rich men and a large number of very poor ones. That is why a large middle class, representing the mean between the extremes of poverty and wealth, is conducive to the formation of a polity.[510] Now since it is of the very nature of a commonwealth (a constitutional state) to be " composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars . . . the state which is composed largely of middle-class citizens is necessarily best constituted in respect of the elements of which we say the fabric of the state naturally consists." [511]

unblemished is Democracy, as we shall show in Part V *infra*. It is not democracy in the Greek sense, nor is it a *mixed* constitution in any sense. The fact that both the polity and democracy remotely anticipate the perfect justice which is possible in the truly Democratic constitution must not mislead us. Cf. fn. 511 *infra*.

[508] Vd. *Politics*, IV, 9, 1294^{b}14-16.

[510] Vd. *Politics*, IV, 11, 12.

[511] *Politics*, IV, 11, 1295^{b}25-29. " Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by the citizens of the middle class " (*ibid.*, 1295^{b}35). Cf. *ibid.*, V, I, 1302^{a}13-15: " a government which is composed of the middle class is the most stable (most free from dissension and faction) of the *imperfect* forms of government." (Italics ours.) This passage would appear to be contradictory to the ones previously cited, which praise the mixed constitution as the *best* state. The apparent contradiction is removed, however, when we remember that " perfect " means " ideal " in the totally impractical sense of something impossible on earth. Vd. fn. 489 *supra*.

It should be observed that, according to Aristotle, there are two ways in which the mixed constitution can come into being: either (1) through some sort of compromise of oligarchy with democracy, achieved in any one of the three ways Aristotle mentions (vd. fn. 508 *supra*); or (2) through the predominance of a large middle class between the extremes of wealth and poverty. The second of these is better than the first, not merely because it reduces the tendency toward faction and decreases the likelihood of a relapse into oligarchy or democracy, but also because a state in which the majority of the citizens are of the middle class approaches the Democratic ideal of the classless society. No Republican state can realize this ideal, because by its very nature Republican government involves class distinctions, exclusions from citizenship, and oligarchical privileges of one sort or another. That is why the theory of the mixed regime is relevant only to the Republican form of Constitutional government. There can be no mixed Democratic

Because of the fact that Aristotle does dwell at length on the greater stability of the polity, especially when there is a large middle class, it has often been supposed that his preference for the polity rests merely on its greater expediency, its resistance against those tendencies to corruption to which democracies and oligarchies usually succumb.[512] But to suppose this is to overlook the much more important fact that the mixed regime, or polity, is *absolutely* superior in the justice of its constitution to the two pure regimes out of which it is composed. We cannot, therefore, speak of these three regimes as accidental modes of the essential form of Constitutional government. Wherever regimes differ in justice, they differ essentially, not accidentally. Hence we must regard polity, democracy, and oligarchy as sub-forms of Constitutional government, related to it as true species to a genus.[513]

constitution, any more than there can be a mixed Royal regime. Strictly speaking, the distinction between pure and mixed constitutions applies only to Republican governments. Cf. fn. 492 *supra*.

[512] " Those states are likely to be well administered in which the middle class is larger, and stronger if possible, than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant " (*Politics*, IV, 11, 1295^{b}37-39). " Where the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions or dissensions " (*ibid.*, 1296^{a}7-8). " The more perfect the admixture of the political elements, the more lasting will be the constitution " (*Politics*, IV, 12, 1297^{a}7-8). " These considerations will help us to understand why most governments are either democratical or oligarchical. The reason is that the middle class is seldom numerous, and whichever party, the rich or the common people, transgresses the mean and predominates, draws the constitution its own way, and thus arises either oligarchy or democracy " (*Politics*, IV, 11, 1296^{a}22-28).

[513] Vd. fn. 289 *supra*, in which we pointed out that we used " Constitutional " as a generic name, divided against " Royal," and that in Part V we would use " Republican " and " Democratic " as specific names, dividing Constitutional government as a genus, and divided against each other as its inferior and superior species. This indicates that the true analysis we shall reach in Part V is here being foreshadowed by the half-true Aristotelian analysis, in so far as the latter sets up a classification which is formally, though not materially, the same: first, a basic essential distinction between Royal and Constitutional government, in which the latter is more just absolutely; and second, a subordinate essential distinction, within the sphere of Constitutional government, between democracy or oligarchy (opposite, though unequal, in their injustice) and polity, the later being more just absolutely; and hence, according to Aristotle, absolutely the most just form of government, as we shall subsequently show Democracy (not democracy) to be.

When we say that, according to Aristotelian principles, the mixed constitution

(5) Those who still cling to the bi-columnar sixfold classification of pure regimes, with its necessarily false conception of the mixed regime as a fusion of the three pure ones in the good

or polity is the ideal form of human government, i. e., the most just, absolutely considered, we are not forgetting these three things: *first*, that, though this conclusion flows from Aristotelian principles, it is false, because those principles include the basic error about natural slavery and the oligarchical prejudice concerning the political privileges which should be accorded the wealthy or noble born; *second*, that Aristotle violates his own principles by regarding absolute monarchy as the ideal or most perfect form of government in terms of the inapplicable standard of Divine rule; *third*, that quite apart from his own principles, Aristotle permits himself to describe what he considers to be the ideal state in terms which show it to be, not a polity, but an oligarchy modified by certain aristocratic provisions. Vd. *Politics*, VIII, 8-10, wherein the ideal constitution explicitly excludes from citizenship, not only slaves and metics, but also all the laboring classes in the population; and cf. *Politics*, II, 9-12, where Aristotle praises the Spartan and other clearly oligarchical constitutions as approximating the ideal. According to the principles of justice set forth in Book V, the exclusion of some freemen from citizenship because they are unequal in wealth or leisure to other freemen is as unjust as giving equal shares of political status and privilege to freemen who are unequal in wealth or leisure.

Thus we see that Aristotle uses the word "ideal" with three meanings: (1) a Platonic meaning which violates his own basic distinction between Royal and Constitutional government; (2) a meaning which expresses his own oligarchical prejudices against democracy, even though those prejudices cannot be defended against his own theory of the just constitution, i. e., of what is just and unjust in constitutional provisions concerning citizenship and office-holding; (3) a meaning which is completely true to his own theory of constitutional justice. The first meaning sets up an ideal that is both false and impracticable—the ideal of Divine government is impracticable in human affairs, and the ideal of absolute monarchy as the most perfect form of human government is false. The second meaning sets up an ideal that is quite practicable, but also quite false by reference to Aristotle's principles of justice: this is the "ideal constitution" according to Book VIII and Book II. The third meaning sets up an ideal that is both practicable and true by reference to Aristotle's principles of justice: this is the ideal or most perfect constitution according to Books IV and V—the mixed constitution or *polity*. But, as we have already seen and as we shall completely prove in Part V *infra*, even this ideal is false, not in Aristotelian terms, but by reference to Aristotle's errors about slavery, wealth, and noble birth. By correction of these errors, we shall come to the true and thoroughly practicable ideal of Democracy. In the following discussion, however, we shall proceed in terms of Aristotelian principles of justice, not understood *formalissime*, but taken under the material limitations of a certain, perhaps inescapable, historic blindness to the whole truth. Nevertheless, enough truth is seen in Aristotle's *Politics* to show why it is the polity described in Book IV, not the constitution Aristotle himself seems to *like* in Book VIII, that anticipates the true and practicable ideal.

column, may wish to know why Aristotle omits monarchical and aristocratic elements from his definition of the mixed regime. The answer is that he does not omit them in one way, though he does in another. The monarchical element may be included in so far as in any sub-form of Constitutional government; *one* man may preside in the administrative process of government, especially in its executive phases. The fact that monarchy *in this sense*—and only in this sense—may be present in democracies and oligarchies, as well as in polities, shows that it does not enter into the essence of the polity *as a mixed regime*. Furthermore, we must not overlook the ambiguity of the word " monarch " when we use it to name the one man who happens to occupy the constitutional office of chief magistrate and when we use it to name a king having the status of royal sovereignty. The latter is an absolute ruler, absolute in power and unlimited in function. The former is not absolute in any way; for, unlike the king, being equal in status to the people he rules, he is only an office-holder with limited juridical power and with limited governmental functions. That is why Aristotle said " Constitutional monarchy is not a distinct form of government." There is, moreover, a third meaning in the ambiguity of " monarchy " when the king in a *regimen regale et politicum* is called " monarch " ; such a man is a middle case between the truly Royal monarch and the Constitutional chief magistrate, for he has quasi-sovereign status and is also like an office-holder; he has absolute power, but he is limited in function.[514] The middle case of the intermediate regime (*regimen regale et politicum*) is relevant to the problem of the mixed regime only in so far as it involves a constitution, albeit practically defective. It is fallacious to say that the mixed regime can,

[514] Because of this middle case, the phrase " limited monarchy " is also rendered ambiguous; it can mean (a) constitutional monarchy, in which the chief magistrate is nothing but a limited *office-holder*, or (b) the *regimen regale et politicum*, in which the king is a limited *sovereign*. Those who do not discern this possible ambiguity, largely because they fail to understand the difference between purely Constitutional government and the intermediate form of government which is the *regimen regale et politicum*, tend to regard " limited monarchy " and " constitutional monarchy " as synonymous. Vd. fn. 417 *supra*; and cf. fn. 348 and 374 *supra*.

or must, have a monarchical element in its essential character *because* the *regimen regale et politicum* may be a mixed regime in so far as it is constitutional. Moreover, a *regimen regale et politicum* need not have a mixed constitution, for it could consist of a king, on the one hand, representing the royal element, and of the barons or nobles, on the other, representing the imperfect sovereignty of the ruled. As a matter of fact, however, the mediaeval instances of Royal *and* Political government usually did involve mixed constitutions, for "the people" included both the lords and the commons, equal in some respects and unequal in others.

The problem of the aristocratic element in the mixed regime is more difficult to solve. Again the ambiguity of a word must be resolved, for in one sense of "aristocracy"—the sense in which it is an accidental mode of Royal, or absolute, government—the mixed regime cannot be a fusion of aristocracy with oligarchy and democracy, any more than it could be a fusion of absolute monarchy with these two. Since the mixed regime is *purely* constitutional government, any combination of Royal with Constitutional elements must be regarded as an intermediate, not as a mixed, regime. But there is another possible meaning of the word "aristocracy." It connotes some superiority in virtue on the part of the rulers. Since a radical superiority in virtue, as between rulers and ruled, is incompatible with Constitutional government, the only superiority that is possible is one in the degree to which the same virtues are possessed by both. Hence, a polity (i. e., a mixed regime) in which those who are chosen for governmental offices have such superiority—which enables them to perform the functions of government more efficiently than men less competent—has an "aristocratic aspect." That is all Aristotle can *rightly* mean when he speaks of the admixture of three elements (virtue, in addition to wealth and freedom) in the formation of a polity.[515] Hence, the addition of the aristocratic element, in

[515] "The distribution of authority according to merit is a special characteristic of aristocracy, for the principle of an aristocracy is virtue, as wealth is of an oligarchy, and freedom of a democracy" (*Politics*, IV, 8, 1294a9-11). But Aristotle violates

this sense, to the polity as a mixed regime does not alter its

his own analysis—at least verbally—when he goes on to say: "The admixture of two elements, that is, the rich and poor, is to be called a polity; and the union of the three (virtue in addition to wealth and freedom) is to be called an aristocracy or the government of the best" (*ibid.*, 1294ª22-24). The union of the three elements must either be Constitutional government or Royal government or the intermediate form (*regimen regale et politicum*). If the union of the three is truly an aristocracy—that is, a mode of Royal government—it cannot be a mixed regime at all, for there is no constitution. If the union of the three is a *regimen regale et politicum*—that is, an intermediate regime—it cannot be a mixed regime simply, but only on its constitutional, and not on its aristocratic (i. e., its Royal) side. Hence, in the third alternative, the addition of the third element (choice of superior men for governmental functions) does not alter the essential character of the polity as a mixed regime, purely constitutional in its generic form of government. *In that respect*, the polity is essentially the same whether or not men who have a higher degree of the same virtues all the citizens share, are usually the office-holders. Cf. fn. 492 *supra*.

Furthermore, Aristotle's discussion here tends to be misleading because of the fact that he speaks of the aristocracy as "having a right to this name (i. e., government by the best) more than any other type of government except the true and the ideal." Whenever Aristotle speaks of "the ideal" in this way, he is referring to the Platonic myth of ideal absolute government, not to Royal government on earth which, either in its monarchical or aristocratic modes, is obviously inferior to Constitutional government by his own consideration of it as just *relative to the most inferior civil circumstances*. Vd. Part IV, Section 3, *supra*, pp. 508-15; and cf. fn. 489 *supra*.

We cannot reiterate too often that the meaning here of "ideal" or "perfect" must not be confused with the notion of "the best form of government absolutely" as that is contrasted with forms of government which may be best relative to particular conditions. The Platonic ideal has no political reality whatsoever, so far as human government is concerned. It has reality only as a conception of Divine government. Vd. fn. 481 *supra*. It is incorrect and misleading, therefore, to say that absolute monarchy (the Royal regime) is ideal in the sense of the best form of human government absolutely, whereas some other form is best relative to actual civil conditions. As a form of *human* government, the Royal regime must be relative to actual civil conditions, and although it may be good relative to a certain level of such conditions, it cannot be the best absolutely if that is an inferior level. The best form of human government absolutely is the one which is relative to the highest possible level of actual civil conditions, and by "possible" here we mean "practicably possible." Hence when we speak of Democracy as the political ideal we mean a practical possibility, one capable of being realized by men as they are or can be. We do not mean an ideal that has no practical relevance for human striving, because it is realized only in the sort of government which God can exercise.

Demongeot fails to recognize the crucial difference between these two meanings of "ideal" when, by distinguishing between a speculative and a practical approach to the problem of the best regime, he tries to account for the apparently inconsistent statements concerning "the best regime" which are to be found in the

essential character, though it does increase the justice of its constitution.[515a]

Politics, and in St. Thomas's commentary thereon. (Vd. *op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff.) In the meaning of ideal which is proper to politics as a practical human discipline, absolute government is in no sense ideal. The mixed regime is the best form for Aristotle, not because absolute monarchy is best only under impossible circumstances, but because under actual human conditions Royal government can be good only on one supposition—the supposition of the inferior conditions of a primitive community. It is on the hypothesis or supposition of inferior and superior civil conditions, having actual historical exemplification, that one form of government can be said to be absolutely better than another, though both can be good relatively. The supposition that some man can be like God in relation to other men is totally inadmissible in a science of politics concerned with human government. It cannot be employed to define the best human government absolutely, or the practicable ideal. The practicable ideal is the best government which can be achieved on earth, which was for Aristotle the mixed constitution. Vd. fn. 513 *supra*.

Failing to discern the vein of Platonism which runs through Aristotle's *Politics*, St. Thomas's commentary does not give a satisfactory rendering of its basic analysis; nor does Demongeot's interpretation of St. Thomas's thought, resting primarily on the *Commentary*, succeed in rectifying the deviations from a doctrine which can be found in the *Politics* by expunging the Platonism and by reading every passage in the light of truly Aristotelian principles, even if that requires one to reject some of Aristotle's own statements as being themselves un-Aristotelian. Cf. fn. 553 *infra*.

[515a] The essential character of the mixed regime is, as we have seen, determined by the fact that it must effect some compromise between the opposite errors of oligarchy and democracy. Vd. fn. 508 *supra*. In effecting such a compromise, it will nullify to some extent the oligarchical fallacy of awarding offices to the wealthy and also, to some extent, the democratic fallacy of distributing magistracies by lot. From these two negatives, an affirmative result is obtained in so far as there is at least an opportunity to take merit or special competence into consideration in the appointment of men to office by election. In the extremes of oligarchy or democracy, offices will be awarded to those who merit them only by chance, not by choice. The fact that a polity substitutes choice for chance by permitting merit to be considered as a qualification for elective appointment to some offices—this fact is the aristocratic element in the mixed constitution.

It should be noted that Aristotle does not introduce the principle of aristocracy as an *alternative* to oligarchy in the formation of a mixed constitution, but rather as something which *may or may not* be added to the mixed constitution, which, in his view, *always* includes oligarchical as well as democratic elements. A mixed constitution is a mixture of social classes, not a mixture of principles, in Aristotle's view. The rich and the poor are the social classes between which some compromise must be effected, not the rich and the virtuous, or the virtuous and the poor, for it is possible for either poor or rich to be virtuous (to have special merit or competence), but it is not possible for the rich to be poor, or the poor rich. Hence Aristotle never conceives the mixed constitution as a fusion of aristocracy with democracy, or of aristocracy with oligarchy. That is why we maintain that the

A constitution is more just which provides for the choice of superior men to occupy governmental offices (superior, of course, only in *degree* of virtue or competence). No constitution can provide for this except by setting the right qualifications for office-holding. That the qualifications for office-holding are less likely to be rightly determined in a democracy or in an oligarchy, either because all free men are deemed equally competent, or because all wealthy men are deemed more competent than the poor, indicates that the greater justice of the polity, as a mixed regime, is in part determined by the fact that its constitution necessarily observes the aristocratic principle in so far as it sets the right qualifications for office-holding. The right qualifications will, of course, be largely negative in character—consisting in an avoidance of false standards of competence, such as wealth or freedom. Beyond that, the actual choice of the best men to hold office cannot be provided for by a constitution, but must be left in actual practice to the prudence and integrity of the community.

We have seen that monarchy, in the only sense in which it is relevant, does not add anything essential to the character of the polity as a mixed regime, because the monarchical element can be common to the other two pure forms of Constitutional government. Now we see that aristocracy, in the only

character of the mixed regime as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy is not essentially altered by the addition of the aristocratic principle with respect to some elective appointments.

Furthermore, we insist that Aristotle is wrong in supposing that an essential distinction can be found among mixed constitutions, according as the aristocratic principle is added or omitted. The mixed regime must *always* involve the aristocratic principle *to some degree*, because, in any compromise between oligarchy and democracy, false qualifications for office-holding (the oligarchical) and wrong methods of appointment (the democratic) must be somewhat nullified, and, negatively at least, this permits the selection of some men for office on the grounds of merit or special competence. The aristocratic principle *can be* completely absent from the extremes of oligarchy and democracy, thought it *need not be*. It cannot be absent from the mixed constitution, though it may vary in the degree to which it is effectively operative. It can never be perfectly present, because its operation is always impeded by the retention of some oligarchical and democratic features in the polity. The aristocratic principle can be operative without impediment only in the perfectly just constitution—only in a Democracy, as we shall show in Part V *infra*.

sense in which it is relevant, does not add anything essential to the character of the polity as a mixed regime for an opposite reason, namely, that the aristocratic principle enters into the essential justice of the polity and is excluded by the essential injustice of the two pure regimes. In the only sense in which the aristocratic principle can be involved, there is no polity in which it is not present to some degree. Hence it may truly be said that the aristocratic element does not increase the justice which belongs to the mixed constitution, for it is inseparable from that justice.

(6) The Aristotelian conception of the polity as the *only* mixed regime presents an insuperable difficulty to those who still persist in thinking that the bi-columnar sixfold classification of the "traditional picture" is Aristotelian, for polity is there represented as a pure regime. This single mistake accounts for all the errors which arose in later versions of the mixed regime. Supposing that there are three pure regimes in the left-hand column, one is naturally led to suppose that a mixed regime is somehow a fusion of these three. One might still be saved from such folly, if one remembered that two of these three regimes are modes of absolute government, and that the third (i. e., polity) differs essentially from them by being constitutional; or if one remembered the difference between polity and democracy, not only as mixed and pure regimes, but also as more and less just constitutions under which the many have a voice in the government. Forgetting these things, and making the false supposition which is the root of error, post-Aristotelian political thought developed the three erroneous theories of the mixed regime which we have already surveyed.

The worst of these is the utterly simple-minded notion found in Rousseau, that the three pure regimes are determined only by the number of men found in governmental offices (one, few, or many), and hence that the mixed regime is one in which offices are so distributed that all three numerical principles are represented in the government.

The best of the three is the Ciceronian version, for, though it fails to observe the distinction between polity and democracy,

though it tends to identify aristocracy and oligarchy, and though it supposes that the three numerical principles should be represented in three distinct organs of government, it nevertheless retains the basic Aristotelian point that a mixed constitution is one in which diverse social classes (patricians and plebians) have some equality of status as well as inequality in rank, function, and power. In the Roman republic, both patricians and plebeians enjoyed the rights and privileges of the most fundamental of all republican offices—citizenship. If Cicero had understood the Aristotelian conception of the polity, he would have been able to see that that precisely covered the character of the Roman republic—a fusion of oligarchy (the patricians) and democracy (the plebeians), with the monarchical element represented in the consulship. Being nothing but limited office-holders, the consuls do not introduce any trace of Royal government, and so the Roman republic is a *purely* constitutional mixed regime, as was the Aristotelian polity. Furthermore, Cicero, like Aristotle, regarded the republic as an *absolutely* more just constitution than the unmixed constitutions in which either the patricians or the plebeians predominated and prevailed. To which it should be added that this agreement between Aristotle and Cicero must be understood in the light of a more fundamental agreement between them, namely, that for a civilized community Constitutional government (whether in its mixed or pure forms) is preferable to Royal government in either its monarchical or aristocratic modes.

Because mediaeval institutions preempted his field of vision, St. Thomas could not conceive the mixed regime as a polity or a republic—i. e., as *purely* Constitutional government, in which the chief executive is *merely* an office-holder. Following Cicero, moreover, St. Thomas retained the notion that a mixed regime involves a combination of numerical principles—the one, the few, and the many—being represented in different organs of government, the royal sovereign, the lords, and the commons. This notion has no place in the Aristotelian conception of the polity, and it *should* have no place in so far as one is concerned

with essential distinctions that have a bearing on the justice of regimes, not with accidental arrangements that have a bearing only on their efficiency. Furthermore, whereas Cicero clearly judges the mixed constitution to be more just and more efficient, it is not quite plain that St. Thomas regards the mixed regime as *absolutely* more just than purely Royal government. This can only mean that he did not fully understand the *regimen regale et politicum* as an intermediate regime, justified in relation to peculiarly mediaeval circumstances, but absolutely more just than purely Royal government (because constitutional in part), and absolutely less just than purely Constitutional government (because royal in part). This may also account for the fact that St. Thomas did not distinguish between a mixed regime (which for Aristotle and Cicero is always purely Constitutional government) and an intermediate regime. The former is always, by its very nature, superior to the pure regimes, the opposite injustices of which it ameliorates by rectifying each through supplementation by the other. The latter is, also by its very nature, always intermediate between the pure forms of government (between which it is an historical bridge)—better than purely Royal government, because the sovereign man is not without some constitutional limitations, and less good than purely Constitutional government, because the constitutional limitations are defective through want of politically enforceable sanctions. Nevertheless, the Thomistic account of the mixed regime as a *regimen regale et politicum* does include (on its constitutional side) the one point that is essential to the nature of the polity as a mixed regime, namely, the combination of diverse social classes, the orders or estates which were more sharply divided from one another and preserved with greater fixity in the hierarchical structure of feudal society than in the Greek or Roman worlds.[516] So far as it was constitutional, the intermediate

[516] Vd. fn. 500 *supra*. Neither Cicero nor St. Thomas recognize the point which Aristotle had in mind when he praised the constitution that results from the predominance of the middle class, as being superior to the mixed regime which results from a compromise between oligarchy and democracy. Vd. fn. 511 *supra*.

regime gave *some* equality of status to these diverse orders or estates (though not *as much* as was involved in Roman citizenship), while at the same time recognizing all the inequalities of hierarchical social rank in the distribution of political honors—shares in the sovereignty, i. e., functions and powers. It is the hierarchical character of the mediaeval constitution, born of feudalism, rather than Greek or Roman class distinctions, which persists so long as the *regimen regale et politicum* persists, and even infects the first modern republics at their birth in the revolutionary movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[517]

Both the Roman and the mediaeval view of the mixed constitution—the one purely Republican, the other limited, of course, to the constitutional aspect of the *regimen regale et politicum*—embrace rather than avoid a sharp distinction in social classes; patricians and plebeians, lords and commons. Furthermore, if one has any respect for the meaning of the word "aristocracy" it is necessary to criticize the specious use of the word to describe the Roman or mediaeval mixed regime as a fusion of aristocracy and democracy. The Roman patricians and the mediaeval lords were oligarchs for the most part, not aristocrats, except accidentally in individual instances. There is no ground for Father Oberling's remark that St. Thomas rejects the Ciceronian conception of the mixed regime (which, by the way, Father Oberling falsely identifies with the Aristotelian conception), because he rejects "the fixed status of its various classes" (*The Philosophy of Law of James Wilson*, p. 270 and fn. 58, 59). Nor was Mr. Justice Wilson correct in his diagnosis of the form of government set up by the American constitution. It was, in the first place, a Republic, not a Democracy; and, in the second place, a mixed regime of the sort which involved some compromise between oligarchy and democracy. The monarchical aspect of it—a single chief executive—was, of course, thoroughly irrelevant to its character as mixed constitution. Vd. fn. 477 *supra*. Father Oberling, like Demongeot on whom he depends, fails to discriminate between St. Thomas's own doctrine and a doctrine that can be constructed by making a collection of sentences out of St. Thomas's commentary on the *Politics*. Vd. fn. 481 *supra*.

[517] Cf. fn. 524 *infra*. We shall return to this last point in Part V, when we consider the defective character of modern Republican government in relation to the emergence of the truly Democratic constitution. As we shall see, the two steps by which the injustice of the Republican constitution is overcome are (1) the abolition of all fixed social classes, and therewith all the unjustified privileges which are the essence of oligarchical injustice; (2) the rectification of unjust disfranchisements consequent upon a restriction of "the people" to a small part of the civic population.

One other point should be observed here. Because of the historical anomaly—the *regimen regale et politicum*—it is necessary to distinguish two meanings of "pure" in the description of regimes. In the ancient world, certainly for Aristotle, the distinction between pure and mixed regimes occurred only in the sphere of Constitu-

The version of the mixed regime which modern Thomists have drawn from St. Thomas's commentary on the *Politics* has the least analytical relevance to the problem of the forms of government, because the conception of any just regime, whether Royal or Constitutional or intermediate, or, as Constitutional, whether pure or mixed, will necessarily involve such notes as (a) the *unity* of peace which is the common good, (b) the *virtue* of those who rule or obey for the common good, as well as the life of *virtue* (i. e., happiness) which the common good serves, and (c) the dominion of *freedom* enjoyed by the ruled, whether it be the perfect freedom of citizenship or the imperfect freedom of subjection. It is only with respect to *wealth* and *freedom* that this modern Thomistic version is relevant to the Aristotelian conception of the polity as a mixed constitution, for that constitution aims to harmonize both of these values, which are exclusively stressed in the extremes of oligarchy and democracy.[518]

tional government. The Aristotelian discussion is most precisely understood when it is read as an analysis of *pure and mixed constitutions*. But with the advent of the *regimen regale et politicum*, and thereafter, it is necessary to use the word "pure" in opposition to *intermediate*, as well as in opposition to *mixed*. In this new context, the word "pure" no longer signifies the character of a constitution, but rather the character of an essentially distinct form of government. Thus, there is purely Royal government and purely Constitutional government, and government *which is not purely either because it is intermediate between both*. The two meanings of "pure" are so independent that we can speak of *purely* Constitutional government which is a *mixed* regime; and the *regimen regale et politicum* can be, though it need not be, a mixed regime, only in so far as it is constitutional. As we have seen, it is possible for the constitutional aspect of the *regimen regale et politicum* to be *purely* oligarchical. In some rare instances, that may even have happened historically.

[518] In so far as the mixed constitution tends to abolish false qualifications for office-holding or citizenship, and in so far as the mixed constitution is made practically effective by the predominance of a large middle class, there is, of course, a greater likelihood that men of superior competence (i. e., having to a higher degree the virtue or capacity shared by all the citizens) will come to positions of authority and responsibility in the government. To this extent, and only in this sense, it may also be said that the mixed constitution places a greater emphasis on *virtue* than do oligarchy and democracy. As for the notes of *freedom* and *unity*, it may be said that any Constitutional government emphasizes *freedom* more than any Royal government, in so far as it establishes the perfect dominion of freedom which is citizenship; whereas Royal government arises primarily from a need for *unity*, as

(7) Next, we must consider the significance of the numerical principle in the classification of forms of government. The most preposterous misunderstanding of the Aristotelian analysis is that which pays attention to numbers exclusively, for it is certainly obvious that it can make only an accidental difference whether Royal government is by one man or a few, and whether Constitutional government involves a larger or smaller number of office-holders.[519] Those who consider only numbers will never be able to find any essential distinctions among just regimes, nor will they ever be able to compare good governments with respect to grades of justice. Aristotle could not have spoken more plainly against this error than he did.[520]

we have seen. Vd. fn. 367 and 457 *supra*. Both in the transition from the domestic through the village to the civic community, and in the historical circumstances surrounding its feudal origins, Royal government tends to unify groups of men who previously settled their disputes by resort to violence and war. Establishing a more inclusive civil community, the authority of the king, as an absolute ruler, replaces such anarchy with the reign of government, and therewith the unity of a peace that can be enforced by a single sovereignty.

"History forcibly illustrates another mode in which unlimited monarchy overcomes obstacles to the progress of civilization, which representative government would have had a decided tendency to aggravate. One of the strongest hindrances to improvement, up to a rather advanced stage, is the inveterate spirit of locality. . . . I am not aware that history furnishes any example in which a number of these political atoms or corpuscles have coalesced into a body, and learnt to feel themselves one people, except through previous subjection to a central authority common to all" (*Essay on Representative Government*, Ch. IV). Hence, according to Mill, it is by absolute monarchy rather than by representative government (i. e., by Royal rather than by Constitutional rule) that a multitude of smaller political units is usually "welded into a people, with common feelings of cohesion, power enough to protect itself against conquest or foreign aggression, and affairs sufficiently various and considerable of its own to occupy worthily and expand to fit proportions the social and political intelligence of the population" (*ibid.*). For these and other reasons, says Mill, "kingly government, free from the control . . . of representative institutions, is the most suitable form . . . for the earliest stages of any community, not excepting a city-community like those of ancient Greece" (*ibid.*).

[519] Vd. fn. 361 *supra*.

[520] Vd. *Politics*, III, 8; and IV, 4, esp. 1290a30-34, where, with respect to Constitutional governments, he says: "It must not be assumed, as some are fond of saying, that democracy is simply that form of government in which the greater number are sovereign . . . nor again is oligarchy that form of government in which the few are sovereign."

Nevertheless, the numerical principle does have some significance. To ignore it entirely leads not so much to error as to an inadequate analysis. It is necessary to understand its significance by relating the numerical to the qualitative distinctions involved in the several forms of government, and to their grades of justice.

In the first place, the essential distinction between Royal and Constitutional government has a numerical aspect in so far as Royal government is justified only relatively to circumstances in which one or a *few* men have virtue or competence lacked by the *many*. In this situation, the *many* enjoy only the imperfect freedom which is the dominion of subjection. Though it does not determine the essential distinction between Royal and Constitutional government, this numerical fact has more than accidental significance, for it bears on the *absolute* inferiority in justice of the Royal regime. Within the sphere of Royal government, however, the numerical distinction between monarchy and aristocracy has nothing but accidental significance. Monarchy and aristocracy are merely modes, not essentially disinct sub-forms, of absolute government. They are the same in their essential principle—government by men who are radically superior in virtue or competence. If they were named from this fact, both could be called " aristocratic "—the accidental numerical difference between them being noted by calling the rule by a superior *one* a " *mon*archy " and the rule by a superior *few* a " *poly*archy."

In the second place, though numbers have only an accidental relationship to wealth and poverty—because great riches usually belong to the few—the quantitative distinctions between democracy and oligarchy, within the sphere of Constitutional government, must not be ignored.[521] If the superiority of Constitutional over Royal government is connected with the

[521] Vd. *Politics*, III, 8; and IV, 4, esp. 1290^{b}7-20 where Aristotle says: " Yet oligarchy and democracy are not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two characteristics of wealth and freedom. . . . The form of government is a democracy when the free, who are also poor and in the majority, govern, and an oligarchy when the rich or the noble-born govern, they being at the same time few in number."

fact that the many attain the freedom of citizenship, then, as an essentially distinct sub-form of Constitutional government, democracy embodies this superiority more than does the opposed sub-form, oligarchy, in which citizenship tends to be more restricted. That is why oligarchy is so readily confused with aristocracy, even though the former is a sub-form of Constitutional, the latter an accidental mode of Royal, government. In both, it is the *few* rather than the *many* who enjoy political privileges and honors—who share in the sovereignty. It is important to qualify this statement at once by noting that "few" does not signify a quantity *equally small* in the two cases; the few of an oligarchical constitution will usually be a much larger number than the few aristocrats who rule absolutely in Royal government, though however large the oligarchical element, it will be small, or a few, by comparison with the many who are underpriviliged.[522] Concerning the extreme types of the democratic and oligarchical constitutions, we can express the quantitative aspect of their difference more accurately by saying that in the one, *all* freemen are citizens, while in the other, *only some* are. The mixed constitution of the polity resembles the democratic constitution more than the oligarchical, in that the predominance of a large middle class extends the franchise to a number almost as great as in the extreme of democracy. That is why, as Aristotle points out, "the polity is generally considered to be a democracy."[523] Yet if one is precise in one's observations about the quantitative

[522] Vd. *Politics*, IV, 3, 1290^{a}15-20, where Aristotle points out that those who look only at the numerical aspect, and, in addition, fail to note the quantitative ambiguity of "few," consider "aristocracy to be a kind of oligarchy, because it is the rule of a few." Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 8, 1293^{b}35, where Aristotle says that "the name 'aristocracy' is usually given to those constitutions which incline toward oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth." This indicates the opposite tendency to regard oligarchy as aristocratic, but now not merely because the "few" predominate, but also because of the accidental advantages which accrue to those who are rich or of fortunate birth.

[523] *Politics*, IV, 3, 1290^{a}15-20. Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 8, 1293^{b}35, where he says that "the name of 'polity' is usually given to those constitutions which incline toward democracy, as the name 'aristocracy' is given to those which incline toward oligarchy."

facts, one is compelled to say that the polity, as a mean or middle constitution, lies between the oligarchy and democracy with respect to the distribution of citizenship and offices; even so it is more on the side of democracy, for in a polity, most of the freemen being of the large middle class, *most* of the freemen are admitted to citizenship, and *most* indicates a quantity which approximates the *all* of extreme democracy rather than the few or some of the opposite, the oligarchical, extreme. Thus we see that within the sphere of Constitutional government, generically considered, the three species differ not only in the justice of their constitutions, but also in the number of *freemen* (obviously not the number of *all* men) who share in the sovereignty. Though the numerical aspect of these three regimes is accidental, it nevertheless follows as a proper accident from the essence of each, because the regimes differ with respect to distributive justice, and distributive justice consists primarily in the allotment of shares in the sovereignty—the dominion of citizenship and governmental offices. And according to Aristotle's judgment concerning the superiority of the polity or middle constitution, the quantitative determination which is signified by *most,* rather than signified by *few,* or *all,* corresponds to the most just distribution of honors, rights, privileges, and functions.[524]

[524] In our earlier comparisons of the three basic forms of government—Royal, Republican, and Democratic—we have already pointed out the numerical aspect of the distributive justice proper to each. Vd. the summary at the end of Part III, *supra*, The Thomist, IV, 2, pp. 339-54. Our analysis there differs, of course, from Aristotle's in that we deny the distinction between natural slaves and freemen, and see no reason for the disfranchisement of artisans, mechanics, or the laboring classes generally. Hence, the distributive justice of what we mean by Democracy is nearest, quantitatively, to the distributive justice of what Aristotle means by democracy, rather than to the distributive justice of his polity. Aristotle's three Constitutional regimes—polity, democracy, and oligarchy—are all sub-forms of what we regard as the Republican, not the Democratic, constitution. We agree with Aristotle, therefore, with respect to the superior distributive justice of Republican over Royal government—the *many* having a share in the sovereignty, rather than *one* or *few*. In the light of the economic and cultural peculiarities of his day, we can understand how Aristotle could justify the exclusion of natural slaves and the laboring classes from citizenship, and thus regard an oligarchical constitution as superior to extreme democracy. Vd. *Politics,* VIII, 8-10; and II, 9-12. Cf. fn. 531 *infra.*

In the third place, the element of numbers must be considered in relation to the perversions of just government. Here the quantitative aspect varies in significance with the type of injustice which determines the precise character of the perversion. The essential nature of tyranny, i. e., the injustice of ruling free men as slaves, is not altered by tyrannical power being in the hands of one man, or a few, or many, though the efficiency and stability of tyrannical government may vary inversely with the number of men who try to exploit the common good. Nor is the essential nature of despotism, i. e., the injustice of ruling equals as unequals (men entitled to be citizens as subjects), affected by the number of men who exercise despotic power over their fellows. But because despotic

Nevertheless, we today see in the extreme democracy of the Greek cities, the formal principle of a greater distributive justice than that achieved even by the polity, giving to *all*, rather than *most* or a *few*, freemen a share in the sovereignty. But even the most extreme democracy that Aristotle could conceive was formally a Republic and not a Democracy, in our sense of these terms, because the meaning of "freeman" was far from being coextensive with the meaning of "man." Using the term "freeman" in the restrictive sense of the Greeks, we can compare the distributive justice of Greek democracy (a sub-species of Republican government) with the distributive justice of real Democracy (a species of Constitutional government, superior to its Republican form) by saying that in the former *all freemen* are citizens, and in the latter *all normal men* are citizens. We shall, of course, return to a much fuller discussion of this point in Part V, when we complete the analysis of Republican vs. Democratic government.

The so-called "ideal of liberty" must be understood in terms of the principle of justice. The ideal of liberty is achieved by different regimes according to the sort of freedom which the ruled possess, and according to the degrees to which smaller or larger numbers of men possess such freedom. In a Royal government, only the rulers have perfect freedom; the rest have only the imperfect freedom of subjection. Under Constitutional government, those who are ruled as citizens have perfect freedom, but the number of those who have such freedom varies according to the restricted or enlarged distribution of citizenship that is to be found in oligarchy as compared with a democracy or a polity. The ideal of liberty is properly associated with the ideal of Democracy only in the sense that this regime aims at the maximum, or most just, distribution of the political status that is perfect freedom. If the word "freedom" be used in separation from the distinction between perfect and imperfect, and apart from considerations of distributive justice, it can be said that liberty is the ideal of every regime that is just in so far as it aims at the common good, because, aiming at the common good, government may subject men, but it never enslaves them. The fundamental notion of a *free* man is one who is ruled as an end, rather than used as a means. Cf. fn. 502 *supra*.

tyranny must always be a second corruption of Constitutional government, whereas simple tyranny is usually a corruption of Royal government, the latter will usually be an injustice perpetrated by the few against the many, and the former an injustice perpetrated by many against all the rest. Here we must observe a difference between the despotic tyranny resulting from the corruption of democracy, and that resulting from the corruption of oligarchy. In its numerical aspect, the latter will tend to resemble simple tyranny, just as oligarchy tends to resemble aristocracy numerically. Furthermore, if we regard democracy and oligarchy as perversions of polity (even though they are also good forms of government in so far as they are Constitutional, and in so far as both are capable of two further degrees of corruption) we must discern the injustice which is peculiar to them. In Aristotle's terms, both are distributively unjust by comparison with polity because they admit *too many* or *too few* to citizenship and a voice in the government. Those who are unjustly excluded from citizenship are unjustly placed in a condition of subjection, not servitude, and hence there is something *like* despotism *within* Constitutional government *to whatever extent the constitution itself is distributively unjust.* But if, in a democracy, the rich are not deprived of citizenship, but merely given an equal share in honors, rather than the greater share that is supposed to be due them because of greater wealth, then the injustice of democracy (with respect to the rich) is not strictly despotic.[525] On the other hand, since oligarchy always involves the exclusion of some freemen from citizenship, with their consequent subjection, the injustice of oligarchy *resembles* despotism.[526] In order to avoid using the word " despotism " in two quite different senses, we shall use it only to name the total corruption of Constitutional gov-

[525] The supposition about the greater share due the wealthier being false, there is no injustice here at all, absolutely speaking, even though one can understand Aristotle's opinion to the contrary in view of the special economic and cultural conditions of Greek life.

[526] The truth of this statement must also be interpreted as absolute, not merely as relative to the historic conditions which determined Aristotle's judgment of these matters. Vd. fn. 525 *supra.*

ernment—the overthrowing of the constitution, and the substitution of rule by men for rule by Law. Let us call the injustice of the constitution itself "*oligarchy*." [567] It is difficult to say whether there is any quantitative difference between despotism and *oligarchy* as unjust regimes, so far as the number of the oppressed is concerned; but it is certainly clear that what Aristotle thought to be injustice of the democratic constitution oppresses fewer men than what we are calling the injustice of oligarchy.

In the light of these considerations, the question arises whether there is a correlation between the degree of injustice and the number of men oppressed by it, as there clearly seems to be a correlation between the grade of justice (Royal, Republican, and Democratic) and the number of men to whom its distributions extend. Can we say that the injustice of simple tyranny is greater than the injustice of despotism or despotic tyranny, because more men are oppressed by fewer? The

[527] We shall use the word "*oligarchy*" italicized to name a specific type of injustice, different from the injustice of despotism and the injustice of tyranny, even as the latter two are distinct from each other. When the word is not italicized, it will have its more usual significance as the name for one of the three sub-forms of Republican government (i. e., Constitutional government with restricted suffrage). Although in Aristotle's view, only the oligarchy, as distinct from the democracy and the polity, was a constitution that involved *oligarchy* (i. e., the oligarchical type of injustice), we can see that every Republican form of Constitutional government is, absolutely speaking, *oligarchical* because of unjust special privileges to certain classes in the population and unjust disfranchisement of others. Even Aristotle's extreme type of democracy, admitting artisans, mechanics, and sailors to citizenship, was *oligarchical* to the extent that the supposition about natural slavery was false in fact. We are not forgetting here that, on the hypothesis of inferior and superior social conditions, Republican government may not be unjust relative to the circumstances. Our point is simply that as absolute government may be either Royal (and just) relative to inferior conditions or despotic (and unjust) relative to superior conditions, so Constitutional government with limited citizenship and restricted suffrage may be either Republican (and just) relative to inferior conditions or *oligarchical* (and unjust) relative to superior conditions. It is only by absolute standards (i. e., by the measure of the best possible conditions) that we speak of Republican government as virtually involving the *oligarchical* sort of injustice. Only the Democratic constitution is free from it, virtually as well as actually. Whether there is any sort of injustice, distinct from *oligarchy*, despotism, and tyranny, which can be virtually or actually present in a Democracy—by reason of some defect peculiar to its own character—is a question we shall consider in Part V.

answer seems to be "No," but there is also a sense in which it is "Yes." Injustice is not measured primarily by the number of those who suffer it, but rather by the degree to which they have been removed from the condition to which they are entitled. Thus, under circumstances which justify Royal government, the corruption of such government to simple tyranny takes men from the imperfect freedom of just subjection by a king to the unjust condition of servitude; whereas under circumstances which demand, in justice, Constitutional government, the corruption of such government to despotic tyranny takes men from the perfect freedom of citizenship to the unjust condition of servitude, and so they are twice removed from the condition to which they are entitled.[528] The complete corruption of any form of Constitutional government is, there-

[528] The complete corruption of any regime, capable of partial or complete perversion, is obviously worse than its partial corruption. It should also be obvious that the complete corruption of a superior regime is worse than the complete perversion of an inferior regime, because the superior is capable of more degrees of corruption. But this second point raises a difficult problem. When we say that "despotic tyranny" is worse than "simple tyranny" we are making this point, but it will be misunderstood if it is supposed that the condition of those who are misruled under despotic tyranny is both actually servitude and actually subjection. Despotism unjustly subjects men, and tyranny unjustly enslaves them, but it is impossible for men to be at once actually subjects and slaves, since the condition of slavery (used as a means) and the condition of subjection (ruled as an end) are incompatible contraries. Hence the words "despotic tyranny" must be understood in two ways: first, as signifying the sort of tyranny which is the complete corruption of a Constitutional regime, in contrast to the simple tyranny which is the only corruption of Royal government; and second, as signifying that the men have been taken from a condition of citizenship, and thus are *virtually* subjected as well as actually enslaved. This is the interpretation which must be placed on the diagram presented in Part IV, Section 2 *supra* (*loc. cit.*, p. 477), where "despotic tyranny" is correlated with both subjection and slavery. Though on the side of the rulers, there is actually both despotism and tyranny, on the side of the ruled there can only be actual slavery; subjection is present only *virtually* in the sense that the men who are enslaved have been degraded from citizenship. Under the simple tyranny which is the corruption of Royal government, the men who are enslaved are not also virtually subjected because they have been degraded from a condition of actual subjection.

This analysis will have a bearing on our future discussions of the corruption of Democratic government, for *oligarchical* injustice will be its first perversion, despotism its second, and tyranny its third and ultimate. The relation of these three perversions of this one form of government is, however, much more complicated than the two perversions of Republican government just analyzed.

fore, worse than the worst perversion of which Royal government is capable, because (relative to the circumstances) those who are entitled to more are deprived of more. But within the sphere of Constitutional government the injustice resulting from the complete corruption of a *more just* constitution is greater only if the number of the oppressed is greater, as will usually be the case. Here as before, of course, we must take into consideration the circumstances which demand the more just constitution as befitting the condition of the people.[529]

Nevertheless, it remains true that, as measured either by change of condition or by numbers oppressed or both, the worst perversion is the most complete corruption of the best government, considered absolutely. *It is the furthest removed from the best.*

(8) This last point leads us to our final criticism of the Platonic sixfold classification as traditionally understood. The traditional misunderstanding of the perversions of good government is that each has one and only one direct opposite, and that the direct perversion of whatever regime is deemed best, on grounds of justice or expediency, is the worst. Thus, when monarchy is deemed best because most efficient, tyranny is regarded as the worst perversion, also because most efficient. But Aristotle plainly says that " the form of government which

[529] Cf. fn. 528 *supra*. It must be remembered throughout this discussion that we are proceeding upon one of two alternative hypotheses concerning historic fact—the hypothesis which supposes an actual development from primitive to civilized conditions in the political community. (Vd. Section 3, *supra, loc. cit.*, p. 520-2; and Section 4, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 694-6). On the contrary hypothesis, no distinction can be made between a form of government which is just relative to certain conditions and that same form as unjust relative to altered conditions. On the contrary hypothesis, for example, absolute government is at once both Royal and despotic, Royal in so far as it is not tyrannical (and thus just with respect to the common good as the end), but despotic in so far as the absoluteness of the regime and the consequent dominion of subjection are never justified. On this hypothesis, despotism is always absolutely more unjust than *oligarchy*, and always virtually includes *oligarchy*; similarly, tyranny is always absolutely more unjust than despotism, and always virtually includes both *oligarchy* and despotism. We shall presently compare the order of good regimes and of perversions according to this hypothesis, with the order that is based on the Aristotelian hypothesis of relative justification for inferior good regimes. Vd. paragraph (8). It will then be noted how much the first of these two orderings resembles the Platonic disposition of all regimes in a straight line of descent from the best to the worst. Cf. fn. 464 *supra*.

is nearest to the best must of necessity be better, and that which is furthest from it must be worst, if we are judging absolutely, and not relatively to given conditions." [530] Here Aristotle is considering the several good forms of government, but the formal truth of his principle applies as well to the comparison of the several perversions. The worst perversion is the furthest removed from the best form of government, by reason of being its most complete corruption. It is neither the first or least corruption of the best regime, nor the greatest corruption to which an inferior regime can succumb.[531] The more just a form of government is, the greater the number of stages

[530] *Politics*, IV, 11, 1296^{b}7-10.

[531] Vd. *Politics*, IV, 2, 1289^{b}3: "The worst form of government is necessarily farthest removed from a well-constituted form." And in Aristotle's terms that means that the sort of tyranny which we have called "despotic tyranny"—the complete corruption of Constitutional government—is the worst perversion; oligarchy, as an unjust constitution, is not so bad, though it is worse than democracy, which is nearest to polity as the well-constituted state.

The phrase "furthest removed from the best" is susceptible of two interpretations. In *Ethics*, VIII, 10, where Aristotle accepts the Platonic notion that monarchy is the "ideal" regime (without adding Plato's critical qualification on the meaning of "ideal"), tyranny is regarded as the worst perversion, because it *resembles* monarchy less than oligarchy *resembles* aristocracy, of which it is the perversion, or than democracy *resembles* timocracy, of which it is the perversion. Here "furthest removed" means "resembles least," and it so happens that the perversion which resembles least the just form which it corrupts is the perversion of the just form which is best. Why this is so is not explained, nor in terms of the superficial bi-columnar classification is it explicable; though in the Platonic ordering of all regimes in a straight line from best to worst, monarchy being at one extreme and tyranny at the other, it is obvious why, if tyranny is regarded as the corruption peculiar to monarchy, it is furthest removed from the best, whereas none of the bad regimes which occupy intermediate places on the line can be as remote from the regimes which they corrupt. Cf. fn. 465a and 466a *supra*.

As we have now seen, however, the sixfold classification of regimes in two columns is essentially Platonic, not Aristotelian. Cf. fn. 464 *supra*. Therefore, this interpretation of "furthest removed from the best" is not applicable to the truly Aristotelian theory of the perversions, which must fit the Aristotelian theory of the ordering of the good regimes. Oligarchy is not a perversion of aristocracy, but of polity, for aristocracy is a Royal regime, and oligarchy is a Constitutional regime. Furthermore, tyranny is the ultimate perversion of any form of government, not merely of monarchy. Hence to say that tyranny is "furthest removed from the best" must mean that the sort of tyranny which is the complete corruption of Constitutional government, in any of its sub-forms, is further removed from these regimes than the simple tyranny which is the only corruption of Royal government, in either of its modes (monarchy or aristocracy).

through which it can pass toward complete corruption, or the greater the number of persons who will be oppressed when tyrannical injustice is ultimately reached. In every case, of course, tyranny, whether simple or despotic, is the ultimate term but, as we have seen, the simple tyranny into which Royal governments may fall cannot be as bad as the despotic tyranny which corrupts Constitutional governments, and the complete corruption of a polity will be worse than the complete corruption of either oligarchy or democracy because its constitution is more just.

There is, however, one other way of looking at the perversions. Simple tyranny is the only perversion of Royal government. Despotism, without tyranny, is the first perversion of Constitutional governments, regarded generically. Here the comparison between the first and only perversion of the inferior form of good government and what is only the first perversion of the superior form, shows despotism to be a less injurious perversion than tyranny, for men are less oppressed—their rights are less completely denied—when they are unjustly subjected than when they are enslaved. Similarly, within the generic sphere of Constitutional government, the first perversions of polity, which is the best constituted form, are less injurious than the second perversion. The first perversions of polity are oligarchy and democracy. These are perverted constitutions. The second perversion—despotism—is not of the constitution, but of Constitutional government itself. Despotism as the complete overthrow of the constitution is obviously worse than democracy and oligarchy as imperfectly just constitutions. Men suffer more from being oppressed by Lawless government than from being deprived of citizenship or what they deem an equitable share of civic honors. And of these two perverted constitutions, democracy more nearly approximates the justice of polity, whereas oligarchy more nearly approximates the injustice of despotism. That is why Aristotle calls democracy " the most tolerable " of all the perversions.[532]

[532] Vd. *Politics*, IV, 2, 1289b4. This fact by itself is conclusive proof that Aristotle considered polity, not monarchy or aristocracy, the best form of government, for if it were not, democracy could not be the most tolerable of the perversions by reason

The principles of the Aristotelian analysis and ordering of the perversions of good government are clearly valid, and they obviously call for a radical reconstruction of the traditional sixfold picture. But they also obviously get us into one verbal difficulty. On the one hand, we speak of democracy and oligarchy as perversions of polity, and yet both democracy and oligarchy must also be regarded as good in some sense because both are subject to further corruptions—despotism and ultimately tyranny. "Despotism" and "tyranny" need never be used as names for good government, but "democracy" and "oligarchy," it would seem, must be used both as good and as bad names. Aristotle recognizes this when he says that democracy and oligarchy "fall short of the best-constituted state, and so they must be reckoned as perversions; yet the *really* perverted governments are the perversions of these." [533] Ty-

of being the nearest approximation to the most just government. Tyranny is the worst perversion only when, as including despotism, it is furthest removed from (i. e., the most complete corruption of) the best regime, which, therefore, cannot be Royal government in either of its accidental modes, monarchy or aristocracy.

It should be further noted that to call democracy "the most tolerable of the perversions" suggests that it is the *least unjust* of the various corruptions of good government, not that it is merely a *less efficient* exploitation of the common good than tyranny. This explains Aristotle's criticism of Plato's position concerning democracy, in *Politics*, IV, 2; and it also corrects Aristotle's own error in that same chapter. Vd. fn. 465a *supra*.

[533] Vd. *Politics*, IV, 8, 1293^{b}25-28. The difficulty in this passage, as in the other passage cited (vd. fn. 531 *supra*) is that Aristotle allows himself to fall back into the Platonism of calling the Royal regime (or absolute monarchy) the "most perfect form of government." That he means by "most perfect" here the inapplicable ideal of Divine government is indicated by the fact that in the earlier passage he says: "that which is the perversion of the first and most divine is necessarily the worst" (*Politics*, IV, 2, 1289^{a}40). But, as we have seen, this ideal is totally irrelevant to the classification and ordering of practicable human regimes, whether considered absolutely or relatively to special circumstances. Vd. fn. 466a, 489, and 515 *supra*. If it be excluded from consideration, as it should have been by Aristotle himself on his own principles, then no one will be tempted to say that the Royal regime which is justified by inferior conditions is the best or most perfect regime, or that tyranny is the worst because it is the furthest removed from monarchy as best.

There can be no question that tyranny is the worst corruption of government. And if the standard used for determining the best government is that it be furthest removed, that it resemble least, the worst, then certainly absolute government, even when it is Royal, must be less good than any form of Constitutional government. Cf. fn. 531 *supra*. This truth holds for an Aristotelian ordering of just

ranny, despotism, and despotic tyranny are the *really* perverted governments. To avoid the ambiguity of calling democracy and oligarchy "perversions," let us speak of them as *ambivalent forms* of government. They are both just and unjust, whereas tyranny, simple or despotic, is in no sense just at all.[534]

regimes and their perversions, and also for the *linear* presentation of a Platonic ordering of regimes, as a comparison of subsequent diagrams will reveal. But it does not hold for the traditional, bi-columnar, sixfold picture as presented on p. 57 *supra*, which is supposed to be Aristotelian rather than Platonic, and hence is falsely supposed to be incapable of *linear* representation. It does not hold because in that confused conception, no perversion can be represented as "further removed" than another from the regime it corrupts; there it is possible only to say that the worst is the opposite of the best, and no satisfactory explanation can be given why this must be so, as is indicated by the fact that this statement has the color of truth only when "monarchy" is chosen as best (for whatever reason), but not when "polity" is so regarded, for "democracy," its opposite, is never worse than tyranny. Vd. fn. 464 *supra*.

[534] It may be properly objected, however, that *benevolent* despotism is also an ambivalent regime, for it combines the justice of ruling for the common good with the injustice of absolutism when that is not justified by circumstances. Benevolent despotism (i.e., despotism without tyranny) must, therefore, be classified along with oligarchy and democracy as an ambivalent regime. It differs from these latter two in one respect: the injustice of an absolute rule is separable from the justice of rule for the common good, but the injustice of an oligarchical or a democratic constitution is not separable from the justice of Constitutional government. Hence, though we shall classify benevolent despotism as ambivalent, we must remember that it is not ambivalent in precisely the same way as democracy and oligarchy are. If we consider Republican government in relation to Democratic on the absolute scale of justice, and see that, under such consideration, Republican government always involves the *oligarchical* type of injustice, then we can say that any Republican government is an ambivalent regime in the same way as democracy or oligarchy, and so by this standard polity is also ambivalent. But for Aristotle it was not, and the reasons are clear why he thought it was not.

It may also be objected that despotism can never be benevolent, but must always be tyrannical, because, the ideal common good being considered, despotism is always in motion away from, rather than toward, the ideal common good. But the word "tyranny" cannot be used univocally to name a violation of the existential common good and also a turning away from the ideal common good. The latter is common to every perversion of government, whereas the former is one among several distinct perversions, each separable from the others. When we distinguish between despotism and tyranny, and regard them as separable and combinable in the case of the corruption of Constitutional government, we are using the word "tyranny" to refer only to the violation of the existential common good *by the manner in which those who have power exercise it*, and so what it signifies is distinct from the injustice resulting from *the kind of power which is being exercised*. Even if despotism be regarded as also violating the existential common good, it must be recognized that it does not violate it *in the same way* as tyranny does. We

Their ambivalence consists in their being just in so far as they are true species of Constitutional government, and in their being unjust in so far as their constitutions imperfectly embody the principle of distributive justice. Hence, within the Aristotelian scheme, there are *two* just forms of government, Royal and Constitutional, the former dividing into the *two* accidental modes of monarchy and aristocracy, the latter dividing into *three* sub-forms, one perfectly just (polity, a mixed regime) and two ambivalent species (democracy and oligarchy, both pure regimes); and there are *three* real perversions, one of Royal government (simple tyranny) and two of Constitutional government (despotism and despotic tyranny).[535]

We have now completed, in the foregoing eight points, our criticism of the inadequacies and errors of the "traditional" sixfold classification, as presented in the table on page 57 *supra*, which is neither Platonic nor Aristotelian, though it is obviously more Platonic in style. We shall now summarize our discussion positively by presenting in another table the classification of the forms of government which is truly Aristotelian and analytically true, even if it is not traditional.

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(To be continued. Lack of space prevents completion of Section 5 and publication of Section 6 in this installment as originally planned.—THE EDITORS.)

shall return to this problem in Part V *infra*. The point here being made is, however, sufficiently clear, and when understood it will be seen to be consistent with the point we have previously made about despotic tyranny. Vd. fn. 528 *supra*.

[535] When the Aristotelian scheme is amplified to include the *regimen regale et politicum* as an intermediate regime, as well as the distinction between the Republican and Democratic forms of Constitutional government, the classification of all forms of government becomes more complicated, but at last it becomes adequate. We shall present this adequate classification in Part V. How different such a scheme of classification is from the superficial, confused, and fallacious traditional sixfold picture, anyone should be able to see for himself. How true the rectified classification is, the validity of its principles proves, and the analytical consistency of their development ensures. (It should be added here that the Platonic classification given in *The Statesman* may be too *simple*, and it may be *false*, but it is not *confused*. It is the "traditional" conception that is *confused*, as well as *false*, as a result of failing to distinguish between Platonic and Aristotelian principles.)

BOOK REVIEWS

A Companion to the Summa: Volume IV, The Way of Life. By the Rev. Walter Farrell, O.P., S.T.D., S.T.M. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942. Pp. viii + 464. $3.75.

The Way of Life brings to completion a theological work of outstanding excellence. This latest and last volume of Father Farrell's *Companion to the Summa* corresponds to the *Pars Tertia* and the *Supplementum*. In other words, it is concerned with the theology of the Incarnation and the Redemption, the Sacraments and the Last Things. In this, as in the three preceding volumes, the author has striven to produce, as he himself expresses it, a layman's edition of the *Summa Theologica*. He has been eminently successful. Indeed, he has surpassed his objective, for not only the layman but also the priest and the professional theologian will find in the *Companion* enlightenment and guidance toward a deeper appreciation of the treasures of sacred lore bequeathed to the Catholic Church by the Angelic Doctor.

Twenty chapters make up *The Way of Life*. The first forms an introduction, developing the theme that the human mind craves mystery. The appetite for mystery is so keen that it leaves a man restless, bored in the face of the obvious. Today, however, the mysterious is too frequently looked upon as an insult to man's intelligence, to his courage, to his willingness to work. The truth of the matter is that the study of mystery—particularly of the supreme mystery, God—evokes courage and love and promotes the substantial progress of the mind by sharpening the intellectual powers. The three previous volumes of the *Companion* deal with the mysteries of God and of human conduct in its relation to God; this volume deals with the climax of mystery, the mystery of God made man.

The following ten chapters propound the doctrines of Christology and Soteriology according to the order followed by St. Thomas. The fittingness of the Incarnation, the mode of the hypostatic union, the integrity of our Lord's two natures, the perfections of His humanity and its so-called defects—these vital truths centered about the Word Incarnate are accurately and convincingly presented. Then the author explains the mediatorial office of Christ and traces the course of His earthly life in its main events from His birth to His passion and death, with His subsequent triumph in the resurrection and the ascension. One chapter is devoted to the Virgin Mother of God and her sublime privileges, concluding with a striking contrast between Mary as she is portrayed by Catholic faith and theology and the ideal of womanhood prevalent in the modern world.

The twelfth chapter, one of the best in the book, entitled "Fruitful

Signs of Life," presents the doctrine of the sacraments in general, stressing particularly the truth that a sacrament is a sign. Then, six chapters are devoted to the study of the individual sacraments, the greatest measure of space being given, as would be expected, to the Holy Eucharist. Naturally, the author brings out prominently the ingenious reasoning of St. Thomas for the seven-fold number of the sacraments, especially the parallel between the needs of man's physical life and the spiritual needs cared for by the divinely established signs of supernatural life. "The sacraments greet man from the womb, and usher him to his tomb" (p. 265). Particularly worthy of praise is Father Farrell's exposition of our Lord's presence in the Blessed Sacrament in the mode of substance (pp. 310-313).

The last two chapters are concerned with the solemn verities of death, judgment, the resurrection, eternal reward and everlasting punishment. In its proper place Father Farrell treats the subject of the unending torments of hell without any attempt to compromise with modern notions. "It is not surprising that men should shrink from hell . . . What is surprising and not at all flattering to humanity is that men should shrink from the truth of hell, as if the place of eternal torment could be obliterated by our denial of it. It is a triumph of unreason so to deal with any truth; it is the height of unreason to give a divine truth treatment of this kind" (p. 452).

The outstanding feature of this work is the author's extraordinary genius for presenting theological doctrine in original terms and phrases that are singularly appropriate and for choosing metaphors and analogies perfectly adapted to present-day life. Thus, he illustrates the Thomistic teaching that the human nature of Christ is actualized by the divine existence of the Word by comparing it to the modern operation whereby the cornea of the eye is transferred from one person to another, whence it comes about that the transferred cornea shares in the one existence of the recipient (p. 99). In the chapter "The Bread of Life," Father Farrell points out that men exhibit a great interest in the food that gives life to the body, and continues: "There has been, perhaps, no greater, more detailed interest than in our time when vitamins, calories, carbohydrates and starches roll off the tongues of children like a litany of old friends" (p. 299). To illustrate a very profound truth of the Incarnation he institutes a comparison, one of whose terms is the light, transparent raincoats used by ladies at the present day (p. 208).

Father Farrell has the ability to insert a dash of humor into his comparisons and illustrations without detracting from the reverence due to the sacred subject. Commenting on St. Thomas's opinion that after the final consummation the earth will be remade and will serve for the happiness of the blessed, he remarks: "Why waste a perfectly good world? It would make a kind of Central Park for the Sunday stroll of the blessed when they feel like stretching their legs again on earth, and there is always the

heavenly home to return to" (p. 428). When he tells us that God demands some contrition on our part before He will remit even venial sins, he adds: "Not even these slight sins are to be snatched out of a man's hands as a noisy rattle is taken from a baby by a nervous mother" (p. 355). He surmises that the bridegroom of Cana, when questioned as to why he kept the best wine until the end "probably just smiled knowingly, and shrugged his shoulders, hoping Christ would not give him away" (p. 195). Pointing out that it would have been completely incongruous had our Lord employed only His divine wisdom and not utilized His human intellect also, Father Farrell comments that otherwise the human faculty would have been "merely an idle decoration of divinity, as grotesque as a moustache scratched on a masterpiece" (p. 73).

One who would seek to discover flaws even in this splendid work could take exception to some of the expressions and statements found in *The Way of Life*. The word "reborn," which the author uses to describe the effect of Penance on the soul (p. 349) is more suitably reserved exclusively for Baptism. It does not seem quite accurate to say that *every* drop of blood lost in the passion was restored to the glorified body of Christ on Easter Sunday (p. 232). And exegetes would hardly admit that the Magi arrived some thirteen days after the birth of Christ (p. 166).

But it would be most unfair to allow such trifles to detract even slightly from the generous tribute of praise that is due to this up-to-date presentation of the unchanging truths of Catholic theology. Father Farrell has proved that even the most abstruse doctrines can be explained to the person of average intelligence, even though he be unfamiliar with the terminology of technical theology. In *A Companion to the Summa* he has provided us with a key to the sacred treasures gathered together by the greatest of Dominic's sons, seven centuries ago.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the science of theology, as Father Farrell treats it, is intimately linked up with the science of holiness. Practical applications of theological truth to the needs of the Christian life are frequently interspersed. Thus—to quote but one of the many beautiful passages of this nature—"As for good works, how could they be made easier for us than to have Christ Himself mark out with His own tired feet the steps we are to follow? The road from Bethlehem to Calvary is not nearly so hard, as long as we can put our arm upon His; we may even find the courage to stop in the midst of our agony for a word of comfort and a gesture of help to others before we plod stubbornly on. This was the example Christ left; an example that was taken up joyously by all of the saints who crowd the corridors of heaven" (p. 31).

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Schelling, The Ages of the World. Translated with Introduction and Notes by Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. xiv + 251. $3.00.

Schelling is little known, less read and still less appreciated. While Hegel's works are accessible to the reader in several translations, there are few of Schelling's writings in English. They are more difficult to render into any other language than are Hegel's or Fichte's. The translation presented in this volume is very readable and reproduces the original meaning as well as this may be done. There are, inevitably, certain passages where the choice of terms may appear debatable. On the whole, however, the translator may be complimented on the version he gives.

If Schelling is little known, the ideas which characterize the later phases of his philosophy are practically unknown. Even in Germany it was mostly the younger Schelling who attracted attention. *The Ages of the World* (*Weltalter*) was begun in 1809 and occupied the philosopher until his last years; but it never was completed and it was published first after Schelling's death by his son in the first edition of the *Works.* Only the first part was written; of the second apparently some pages exist, which were never published. This first part deals with the past. But it is not, as one might suppose, a philosophy of history. The book is essentially one of ontology. Schelling strives to discover the meaning of being. The most remarkable feature of this philosophizing is the emphasis on the concrete, on existence in its contingent character, as individual being and becoming. Mr. Bolman is justified in speaking of "existential dialectics" as set over against the ideal logical dialectic of Hegel. Both approaches, the analysis of the ideal or logical significance of being, and the analysis of existence, are synthesized by Schelling in what he called "metaphysical empiricism." Mr. Bolman refers in his interesting and instructive introduction to certain parallels between this philosophy and ideas of Kierkegaard. The latter attended Schelling's classes, but professed to have been very much disappointed. Nevertheless, some influence may be suspected. It would be interesting to know whether the unpublished parts of Kierkegaard's journal contain more references to Schelling.

Schelling's speculation had turned on problems best characterized as pertaining to natural theology. A strong current of intense religious feeling runs through this book. One aspect of the theological problem in Schelling is the relation of divine immanence to divine transcedence; another, Revelation as part, if one may say so, of divine nature and as a historical fact. And a third the acknowledgement of the "dark" side of existence, problems which appear under the names of despair, dread, and the like, again strongly reminiscent of Kierkegaard.

The translator summarizes in his introduction the main features of his author's philosophy. To give a still more condensed account is clearly im-

possible. Be it sufficient to state that this book deserves full attention on the part of the student of the history of philosophy or of German Idealism. The historian discovers manifold threads relating Schelling with his predecessors, Neo-Platonism, also in its Christian form (one finds terms pointing back to the Areopagite and Eriugena), with certain medieval ideas, and of course, with Fichte and Kant, but also influences, though difficult to trace, on more recent systems. This philosophy, so long neglected and considered obsolete and of a purely antiquarian interest, may have a message for our days. If one cannot agree with Schelling's daring and imposing speculations, they at least might be considered as suggesting an approach to natural theology which perhaps allows for transposition into the world of traditional ideas.

Schelling is never easy reading. However well translated, he becomes still more obscure when his ideas are stated in a terminology not originally his. The translator has carefully added, in brackets, all German terms the meaning of which is not exactly rendered by the English word. Once, however, the reader has made his own Schelling's peculiar viewpoints concerning certain fundamentals, he will be able to follow his ideas, and he will find the study of this man enticing and stimulating. Philosophical literature owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. Bolman for the translation and for the introduction and notes.

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Philosophical Essays in Honor of Edgar Arthur Singer, Jr. Ed. by E. P. CLARKE and M. C. NAHM. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942. Pp. x + 377. $3.50.

Many such collections of essays have appeared on special occasions such as the birthday or the retirement of the man they honored. This one, however, sprang from the desire of friends or pupils to express their sympathy and gratefulness independently of any such extrinsic reason. The articles mirror the varieties of interests and contributions Prof. Singer has displayed in his writings. There are four divisions: Methodology and Science; Ethics and Religion; Aesthetics; History. A bibliography of Dr. Singer's writings is added. Although all these articles present interesting features, only a few can be made the subject of a somewhat lengthy report. Of the rest, a mere list of titles must be given.

A. O. Lovejoy discusses "The Criteria and Limits of Meaning." He does it by analyzing critically a volume by R. Carnap on spurious problems in philosophy in which this representative of logical positivism deals with meaning, using, as the writer points out, two criteria as if they were interchangeable without actually being so. Nor is the second criterion to

be derived from the first. " A term . . . has meaning . . . if its referent is thinkable," according to the first; according to the second " a sentence has meaning only if it expresses a judgment such that there is a thinkable experience which would be so related to the judgment that it would establish the truth or falsity of the judgment." Contrary to what Carnap believes, it is not evident that all propositions not empirically verifiable are incapable of expressing thinkable ideas. (Prof. Lovejoy might have added that this very proposition which plays so fundamental a rôle in the reasonings of logical positivism is itself incapable of verification.) Had this school been content with distinguishing a class of propositions which are " scientifically meaningful " without generalizing ideas relative to this class and applying them to any proposition whatsoever, they would have given a definition of the meaning of " scientific " and thus done valuable work. But their statements of philosophical import (all in a negative direction) cannot be accepted; positivists though they are, (to summarize Lovejoy's arguments) they are not logical. The contradictions in which this kind of reasoning becomes involved are illustrated with Carnap's statements concerning the other ego (*das Fremdpsychische*). This article ought to be read carefully by all those who are unduly impressed by the claim of the logical positivists to be so very " scientific."

H. B. Smith's article, " Postulates of Empirical Thought," is reprinted from *The Journal of Philosophy*, XXV (1928). H. Jaffe contributes an essay on " The Development of the Experimental Method," and C. W. Churchman one " Towards a General Logic of Propositions." E. F. Flower, in " Two Applications of Logic to Biology," deals with the difficulties any attempt at defining life encounters, and proposes—anticipating a study by Dr. Singer—the " producer-product relation " as a suitable basis for such a definition. The article by M. I. Pennymaker also is concerned with the definition of life; she asks what are the " Biological Phenomena Which a Definition of Life Must Include "; the article enumerates the most important difficulties and lists several such attempts, without reaching or trying to reach a definite conclusion.

The three following articles deal with psychological questions. E. R. Guthrie studies " The Principle of Associative Learning," chiefly in regard to animal behavior, while Fr. W. Irwin analyzes " The Concept of Volition in Experimental Psychology "; his endeavors are somewhat marred by his all too positivistic viewpoint (" a private experience which we cannot share with them . . . and which is therefore a scientifically unverifiable and meaningless entity "). But the author himself is forced to speak of a " hierarchy of goals " of which he can know only by a subject's reports and which he neither can share nor verify. Volitional behavior is defined as " exhibiting a purpose ascribable to the behaving creature as an individual." M. G. Preston's article, " The Experience Theory of the Social Attitudes,"

reviews briefly studies on past experience and, especially on attitudes; these, the author claims justly, cannot stem from mere repetition; the "dynamical state of the individual" has to be explored. Although this article contains many interesting remarks, it fails to attain its end because of the prevailing mechanistic terminology.

The section on Ethics and Religion consists of three essays. T. A. Cowan's article, however, is more sociological and criminological than ethical ("Toward an Experimental Definition of Criminal Mind"). W. S. Sheriff, a Baptist minister, in his "Reflections on Contemporary Science and Ethics," sees two matters of concern for the ethicists "standing out against the background of contemporary chaos." One is progress in science, the other the general moral uncertainty of our time. Regarding the first, it would seem that the writer has fallen prey to the common scientistic mentality when he demands that the ethicist adjust "his work to the intellectual aspects of the contemporary growth in science," and that "the principles of ethics must, if they do not grow out of scientific endeavor (how could they?), at least be in accord with the results of scientific investigation." This view assumes, uncritically, that no aspect of human life is beyond the grasp of scientific method. But, before subjecting ethics to "science," one ought to inquire whether science has anything of relevant weight to say on matters with which ethics is concerned. J. K. Shryock sees "The Cultural Function of Religion" in opposition to the one of science, in so far as the postulate which lies at the base of morality is different from the fundamentals of science. However, as "the ideal of science does not include a love of science," so the "ideal of morality does not include a love of man." The scientist and the moralist to fully achieve their ideals have to "borrow the ideal of art." The ideals of these three being separate and not necessarily connected, they are in need of a union "coming from without." The unifying factor is found in "the postulate of God as the end of man." The Kantian background of this reasoning, although not metioned, is discernible.

The part on Aesthetics comprises four interesting articles whose topics, however, are too special to be reported here. But any student of aesthetics will profit by perusing this section. The articles are: J. St. Adams, Jr., "Esthetic of Music and the Rational Ideal"; L. W. Flaccus, "Shaper, Thinker and Visionary"; M. C. Nahm, "Ateological Theories of Aesthetics"; M. G. Rigg, "The Expression of Meanings and Emotions in Music."

The series of the historical essays is opened by G. H. Clark's "Phantasia in Plotinus"; this study ought to be of interest also to the medievalist, especially in regard to the manifold relations of Plotinian thought and the Greek Fathers (see the studies of P. Henry); the pertinent passages of Ennaed, IV, 3, are translated. Fr. P. Clarke compares "Kant and Thomas Aquinas on the Proofs for the Existence of God"; he correctly points at

the differences in the evaluation of the cognition based on analogy as one of the main reasons for the divergence of views, or as he says: "The difference lies in the definition of knowledge itself." I. Husik takes up a problem he discussed thirty-eight years ago (Philosophical Review, XIII [1904], 514): "The Categories of Aristotle"; contrary to other scholars he holds that the whole book is genuine, while it is considered by some as only partly so, by others as totally spurious. He brings forth evidence that the Categories are closely related to the Topics, written before and serving as basis for the latter; this he holds to apply to the Categories properly so called and to the Postpraedicamenta. J. H. Randall, Jr. has an article on "Newton's Natural Philosophy, Its Problems and Consequences," in which interesting relations to Kantian notions are illustrated. Finally, there is W. D. Wallis' "David Hume's Contribution to Social Science,"

These essays are worth reading. They give an idea of the influence Dr. Singer exercised, and still exercises, on many minds. They also reveal, more clearly than is often the case, the many ramifications of philosophical thought and its actual or potential influences on fields which by some are considered as immune against contamination by philosophy. They finally show a lively interest in many problems of a rather speculative nature existing in more minds than the superficial observer of modern civilization may assume.

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Science, Philosophy and Religion, Second Symposium. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc. 1942. Pp. 559. $3.00.

Our age will be remembered, it may be supposed, not only for its global war, but also for its symptomatic predilection for learned papers by specialists; and some future historian of culture might even give a paper showing how the experts of the twentieth century were learnedly giving papers as their world was crashing about them. Though there are some valuable contributions among them, this miscellany of papers does not in any real sense constitute a book. Papers which are interesting when presented orally against a background of discussion—as some of these were—often fall flat on the printed page, and the reasons for this are many, some of them being pointed out long ago by Plato. This is remedied somewhat by the group papers with critical comments by those in the same or other fields; yet even here one is reminded all the more poignantly how much has been lost in our failure to carry on a dialectical interchange, a lively clash of minds in which truth is begotten and errors are discarded.

The mechanically juxtaposed papers with their contradictory deliverances challenge the reader to introduce some kind of order, and here the editors could have been more useful had they attempted at least to delineate sharply the areas of agreement and disagreement among the contributors. Just as there are different kinds of unity, so there are different kinds of difference: some are creative and permit a richer collaboration; others are destructive; and all the good will in the world, gentlemanly tolerance, and the like, cannot hold together mutually exclusive contradictories. The fact that there is so much disagreement within each of the disciplines, as well as among the different disciplines, shows how important it is to continue to explore differences. This should be done, not by covering them up politely, but by a rigorous philosophical method. Indeed, only by facing this task unflinchingly will the groundwork be prepared for some kind of unification.

In its present form, this volume is an extended case history of what is healthy and diseased in our culture. The scientists differ among themselves and with the philosophers and theologians, who also differ among themselves on basic issues (except for the Scholastics, who share some common principles, at least); and there does not seem to be any generally accepted working definition of democracy. Even among the philosophers, who should know better, one, for example, rejects " many of the exaggerated claims of racism and nationalism on *empirical grounds* " (italics my own). Another shows the same misconception of what philosophy is equipped by its nature to do by admitting that his agreement with certain points about democracy is " a personal rather than a professional one, that is, it is dictated by my personal inclinations as a citizen, rather than by any facts or principles known to me in my *technical capacity as a philosopher.*" (Italics again my own).

Though more feebly voiced than in their heyday, there are still strong echoes of scientism more or less positive, idealism and materialism variously nuanced, subjectivism, unnatural naturalisms, less than human humanisms, neo-pragmatism, and many other varieties of error, which still persist, strangely enough, even though the soil out of which they first grew has long since disappeared. Amusing as it may seem, there is the fear of a plot to force a " return to the faith and discipline of Neo-Scholasticism." Through one of its defendants who quotes Auguste Comte's remark that the ultimate conflict in philosophy would be between positivism and Scholasticism, empiricism feels called upon to accept the challenge of Scholasticism, and this is an encouraging sign. That it fails makes it even more pathetic, and that is another reason why Scholastic philosophers should speak more understandingly to their contemporaries.

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BRIEF NOTICES

A Chronological Harmony of the Gospels. By Stephen J. Hartdegen, O. F. M., S. S. L., Paterson, N. J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1942. Pp. xxv + 220, with two maps, a plan of the Temple, and an index. $2.50.

Fr. Hartdegen's "Harmony" is the second book of its kind to feature the recently revised text of the Challoner-Rheims version of the New Testament. The author has stressed the chronological factors of the life of Christ, and has accordingly arranged the text to cover Christ's public life in a little more than two years. This position is shared by many of the most competent and recognized Catholic scholars, such as Lagrange, Höpfl, Grandmaison, and others, and is therefore anything but a rash challenge thrown into the teeth of tradition. On the contrary, it enables us to form a more accurate picture of the life of the Savior; and scientific scholarship, in doing this, has achieved a notable triumph.

The text is arranged in the familiar sequence: Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John; but it is the fourth gospel which is the guide. Chapter six precedes chapter five; a change which many reptuable authors consider as most probable, for it unquestionably injects a satisfactory order into the text, and has a foundation in an ancient tradition. There does not, however, appear to be any necessity to identify the two feasts mentioned in 5, 1 and 6, 4 as one Pasch, nor to distinguish them so as to make two Paschs (which is an argument for the three-year ministry of Christ); the feast in 5, 1 may well be Pentecost. The manuscript tradition would seem to rule out the possibility of this feast being the Pasch.

Another noteworthy problem in a chronological arrangement of Christ's life is that of the cleansing(s) of the Temple. Fr. Hartdegen holds for two of them, one at the beginning, and the other at the end of Christ's life. Here again, as in the problem mentioned above, the final solution is still to be found; in the meantime we find excellent authorities for either position.

In this handy little volume, sections of the text are numbered consecutively. This is a very sensible arrangement which greatly facilitates reference work. Instead of grouping the debatable points into a single introductory section, introductory notes are strategically placed where questions concerning them would naturally occur to the reader. Thus, heading the chapter "Annunciations" is a discussion of the time of Christ's birth (c. 7 B. C.) and the genealogies. Two other like sections deal with the extent of the public ministry and with the date of Christ's death (30 A. D.). These remarks are well written, clear, and very much to the

point. They are followed by a brief but reliable bibliography. Complementing these notes are others which appear throughout the book as footnotes, and they maintain the same high standard. The author deserves congratulations for a fine piece of work.

Le maître et l'élève. (Les méthodes scientifiques dans l'éducation: Troisième Congrès annuel, 24-27 juin 1942) Ottawa: Les Editions de Lévrier, 1942. Pp. 201.

Regards sur les sciences expérimentales. (Les méthodes scientifiques dans l'éducation) Ottawa: Les Editions du Lévrier, 1942. Pp. 187.

The first of these, a report of the third annual Congress on *Les méthodes scientifiques dans l'éducation* measures up to and in some respects surpasses previous volumes in this series. It contains the following papers: "La genèse du savoir," by Edmond Gaudron, O.F.M.; "Les dispositifs cérébraux et la fonction de l'apprentissage," by Dr. Antonio Barbeau; "Les lois de l'acquisition du savoir," by Noel Mailloux, O.P.; "Improvement in Learning and Its Permanence," by R. E. Brennan, O.P.; "La transfert dans l'apprentissage," by Charles Bilodeau; "La mesure dans l'apprentissage," by L. T. Dayhaw; "L'école et la communication du savoir—Une visite à Winnetka," by Irénée Lussier; "The Role of Reason in the Formation of Character with Special Reference to Adolescent Minds," by Rudolf Allers.

The second volume appears under the same auspices and is concerned with an analysis of the techniques of research and teaching in the experimental sciences. The first two articles deal with the instrument of scientific knowledge—human perception. The remaining articles treat the various sciences from the point of view of method. Especially interesting is the concluding article: "Les mathematiques au service des sciences expérimentales," by M. Abel Gauthier.

The Logic of Belief. By D. Elton Trueblood. New York: Harper, 1942. Pp. 327, with index. $2.75.

If one could agree entirely with the presuppositions of the author, this would be an excellent work on the philosophy of religion. These presuppositions are, first, that belief in God is simply natural; second, that it does not go beyond the realm of probability. The author rightly states that if one cannot show with certainty that God alone explains the universe, then His existence is only probable. The traditional proofs for God's existence assert just that—the universe as we know it experientially and intelligently has no other possible explanation than the existence of an Uncaused Cause. Yet the book has its value for the modern mind; the author clearly shows that belief in God has vastly more (probable) evidence for its truth than all other beliefs (including those held by scientists in their own field).

In the final chapters the author has some excellent things to say about the problems of evolution, evil, and immortality.

Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil (A Trans. of St. Augustine's *De Ordine*) By R. P. Russell, O.S.A. New York: Cosmopolitan Science and Art Service Co., Inc., 1942. Pp. iv + 191, with index. $2.00.

It is to be hoped that this is the first of many more translations of St. Augustine's great works. The Latin text is included with a fine translation on opposite pages. Fr. Russell has added a few annotations to the text. The work is a report by St. Augustine of a series of conversations between himself and his friends on the problem of order in the world. The seriousness of the subject is relieved by the personal touches brought in throughout the dialogue. One might hope that Catholic theologians today could recapture the charm and simplicity of the Augustinian presentation of the deepest truths of faith and reason.

Plato's Earlier Dialectic. By Richard Robinson. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1941. Pp. viii + 239, with index. $3.00.

In his introduction Mr. Robinson lays down some very careful canons for the interpretation of an author's writings. In his own interpretation of Plato's dialectic he follows them carefully, yet the result is not too convincing. He discusses the Socratic Elenchus and the dialectic of the middle dialogues. First of all, he studies the passages in which Plato explains the method involved in each of these; then, he proceeds to show that Plato's practice did not coincide with the theoretical expositions. The important point of Plato's intention in all the dialogues is not considered The result is a material, not a formal, interpretation. The earlier dialogues, are, for example, a negative preparation for the dialectical movement of Socrates' discourse on love in the *Symposium*. Hence, Mr. Robinson scoffs (genteelly) at Socrates' famous question, " What is X? " as though he were looking for a definition expressible in human words. Perhaps, since he never is satisfied with the answers he receives, he is trying to communicate the truth that all human definition fails to express reality perfectly and that the only one who really knows is God.

Philosophy for the Millions. By J. A. McWilliams. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. viii + 206. $2.00.

The Solution is Easy. By Mark Schmid, O.S.B. New York: Frederick Pustet Co., 1942. Pp. xii + 180, with glossary and index. $2.00.

Scholastics are still accused by non-Scholastics of having all the answers, without penetrating any of the real difficulties offered by modern thought. These two works, in different degrees, could be used to support such an

accusation. Fr. McWilliams has been the wiser, for he confined himself to a few problems closely connected with man and hence was able to treat them more thoroughly. Yet there is a difficulty behind both works. Is philosophy a series of propositions that can be taught somewhat as the doctrines of faith are preached? Or is it not rather an intellectual virtue than can be attained only through discipline? Clearly, the latter view is the traditional one. Granted that those who cannot spend the time required to perfect the habit of philosophy may have a more or less perfect participation in the habit through reading short expositions such as these, yet these participations can never rise above the level of opinion. The readers to whom they are addressed already have something better than philosophy to give easy solutions and that is faith.

The Ethics of Tolerance. By Ira Eisenstein. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. Pp. 87. $1.50.

Mr. Eisenstein prefers the word equity to tolerance, for the latter bears the stamp of snobbery—the thing or person tolerated is looked upon as evil. Equity, on the contrary, looks on all things as more or less good; if a thing or person is evil, it should not even be tolerated. The author is discussing this problem from the viewpoint of the secular state and hence his distinctions are understandable, although not entirely defensible. Part of the work is given to an application of the principles of equity to special groups. Mr. Eisenstein shows himself very understanding and sympathetic in his treatment of the Jewish problem. Unfortunately, he is not so sympathetic when he treats of Catholics and their relations to the state. This lack of sympathy, we hope, is due to misunderstanding. Thus, he admits that Catholic schools should be tolerated as long as a large number of Catholics attend public schools. If the Church insisted that all Catholic children go to Catholic schools, then, the author insinuates, the state would have a problem on its hands; such exclusivism would unfit Catholics for living with their fellow citizens. More amusing is his attempt to find an analogy between the feeling of an Irish-American for Ireland and that of a Catholic American for Vatican City. He knows the distinction Catholics make between the Holy Father as a spiritual and temporal ruler, yet is discourteous enough to suggest that such a distinction is merely for the sake of "convenience."

Social Theories of the Middle Ages. By Bede Jarrett, O.P. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Book Shop, 1942. Pp. ix + 280, with index.

We should be very grateful to the Newman Book Shop for its reprint of this classic on medieval social philosophy. Fr. Jarrett discusses law, education, women, slavery, property, money-making, war, Christendom, and art. There is a short bibliography appended and a good index.

Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation. By Raymond B. Blakney. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941. Pp. xxviii + 333.

In his introduction the author says: "Before I began to read Meister Eckhart, I shared a common prejudice against medieval thinkers and all their works." His study of Meister Eckhart seems to have dispelled the prejudice—as far as Meister Eckhart is concerned. The author still retains the rest of his prejudice. This leads him to see Eckhart more as a forerunner of the reformation than as an orthodox Catholic whose teachings were garbled by the ineptitude of his listeners who took notes while he preached. Mr. Blakney continually insinuates that Eckhart was considered heretical by the Church because he had the gift of stamping orthodox religious ideas with the vivid pattern of his own deep religious experience. A glance at the list of propositions from Eckhart's works that were condemned by the Church would reveal that they are the same ones he himself condemns in his "Defense." The translation is very readable; there are, however, inaccuracies because of a lack of understanding of Catholic theological terminology.

Essays on Catholic Education in the United States. Edited by Roy J. Deferrari. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University Press, 1942. Pp. xi + 556. $4.50.

This volume carries on the intention of an earlier volume, *Vital Problems of Catholic Education in the United States,* without repeating what was said there. There are several essays grouped under each of the following general headings: Fundamental Principles; The Divisions of the Educational System; The Professional Schools; Some Special Fields; Catholic Education Within Special Groups. All the authors strive to trace the historical development of their subjects within the United States and present the contemporary situation with suggestions for further progress. In the section on The Professional Schools, Fr. Francis Connell, C. SS. R., contributes an article on "The Theological School," in which he emphasizes the role it should play in guiding all the schools of a university. This volume adds a rather ironical commentary on that article, for the leading article on "Fundamental Principles" is written by a philosopher of education.

Intellectual America. By Oscar Cargill. New York: Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. xxi + 777, with index. $5.00.

The subtitle of this volume is "Ideas on the March." Mr. Cargill investigates the predominant schools of thought in America through the literature that has appeared here during the last decades. He traces influences from the continent and the changes that have taken place in various movements once they have reached our shores. In this volume, the author is striving mostly for clear presentation without evaluation; this he promises in a later volume.

BOOKS RECEIVED

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THE UNITY IN THE UNIVERSE, ACCORDING TO ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD

INTRODUCTION

PROFESSOR Whitehead has made a large contribution to the field of modern philosophy in the several works which he has published. In the series of books which have appeared, he preserves the general outline of his theories, although he makes certain changes in the detailed explanations. In his latest work, *Modes of Thought*, one may note a further transition in his doctrine, still within the general trend of his earlier thought. For the purpose of this study the most systematic presentation of his cosmology may be found in *Process and Reality*. It is easily understood that, while he is presented as a philosopher in the general sense of that term, he has come to philosophy by way of mathematics and mathematical physics. Hence, he is especially interested in the cosmological rather than ontological aspects of philosophy. At the same time, his philosophy is organic, founded on principles which pertain as much to biology and psychology as to cosmology. His doctrine of prehension or prehensive experience as it is

presented in *Process and Reality* is an extension of a fact which is verified concerning living things, to the inorganic world.

First of all, the world must be conceived as composed of monadic actual entities. Each entity *becomes*—it never *is*—and it is nothing but the process of its own becoming. This process of becoming resolves itself into the ingression of eternal objects which constitute the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence. Not only do eternal objects enter into the composition, but other actual entities may be prehensively gathered into the unity of one new entity. The eternal objects are similar to universals or Platonic forms, and have an existence separate from that which they possess when they are a part of the constitution of an actual entity. A rather disconcerting example of eternal object is a definite shade of green. Mr. Whitehead does not employ the term " greenness " but we may assume that the term is not alien to his idea of an eternal object. In this manner of ingression or " participation," the eternal objects are the source of the temporal actual entities of which the actual world is formed.

The part of " creativity " in the system is not very clear. It will be treated more fully in the section on creation. For the present, we may say that it is used at times as a synonym for the word " creation " considered as the act of creating; at other times it is that which results from the act of creation, the created world. At all events it is to be conceived as an element to be found throughout the world. All existing things, including God, are characterizations of it.

The two groups, actual entities and eternal objects, are mediated by a thing which combines the two. The mediating element is the divine element in the world, " by which the barren inefficient disposition of abstract potentialities or eternal objects obtains primordially the efficient conjunction of ordering." This ordering is said to be the " ideal realization " of all eternal objects. " The ideal realization of potentialities in the primordial nature of God constitutes the stability by which the actual process exemplifies general principles of metaphysics and attains the ends proper to specific types of emergent order."

By reason of the actuality of the primordial valuation, or ordering, or realization, of eternal objects, each eternal object has a definite, effective relevance to each concrescent process. The ordering amounts to a plan which is realized only approximately in the concrescent process which constitutes a given actual entity. The concrescing entities enjoy a certain amount of freedom in the process, and therefore the primordial aim is attained only more or less.

The process does not cease at the completion of a given actual entity. It begins with data, eternal objects, actual entities or both. These data are prehended by the actual entity, in a manner analogous to the act of experience of the higher animals, so that the data are made a part of—they are objectified in—the new actual entity. The act of experience is called "prehension." The prehensive process is completed when a given entity has attained a definite satisfaction. At this point it is called a subject-superject. The prehending actual entity is called the subject. When it is ready to be objectified in a new process it is called the subject-superject.

The whole world continues the process, each actual entity prehending every other entity of the world, in this way constituting one form of world unity. Finally all are united in the one divine prehension which constitutes God in His consequent nature. The harmonization or harmonious union of the things of the world is the special concern of Mr. Whitehead in his cosmology. It is also the special subject of this discussion. We shall try to present the system in a brief explanation, touching especially upon the items of causality and creation, as a means of understanding the unity which constitutes the world as one in the divine prehension.

I

Extrinsic Causality in the Process of Concrescence

According to the principles of organic philosophy, as presented by Professor Alfred North Whitehead, in the process of constituting an actual entity there are two causative factors of

great importance. The first of these is the data of the actual world relevant to the concrescent subject. The data are objectified in the process to form the resultant actual entity or subject-superject. This latter term is used to indicate that no actual entity simply *is*, but that it becomes a part of the data of the actual world or another concrescence as soon as it is itself finally constituted. The actual entity accepts or rejects (prehends) the various proposed objects into its constitution in accordance with a lure for feeling, or tendency toward satisfaction which is fully attained by the subject-superject. This latter entity is not a static state but dynamic, and it loses the characteristic of completion since the process is repeated. The " completed " actual entity forms the ground or foundation, as one among many actual entities, the data of an actual world, relevant to a new concrescent entity.

The data, precisely as such, are called the efficient cause, while the lure for feeling is the final cause of the process. That same lure for feeling is another word for " Mind "; but a mind which may be not-conscious. In other places the lure for feeling is said to be the germ of mentality rather than mentality. Finally, God is the lure for feeling.

The subjective aim in the process is derived from the primordial actual entity, that is, the primordial nature of God which is the conceptual valuation of eternal objects. These eternal objects " as in God's primordial nature constitute the Platonic world of ideas." [1] From this conceptual valuation the aim of a given entity is derived. This subjective aim, however, is not a complete determination, for the actual entity is partly undetermined. The propositions—the objective lure proposed for " feeling " or absorption—can be present only when the given actual entity has reached a stage of its development at which it can prehend the proposition. Until that moment the proposition does not exist for that subject. The indetermination also consists in the power of the concrescent entity to accept or reject freely the proposition proposed.

[1] *Process and Reality* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1929), p. 63; *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p. 228.

Thus in the process the efficient cause is the data of the relevant actual world, while the process is guided by a determining basic aim derived from the primordial nature of God and carried on in accordance with a free choice made by the concrescent entity itself.

The philosophy of organism is a philosophy of becoming, completely rejecting the idea of an actual entity which is the unchanging subject of change. Hence arises the great problem of extrinsic causality which is so closely allied to the consideration of matter and form, substance and essence. In this section we are considering the nature and operation of extrinsic efficient and final causes in the process. It is well to note our own position in the beginning of the discussion. First of all, we cannot agree with Mr. Whitehead concerning the nature of things. Being and becoming are not the same. The world is not *all* becoming. It is quite true that the things of the world are all in potency to a further act. That which is, is in potency to become that which it is not. At a given moment a child is in act with regard to certain perfections. It is also in potency to certain other perfections. For example, it is in potency to the attainment of intellectual knowledge which it does not already possess. We differ from Mr. Whitehead since we say that the entity is already in act with regard to certain perfections although it is in potency with regard to others. He would say that it is in no way in act; that is, it is always becoming. We emphasize that in becoming *something* becomes. There is a *terminus a quo* and a *terminus ad quem* in every change, but the subject of that change endures. Otherwise, it would not be change, but annihilation of the one and creation of the other. The child which passes from potency to act of knowledge changes, but it is the same subject of change.

Nevertheless there is a difference. The ignorant child becomes a knowing child. That which was red becomes violet. That which was multiple becomes one. This is the essential of all becoming. There is a successive union of diverse elements. According to the principle of identity, elements which are different in themselves cannot of themselves be united, for they

would then be both what they are and what they are not. Since they cannot unite themselves, they must be brought together by an extrinsic sufficient reason. The union of these diverse elements is the gradual process of becoming. That which becomes is not yet determined being but is undetermined being; that is, it is in potency. What is of itself undetermined cannot determine itself. The determining or actualizing agency is called the efficient cause.

The efficient cause must itself be in act with regard to the perfection which it actualizes in another. A man who is totally ignorant of the science of geometry cannot bring a child (who is in potency to that knowledge) to a knowledge of that science. Only in so far as anything is in act does it move another thing. This is true not only of local motion but of every change which takes place, including the intellectual and voluntary actions of man.

In a few words, that which is in potency to an act cannot reduce itself to that act, but must be reduced to it by an extrinsic efficient cause which is itself in act. Even in living bodies, in which one part moves another, an extrinsic cause is finally required, for the moving part is itself moved by some external force. The same is true of the intellectual act of knowledge. The intellect depends on the imagination which in turn depends on the external object of knowledge. We shall not go into the question of total and partial causes. It is evident that the material object of knowledge is not the total cause of the intellectual idea, or of the operation of the intellect. We shall only point out that the total cause of an effect or perfection must itself first be in act with regard to that perfection.

A question still remains. Why does the efficient cause act? An agent is in act with regard to many perfections. Yet it does not always cause those perfections in another. A man possesses much knowledge which he does not impart to others. When the efficient cause acts, why does it do so, rather than remain at rest? Why does a carpenter make a chair rather than a table? If the agent produces a given effect rather than another, it must be that he is determined or ordained to that one which he

produces. He must have a tendency to just that effect. That which motivates him to act, and which determines him to one rather than another effect, is the final cause. It is evident that every agent acts for an end. Moreover that end is distinct from the agent, although it must be present in some way to the efficient cause. It is present intentionally, and exercises a causality which determines it to that end. The final cause does not exercise efficient but final causality, which is of a different order. The former is concerned with the existence of the effect; that which is in potency to existence is reduced to the act of existence. The efficient cause applies the form (act) to the matter (potency), which results in the totality of the effect. That which induces the efficient cause to act is the final cause. The efficient cause is that which produces the effect. The final cause is that for which the agent acts.

In other words, the final cause is that which determines the agent to act. If the agent were not so determined, it would remain inactive or it might produce any effect. There would be no sufficient reason either for the effect or for the activity. The effect would be due to pure chance; and pure chance is no explanation of things. It is rather the lack of an explanation. We may use the term " by chance " in a different sense, in that something happens by accident, at the same time that we insist that it is the result of an action which is carried on with an end in view. The traditional example is that of a man who digs a hole in a field in order to plant a tree, and in digging the hole discovers a treasure. It is true that the discovery of the treasure is a chance occurrence. But the action which results in that discovery is by no means due to chance. The man had a definite end in view in digging; during that action the treasure was discovered by accident.

The determination of the agent to the end may be according to its nature, or according to its intellect. By its very nature the eye is ordained for seeing; a bird is ordained to build a nest; a bee is determined to build a hive; a ship is determined to sail. On the other hand an agent acting according to its intellect may have an end to which it is determined precisely by its intellect.

In causes acting according to their nature the end of the act and the end of the agent are identical. An agent acting according to its intellect may have a further end in view, beyond or above the end of the act. For example, fire is determined by its nature to burn, to give heat and light. An intelligent agent may use that fire for a further end, to warm himself, to destroy incriminating papers, and for many other purposes. He may build a ship which is destined to sail, in order to make his living, or to have the pleasure of sailing the ship. In this way he uses things which are determined by their nature to certain ends and directs them in the production of further effects, which are the ends that he has in mind.

Mr. Whitehead admits final causality; in fact, he is credited with re-introducing final causality into the world of today. He gives the example of the battleship Utah which made a good-will trip around the continent of South America. There was an aim in the " concourse of atoms, of iron and of nitrogen, and of other sorts of chemical elements into the form of a ship, of its armor, of its guns, of its engines, of its ammunition, of its stores of food." [2] This example shows not only final causality but also the necessity of an efficient cause. For all these elements are diverse, and yet they are brought into the one unit, the Utah. An efficient cause is necessary to reduce the multiple to unity. Each of the component elements had an end proper to it, according to its nature. But the gathering of all into the one ship was due to the principal efficient cause, the builder.

Obviously the ship was not actual at the time it was designed by the builder. It was a possible, since the component elements were present, and the necessary cause, the builder, was also there. It did not become actual until all those diverse elements were reduced to unity by the action of that efficient cause. Nevertheless the builder had a complete plan in mind. He had an end in view which specified his action. The battleship existed intentionally in the mind of the designer. Moreover the director of each part of the work of construction had in mind

[2] *The Function of Reason* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1929), p. 10.

the proximate end which he was to accomplish in the process. Each agent, in attaining an end, even if it be a proximate end, is in some way determined to that object. Otherwise the existing effect would be without a sufficient reason for its becoming. The new contingent effect would have been determined neither *in se* nor *in alio* to become that which it is; not *in se* because it is by definition contingent; not *in alio* because the agent was not determined to it. Thus the end must be in some way present to the agent in order to determine it to produce that end. It is present intentionally to the agent. In the beginning it is a mere possible not yet actual, yet it is really, intentionally present in the mind of the agent. This is always true of agents which act according to their intellect. An agent acting according to its nature need not have the end intentionally present to it, since it is determined to that end by its nature. Still we are forced to admit that the author of that nature is intelligent. The agent acting according to its intellect (and the author of nature) must be conscious and cognizant of itself. Not only must the end be perceived by the agent, the relation of means to end must also be perceived. Precisely for this reason the agent must be intelligent, since only an intelligent agent can know the relation of means to end.[3]

It may be objected that there are unintelligent and unconscious efficient causes. This fact does not affect the metaphysical proof above. When an unintelligent cause attains an end, it acts under the direction of an intelligent cause. This direction may be immediate, as when an arrow is directed toward the target by the archer. It may also be carried on indirectly as the author of the nature of a thing directs it to the attainment of an end, as a fire is determined to burn. A triangle also has its determined properties. But the determination does not come from itself, rather it belongs to the object as coming from another. The ultimate author of that determination acts for an end and knows the relation of means to end. That is, it is intelligent.

[3] Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *God, His Existence and His Nature* (London: Herder, 1934), I, pp. 163-172; 194-205; 261-293.

To sum up, when an effect is actualized and it is not pure act, it must be actualized by another entity which by its action produces the transition from potency to act. The actualizing agent is called the efficient cause. That which motivates the efficient cause to action is called the final cause. These two are really distinct the one from the other, although the final cause must be intentionally present in an intelligent agent. In an agent acting according to its nature, the nature itself determines the agent to the object of its action.

In applying these principles to the process of concrescence, we shall first consider the efficient cause. " Efficient causation expresses the transition from actual entity to actual entity." [4] There is no question here of transition from potency to act, for the process is mere becoming and is not terminated to being. Nothing ever really is. As soon as an actual entity " is," it re-begins the process of concrescence. Nothing is ever in act, it is always becoming. It may be said that these actual entities are in act when they attain their proper satisfaction. It is true that they are then in act, and they are also at the same time in potency to a further act. Mr. Whitehead's own expressions and language indicate this very state of affairs. On the other hand, he explicitly denies that anything is. He emphasizes the " objectification " of the entities, denying them any state of act.

Transition is only one of two kinds of fluency:

> One is the " fluency " inherent in the constitution of the particular existent. This kind I have called " concrescence." The other kind is the fluency whereby the perishing of the process, on the completion of the particular existent, constitutes that existent as an original element in the constitution of other particular existents elicited by repetitions of the process. This kind I have called " transition." Concrescence moves towards its final cause, which is its subjective aim; transition is the vehicle of the efficient cause which is the immortal past.[5]

One would be inclined to think that transition is the efficient cause in the production of the new entity. This, of course, would be contrary to the traditional idea of efficient causality.

[4] *Process and Reality*, p. 209. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

As a matter of fact, the situation is expressed only partially in such a conclusion. For in the novel concrescence of an entity " the determinate efficient causation is the inflow of the actual world (i. e., the data of the actual world relevant to that entity) in its own proper character of its own feelings felt and re-enacted by the novel concrescent subject." [6] Note that there are two actions indicated. First, there are " feelings " in the actual world relevant to the entity. Secondly, those feelings are " felt " by the concrescent subject. Much depends on the meaning of the words " feeling " and " felt." According to our presentation, the efficient cause by its action produces the effect. If concrescence is a process of feeling the data, and thus producing the novel actual entity, the entity which " feels " is the principal efficient cause of the new entity.

According to Professor Whitehead,

> Each actual entity is concrescent as an act of experience arising out of data. It is a process of feeling the many data, so as to absorb them into the unity of one individual " satisfaction." Here " feeling " is used for the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in operation. Feelings are variously specialized operations effecting a transition into subjectivity.[7]

Following such a line of reasoning, there can be no doubt that the actual operation effecting the passage of the objective data into the novel actual entity is the action of " feeling." Moreover, this action of feeling is carried on by the concrescent entity itself. It is always an active element in transition; while " actuality (the data of the actual world) in the process acquires efficient causation whereby it is the *ground* of obligation characterizing the creativity." [8] This may be to term the " actuality " the material cause of the effect but certainly not the efficient cause, properly so called.

The " feeling " agent is indicated clearly enough. " The word ' feeling ' is a mere technical term: but it has been chosen to suggest that functioning by which the concrescent actuality

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 346. [7] *Ibid.*, p. 55. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

appropriates the datum so as to make it its own." [9] In spite of Mr. Whitehead's terminology, it is clear that the actual entity feels the datum, and that this "feeling" is the true efficient causality which is exercised. It is expressed in another way when he writes: "The three categories (of Subjective Harmony, Unity and Conceptual Reversion) express the ultimate particularity of feelings. For the superject which is the outcome is also the subject operative in their production." [10] We shall say nothing of the contradiction inherent in this doctrine. We limit ourselves to a statement of the doctrine itself. The subject, i. e., the actual entity, is that which, by its own action, feels the data.

According to the description of the experience of the simplest grade of actual entity, which is said to be

> the unimaginative response to the datum with its simple content of sense, Occasions A, B and C enter into the experience of occasion M as themselves experiencing s_1 and s_2. Occasion M responsively feels sensa s_1 and s_2 as its own sensations. There is then a transmission of sensation emotion from A, B and C to M.—Thus the (unconcious) direct perception of A, B, and C is merely the causal efficacy of A, B, and C as elements in the constitution of M.[11]

This does not mean that the data are exercising efficient causality in the becoming of M. It is true that they are actively feeling s_1 and s_2, but it is by this feeling that they, themselves, are constituted. Precisely as data for the new process of concrescence they are felt by M. To say that they are active is merely to point out that they have properties which make them useful as constituents of M. For example, steel is a useful material element in the construction of a bridge because it possesses properties of resistance and cohesion which suit that purpose, while another material, such as wax, does not possess those properties. This fact does not make the steel the efficient cause of the bridge. It is only the material cause. One must understand the following statement in the same sense: "The direct perception whereby the datum in the immediate subject

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 229. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 361. [11] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

is inherited from the past can then, in abstraction, be conceived as the transference of throbs of energy, clothed in specific forms provided by the sensa." [12]

The energy constitutes the data as *entities*, and efficient causality is exercised in *that construction*. When the " dative throbs of energy " are transferred to, or objectified in, a *new* entity, the transference is due to the efficient causality of the *new* entity by its positive action of feeling.

The author implicitly admits the truth of this conclusion when he insists that the actual entity is self-creative.[13] Nor does he mean by this that the entity is simply its own final cause, although this notion is included in the term. His theories concerning the relation of the final and efficient causes are somewhat vague. He fails to note that the final cause is that for which the efficient cause acts; that the end moves the agent to action, and that an end must be immanent in the efficient cause, either in its nature, or in its intellect. We are told that the subjective aim guides the process. The aim is indeed immanent to the process and, therefore, to the entity which *is* the process of its own becoming. But the data, as data, are not the process. Thus the end is not immanent in the data (the so-called efficient cause); it is present neither in the individual occasions which are the initial data, nor in the one complex datum formed from them.

The end must be present to the efficient cause of the action. We are told that the aim is inherent in the process, and therefore in the actual concrescent entity which is the process of its own becoming. On the other hand, it is not immanent in the data, as such. Hence we are forced to conclude that the actual entity, rather than the data, must be the efficient cause.

Another aspect of the self-creative nature of the entity is seen in the decision, which puts the stamp of completion on the process. This decision is the act of the actual entity itself, in accordance with the subjective aim. In other words, the final

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[13] Cf. *Process and Reality*, pp. 62, 118, 314, 317, *et passim*.

attitude of "Yes" or "No" in prehension depends on the entity itself. The active nature of the entity in concrescence is everywhere emphasized. The entity feels the data not passively but actively. The very definition of the term "feeling" was seen above. We may consider the action from another point of view. Feelings are positive prehensions.[14] A positive prehension is the *definite inclusion* of the item (of the universe) into a positive contribution to the subject's own real constitution.[15] We are always confronted with the same language, the same expressions which indicate the activity of the entity and the comparative passivity of the data.

In all fairness to the author, we must point out one passage in which a different attitude is shown. In *Modes of Thought*[16] he writes: "We must not conceive of a dead datum with passive form. The datum is impressing itself upon the process, conditioning its forms." He has advanced a step in the exposition of process. Nevertheless, it is really the same as before. The datum is in potency to become one thing, or one type of thing, and not another. In that sense it impresses itself on the process. One could try forever to construct a bridge out of sand, but he would be doomed to failure, for the sand impresses itself on the process, making it impossible to fashion a bridge. On the other hand, steel impresses itself on the process, making it possible to produce a bridge. Nevertheless the steel is by no means the efficient cause of the becoming of the bridge.

Mr. Whitehead has indeed made an advance in recognizing the necessary active character of the data, but we cannot yet find in them an efficient cause. Moreover, if one were able to interpret this statement in that sense, it would be quite opposed to the doctrine as it is exposed in the author's earlier works.

The only conclusion to which one can come after such a consideration is that the data, which Professor Whitehead terms the "efficient cause," cannot be accepted as such. The real

[14] XII Category of Explanation, *Process and Reality*, p. 31.

[15] *Process and Reality*, p. 56.

[16] (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1938), p. 131.

principal efficient cause of the becoming of an actual entity is the actual entity itself. No other source of efficient causation is mentioned. God is not the efficient cause, as will be shown later. The actual entity is not *actus purus*, yet it causes its own transition from potency to act. This expression can be used concerning the philosophy of organism because there is a becoming, and the effect is really the actualization of the potency. The real difficulty in this philosophy is that there is a becoming without a sufficient reason for it. Creation is self-creation. The creature is its own creator.

When one considers final causality according to Professor Whitehead, one finds the same element of self-causation. In the philosophy of organism one finds some elevated conclusions concerning the union of the world with God in His consequent nature. Unfortunately the doctrine is tinged with sentimentalism. For the purpose of this paper it is not worth while to consider this aspect of his presentation. We shall confine ourselves more directly to the consideration of the final cause. As was seen above, the final cause properly so called is the object which determines the efficient cause to act. Hence the description given by Professor Whitehead is not absolutely contrary when he writes: " The subjective aim at ' satisfaction ' constitutes the final cause or lure whereby there is a determinate concrescence." [17] In other words, the final cause, as object, is the satisfaction toward which the entity tends; as present in the actual entity, it is the subjective aim at that satisfaction. By satisfaction is meant " one complex fully determinate feeling which is the completed phase of the process. . . . It is fully determinate a) as to its genesis, b) as to its objective character for the transcendent creativity and c) as to its prehension—positive or negative—of every item of its universe."[18] Evidently this is nothing more than to say that completion is the object at which the entity aims. The question of just " what completion is " naturally arises and is answered definitely enough when we read that the process is its own reason. " Every actual entity is finally its own reason for what it omits." [19]

[17] *Process and Reality*, p. 121. [18] *Ibid.*, p. 35. [19] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

This satisfaction is the aim of every actual entity, including God. The ultimate end of all entities is " satisfaction " in the consequent nature of God. There is no doubt that Professor Whitehead admits finality in the sense of an ordering of means to his end. The basic aim of every actual entity in concrescence is derived from the conceptual, primordial nature of God, which is the primordial conceptual valuation of eternal objects so that they have relevance to the process of creation.[20] In this way God may be termed the " final cause " of the concrescence. " He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire. His particular relevance to each creative act, as it arises from its conditioned standpoint in the world constitutes Him the initial object of desire; establishing the initial phase of each subjective aim." [21]

It must be noted, however, that the conceptual valuation of eternal objects does not cause them. The knowledge of God is not the cause of things in the philosophy of organism. Moreover the ordering of means to the " ultimate end " of unity in the consequent nature of God is by no means complete. It would be more proper to say that the basic aim is derived from God, that afterward He leaves the entity to its own concrescence, and that finally He takes the result and prehends it in His consequent nature, saving what can be saved.[22]

When he writes that " the final cause is the lure whereby there is a determinate concrescence," Professor Whitehead does not deny our position, namely, that the final cause acts on the agent and determines the agent to act. His use of the term " aim " indicates clearly enough that the final cause determines the efficient cause as the object of its action. For him, the efficient cause is the data of the actual world relevant to a given actual entity. Although we have seen that this thesis cannot be sustained, we may consider the relation between it and his idea of final causality. The aim or object of the process should be the determining factor for the data of the actual world. Now, the satisfaction or feeling to be attained

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 486. [21] *Ibid.*, p. 487. [22] *Ibid.*, p. 490.

is not yet actual but only a possible; and a possible can be real and present to the agent only intentionally. Such an agent can know the object only if he is also cognizant of himself; in other words it must be a conscious agent. Moreover not only must the agent know the means and the end, he must also know the relation of means to end; this is to say, the agent must be intelligent.[23]

It is a well-known principle that in the attainment of an effect a being may act according to its nature or according to its intellect. Unintelligent efficient causes act according to their nature, while an intelligent cause acts according to its intellectual conception of the end to be attained. The nature according to which an unintelligent cause acts must be directed (if not created) by an intelligent being. If its action is directed to a higher end which is not contained in its nature, it must be directed by an intelligent being. Even when the cause acts according to its nature, for an end implied therein, that very nature is itself determined to the end. The intelligent cause which is required is said to be the author of that nature, who acts to attain an end and adapts the means to its attainment, knowing the relations of means to end. In the philosophy of organism, actual entities need not be conscious.[24] Much less are they intelligent. The lure for feeling which guides the process, and which one might be led to consider a kind of *anima mundi*, is the germ of mentality rather than mentality itself.[25] Since these unintelligent and unconscious entities must act according to their nature in the production of an effect, the question arises, " What is the intelligent being which directs them and to which the end is intentionally present? " In the last analysis it must be the primordial nature of God which conceptually evaluates the eternal objects and makes them relevant to the process of creation. But when we " consider God in the abstraction of primordial actuality, we must ascribe

[23] Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-68.
[24] *Process and Reality*, pp. 31, 72, 77.
[25] *The Function of Reason*, p. 27.

to Him neither fullness of feeling nor consciousness." [26] As a result we find an impossibility—a deficiently actual being, unconscious even of itself, furnishing the aim of the process.

There is a further difficulty in connection with the final cause. " Every temporal entity, in one sense, originates from its mental pole analogously to God Himself. It derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions." [27] If there are indeterminations in every developing actual entity, there must be some reason for each determining decision. According to the author's own description presented above, only the basic aim comes from God; the entity is in other respects self-determining. He puts this very clearly when he speaks of the " fact that every entity—since it is what it is—is finally its own reason for what it omits." [28] And again, " The world is self-created and the actual entity as self-creating creature passes into its immortal function of part creator of the transcendent world. In its self-creation the actual entity is guided by its ideal of itself as an individual satisfaction and as a transcendent creator." [29] We have already seen that a self-creating entity is impossible. Here it is to be noted that this self-creating entity—which need not be conscious—and which, therefore, may be quite unable to conceive any end intentionally, is guided by its own ideal of itself, as an end. In this way the actual entity satisfies Spinoza's definition of substance, that it is *Causa Sui.* It is finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency.[30]

Professor Whitehead is here attempting to save both the freedom of the process of concrescence and the divine ordering of the world toward unity in the consequent nature of God. The existence of evil in the world is one reason why he posits the freedom. In this manner he hopes to avoid attributing evil to God as its creator. In spite of this exposition we have every reason to doubt concerning the *fact* of the freedom of con-

[26] *Process and Reality*, p. 486.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 317.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 61.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 118.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

crescence. The uniformity of the world of nature, and the uniformity of its action, would indicate not freedom but determination. We must distinguish when it is a question of the possibility of such freedom within a world ordered by God. Freedom concerning the means is quite admissible. Indeed, we hold this doctrine as true of man. Concerning the ultimate end of the world and of the entities within the world, there can be no freedom, although man may be determined to attain that end freely, with freedom concerning the means to it. If the world is not fully determined to its final end, it may not reach that end. If it does not finally attain unity in the consequent nature of God, such unity is not its proper object. If it does attain such unity there is not a sufficient reason for the attainment.

Mr. Newton P. Stallknecht has drawn the proper conclusion from this doctrine. Speaking of man he writes, " Man is free because God is human." [31] We may add that nature, too, is free because God is human. Whitehead has described God as a " personal force which is no more than the successful hypostatization of human personality working out its course among its besetting difficulties." God as the final cause is the " eternal object of desire " which " establishes the initial phase of every subjective aim," but which does not act as a fully determining cause. Whence come the difficulties of which Mr. Stallknecht speaks, for actual entities, using the freedom which is theirs, freely accept or reject propositions in the process. They are their own reason for that which they are. The freedom of man is communicated to all the entities of the universe. " The attitude of God is that of a patient father, who does not ordain the course which those under him must follow but offers opportunity which they may be capable of grasping. The guidance is not omnipotent—the universe is open." [32]

God's role is not the combat of productive force with productive force, of destructive force with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual

[31] *Studies in Creation* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1934), p. 151.

[32] Stallknecht, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

harmonization. He does not create the world, He saves it: or, more accurately, He is the poet of the universe with tender patience leading it by His vision of truth, beauty and goodness.[33]

In conclusion, the theory of both efficient and final causality in the philosophy of organism is deficient. That which is called the efficient cause is revealed to be, rather, a material cause. The proper efficient cause is the concrescent entity itself, an impossibility. Finality is admitted, in the sense of a primordial ordering of the process. But that ordering need not be carried out in its entirety, since the concrescent entities are free or self-determining. This theory inevitably leads to the elevation of the actual entity, so that it is its own efficient and final cause. The God to whom all entities are ordered is no longer the creator of the world but one who seeks to bring his own nature to completion and satisfaction, and harmonizes the universe in that process. It must be admitted that the aim of entities to be united in God is not unchristian. But, as is readily seen, the fundamental reason for such a tendency is lacking, since the theory of causality is unsound. It will be seen later that the explanation of creation is also incorrect. Lastly, the unity of finality of the universe will be seen to be quite unfounded in principle as well as exaggerated in execution.

II

Creation and the Basis of Unity in the Universe

In any study of creation according to the philosophy of organism, one must first get clearly in mind two important facts. First of all, the term " creation " is used in two senses. At times it is employed in the sense of the mere conceptual evaluation of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God. This meaning would be analogous to, but not by any means identical with, our use of " creation " in the strict sense, *productio rei ex nihilo sui et subjecti.* As we shall note later, the idea of creation from absolutely nothing does not appear in the

[33] *Process and Reality,* p. 490.

philosophy of Whitehead. The term is also used in the wide sense for the mere production of things, for example, the creation of a statue by an artist. The doctrine of creation may be summarily divided into the conceptual creation in the primordial nature of God, as opposed to physical (non-conceptual) creation of a novel entity from entities which precede it in the welter of the process. In this chapter we are interested especially in conceptual creation. It is evident that physical creation is of far less importance as far as the principles of philosophy are concerned. Moreover, we shall consider it in connection with the chapters on unity.

Secondly, it must be remembered that Professor Whitehead is speaking always of the *becoming* of things which never really *are*. He wishes to be considered a dynamist, for he expressly holds that all is process. In spite of his definite dynamistic tendencies, in his latest book, *Modes of Thought*, he has betrayed a departure from the strict dynamistic thesis that all is process. He writes, " The universe is more than process. . . . The difficulty is to relate the static form to the active process." [34] He evidently holds to dynamism because the idea of static reality devoid of process is quite contrary to what is known of the universe. He feels that he must choose between activity, which he sees in the universe, and a completely static system in which there is no change. He fails to realize that there is another alternative, and therefore he accepts dynamism. The true state of affairs is being gradually recognized. Hence he writes again in *Modes of Thought*,[35] that there is a transition which is real and an *achievement* which is real. In *Process and Reality* he often speaks of the end of one process of concretion and the beginning of the next successive concretion, at which point there is a " momentary halt for attainment." He points out that " in the inescapable flux there is something that abides: in the overwhelming permanence, there is an element that escapes into flux. . . . Those who would disjoin the two elements can find no interpretation of patent facts." [36] The

[34] Pp. 137-138. [35] P. 140. [36] *Process and Reality*, p. 478.

strange thing about the philosophy of organism is that the two elements are clear, yet when it is necessary to explain them, recourse is had merely to process. The fact which he tries to explain is a denial of the doctrine of process.

He lays great emphasis upon the notion of potentiality.

> The notion of potentiality is fundamental for the understanding of existence, as soon as the notion of process is admitted. . . . Thus the actualities of the present are receiving their character from the process and are bestowing their characters on the future. Immediacy is the realization of the potentialities of the past, and is the storehouse of the potentialities of the future.[37]

In all these expressions he indicates that there is something which is no longer becoming, but is. This is the superject at the momentary halt for attainment.

Although he insists time and time again that nothing really is, the Scholastic doctrine of potency and act could very easily be followed by Professor Whitehead if he understood it properly. He even

> maintain(s) that for human experience, there are two natural starting points for the understanding of types of existence. The two types in question can be named respectively, the Type of Actuality, and the Type of Potentiality. These types require each other, namely, Actuality is the exemplification of Potentiality—and Potentiality is the characterization of Actuality, either in fact or concept.[38]

It is difficult to know just what the expressions mean. Still, it is clear that he realizes that there are two types of existence to which all other types are reducible. For us there are no other types. Being is either potency or act. Mr. Whitehead has evidently read much of the unchanging God of Christian philosophy, and therefore he hesitates to accept anything savoring of staticism. For some reason he thinks that a God who is pure Act is simply static.

He is so much opposed to staticism as it is seen in Newton that he refuses to admit explicitly what he holds implicitly, the

[37] *Modes of Thought*, p. 136.

[38] *Modes of Thought*, p. 96.

place of *act* in the universe. With the presence of even such a process and act as Whitehead admits, it would not be too difficult to argue to the existence of Pure Act, according to the traditional method of St. Thomas. This, however, is not our present task. Moreover, the eminent professor might take refuge behind his opinion that it is a prevalent *bad* habit to "trust in language as an adequate expression of a proposition." [39] He would, perhaps, deny that his expressions are more than slips of the tongue. He would hardly admit that he is tending to the Scholastic doctrine of Potency and Act, and the admission of the existence of an unmoved Mover who is "eminently real."

The potential, or possible, is so essential a part of the philosophy of organism that its author weakens his own doctrine of creation because of it. There must even be a possible as the *terminus a quo* of all creation. Like Plato, he fails to reach a beginning, in the causal sense of that term. Because of the use of ambiguous terminology, he gives a bad impression of his perspicacity when he speaks *without qualification* of the "creative process" which "is to be discerned in that transition by which one occasion, already actual, enters into the birth of another instance of experienced value." [40] "The Creative process is a process of exclusion to the same extent as it is a process of inclusion." He speaks of an "actual" which he calls the "ground" of the creative process.[41] Thus in creation there is a fusion of the "actual with something which, at its entry into the process, is not actual. The process is the achievement of actuality by the ideal consequent, in virtue of its union with the ground." [42]

In the first place we may ask, "Whence comes this ground? Is it created? If so, is there a ground in its creation?" Evidently there is something actual. In other words, creation starts with something already existing, and that something is by no means Infinite Being and Pure Act. It is creation in the

[39] *Process and Reality*, p. viii; *Modes of Thought*, p. 139.
[40] *Religion in the Making* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 112.
[41] *Ibid.* [42] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

same sense as artistic creation, which is no more than production from pre-existing material.

The ideal consequent or " non-being " which has a part in the process is also something. It is not non-being in the true and accepted sense of that term. In the philosophy of organism, non-being and being are defined in terms of relevance to a given actual occasion. That which is relevant is being; that which is not relevant is non-being for that occasion. Transcendental being is not considered.

This brings us to the more metaphysical treatment of the problem as it is presented in *Process and Reality*. Even here, it is held that all which arises, arises first conceptually. But the conceptual origin is merely the conceptual valuation of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God. Once again, Creation is by no means *productio rei ex nihilo sui et subjecti*. It is always a fusion. The eternal objects do not simply *become*; they become *relevant* because of that conceptual valuation. Prior to that valuation they are non-being only in the sense that they are not relevant to the process.[43] They are represented to us as *eternally* standing before the valuation of God. Nevertheless they are uncreated; for by that evaluation, order is introduced among them, while they are independent of God in their *esse*.[44]

On the other hand, causal dependence is the essential note of creation according to the Scholastic system. True, creation actively considered is only the action of God creating out of nothing, and God's action is God. Therefore, in that sense there can be no dependence, since God is absolutely independent. But taken passively, creation is the creature itself, in so far as it is dependent in *esse*. In other words it is simply the relation of a derivative to its cause It is a question of actual dependent beings needing a first term, and consequently a question of the entire, causal dependence of everything in the world, including duration, upon the first principle.[45] The

[43] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 234.

[44] *Process and Reality*, pp. 34 and 486.

[45] Cf. Sertillanges, *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy* (London, 1931), pp. 91-134.

Scholastic takes as a fundamental part of his system the existence of contingent things. From that, by the principle of causality, he argues to the existence of a necessary Being, the First Cause. From the fact of change, which is evident in the world, he argues to the existence of Pure Act, in virtue of which all becoming takes place.

Professor Whitehead denies the validity of such reasoning, for it is a primary principle of his philosophy that our notion of causality concerns the relation of things within the actual world, and can only illegitimately be extended to a "transcendent derivation."[46] For him, a "transcendent derivation" would be the creation of the world by a creator quite external to it. This would be a "supernatural origin" such as Newton held. He (Whitehead) would make the Creator an integral part of things and the world a part of God. He forgets that, although there is a real distinction between the cause and effect, God, the cause, is in the world by His power and by His essence. This does not mean, however, that He is limited *to* this world or *by* this world. He is transcendent Being, but He is also immanent in the world. Creation is the production of existing being according to its *esse*. That *esse* can only be a participation of the divine *esse*. Hence the Creator may be said to be present in the world because the world is produced by Him, and it *is* only as a participation of His Being. Yet He is transcendent. The world does not contain or limit Him.

The doctrine of participation is to be found nowhere in the philosophy of organism. For participation is a participation of being, which is not admitted in the organic system. Everything is becoming; nothing is. According to the doctrine of participation, being is divided into two types, that which is being by its essence (*ens per essentiam*) and that which is being by participation (*ens per participationem*).[47] In the former, essence and

[46] *Process and Reality*, p. 130.

[47] Cf. Del Prado, *de Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae* (Fribourg, Switzerland: 1911), pp. 86-130; Garrigou-Lagrange, *de Deo Uno* (Paris: 1938), pp. 156-164; Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae* (Paris: 1937), vol. III, pp. 75-95 and 381-385. The most complete treatment will be found in Cornelio Fabro,

existence are one. In the latter, essence and existence are really distinct. In the former we need look for no external sufficient reason. This is the Supreme Being, and the Supreme Being does not *receive* existence. Rather, the Supreme Being, whom we call God, *is* His essence and He *is* His existence. He has no external cause of His existence nor of His necessity in existence. (*Non habet causam sui esse nec suae necessitatis in essendo.*) He is by and of Himself, because of His own proper essence.

In that which is being by participation, essence and existence are really distinct. The essence of participating being does not *include* existence but it *receives* existence. According to the degree of participation it is said to be more or less being. This participation is not univocal but analogical. One cannot predicate being of God and creatures univocally but analogically, by an analogy of proportionality.[48] It is pantheism which predicates being univocally of God and creatures. According to such a system, God is either a part of the world, whether its form or its matter or its existence; or He *is* the world and the world is God. According to the evolutionistic pantheists, God, the *only* reality, evolves in such a way that the world is produced from His essence. Nonevolutionistic pantheists maintain that the world is only a manifestation of the one reality which is God.

The essential note of all pantheism is the univocal predication of being as of God and of creatures. God is not transcendent but entirely immanent in the world. In fact, one can avoid pantheism only by holding the analogical predication of being of God and creatures. Thus God is transcendent, although immanent in the world by His power and by His essence. But His essence is participated only analogically by the creatures of the world.

For Mr. Whitehead, God is not truly transcendent. He is "transcendent" only in the sense that He, *like all actual entities*, is a subject-superject, and as such He can be objectified

S.P.S., *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione, secundo S. Tomaso d'Aquino, Vita e Pensiero* (Milan: 1938).

[48] Cf. Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae,* vol. I, pp. 96-104 and vol. III-2, pp. 26-42.

in the prehensive concrescence of other actual entities. This is a new and unusual use of the term " transcendent," not at all in keeping with the classical meaning of the word.

It can hardly be said that Mr. Whitehead is an emanationist or evolutionistic pantheist, if we mean by that one who holds that creatures evolve from God. On the other hand, there is a certain similarity between the constitution of the consequent nature of God by His prehension of the world, and the evolution of the world into God as this theory is advanced by Heraclitus and Hegel. There is, however, this important difference. Although Mr. Whitehead's actual entities are self-creative, they create themselves as *subjects*. True, they are active in this creation or concrescence. True, also, according to the philosophy of organism they should continue to be active in their character of subject-superject. But as subject-superjects they are *actively* prehended by the new concrescent subject. The active subject-superject is what it is. The prehension is an activity proper to the new actual entity. Not as subjects but as *subject-superjects* the actual entities of the world are ready for objectification or prehension by God. Thus we may say that God is the actual world as prehended by Him, for the process and the subject of the process are the same in the philosophy of organism. In that way, God and the world are physically one. In that sense, therefore, the philosophy of organism may be called pantheistic. Nevertheless emanation has no place in this system, nor can one find a downward evolution from God to the world. Ultimately, it is because Mr. Whitehead holds that God is not transcendent but immanent that we may term his philosophy at least latently pantheistic, in spite of his assertion that the world creates God.

Because he cannot go beyond the limits of the actual world in an examination of its origin, Professor Whitehead must be content with an explanation which begins with " something " in the world. He follows the Platonic system of creation, in which " the creation of the world is not the beginning of matter of fact, but the incoming of a certain type of social order." [49]

[49] *Process and Reality*, p. 134.

This same supposition is expressed in a more concrete fashion when we are told that the miracle of creation is described in the vision of Ezekiel, who found himself in the midst of a plain strewn with bones. He prophesied and " the breath came into those bones and they lived and stood up on their feet, an exceeding great army." [50] This is the misapprehension which is seen in many another dynamistic theory, and even in most other non-Scholastic theories. Mr. Newton P. Stallknecht has given us a very good study of the philosophy of creation, but the same mistaken presupposition appears in his criticism of Gentile. " Creative production seems to require an unrealized possibility—something ' to be created.' Now if there is no sheer possibility (as in Gentile), creation must be a bolt from the blue, a veritable creation out of nothing." [51] We are not interested at present in determining whether such a statement is a true summary of Gentile's theory of creation. It is only desired to point out that the true nature of creation is not fully understood by the critic. Certainly a thing must be possible if it is to be created. The possibility necessary for the act of creating the world, however, is nothing but the divine essence, God Himself, not a pre-existing something which He uses in creation. Unfortunately, the possibilities of Mr. Whitehead are, rather, *existing* and independent of a creating God.

Professor Whitehead demands a possible for the same reason that a Thomist demands a First Cause Who is Pure Act and Eminent Being. Moreover, the former fails to realize that a possible must itself be acted upon by another agent in the process of becoming. Otherwise it is carrying on an action without the means necessary for doing so. It is not incorrect to argue as follows: " It is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact can float into the actual world out of non-entity. Non-entity is nothingness. Every explanatory fact refers to the decision and to the efficacity of an actual thing." [52] It is very true. No fact can " float " into the actual world. It

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 118.
[51] *Studies in Creation*, p. 127.
[52] *Process and Reality*, p. 63.

requires an efficient cause, but a *creating* efficient cause cannot have any previously existing potentiality or actuality, as a means of the act of creation. If the author were logical, from the starting point quoted, he would have to arrive at the traditional idea of God.

In fact, however, the philosophy of organism follows the Platonic method; only, in place of primordial chaos, Whitehead relies upon a number of eternal objects and creativity. He adds the aesthetic treatment to that, developing his system according to an analogy with human "creative" art. For all the aesthetic creationists, there are the four causes. Thus, for example, in literary composition, a material cause is found in the words, grammatical relations, the medium of expression from which the statement is manufactured; the efficient cause is the author; the formal cause is that which determines the literary composition to be what it is in its entirety. Stallknecht says that the formal cause refers to a "plan of organization"; and it is this which individualizes the work.[53] The plan of organization is found primarily in the mind of the author. The created composition is perfect in so far as it is informed by the plan, or in so far as the plan is realized in the resulting composition. The final cause of the work may be merely the idea, which comes to the mind, the motivating element of the author's writing.

There are differences in the various presentations of the aesthetic doctrine, but all the authors emphasize one special characteristic of human creative effort. There is no complete, definite and determined plan in the mind of the creator when he begins the work. As Mr. Stallknecht expresses it: "Communication or expression clarifies our thought and even actually develops it." [54] This opinion is certainly true of human creation, but when applied to true divine creation it indicates a malignant anthropomorphism, inherent in the aesthetic doctrine. The creating God is supposed to act in the same fashion as a creating artist. Whitehead holds that there is a general plan in creation

[53] *Studies in Creation*, p. xi.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. xi.

but, as in human activity, this plan is to be found only in broad outline in the creative mind of the primordial God. It might be added, moreover, that the primordial nature of God is unconscious in the act of evaluating—a manifest impossibility in a conceptual act. Be that as it may, the aesthetic position is that man does not see *tota simul*, i. e., that man has only discursive knowledge. Therefore God also has only discursive knowledge, and therefore the plan of God is developed as the process goes on.

This doctrine is one of the fundamental points in Whitehead's treatment of the problem of evil.[55] It is also the basis of his explanation of freedom in the universe. Because God knows things only discursively and successively, He plans things in general, and leaves the details to be worked out, as the plan is realized, successively. He hopes thus to avoid both ontological and moral determinism. Hence he writes: " (Every temporal entity) derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions." [56] Here, too, is the foundation of his antithesis—" It is as true to say that God creates the world as that the World creates God." [57] The consequent nature of God is continually being created in accordance with the plan of conceptual evaluation of the eternal objects in His primordial nature—but certain elements in the emergent world (and therefore in the consequent nature which prehends the world) are due to the " individual decisions " of the concrescent world entities. There is a creative evolution, at each successive moment of which the primary, general, and indistinct plan is successively determined, developed, and modified in its details.

The conception of an immanent Creator, transcendent in His Being, knowing all things of the present, past, and future world in one *nunc* of eternity is to be found nowhere in Whitehead. Moreover, the axiom, *scientia Dei causa rerum*, is present only in a very emasculated form. He is so much impressed by the

[55] *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 257-58; *Religion in the Making*, pp. 94, 98, 100.

[56] *Process and Reality*, p. 317. [57] *Ibid.*, p. 492.

contradictions of idealism that he cannot appreciate the divine idealism expressed in that formula, " The knowledge of God is the cause of things." His creating God is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feelings at the base of things, unconscious and deficiently actual. Because, in the philosophy of organism, there is a real distinction between God and His knowledge, and between God and His action, eternal objects must be introduced as uncreated, the object of the conceptual evaluation. Once it is admitted (as it is proved in Thomistic philosophy) that there is no real distinction in God and that God *is* His being, it follows that everything which is created is only a participation of that Eminent Being, which is the essence of God. Contemplating His essence, God knows the ways in which it can be participated. Knowing that essence, He creates the actual world of matter of fact. From the many possibles which He sees in His essence God selects certain ones to which he gives existence. Creation can properly be called " selection from a catalogue " when we admit that the selector and the catalogue are one, the " catalogue " being the essence of the creating God. In that case He cannot be the primordial non-temporal accident of an all-pervading creativity. He cannot conceptually evaluate eternal objects distinct from and independent of Himself. All that is, is by participation of His Being.

Mr. Whitehead has seen the true doctrine that God must be pure Act, unchanging Being. Yet he cannot accept his own conclusion. He speaks in Thomistic terms:

> The boundless wealth of possibility in the realm of abstract form would leave each creative phase still indeterminate, unable to synthesize, under determinate conditions, the creatures from which it springs. The definite determination which imposes ordered balance on the world requires an actual entity imposing its own unchanged consistency of character on every phase.[58]

The conclusion is closely allied to the Thomistic proof for the existence of God. Unfortunately Mr. Whitehead has a besetting difficulty.

[58] *Religion in the Making*, p. 94.

A simpler metaphysic would result if we could stop at this conclusion. A complete determinism would thus mean the complete self-consistency of the temporal world. . . . If the theory of complete determination, by reason of the necessity of conformation with the nature of God holds true, then the evil in the world is in conformity with the nature of God.[59]

Because there is evil in the world, we must find therein " formative elements which are not definable in the terms which are applicable to God." [60]

In the process of concrescence there is one very puzzling element, creativity. " In all philosophical theories there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents . . . In the Philosophy of Organism this ultimate is termed creativity and God is its primordial accident." [61] Just previous to this statement, Professor Whitehead remarked that this philosophy is closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of thought. Hence we are led to suppose that creativity is a kind of Spinozistic absolute substance, which gives rise to multiplicity through its modes. Whitehead, however, is seeking to explain not multiplicity but unity; how the abstract is built up from the concrete.[62] Therefore, he does not begin with one all-pervading substance. For him, the modes of Spinoza become the sheer actualities, while the concrescence of any one of these actualities involves all the other actual entities among its components. In this way the obvious solidarity of the world is to be explained, by a system of prehensive unification. We can hardly find a place for creativity *as a Spinozistic substance* in this system.

Strangely enough,

Creativity is another rendering of the Aristotelian " matter " and of the modern " neutral stuff." But it is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of " form " or of external relations; it is the pure notion of activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world.[63] Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian " matter " is

[59] *Ibid.*
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 99.
[61] *Process and Reality*, p. 9.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

without a character of its own. It is the ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because all characters are more special than itself. But creativity is always found under conditions and described as conditioned.[64]

This description is not quite clear. The " stuff " is Aristotle's matter divested of its essentially passive character; in other words it is not Aristotle's matter. It is the pure notion of activity. It can receive neither form nor external relation. The author comes dangerously close to asserting that it is pure Act. Perhaps he realizes that such an assertion would turn his whole system upside down.

The question becomes more confused than ever when we read,

> In the abstract language here adopted for metaphysical statement, " passing on " becomes " creativity " in the dictionary sense of the word " creare "—to bring forth, beget, produce. Thus, according to the third principle, no entity can be divorced from the notion of creativity. An entity is, at least, a particular form capable of infusing its own particularity into creativity.[65]

Here is a problem indeed. Creativity is incapable of receiving a form; yet every entity is a particular form capable of infusing its own particularity into creativity. The latter must be passive, at least in the sense that it is capable of receiving that particularity of form. It is hardly necessary to point out the confusion which arises from the definition of the noun " creativity " as the verb *creare*.

In spite of the ambiguity as to what characterizes creativity, it seems that creativity is the same as the creative act. This is quite in accordance with his opinion that the act and the result of the act are numerically identical. When he " ascribe (s) the reverted conceptual feeling in a temporal subject as to its conceptual feeling, derived by Category IV from the hybrid physical feeling of the relevances conceptually ordered in God's experience," he says that " in this way, by *the recognition of God's characterization of the creative act*, a more rational explanation is established." [66] On another page he says that " God

[64] *Ibid.* [65] *Ibid.*, p. 302. [66] *Ibid.*, p. 253.

and the actual world jointly constitute *the character of the creativity* for the initial phase of a novel concrescence." [67] According to these two passages, the two expressions seem to be synonymous.

In qualifying the statement that God can be termed the creator of the universe, Professor Whitehead writes:

> But the phrase is apt to be misleading by its suggestion that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition. The true metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativity, and therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action. It is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity, and God is the eternal primordial character.[68]

On page 42 of *Process and Reality* he denies categorically that creativity can be characterized, but it is found under conditions and is "described as conditioned." In the text quoted he says that God is the "aboriginal condition" which qualifies the action of creativity, and the primordial character which characterizes what he has previously described as uncharacterizable and what is only *described* as conditioned. It seems that a reader ought to be pardoned for failing to understand what creativity really is.

We may, however, have a better idea of what it does.

> Creativity is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the "many" which it unifies. Thus creativity introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are the universe disjunctively. The "creative advance" is the application of the ultimate principle to each novel situation which it originates.[69]

Creativity is the principle of novelty inasmuch as it *introduces* that element into the actual occasion. Evidently it is not the *source* of originality, for

> it must also be noted that the pure mental originality works by canalization of relevance arising from the primordial nature of God. Thus an originality in the temporal world is conditioned

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 345. [68] *Ibid.*, pp. 317-318. [69] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

though not determined, by an initial subjective aim supplied by the *ground of all order and originality.*[70]

Hence, God is the source of originality or novelty by His primordial nature. The process is described in a little more detail on page 229:

Whatever arises in actual entities from God's decision arises first conceptually, and is transmitted into the physical world. In transcendent decision (i. e., passage from superject to novel concrescent entity) there is transition from the past to the immediacy of the present; and in "immanent decision" there is the process of acquisition of subjective form and the integration of feelings. In this process the *creativity,* universal throughout actuality, is characterized by the datum from the past.[71] And it meets this dead datum—universalized into creativity—by the vivifying novelty of subjective form selected from the multiplicity of pure potentiality.[72]

In this passage, novelty seems to be selected from the multiplicity of pure potentiality, which is elsewhere described as the ensemble of eternal objects, and which, in the passage quoted above, is derived from the primordial nature of God. The selecting agent is the creativity. It introduces the novelty into the actual occasion. But it must be remembered that anything which is received into the constitution of an actual entity is accepted according to a dual aim, the one a general end derived from the primordial nature of God, the other a purpose quite peculiar to the entity itself. In other words, the creativity can introduce the novelty, but the actual entity itself is the final reason for the acceptance or rejection of what is accepted or rejected.

There are many difficulties in the understanding of this system. We find statements which are difficult to reconcile, if they are not contradictory. Nevertheless, this much is sure—creativity is an *active* force, it *acts* in the process. Therefore, it cannot be pure potentiality. An agent acts only inasmuch as

[70] *Ibid.,* p. 150.

[71] Cf. *Ibid.,* p. 42.—"It cannot be characterized because all characters are more special than itself."

[72] *Ibid.,* p. 229.

it is in act. The potentiality in the process must be found in the eternal objects. Moreover, it was stated previously that creativity is the pure notion of activity. According to the principle *agere sequitur esse*, creativity must first *be*, it must exist. It must, therefore, be *something* prior to and distinct from a " God " who is its primordial accident; in other words, it must be independent in its being, as it is in its action. Creativity has a function in creating, inasmuch as it underlies all actuality and is the principle of novelty. It is certainly not created. It is given. No explanation of its origin is presented. The misapprehension that if a thing is (or is in process) from eternity, it needs no causal explanation is here manifested once again.

In summary, creativity is an *active* matter, with no potentiality, but it is also passive. Unlike the Absolute Substance of Spinoza, it is not the only thing which there is in the world, but it is merely underlying all actuality. Professor Whitehead, seeking to explain the derivation of the abstract from the concrete, the one from the many, begins with the many. The many, however, are not only the actual entities of the actual world. There are also primordial entities (that is to say, primordial " somethings ") : creativity with its primordial accident, God, and a number of eternal objects, similar to the Platonic forms. There is a multiplicity which is eternal, and the elements of that multiplicity are mutually independent as well as dependent. It is this multiplicity which in the process of prehensive unification becomes the one consequent nature of God. This fact is not stated explicitly, but it is the only reasonable assumption.[73] The explicit position of Whitehead is that the multiple actual entities become one in God. In fact, however, the actual entities themselves become as a result of the action of the elements mentioned.

Having treated of creativity, we now turn to the eternal

[73] Cf. " The notion of a supreme being must apply to an actuality in process of composition; an actuality not confined to the data of any special epoch in the historical field. Its actuality is founded on the infinitude of its conceptual appetition, and its form of process is derived from the fusion of this appetition with the data received from the world process." *Modes of Thought*, p. 128.

objects. They correspond to the Platonic forms or universals. The definition given is as follows: " Any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an eternal object." [74] In the fifth Category of Existence are placed " Eternal Objects or Pure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Fact, or Forms of Definiteness." [75] A definite shade of green is an example of an eternal object.[76] Each object has two essences; one is an individual essence, which is the particular individuality and cannot be described otherwise than being itself. It is composed of the internal relations of the object to itself. We may say that it is the object as it is in itself, excluding all relations to other eternal objects. Still, these external relations cannot be overlooked because they also constitute the object to be what it is in relation to other eternal objects. The one essence cannot be separated from the other. The relational essence determines how it is possible for the object to have ingression into actual occasions. In itself, the object is neutral to any entrance into actuality, but the relations which exist among these objects are eternal, and proceed from a necessity of the nature of each one.

An eternal object may be complex, in that it may be composed of a number of eternal objects in a definite relationship. This does not mean that *all* the possible relations of each of the component objects are constituting factors in the one complex object, but that certain relations of each object constitute the one complex. An object which cannot be analysed into simpler objects, i. e., a relationship of components, is simple. A definite shade of green is a simple eternal object. The shape *sphere*, is also an eternal object.

These objects " subsist " as components of the primordial nature of God.[77] The term subsistence is not defined but it is evidently intended to convey the same idea as in Scholastic terminology and is contrasted with " being " and " becoming."

It is necessary to recall that the eternal objects are pure

[74] *Process and Reality*, p. 60.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[76] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 240.
[77] *Process and Reality*, p. 60.

potentials and that they correspond to the Platonic subsisting forms. These universals stand eternally before the conceptual valuation of the primordial nature of God, and for that reason they have relevance, that is they have " real togetherness." According to the ontological principle, all real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality.[78] At the same time Professor Whitehead makes a further deduction, saying that according to the principle of relativity there can be only one non-derivative actuality, unbounded by its prehension of the actual world. We can have no quarrel with this position. This entity or actuality, however, is certainly none other than the primordial nature of God—a non-derivative actuality which is also an actuality formally constituted by the conceptual valuation of eternal objects. Moreover, these eternal objects are not God, neither are they created by God. Here is the great weakness of this philosophy of creation. If God's primordial nature is formally constituted by His conceptual valuation of eternal objects, He is derived, in the sense that there are distinct and independent elements which enter into His formal constitution. That these elements have only conceptual existence does not avoid the difficulty. They are something, independent of the primordial and eternal prehension. To speak of them as non-temporal does not alter the situation. It is the causal relation of the two that matters. Ultimately, it must be admitted that the eternal objects are a material cause of the primordial nature of God, and that that nature is, therefore, derivative.

The term " derivative " is taken from Hume's Treatise, Part I-1, where he speaks of all our simple ideas as " derived from simple impressions which are correspondent to them and which they actually represent." True, Hume holds causation as only a mere succession of phenomena. But we can limit our discussion for the moment to the actual relation between our ideas and the simple impressions from which they are derived. That relation is a causal relation. Our treatment is justified, moreover, by the fact that Professor Whitehead rejects Hume's theory of causality.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

It is expressly stated, " God differs from the other actual entities in the fact that Hume's principle of the derivate character of conceptual feelings does not hold for Him." [79] There is still the same threefold character in God as in the other actual entities, and the first character is that " the Primordial nature of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings, including among their data all eternal objects." [80] In the section on causality we saw that the data in the concrescence are said to act as efficient causes. More properly they are material causes. In either case, it is contradictory to hold that the principle of the derivate does not hold for God, and yet that His nature is a concrescence of conceptual feelings, with eternal objects for their data.[81] True, the concrescence of conceptual feelings (God's nature) is deficiently actual. This fact might lead us to think that the eternal objects must also be deficiently actual. They subsist in the primordial nature. It is said that they " exist " there, in a special way. Tney require the transition to the conception of them to be " efficaciously " existent by reason of God's conceptual realization of them. This is a significant qualification of the statement which precedes, that " The many eternal objects conceived in their bare isolated multiplicity lack *any* existent character." There is a definite change in meaning between existence and efficacious existence.[82] Even if we limit ourselves to the subsistence of these objects or to what they are in their " bare isolated multiplicity," they are still something outside the mind of God when they are considered apart from their conceptual valuation. They become *relevant* because of the valuation, they do not simply become.[83] Prior to that act they are non-existent *for a given occasion*.[84]

[79] *Process and Reality*, p. 121.

[80] *Ibid.*

[81] In *Religion in the Making*, the dependence of God is emphasized. " ' There is no entity, not even God, which requires nothing but itself in order to exist ' (Descartes). According to the doctrine of this lecture, every entity is in its essence social and requires the society in order to exist." *Religion in the Making*, p. 108.

[82] *Process and Reality*, p. 494.

[83] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 234.

[84] There is a very interesting similarity between the ideas here expressed concern-

All these distinctions and qualifications are mere subterfuge. If the eternal objects are anything outside the conceptual valuation of them, they are eternally something—not-nothing—independent of the divine causality. A mere child would then ask, "Where do they come from?" Evidently they do not come from God because they are only prehended conceptually by Him, and they are *components* of His primordial nature. One seeks in vain for any other explanation. Like Plato and all the dynamists since his day, Whitehead fails to reach the ultimate explanation of things. He insists on primordial potentialities which are merely ordered in the mind of God. The fact that they are called eternal does not prevent one from demanding the cause of them. The philosophy of organism does not touch the depths of the problem. As Miss Emmett points out,[85] Whitehead has reduced creation to a selection from a catalogue. We add, a catalogue with an eternal, unexplained, independent existence, even apart from the deficiently actual existence which it receives in the primordial nature of God.

Beyond all doubt the philosophy of Whitehead is a great advance over the completely materialistic, mechanistic conception of the universe which dominated 19th-century philosophy. He and his contemporaries have indeed re-introduced God into the world of non-Scholastic philosophers. For this they are to be given a great deal of praise. As in all such movements,

ing eternal objects, and the presentation of propositions as being neither pure potentials nor pure actualities. They are said to be a "manner of potential nexus involving pure potentials and pure actualities"—entities of a new impure type which "presuppose the two pure types of entities" (*Process and Reality*, p. 266). Seemingly there are three stages in the relevance of propositions. First of all they are mere "possibles" but possibles which *exist* outside the actual world of a *given actual entity*. Secondly they become "proximately possible" when that actual entity has reached a stage of development in which it is capable of feeling them; they are then relevant and *existent* to *that* actual entity. Finally they are pure actuality, or a part of an actual entity, when they are actually felt by the entity. Perhaps the same stages could be applied to eternal objects, before their valuation in God, in their valuation by God, and their "actuality" in His primordial nature. At all events, the eternal objects must be considered as "existing possibles" before their valuation.

[85] *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism* (London: 1932), pp. 116 ff.

however, there has been a decided break from the old system, without the complete formation of a coherent new philosophy. Certain true principles are discovered and, because they are so much opposed to previous thought, they are overemphasized and applied improperly. The result is a lack of equilibrium in the developing system. For example, Professor Whitehead is quite correct when he denies the possibility of a "temporal world conceived as a self-sufficient completion of the creative act." Such a thesis violates the first principle of causality. Creation is only explainable by maintaining that it is a constant dependence in existence of the creature on the creator, not only at the first moment but at every moment of the creature's existence. We conclude that there must be an independent supreme being in virtue of which all other being is, as a participation. Professor Whitehead cannot follow us in this deduction because a Being who is "eminently real" (Supreme Being) would also be pure act, and an Unmoved Mover. He cannot understand how an Unmoved Mover can be the source of the movement or process which he clearly sees in the world. Such an Unmoved Mover could not give His creatures action but "sleep." [86] This difficulty is due to a simple misapprehension of the meaning of the term. To call the Prime Mover "Unmoved" does not mean that He does not act but only denies that He *is moved* or changed, that He passes from potency to act. On the contrary, that which acts, acts inasmuch as it is *in actu*. God is Pure Act, one eternal act; while the motion or process in the world is only the effect, in time, of His one eternal act. He is and acts outside time. The effects of His action are manifested in time.[87] Thus, not only *can* the Unmoved Mover be the source of action but He *must* be the ultimate source of all the action in the world. The objection of Mr. Whitehead seems valid because it is the exaggeration of a part of the truth, while it implies a misunderstanding of the true nature of an Unmoved Mover.

[86] *Process and Reality*, p. 484.

[87] Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange on the refutation of *Plus est in motu quam in immobilitate, De Revelatione* (Rome: 1931), pp. 264-268.

It must also be noted that Whitehead's philosophy is itself evolving, and, in many points, coming closer to the true position, as we noted concerning his idea of process. Perhaps he will complete his system and discover the true doctrine. But, if he does, he will be like Chesterton's English yachtsman who slightly miscalculated his course and discovered England, under the impression that it was a new island in the South Seas. What he will "discover" has been known for centuries. Up to the present he has been emphasizing partial truths, omitting the ensemble from full consideration. As a result he is involved in manifold inconsistencies. His repudiation of the prevalent "belief that logical inconsistencies can indicate anything else than antecedent errors" [88] will not help him. Granted that hypotheses are not considered as true or false but as workable or non-workable. Granted that they are not disproved but abandoned. Still, common sense tells us that of two contradictory propositions one is true, the other is false. We may not know which one is false, but we do know that one of them is false, as it is stated. It is then the task of the theorist to re-examine the data in the hope of finding out where the element of truth or falsity lies. He may never find the true state of affairs, but that does not deny the existence of the truth. So with the philosophy of organism, truth and error are both present. The inconsistencies must be explained on the supposition that one doctrine is true, the other false as it is stated.

We are attempting to find the truth and error in Whitehead's conception of the unity in the universe. In treating of this question, it has been necessary to consider the origin of the universe. We are told definitely that whatever arises in actual entities from God's decision arises first conceptually and is transmitted into the actual world. This presupposes that there may be something in actualities which is not ultimately derived from God's decision. The insistence on the pre-existing potentialities for creation explains this pre-supposition. The eternal objects and creativity do not arise from God's decision; they are not created. If they are not created, and if they are not

[88] *Process and Reality*, p. viii.

God Himself, we are forced to ask two questions. In the first place, " Whence do they come? " As we have seen above, our question is unanswered.

Secondly, we ask: " Why must all things become one with God in the process? " Why is there this concrescence into unity? We have seen that God is the principle of concrescence. But a God who is merely a principle of concrescence is a source of external order only, as a librarian is the source of order among the books in a library. We are forced to probe deeper. The question is no longer, " Why do things become *one*? " but " Why do things *become*? " The God of Whitehead is neither Infinite Being nor Pure Act. He cannot be the ultimate source of all action, all becoming, in the universe, for a thing acts only as it is *in actu*. The God whom we meet in this presentation is only deficiently actual. It is pointed out that there is a correlative of potentiality, which is " givenness." [89] There is truly a correlative of potentiality, that which is in no way potential, but which is in itself the source of all potentiality. This is to say that there is Pure Act. Such a conclusion is not to be found in Whitehead. He would hold that givenness and potentiality are both meaningless apart from a multiplicity of potential entities. We add that they become meaningless apart from Pure Act, by which those potentialities become " given," or actual. Only with such a Pure Act, can we explain any becoming in the world. If God is the cause of the becoming and being of things, we have a right to call him the real principle of real order. Then there is a reason for saying that all things must become one in Him, must return to their cause. Even then one cannot rightly say that they become *physically* one in God, as Plotinus said. Material things cannot become physically one with the Pure Spirit who is God. They must first be spiritualized and thus returned to God through the mediation of an entity which is both material (in order to be in contact with the world of matter) and spiritual (in order to be in contact with the Spiritual Entity). In other words, we can predicate a real, but only *intentional and not physical*, unity of the material

[89] *Process and Reality*, p. 60.

world with God. This unity is brought about through the medium of man's knowledge. But, without the element of causal dependence, even this theory of unity must surely fall by the wayside of philosophical thought.

Since Professor Whitehead cannot bring himself to admit God as Pure Act and Pure Being, he contents himself with an aesthetic theory of creation, and a purely anthropomorphic idea of God. He calls Him God, and then permits Him to have a nature just like that of any other man. The aesthetic theory of creation follows the analogy of human aesthetic " creation," failing to note that the methods are but analogous and not identically the same. Man " creates " a work of art when he uses his faculties to synthesize in a novel fashion the images which he derives ultimately from previous sense impressions. God, however, acts differently. Since He is the plenitude of Being there is nothing outside Him upon which He can depend for His " images." Derivation can only be from Himself. Not even Bergson's memory patterns can be admitted. God does not remember anything, He knows it. By His act of knowledge and the will to create, things are. The theory of memory patterns suggests that there is a past in God, while in fact there is but one eternal present. The emphasis is placed on the existence of these patterns *in God*, as if this would help one to avoid stating that there is something outside God upon which He depends for material in creating. The result is only confusion worse confounded. Ultimately, Bergson's theory is reduced to one of two possibilities. Either God is a temporal entity which can have a past, and a memory of itself in the past; or there is something like Whitehead's eternal objects standing eternally before the conceptual valuation of the primordial nature of God. God's action (and, therefore, God, even the God of Whitehead) would be derived from these objects. Yet Whitehead affirms that the principle of derivation does not hold for Him. We are faced with a manifest contradiction. God is derived—God is not derived. One statement is false. In fact, we can avoid all difficulties if we admit that God is not derived, that He is the Creator, Pure Act and Eminent

Being; that He is the cause of all becoming as well as of order. This means that Whitehead's principle of concrescence, a mere harmonizing God who introduces external order among things, must be abandoned. God must be admitted as a creator who creates *ex nihilo sui et subjecti*. Only then has one a solid foundation for any proper unity in the world. The world is one because it is created by an omnipotent God, Pure Act and Eminent Being. As an effect it is destined to return to its cause if it is to realize its perfection as an effect. The detailed discussion of the unity of the universe is reserved for the next section. We have now succeeded in finding a solid foundation for such a process of unification.

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(To be continued.)

THE PROBLEM OF MEANING

I

THE English word " meaning " has a peculiar ambiguity which has been to a considerable extent the source of confusion in the many studies recently published on " meaning." The lack of any precision of the word " meaning," of any rigor in method by way of attacking the problem, and even of full comprehension of what the problem of meaning embraces, seems to be the most prominent characteristic of many contemporary writers. We at least have to know what *they* mean even if we are trying to find out the meaning of " meaning " This can happen only if they make known to us in some way what they are trying to impart. In many cases, these writers have failed badly in imparting what they intend us to understand by the problem of meaning. This is evident because of the apparent failure of these writers to communicate successfully with each other, and also because tangential issues frequently seem to be argued as though they were fundamental.

In several notable instances, the problem of meaning seems somewhat misconstrued since, in such cases, the analysis obviously depends upon meaning and yet what is supposed to be sought is meaning itself. There is no question that the peculiar nature of the problem contributes to such confusion; yet this, in turn, should suggest exceptional care and rigor in method and procedure. We should ask questions about meaning, and perhaps especially about the ambiguous word itself. Still, it seems there are some questions which need not be asked: for example, to ask whether a given word or sentence has meaning appears already to be a misconstruing of the problem. If words do not already presuppose meaning in some way, then linguistic endeavors to ascertain how they somehow come to acquire meaning are rather futile. It amounts to the same thing as examining a painting and then asking whether it represents

anything or not. That would not seem to be the problem; the problem would be *since* it is representative, how and what it represents. This would seem evident in any work of art, of which language is an example. It appears, however, that we shall not appreciate the current problem of meaning unless we have somehow understood what it means to ask when words and sentences are meaningful and when they are not. The ambiguity is already tremendous here; nevertheless, this is the starting point in the present problem of meaning.

On the other hand, we should credit these contemporary writers with raising difficulties about principles and elements that may not have been given sufficient attention and examination. We should welcome this opportunity to face questions and difficulties, since that is the necessary occasion for attaining a firmer grasp of the principles and elements which are needed.

Now there certainly is, in a definite sense, a genuine problem of meaning. But the problem of meaning can be easily misconceived if it is based principally upon the ambiguity of the oral and written mediums which convey meaning. And when the problem is based on a medium of expression as completely ambiguous as the word "meaning," such a problem can only raise a host of other difficulties, largely fruitless and unnecessary. This has happened, in part, in the current formulation of the problem of meaning. In general, it seems accurate to say that contemporary writers suppose that the essence of the problem is the ambiguity of the verbal or oral signs of meaning, or even the mere verbal or oral signs of meaning as such. We shall, then, first have to make a brief survey of some of the current contributions to the problem of meaning in an endeavor to locate what they encompass. Then we shall have to examine dialectically the main points that are there proposed.

A general, though brief, survey of the problem along this line seems to have been made by Mr. Leo Abraham in an article he wrote entitled "Theory of Meaning." [1] After distinguishing five general ways of treating the problem of meaning in contem-

[1] *The Monist*, July, 1936, p. 228 ff.

porary writings, Mr. Abraham compiled a list of some fifty different meanings of " meaning " to make the point that the word " meaning " is hopelessly ambiguous since all these fifty senses of " meaning " are currently used.[2] This series of quotations serves to indicate how the contemporary problem centers on the ambiguity of the word " meaning." The difficulty then might seem to be how to disentangle from all these meanings of " meaning " an " accepted " or " best " or " correct " meaning of " meaning." This is what Mr. Abraham suggests in the following question:

> How then are we to choose from among the fifty-odd different uses of " meaning " the one basic signification, or a basic group of connected significations, the consideration of which may legitimately be termed the " theory of meaning "? [3]

Mr. Abraham goes on to point out that an arbitrary selection is bound to be inadequate for material upon which to base a theory of meaning. Nevertheless, he adds, the meaning of " meaning " as signification has a certain priority and is more or less common to any derived meanings of " meaning." Meaning as signification, then, is the least arbitrary and the most fundamental of all the contemporary meanings of " meaning."

Mr. Abraham's final major point is that " the frequent historical departures from the basic sense of ' meaning ' as signification have numerous linguistic, critical, metaphysical, and epistemological motivations, the consideration of which provides a convenient connecting link among many of the theories of the various relations, characteristics, events, and objects historically designated by the term ' meaning.' " [4]

This approach through the ambiguity of verbal meaning seems typical of many contemporary writers. That is to say

[2] " Like many other philosophical terms, ' meaning ' is extraordinarily ambiguous. Its radical ambiguity may most readily be indicated by the following group of more than fifty typical quotations from philosophical and psychological writers, in each of which the term ' meaning ' is used in a different sense." *Ibid.*, p. 228. The extent of Mr. Abraham's list can be seen by consulting his article; it is thoroughly representative.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 248.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 257.

that, whether they realize it or not, the problem of meaning becomes rooted in the ambiguity of the oral or written word, for that is the only way in which we can understand the difficulty of the meaning of "meaning." Now might it not seem obvious that meaning already has to be involved in the very use of spoken and written language, and that once there is linguistic expression the presence of meaning could not be denied? Yet it is precisely this that is denied in the current formulation of the problem, and it is here that the current problem of meaning takes a decided turn for the worse.[5] In brief, the situation

[5] Mr. Abraham's article is understandable enough. He has noted the extent of the ambiguity of the word "meaning" as used by various writers and has compiled a list of representative uses to indicate this extent. It is questionable whether it is profitable to attempt to choose from this list an "accepted" or "best" or "correct" meaning of meaning since the meaning of any word as a word has a necessary arbitrary element in it. Nor is the problem of meaning clarified by this procedure.

While Mr. Abraham does not seem to recognize that there is this necessary arbitrary element in any word, he does reject a solution that would be based merely on the ambiguity of "meaning":

"Another conceivable answer to our quest for a definite subject-matter is the position that the scope of the 'theory of meaning' is basically determined by the very ambiguity of the term 'meaning' which rendered the previous answer invalid. The topic of the 'theory of meaning' would, on such a view, be marked out by the historical mutations of the word 'meaning' and the theory itself would consist of the elucidations of these mutations, or at least of the more common among them, together with the determination of the truth or falsity, consistency or contradictoriness, and importance or triviality, of the various propositions in which the considered variations of 'meaning' have been employed. Now it is clear that such a subject-matter, while it might prove to be a very interesting philosophical *potpourri*, would possess no internal coherence or continuity other than that given by the lexicographical fact that a single word, 'meaning,' had been used, and was perhaps still being used, for the widely varying array of conceptions included. But if philosophy is anything more than a sub-species of lexicography, there would seem to be no more reason for calling a dissertation on such an assortment of ideas a 'theory of meaning' than for bestowing that title upon a study of any other dozen topics whose common bond was their selection at random from the *Encyclopedia Britannica* . . ." (p. 238 ff.)

Mr. Abraham's full conclusion on the matter can be judged best in his own summary of it:

"I have here attempted to show (1) that at least five distinguishable cultural tendencies have contributed to the prominence of discussions of 'meaning' in recent and contemporary philosophy and psychology; (2) that the term meaning is hopelessly ambiguous, possessing at least fifty different significations in fairly current use; (3) that consequently the notion of 'real definition,' trivial or contradictory con-

seems to be this: even when there is linguistic expression, the problem is whether that linguistic expression has meaning or not. In other words, meaning has to be *added to* language, and the problem then seems to be to discover in what way it can be added.

Thus Mr. A. J. Ayer, in an article "Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics,"[6] puts the matter this way:

> My purpose is to prove that any attempt to describe the nature or even assert the existence of something lying beyond the reach of empirical observation must consist in the enunciation of pseudo-propositions, a pseudo-proposition being a series of words that may seem to have the structure of a sentence but is in fact meaningless. . . .
>
> So in every case where we have a series of words which seems to be a good grammatical sentence, and we wish to discover whether it really makes sense—i. e., whether it expresses a genuine proposition—we must consider what are the circumstances in which the proposition apparently expressed would be called true or false: what difference in the world its truth or falsity would entail. And if those who have uttered it or profess to understand it are unable to describe what in the world would be different if it were true or false, or in any way to show how it could be verified, then we must conclude that nothing has been asserted.[7]

How are we going to find out, then, when a series of words

sidered in itself, is useless in determining the proper subject-matter of the theory of 'meaning'; (4) that the valid view of definition is that which interprets it as the process of indicating to a person or persons the individual, group, or general signification of signs; (5) that the arbitrary selection, according to one's dominant interest, of any definition of 'meaning' is practically and historically inadequate as a means of providing the proper subject-matter for the theory of 'meaning'; (6) that the sense of 'meaning' as signification, because of its temporal priority, logical indispensability, and general ubiquity in philosophical discourse, often in concurrence with other definitions of the term, is the least arbitrary and most fundamental of all the current senses of 'meaning' . . ." (p. 257). The seventh point has been quoted above.

[6] *Mind*, July, 1934, p. 335 ff.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 335-338. Mr. Ayer thereupon demonstrates that all of the assertions of metaphysics must be nonsense since it aims "to describe a reality lying beyond our experience." (Mr. Abraham refers to Mr. Ayer's question-begging argument and notes it as an argument following from an arbitrary definition "as to what anybody does or should mean by the terms 'meaningful' and 'meaningless' . . ." Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 253, n. 26).

really makes sense? It seems to have been for the solution of this that the principle of verification was proposed. That is, if a series of words can be verified, then that series of words has meaning.

This principle of verification has been enunciated in various ways, but basically it means simply this: the meaning of a sentence or proposition or assertion is the way in which it can be verified. Mr. A. E. Blumberg, in his article "Demonstration and Inference in the Sciences and Philosophy," [8] refers to such a principle of verification. He distinguishes empirical verification from inference. A purely logical inference needs no empirical verification since it is only another way of saying the same thing; it deals only with the formal tautologies of logical and mathematical assertions or propositions. There is a kind of "empirical" inference also (*i. e.*, an inference that is not merely tautological), but this is not what is meant by verification, for "an empirical inference is a guess, a leap into the unverified. The fundamental maxim which permits (not verifies) an empirical inference is: the inferred proposition must be theoretically capable of empirical verification. This maxim is, in effect, merely another way of saying that a supposed proposition which is theoretically incapable of verification is meaningless . . ." [9]

The question naturally arises, and is Mr. Blumberg's main question in the article, of how philosophy and metaphysics can use demonstration or verify propositions. There have been two general ways to demonstrate without appeal to empirical data. One way supposes that propositions may "intensionally" imply other propositions. But such implication, Mr. Blumberg points out, either is identical with tautological implication or is not. If not, then the implication either is in fact an extensional proposition which must be verified empirically, or it may be intensional as merely defining how a symbol is to be used, and consequently is intensional only in relation to syntax. The other way of demonstrating in philosophy is some-

[8] *The Monist*, October, 1932, p. 577 ff. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 581.

times claimed by the use of "non-empirical demonstrable premises." This is a sort of intensional verification which, Mr. Blumberg decides, is only a matter of psychological attitude.

Neither way of verification is valid. Consequently, philosophy has no way of verifying its propositions; in fact, it has no propositions. This is Mr. Blumberg's conclusion:

> Therefore, philosophy does not consist of propositions (*i. e.*, of assertions capable of being true or false). Its assertions are strictly speaking meaningless. They may be termed elucidations, that is, more or less clumsy verbal attempts on the part of a person to convey to others "that which cannot be said." Elucidations are efficacious if they succeed in conveying what they are intended to convey. The test of their efficacy is a specific set of effects upon a qualified audience. This paper consists of elucidations.[10]

Mr. Rudolf Carnap has also enunciated the principle of verification in various ways. In an article entitled "The Construction of a Language-System"[11] he said:

> The word "meaning" will here be taken in its empiricist sense; an expression of language has meaning in this sense if we know how to use it in speaking about empirical facts, either actual or possible ones. Empiricists generally agree . . . in the view that the question whether a given sentence is meaningful is closely connected with the questions of the possibility of verification, confirmation or testing of that sentence.[12]

If this principle is to be generalized for all meaning, then it would follow that a sentence obtains meaning only when it is capable of being verified or tested empirically. It was upon such a generalization that Mr. Ayer demonstrated the impossibility of metaphysics, as did also Mr. Blumberg; for the

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 584.

[11] *Philosophy of Science* (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, Publishers), January, 1937, p. 2 ff.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 2. This is the fourth section of Mr. Carnap's general article on "Testability and Meaning." In this section, he attempts the construction of a language system that will fulfill the empiricist criterion of meaning.

It is interesting to note that in this article the principle of verification is noticeably modified. Complete verification is no longer possible, but only a gradual process of confirmation. Confirmation becomes the test of meaning instead of verification.

metaphysical proposition cannot be verified empirically, and since there is no meaning without that, hence the metaphysical propositon is meaningless.

But there have been writers who have objected to this reduction of philosophy to meaninglessness or nonsense. One of these was Mr. W. T. Stace in his article "Metaphysics and Meaning" [13] in which he replied directly to Mr. Ayer. Mr. Stace first said:

> Thus this new theory of meaning threatens violent revolution over the whole domain of philosophy. For if the theory be accepted, a great deal of the philosophy of the past is simply blown up. Philosophers have always been accustomed to hear from their opponents that their conceptions were false, their arguments fallacious. But they have retained at least the right to defend themselves, to retort on their opponents, if they could. But now they are to have no right to open their mouths at all. For whatever they say, whatever opinions they believe themselves to be advocating, they are to be told that they are merely uttering nonsensical noises. In these circumstances linguistic analysis may remain, and this may be called philosophy if you like. But any other kind of philosophy must simply disappear. Thus the new theory constitutes perhaps the gravest challenge which philosophy has ever had to face.[14]

What, then, does Mr. Stace do about this principle of verification? Does he reject verification as the principle of meaning? On the contrary, he proposes another principle of verification:

> We may therefore formulate the correct principle by saying: either *that any statement, to have meaning, must symbolize experiencible characters of the world*; or, what is the same thing, *that every concept employed in it must have empirical application*.[15]
>
> . . . the theory of meaning which we have now evolved shows that any statement is meaningful provided the concepts which it employs have application in experience; or in other words, provided what it asserts is an experiencible character of the world; and the experience which is thus the criterion of meaning may be that of any mind, human or non-human, provided that it shares structure

[13] *Mind*, October, 1935, p. 417 ff.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 419.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 426.

with our experience. Therefore metaphysical propositions are not necessarily, and as such, meaningless. . . .[16]

Another writer took up the question whether the principle of verifiability itself was meaningful. This was Mr. A. C. Ewing, in his article "Meaninglessness."[17]

In this article I intend to examine the conditions under which a sentence may be said to be meaningless. I have been stimulated to do so by a belief that present-day thinkers are often far too ready to dismiss a philosophical statement as meaningless, and particularly by my opposition to the theory that the meaning of all statements is to be analyzed solely in terms of verification by sense-experience.[18]

Mr. Ewing thereupon questions how it would be possible to verify the statement that all meaningful statements are verifiable. In discussing this briefly, he concludes:

The statement that all meaningful statements are verifiable is therefore not itself verifiable. It follows that if it is true it is meaningless. But a sentence cannot possibly be both true and meaningless. Therefore the sentence in question cannot be true, but must be either meaningless or false. According to my view it is the latter.[19]

Mr. Ewing does go on to discuss the conditions under which "verbal expressions could be said to be meaningless," and in so doing, lists these possibilities:

1. There are sentences which express exclamations, commands, exhortations. These do not assert propositions, and therefore there is a sense in which they have no meaning, though no doubt in another sense they have a meaning since they can certainly be understood (or misunderstood). It is possible that a philosopher might confuse such a sentence with a sentence expressing a proposition and so utter a sentence which had no meaning, thinking it had a meaning, though I doubt whether this occurs at all frequently.

2. There are expressions such as *the table is beside* or *Cambridge is between York* which are meaningless because incomplete, *i. e.*,

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 436. Mr. Ayer replied to this article in one entitled "The Principle of Verifiability." (Cf. *Mind*, April, 1936, p. 199 ff.). Here the principle of verifiability is "weakened" to mean "that some possible observations should be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood." . . . And thus on the problem of meaning goes.

[17] *Mind*, July, 1937, p. 347 ff. [18] *Ibid.*, p. 347. [19] *Ibid.*, p. 349.

the form of the expression is such as to require an additional term to give it meaning and the additional term is absent. In the first example there is a dyadic relation with only one term, in the second a triadic relation with only two terms. There are, I think, cases where philosophers have uttered meaningless expressions of this type thinking they had a meaning. . . .

3. An expression may be said to be meaningless if it includes some word or words which do not stand for anything. If the meaning of the word in question is complex, it might be said to be meaningless on the ground that it was self-contradictory, in which case it will come under a later heading; but apart from this we might conceivably have a sentence containing indefinable or undefined words which stood, not for something self-contradictory, but for absolutely nothing at all. I do not mean merely " for nothing existent " but for nothing of which we have any idea at all. I do not know any clear instances of sentences containing such words in any philosopher except Lewis Carroll, but it would no doubt be alleged by some philosophers that, *e. g.*, " subsist " as opposed to exist or " good " as used in *Principia Ethica* are examples.

4. An expression (we should hardly call it a sentence) might consist of words all of which had a meaning and yet be itself meaningless because the words were combined in a way contrary to the rules of syntax, *e. g.*, are of fond not dogs cats. The term *syntax* is used here in its strictly grammatical sense, not in the extended sense in which " grammar " is used by certain positivists. I do not know whether there are instances of such expressions in philosophical works excepting those due to momentary slips or misprints.

There are no doubt these four classes of meaningless expressions, but I come now to two other alleged classes of meaningless sentences about which I feel a good deal of doubt. In fact I shall contend against most philosophers that they are not meaningless at all. . . .[20]

But Mr. Ewing's reduction of the principle of verification to meaninglessness had already been anticipated more fundamentally by the real forerunner in the current analysis of meaning, Mr. Ludwig Wittgenstein.[21] His influential work, *Trac-*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 359. The two other classes of sentences Mr. Ewing goes on to discuss are (5) a sentence such as " Quadratic equations go to race-meetings "; and (6) any self-contradictory statement. The point of interest here, of course, is only with the above cases of meaningless sentences or expressions.

[21] There is also another early influential article which bears upon this issue of

tatus Logico-Philosophicus, which begins with the celebrated announcement, "The world is everything that is the case," is, more than any other contribution, the basis upon which the empirical analysis of meaning, particularly the "pictorial" representation of reality and the association of verification with meaning, rests. Mr. Carnap, in discussing meaninglessness in his article "On the Character of Philosophic Problems" [22] referred to Wittgenstein in answer to the objection that the positivists and antimetaphysicians themselves cut off the branch on which they sit.

Wittgenstein has represented with especial emphasis the thesis of the meaninglessness of metaphysical propositions and of the identity of philosophy and the logic of science; especially through him has the Vienna circle been developed on this point. How now does Wittgenstein dispose of the objection that his own propositions are also meaningless? He doesn't at all; he agrees with it! He is of the opinion that the non-metaphysical *philosophy* also has no propositions; it operates with words, *the meaninglessness of which* in the end it itself must recognize:—

"My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed

verification and meaning. This is F. Max Mueller's "On Thought and Language" which appeared in *The Monist* for July, 1891, pp. 572-589. Here is emphasized the intimate connection of thought and language, so intimate that they are really inseparable. In fact, in attempting to ascertain which is really prior, Mr. Mueller made this significant observation:

"Suppose we had no such word as *matter*, would not our whole system of thought be different? Matter is not an object, perceived by our senses. We may even go further and say that matter by itself never exists. . . .

"It is clear, therefore, that matter is made by us, and that without some such word as matter, we could never have the faintest idea or concept of matter. For how should we call it? On the other hand, it is equally clear that we could not have the word matter, without the concept of matter. For what would be the use of it? Now, what follows from this apparent dilemma? If the concept cannot be prior to the name and the name cannot be prior to the concept, they must needs be simultaneous, or, more correctly, they must be the same thing under two aspects.

"From an historical point of view, that is, if we consider the genesis of words and concepts, not in modern times, but during that period when words and concepts were framed for the first time, we are bound to admit that the word is really the *prius*. That period may be ever so far distant, but it was nevertheless a very real and truly historical period." (pp. 573-574).

[22] *Philosophy of Science*, January, 1934, p. 5 ff.

out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it). He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." [23]

There are at least two books which must be considered briefly in relation in this problem. The first is Mr. Wilbur Marshall Urban's *Language and Reality*.[24] This book is a comprehensive and extended study of the problem of meaning in its broadest dimensions, and is certainly one of the outstanding challenges to the current positivistic conception of meaning. In his preface to this work, Mr. Urban shows that he fully appreciates the fundamental implications of the current issue while at the same time aware of its parallels in the past [25]—

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8. (Cf. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Cambridge, 1933, p. 189). Some other especially important statements for the problem of meaning from the *Tractatus* are:

"2.1 We make to ourselves pictures of facts.

2.11 The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and non-existence of atomic facts.

2.171 The picture can represent every reality whose form it has. The spatial picture, everything spatial, the colored, everything colored, etc.

2.202 The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space.

3.02 The thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it thinks. What is thinkable is also possible.

3.3 Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name a meaning."

[24] Macmillan Company, New York, 1939.

[25] "It is, perhaps, safe to say that Logical Positivism has passed its zenith and has modified its original positions to such an extent that its sensational character is greatly softened and its initial force largely spent. But it is equally certain that it has left a residuum of significant problems which constitutes a permanent element in the philosophy of the present. Perhaps the best way to introduce the present study is to relate it to that movement. The writer shares with those of this way of thinking the belief that problems of language are basal for science and philosophy. If philosophy is not solely a 'critique of language,' as is frequently maintained, such a critique is certainly an indispensable *prolegomenon* to philosophy. . . .

"There are those who seem to ascribe all our difficulties, economic, political, and social, to the 'tyranny of words' which hide from us the realities of things. There are those, on the other hand, who find in 'blessed words,' with all their accumulated intension, the very actuality of culture and the embodiment of reality. It is not my object here to decide between these two extremes, but merely to suggest that what are called verbal questions are really not merely verbal but go to the heart of philosophical issues. In any case, I think it must be patent to all that a philoso-

indeed, Mr. Urban is one of the few contemporary writers who has sufficient philosophical perspective and insight both to see into a problem and to see beyond the narrowness of a couple of decades of contribution; in short, he is not only not ignorant of what has already been accomplished throughout the tradition of thought, but he is also able to make use of the wealth of material that is available on this old and new problem of meaning.

Mr. Urban's book is divided into two main sections: (1) "The Philosophy of Language" and (2) "The Principles of Symbolism." Obviously, just criticism cannot be made here in space that must be so confined. It can be said, generally, that Mr. Urban, though at the expense of considerable repetition, does raise and face all the main issues. There is, however, the primary point on verification and meaning that deserves consideration here, and it is rather significant to note just how Mr. Urban treats this point in relation to the way various positivists have developed it. In fact, he seems to accept the association and identity of verification and meaning quite as completely as the foregoing writers.

Mr. Urban discusses, for example, the statement of Mr. Carnap that the meaning of an assertion is the way in which it may be verified.

> In other words the meaning is the verification. A consequence of this is that all uses of language to which the question of truth or falsity is irrelevant (if there be such uses) are, *ipso facto*, meaningless. Now I am not disposed to doubt this general statement of a necessary relation of meaning to truth, *if* it is properly understood . . .[26]

phy of language such as that of the New Positivists, which would eliminate whole areas of human discourse as meaningless and unintelligible, has significant implications for human culture. It might conceivably be the prelude to a brave new world in which the human spirit, having rid itself of the ghosts of Plato and Aristotle, and the impedimenta of the centuries, should enter into the full light of a wholly 'scientific' era. It might, on the other hand, conceivably be a symptom of a decaying culture and a prelude to a scientific barbarism and a cultural nihilism. In any case, the issues presented by so untoward a situation constitute a challenge to critical thought." (*Ibid.*, pp. 11-13).

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 209. He then discusses the emotive use of language.

After repeating that he grants the general truth of the statement that there is no meaning where the question of truth or falsity is wholly irrelevant, Mr. Urban then points out:

Verifiability may mean two quite different things which must be carefully distinguished. On the one hand, it may mean a certain character of the content of one's assertion or hypothesis which makes it possible actually to satisfy the conditions of verification. On the other hand, it may mean merely a certain character of one's assertion or hypothesis which marks it off from the unverifiable, but which does not, however, involve necessarily the possibility of actual verification.[27]

With this distinction made in the use of the term "verifiability," Mr. Urban proceeds by stating:

It is verifiability in this latter sense alone, then, that can with any show of reason be made the criterion of meaning. Let us see, then, in what verifiability in this sense is held to consist, that which, although actual verification may be forever impossible, yet makes the assertion *in principle* verifiable. . . . It is the possibility of sense experience. The mountain on the other side of the moon may not be actually observable, but the fact that it is intrinsically observable makes the assertion meaningful.[28]

Mr. Urban says there is no question that where there is verifiability in this sense, the assertion is also meaningful. But he does question whether such assertions only are meaningful. Mr. C. I. Lewis, he points out, holds there are cases where meaning may go beyond the possibility of verification altogether, such as "the conception of other selves."[29] This leads Mr. Urban to say:

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 210.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 210-211.

[29] The full quotation from Mr. Lewis is: "In the nature of the case I cannot verify you as another centre of experience different from myself, and yet the meaningfulness of the supposition of other selves is unquestioned. There is nothing to which I can give more explicit empirical content than to the supposition of a consciousness like mine connected with a body like mine. The conception of other selves as metaphysical ultimates exemplifies the philosophic importance that may attach to a supposition which is nevertheless unverifiable on account of the limitations of knowing." (C. I. Lewis, "Experience and Meaning," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. VII, No. 2, p. 146.)

It seems necessary to conclude, therefore, that while there is meaningful assertion wherever there is reference to empirically observable entities, there is also meaningful assertion where there is no such reference. The question now arises whether these facts contradict the preliminary position that the meaning of an assertion is connected with its verifiability. Obviously we are here faced with a definite alternative. Either we accept Professor Lewis's position or else maintain the view that there are other ways of verification. It is the latter alternative which seems to me to be demanded by the facts. I shall presently develop a theory of verification along these lines.[30]

In discussing whether the supposition of other selves is meaningful, Mr. Urban admits that there might be some justification in thinking that the condition of meaningfulness is not verifiability (" but rather imaginability "). But with no explicit reason, Mr. Urban discards this view and states that he is " equally disposed to think that such content alone does not make the supposition meaningful, and that what does make it meaningful here also is, in the last analysis, the way in which it may be verified." [31]

Mr. Urban, then, like Mr. Stace, does not reject verification as the principle of meaning, but counters by proposing other ways of verification:

It has been repeatedly pointed out that the proposition that the meaning of an assertion is the way in which it may be verified, contains a circle and creates a predicament. For we cannot determine the verifiability of the assertion until we know what it means. What, then, does this predicament suggest? Not that meaning and verification are independent and unrelated, but rather that there are different ways of verification dependent upon the meaning of the assertions or the different universes of discourse in which they are made. It is true that when the universe of discourse in which the assertion is made is the " physical " context, verification does involve reference to an observable entity. On the other hand, it is equally clear that assertions are made in other universes of discourse in which no such reference is implied. It does not mean, however, that such assertions are either without meaning or unverifiable in every sense. We may say that such meanings are *authentic* even

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 212.

when they are not verifiable in the narrow sense of the empirical criterion.[32]

Mr. Urban then proceeds to explain more fully what he means by "authentication," which is also to mean a way of verification in order to get meaning:

> This, then, is the notion of authentication, the use of which is, I think, justified by appeal to the aesthetic. As we shall see, it is everywhere present in human discourse, and is indeed—this is one of our main contentions—*presupposed in empirical verification itself*. Within this general notion of authentication we may distinguish direct and indirect. It is from a case of indirect authentication that we started, namely, the reality of other selves, and to this type we shall return, but it is important to understand first what direct authentication is—its nature and its range.
>
> Direct verification, in the ordinary sense, consists in reference to an observable entity, and the primary instance is said to be "pointing." Verification in this sense is possible only in a physical context or universe of discourse, but there are similar or analogous types of authentication in other universes of discourse. In direct authentication we may speak of "showing forth" (*Aufweisen*) of some *quale* or relation. In developing this form of direct authentication, I shall purposely take my illustrations from the universe of ethical discourse and value propositions, for the reason that it is precisely assertions of this sort that, on the basis of the empirical criterion or norm, are said to be unverifiable and therefore meaningless. . . .[33]

After citing some examples of assertions of value which involve showing forth "some *quale* or relation which is intuited, and in that intuition acknowledged" (*e. g.*, the assertion that an action is "proud"), Mr. Urban summarizes the two forms of verification known as "authentication": Direct authentication "is a form of verification which takes place in communication—in the mutual acknowledgement of values and their relations," while the indirect, in following upon the direct, "consists in the mutual acknowledgement of *the implications of that discourse*."[34]

Finally, for our purpose here, in maintaining that meaning

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 213. [33] *Ibid.*, p. 215. [34] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

and verifiability, as here explained, are inseparable and that all verification must be reduced ultimately to the verification which is authentication, Mr. Urban raises the question of the relation of meaning and truth, since his remarks tend to make an identification between the two. Mr. Urban discusses this himself:

> We have already called attention to the circular character of the relation between meaning and verifiability. The meaning of an assertion, it may properly be said, is the way in which it may be verified; but we cannot determine the way of verification until we have determined the sense of the proposition. The reason why the assertion that there are other selves cannot be verified by the "empirical criterion" is because it does not mean something that can be thus verified. Meaning is, then, in a sense "logically" prior to verification. But it is also logically more ultimate. That is, in the very fact that we have established the meaningfulness of the assertion of the existence of other selves, as the necessary presupposition of the meaningfulness of discourse about other things, we have in that very process verified it. This situation may be stated in the following way. All meaningful propositions, *qua* meaningful, are *ipso facto* true or contain elements of truth. To distinguish the meaningful from the unmeaning in discourse is inevitably to determine true propositions.[35]

Although this seems paradoxical, Mr. Urban admits, nevertheless meaning and truth tend ultimately to coincide, although initially they do not. Thus, when speaking about mountains on the other side of the moon this, being a sensuously observable entity, needs to be actually observed to be verified, and is therefore only verifi*able* (though being "in principle" somehow meaningful). But the "assertion that there are other selves is a meaningful proposition and, in this case at least, to say that it is meaningful is the same thing as to say that it is true."[36]

Consequently:

> Truth, then, in the last analysis, is immanent in discourse—the sum-total of intelligible discourse *is* the truth. *Veritas in dicto, non in re consistit.* If there is no knowing that does not involve expres-

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 389. [36] *Ibid.*, p. 390.

sion (and ultimately linguistic expression), whether such knowledge be knowledge by acquaintance or knowledge by description, then it is only in language that the meaning of that knowledge can be elucidated and interpreted. The proposition *Veritas in dicto* is often interpreted as nominalism—and as used by Hobbes, with his theory of language, it could not be otherwise—but properly interpreted it need not be. For, as we have shown, it is precisely a nominalistic theory of language which makes it impossible that truth should be found in discourse. Nominalism not only paralyses speech but stultifies all discourse. It is precisely because names are not mere *nomina*, not mere conventional signs, that it is possible to maintain that if our discourse is ultimately intelligible it is also, in its totality, ultimately the truth. . . .[37]

The other book is Mr. Bertrand Russell's *An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth*.[38] This is also an influential work on this problem and represents the fruition of the observations of Mr. Russell over a period of years. The book itself is based on the lectures and discussions given by the author at the University of Chicago in 1938-39, and at the University of California in 1939-40. Mr. Russell inclines toward the logical positivists, although he is not in complete agreement with them. In his own words, the two main questions in his book are: "What is meant by 'empirical evidence for the truth of a proposition'?" and "What can be inferred from the fact that there sometimes is such evidence?"

The opening chapter "What is a Word?" might seem to throw considerable light on the matter at hand. At the end of the chapter, however, the reader may still be in considerable doubt as to what a word is since the consideration of a word as a "mound of ink" or a "verbal utterance" not only seems inadequate but tends to confuse with words what may also be mounds of ink or verbal utterances without being words. It would seem that the notion of a word cannot be grasped unless not only meaning or significance is involved, but also a certain kind of significance—this, however, apparently is a part of the problem of meaning. But it is regrettable that even here so

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 894.

[38] W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1940.

much is ignored or overlooked that is necessary simply to focus the problem of meaning. Perhaps such a question as "Why are Words?" would tend to pose the problem more rigorously and get us beyond mere verbalism.[39]

The part of Mr. Russell's book, however, that has most bearing on the present problem is Chapter 13, "The Significance of Sentences," which merits at least brief summary here.

The sentence "Socrates is a man" is significant because it recognizes the rules of syntax. The expression "is a man," as a complete sentence, violates the rules of syntax and is nonsensical, "nonsensical" being the contradictory of "significant." "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination" is likewise nonsense, although it does not violate syntax. Consequently, better rules of syntax must be drawn to prevent nonsense.

There is an objective and a subjective side to every assertion: subjectively, the assertion "expresses" a state of the speaker; objectively, the assertion is true when it "indicates" a fact and is false if it does not do so.

> Thus, true and false sentences are equally significant, but a string of words which cannot express any state of the speaker is nonsensical . . . The question of significance may be brought into connection with sentences heard rather than spoken. The hearing of a significant statement has effects dependent upon the nature of the statement but not upon its truth or falsehood; the hearing of what is recognized as nonsense has no such effects. It is true that what is in fact nonsense may have effects such as only a significant statement should have, but in that case the hearer usually imagines a signification of which the words are not strictly susceptible. Broadly speaking, we may say that a heard statement, interpreted by the hearer as significant, is capable of effects of which *obvious* nonsense is incapable.[40]

There are three kinds of sentences: true, false, and nonsensical. A nonsensical sentence will not be false, although to say it is true is false. "We shall say that, when a sentence is mean-

[39] However, in the chapter on "Significance and Verifiability" Mr. Russell attacks strongly the principle of verifiability. See especially p. 387: ". . . All those who make 'verification' fundamental overlook the real problem, which is the relation between words and non-verbal occurrences in judgments of perception. . . ."

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

ingless, so is its negation." [41] If there is something that a sentence signifies, the sentence is significant; if there is nothing that it signifies, then it is nonsensical. "Socrates is a man" is significant because it signifies something, while "is a man" signifies nothing. Too many words may also not make sense: "'Socrates is a man' is a man." "The law of contradiction is yellow" is a kind of nonsense. The sentence "I am lying" seems to signify something, but it does not.

The difficulty, then, is to decide when a string of words signifies something and when it does not; and if it does signify something, whether that something must be different from the sentence "or whether significance can be merely adjectival." "A sufficient but not necessary criterion of significance is that perceptual experiences can be imagined, or can actually occur, which make us use the phrase (or its contradictory) as an assertion." [42]

The truth of the statement "snow is white" is different from the expression of it: the statement is made true by a fact of physics; the expressing of it expresses the state of mind, that is, asserts the object of belief, not the mere having of the belief. The question then is: Is there an object of belief? "...

> if beliefs have objects, what I believe when I believe that snow is white is the same as what I doubt when I ask 'is snow white?' This, whatever it is, is, on this hypothesis, the significance of the sentence 'snow is white'... If we can decide what is meant by the 'significance' of a sentence, we shall say that it is this significance that is to be called a 'proposition,' and that it is either true or false.... To try to discover what is meant by the 'significance' of a sentence, let us contrast a significant sentence with one that is not. Take 'Socrates drinks the hemlock' and 'quadruplicity drinks procrastination.' Of these the former logically can be, and once was, a judgment of perception; when it is not a judgment of perception, it is capable of calling up a complex image which has the same significance as, or, perhaps, *is* the significance of the phrase. But we cannot form an image of quadruplicity drinking. When we try to do so, we merely imagine some man whom, for fun, we call "Quadruplicity"... [43]

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 216. [42] *Ibid.*, p. 219. [43] *Ibid.*, pp. 221-22.

The question may be put in this form: " What do we believe when we believe something? " If a number of people believe there is going to be an explosion, they have in common a state of tension or expectation

but the difficulty arises as regards the connection of this (a) with the explosion or its absence, (b) with something which, in order to be vague, we will call the " idea " of the explosion.[44]

Perhaps we can now explain the " significance " of a sentence as follows: First: some sentences signify observed facts; how this happens, we have already considered. Second: some observed facts are beliefs. A belief need not involve any words at all in the believer, but it is always possible (given a suitable vocabulary) to find a sentence signifying the perceived fact that I have such-and-such a belief. If this sentence begins " I believe that," what follows the word " that " is a sentence signifying a proposition, and the proposition is said to be what I am believing. Exactly similar remarks apply to doubt, desire, etc.[45]

But this has some difficulties. Yet there seems to be something to the suggestion that a sentence is significant if " I believe that p " or " I doubt that p " " can describe a perceived fact in which words need not occur."

We can say that the significance of an atomic sentence is a state (as a complex image) or set of states (as a set of like complex images) of the believer. Images, as a form of language, differ from words in not containing any nonsense. Now the something that a sentence signifies cannot be the fact that makes it true or false, and hence must be something in the person believing the sentence. This might be images. But the bringing in of images and the distinction between propositions and sentences may well be an unnecessary complication. Perhaps significant and nonsensical sentences can be distinguished in the effects of the hearer rather than the speaker.

An article by Kaplan and Copilowish entitled " Must There Be Propositions? " in *Mind* for October, 1939, is then reviewed with which Mr. Russell takes issue by answering it affirmatively in pointing out that the term " implicit behavior " is what he means by proposition; and this, of course, must always

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 223-24.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 226.

be present. This leads to a conclusion of this part of the chapter in which the following is summarized: Propositions do have to be distinguished from sentences, but they are to be defined as psychological and physiological occurrences, and it is these that sentences express. Words are not essential to propositions; the only essential point is that sentences signify something other than themselves, which is psychological or physiological.

In reproducing this section of Mr. Russell's book, it is the point on significance and sentences which is emphasized. Mr. Russell does not, as has been seen, associate verifiability and meaning in the manner of the foregoing writers; he recognizes the futility of it and insists it ignores the real problem. However, Mr. Russell does accept meaningless or nonsensical sentences. Incidentally, there would seem to be a difference between meaningless and nonsensical; this point appears to have been overlooked by all, although this may be partly a matter of terminology—as to how we are to understand "meaningless" and "nonsensical." There is, apparently, in the current issue also the problem of the meaning of "meaninglessness."

At any rate, in the case of Mr. Russell, sentences may be both significant and nonsensical, where "nonsensical" is the contradictory of "significant." This again raises the apparently inevitable problem of how to distinguish nonsensical sentences from significant sentences. According to Mr. Russell, this will depend upon the rules of syntax, although it is not quite clear how this is to be related to his remark that the real problem for meaning or significance is the relation between words and non-verbal occurrences. "Syntax" here is taken in a wider sense than its purely grammatical significance; generally, it means both the logical and grammatical connections or relations between terms in virtue of which propositions or sentences are formed.[46] This, in turn, will raise the question whether significance is established in terms of the rules of syntax or, on the contrary, whether rules of syntax are formulated in

[46] In addition to Chapter 13, Mr. Russell also treats of syntax in Chapter 2: "Sentences, Syntax, and Parts of Speech."

terms of significance. Or: does significance presuppose syntax or does syntax presuppose significance? It is this which has important bearing on the question of how sentences are meaningful, and whether sentences can be meaningless. In connection with this, Mr. Russell has also said:

. . . Does logic or theory of knowledge need " propositions " as well as " sentences "? Here we may define a " proposition," heuristically, as " what a sentence signifies." Some sentences are significant, others are not; it is natural, though perhaps mistaken, to suppose that, when a sentence is significant, there is something that is its significance. If there is such a something, it is what I mean by the word " proposition." . . .

Whether or not there is a substantive " significance," there is certainly an adjective " significant." I apply this adjective to any sentence that is not nonsense. " Significant " and " significance " are words that I apply to sentences, whereas " meaning " is a word that I apply to single words. This distinction has no basis in usage, but it is convenient. When a sentence is not significant, I call it " nonsensical."

No ordinary language contains syntactical rules forbidding the construction of nonsensical sentences; e. g., the sentence " quadruplicity drinks procrastination " is not one that grammarians can condemn. Yet it seems clear that it must be possible to construct a language having the following two properties:

(1) Every sentence composed according to the rules of syntax out of words having meaning is significant;

(2) Every significant sentence consists of words having meaning and put together according to the rules of syntax.

. . . But although it should be possible, in a good language, to give syntactical rules determining when a sentence is significant, it must not be supposed that " significance " is a syntactical concept. On the contrary, a non-tautologous sentence is significant in virtue of some relation that it has to certain states of the person using the sentence. These states are " believings " and are instances of the same belief which is " expressed " by the sentence. In defining the relation of the sentence to the belief (which latter is in general non-verbal), we have to remember that false sentences are significant as well as true ones. And when the relation has been defined, we have to show that our syntactical rules of significance are such as it justifies.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 208-210.

II

There is the initial difficulty of understanding adequately the meaning of these writers who have made contributions to the problem. Since the problem is meaning itself, the difficulty is apparently increased. How could we ever reach an understanding, and much less a solution, of the problem of meaning if the meaning of " meaning " is likewise a problem? It is possible to remain indefinitely in this void, and it appears that some of the writers have remained on the level of verbal ambiguity.[48]

For example, we could conceivably approach the problem in a like manner. We could remark that the question " What is the meaning of meaning? " seems to present many difficulties to be solved before we can decide what the question asks, *i. e.*, what the question means. This seems quite plausible when one considers the various ways in which it has been answered.

Does the question mean, for example, " What is the meaning of the word ' meaning '? " If so, then the answer is in a good dictionary wherein is stated all that the word " meaning " has been used to mean. In this meaning, the word " meaning " has many meanings, and their enumeration seems to be an adequate answer to the question. And yet it might be pointed out that in this meaning of the question, the *first* word " meaning " is a case of what the word " meaning " is used to mean. Now if this particular case in which the ambiguous word " meaning " is used is itself ambiguous, then the question " What is the meaning of the word ' meaning '? " remains inextricably ambiguous. This seems to suggest that if we lay claim to knowing what we mean by the question we are taking both words " meaning " in an unambiguous meaning: the *first* means the meaning of the word and nothing else; the *second* means the word " meaning " and nothing else, *i. e.*, the deter-

[48] It has been possible, of course, only to reproduce a few of the many treatments of this problem, and those only briefly and insofar as they serve to indicate what appear to be the main difficulties, issues, and suggestions for solution. These are used now to try to centralize the problem.

minate or particular word we actually use to mean the act of meaning, to mean what is meant thereby, etc.

Should it not be pointed out, then, that while the question is about an ambiguous word, the word itself is not used ambiguously—at least not if we know what we ask? The word " ambiguous " itself may be ambiguous in two ways: first, in that this word, as any other word, may be used to mean very different things; second, in that it applies to all words of which it is itself a case. But there would remain a respect in which it is not ambiguous, namely when I use it to mean that word which may be ambiguous in the two mentioned ways.

From this might be shown that if in the question " What is the meaning of ' meaning '? " the first word " meaning " is ambiguous, then to mean the word " meaning " would itself be ambiguous. The question would then be ambiguous. And if it is ambiguous to the one who asks the question, then he does not know what he is asking. And if, for the sake of argument, it were conceded that even the first word " meaning " in " What is the meaning of ' meaning ' ? " is considered ambiguous, then it would follow not only that the question itself is inextricably ambiguous, but also that even this concession cannot escape taking the word " meaning " in some definite meaning insofar as it means the ambiguous word " meaning " as the condition of the ambiguity of the question. From this difficulty there seems no escape. If words cannot be used unambiguously, can there be any communication at all? Could one ever know what the other means? Could the other himself mean something?

Again, the question might mean: What is the meaning of the first word " meaning " in the question " What is the meaning of ' meaning ' ? " If this question means something, the word " meaning," which is ambiguous, should be used unambiguously. What, then, does it mean here? What do we mean when we ask for the meaning of a word? Would we not mean " What does the word signify? " And would we not answer by the signified? And is this not called the meaning of the word? Whatever the ambiguity of the word " meaning " when

it is used in this context, does it not signify unambiguously? And if its use cannot be narrowed down to this signification, does the question merit being asked? But it can only remain doubtful that this is what the question asks. For the one who asks it should be the one to do the narrowing down.

Or, perhaps, in this question, " meaning " stands for the act of signifying one thing by another, or for what is signified. Then it might be put more explicitly by asking: " What is the signified of signifying? " or by " What does signification signify? " This might help to bring out the verbalism of the question " What is the meaning of meaning? " which in fact seems to mean " What is signification? " And if this is true, then it might be shown that certain highly critical authors have been copiously indulging in what they mean to be most critical of.

The same way of proceeding could be adopted in exploiting the verbalism of the question " What is the meaning of ' meaninglessness '? " But the merit of mere verbal expatiation seems, despite the attention given to it, very dubious. If we can skip by most of the void of verbal ambiguity, it does become important to determine how we are to understand what constitutes " meaninglessness " or nonsense as it is employed by the various writers. And in this contemporary issue, " meaningless " is more significant for the problem than meaning itself.

Are we to understand, for example, when it is claimed that words or sentences are meaningless that actually the words or sentences in question really have *no* meaning? Or, are we to understand that the expression in question does not convey meaning to the reader or listener, although it may to the user? It might also mean that the user employs words whose meaning he does not understand and which, in addition, the reader or listener may or may not understand.

If either of the last two possibilities is meant the problem is, of course, a normal and frequent one. A person need not know the meaning of words he can pronounce, and the person is rare who knows the meaning of all words directed to him. Now when a person does not understand communication that is directed to him, he frequently says: " That's meaningless," or

" That's nonsense." Here again, a certain amount of verbal ambiguity has to be contended with, for he may mean by that remark only that a particular statement is odd or ridiculous. In this case he does not really mean " meaningless " or " nonsense," as almost everyone, except perhaps some philosophers of language, would distinguish between the ridiculous and the strictly meaningless. When we say, for example, that Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* is nonsense, we mean " nonsense " in the sense of ridiculous. Only a narrow semanticist, possibly, could be logically led to mean that it was strictly meaningless, in which case any laughter evoked would have to be somehow merely idiotic. We may, however, consider it fairly safe to say that while " meaningless " or " nonsense " may mean, among other things, the ridiculous, it is not this use which concerns us here, although a certain kind of semantic analysis of various sentences of *Alice in Wonderland* might be fascinating in this connection.

The person might mean by " That's meaningless " that it is meaningless " to *me* " and merely fail to utter aloud that significant prepositional phrase. This, again, is a frequent occurrence, and many fallacies arise therefrom because the person deduces from the state of its " meaninglessness " to him the " meaninglessness " of the statement itself.

These last two possibilities do not provide any insuperable difficulties that an intelligent use of the liberal arts might not clear up and consequently we must revert to the first case of the meaning of " meaningless " as it appears in the various writings. We must understand, then, that words or sentences can be meaningless, where " meaningless " is to mean devoid of all sense, signification, understanding, intelligibility, and so on. It seems hard to grasp the full meaninglessness of meaningless in this meaning, but this seems to be what the different writers intend.[49] They mean there is no meaning at all. If this is not

[49] Very likely we should also ask whether in " meaningless " meaning is to be denied in a privative sense or in an absolutely negated sense. That is, whether meaning is absent from where it ought to be or might have been, or whether meaning cannot possibly be present. It seems that the absolute denial of meaning

what they mean, then many of their remarks become somewhat absurd although, of course, still meaningful. How else could the issue of " meaninglessness " be understood? How else can their writings have any point? How else can the principle of verification be appreciated as they introduce it? Why else would such statements as " Quadratic equations go to race-meetings," " Quadruplicity drinks procrastination," or any handy metaphysical sentence that may be lying around, be questioned? Perhaps this labors a point that is evident enough. " Meaningless," after all, does mean no meaning. This point, however, is an important one and we must be as sure as we can that this is the one certain point in the current problem, namely, that there are meaningless words and sentences, and that we know what is meant thereby. If we ignore this, we ignore the contemporary problem altogether. We must, then, in order to face the problem with them, continue on to ask questions and discuss suggestions as to when oral or written expressions have meaning and when they have not.

For example, the suggestion has been made that " meaning " be used in an empiricist *sense*. It might be put in the form of the following question: Does an expression of language have meaning when we know how to use it in speaking about empirical facts?

Here again we might revert to the endless regress of defining a word by using an instance of it. Then, too, there could be the difficulty of how we are to understand " meaning " in only a narrowed case of it. For if the word " meaning " is to be taken here in its empiricist sense, would we not have to know the meaning of the word " meaning " in order to know the meaning of its empiricist sense? Or would we not have to presuppose what we mean by the word " meaning " in order to know what is to be meant by it in its empiricist sense? Would we not have difficulty in knowing what the remark means because it is play-

is meant, as the privative sense would imply that there is or ought to be some meaning in some way. Etymologically, " meaningless " should mean in a privative sense, while " nonsense " should mean the absolute denial. Popularly, the meanings seem to have become reversed.

ing upon the ambiguity of " meaning " and " sense "? Does not the remark only seem to be saying that the word " meaning " will be taken in its empiricist meaning (sense) and that an expression of language has meaning in this meaning (sense) if we know how to use it?

Or again, the remark seems to be saying that an expression of language has meaning when we know how to use it. But is that saying anything else than an expression of language has meaning only when we use it as having meaning? For we can use it about empirical facts only when we use it meaningfully. But is not this only saying that an expression of language has meaning when it has? And how would that differ from an expression of language being an expression of language only when it is an expression of language?

The inevitable difficulty here is that we have to know already the meaning of " meaning " in order to know the special meaning. The problem is escaped by ignoring it, and by arbitrarily assuming that whatever " meaning " may mean it is here to mean a special meaning of " meaning." This would, perhaps, be admissible if it were not used as a club to reduce any other meaning to " meaninglessness." This is what has been done repeatedly in the current issue. Any expression of language which is not used about " empirical facts " or in connection with " empirical investigation " is *ipso facto* meaningless. We need not be surprised, then, if the attempt has been made to *demonstrate* the impossibility of metaphysics, or for that matter it could be *Alice in Wonderland* or anything else that " lies beyond empirical observation." For in this remarkable inference *any* attempt to describe the nature of something lying beyond the reach of empirical observation must in fact be meaningless.

And yet if such is the case, would not such a statement or demonstration itself be " meaningless " ? [50] For something that lies beyond the reach of empirical observation should be something which is such that it does lie beyond the reach of em-

[50] Mr. Ewing (*op. cit.*) has also used this same sort of argument against the principle of verification.

pirical observation and is therefore said to be meaningless. But is not this itself, then, what is meant by " meaningless " ? For does not this statement imply that what lies beyond the reach of empirical observation is something which cannot be verified by empirical verification? Must not this mean that what lies beyond the reach of empirical observation is meaningless, and yet at the same time must not it mean something which is not within the reach of empirical observation? Granting a flexibility of meaning here, must we not say that even so such a statement or demonstration is, in its own terms, meaningless? How could such a statement lie within the reach of probable, possible, hypothetical, or even imaginary, empirical verification?

Then again, in these circumstances, could we admit a difference between statements that are proper to a fairy tale and statements that are proper to empirical science? For if the meaningfulness of a statement depends upon its being within the reach of empirical observation, and if statements used in fairy tales are known to mean fairy tales, then fairy tales would have to be within the reach of empirical observation and be empirical facts. But if there is some difference between fairy tales and empirical science, how would we know the difference between a statement used in a fairy tale and a statement lying within the reach of empirical observation unless we know what it means for a statement to lie beyond the reach of empirical observation? But would not this imply that statements may mean something non-empirical? If not, could we ever discover whether empirical facts are fairy tales or fairy tales are empirical facts?

If there is a dilemma here, perhaps it can be broken by going beyond words, statements, and sentences to " concepts." This at least is suggested by a writer who is dissatisfied with the foregoing demonstration. This suggestion seems to have the merit of attempting to leave the realm of mere verbalism. Here a statement becomes meaningful if the concepts employed have application in experience in some way, which might seem to broaden the scope of meaning somewhat.

Of course, the use of " concepts " may cause a repressed

shudder in some. There is a fair chance of its being meaningless, and hence it may result in the common fallacy of begging the question. But it is clear that help is needed wherever it may come, and " concepts " (" notions," " ideas," " understandings," " thoughts ") need not be despised metaphysical entities which depend upon a superstitious past. As with any other word, a good deal depends upon what is intended to be imparted by it.

In the present instance, there is presumably a distinction between words and concepts. And probably by " concepts " is meant notions distinct in some way from their verbal expression. Now it seems to be implied in this suggestion that there can be meaningless concepts, since only those concepts which have application in experience are meaningful. What, then, would a meaningless concept be? Is it one that would not have application in experience? Would we not have to know by a concept that it does not have application in experience? And would it be possible to have a concept that did not have application in experience? Would not the mere having of a concept be an application in experience? Can I conceive or understand without meaning?

Would a concept of a concept have application in experience? Can I not conceive that I conceive and is this meaningless? And, for the sake of argument, if a concept could be meaningless, could I have a concept of a meaningless concept? Would not the concept of a meaningless concept at least have to mean a meaningless concept? But would not this be asserting an experiencible character of the world? And would the concept of a concept have application in experience? What is involved in meaningless concepts that makes them meaningless? Would it be because they have a meaningless meaning?

Is a non-human mind an experiencible character of the world? Is it a concept? If it is not applicable in experience is it not then meaningless? Would not non-human experience be meaningless? To be meaningful, the non-human mind and the non-human experience should have application in experience. But could a non-human mind sharing structure with our experience be an experiencible character of the world?

To shift meaninglessness from words and sentences to concepts may not be as helpful as it might seem. For there may not be so much difference between attempting to decide when words are meaningful and when concepts are meaningful, since the same fascinating difficulty recurs of trying to decide when either is meaningful, which accordingly exacts knowing when they are meaningless and how we can know that we know they are meaningless. But is not this all, nevertheless, quite significant?

The problem, in clearer terms, seems to revolve around meaning and verification in various ways. The problem seems to center on what means of verification to employ in order to secure meaning. Meaning and verification, we are told, are inseparably related. This leads one writer to suggest that because of this inseparable relation, meaning and truth have to be identified ultimately. In other words, to distinguish the meaningful from the "unmeaning" is really to distinguish the true from the false.

The "true" and the "false" are likewise fighting terms, but perhaps there can be somewhat general agreement in understanding them to mean that when something is asserted it is either so or not so, which in turn is determined in various ways. This is rather gross, but not too gross for our present purposes. We also avoid at this point the endless regress possible in ascertaining the meaning of truth if meaning and truth are (ultimately) to be identified. There is not, of course, such a regress in ascertaining the meaning of the false, although there may be a peculiarity.

And yet why must meaning and truth be identified, even ultimately? Is it evident that wherever there is meaning there must be truth? If the true to be true must be meaningful, does it also follow that a meaning to be a meaning must be truthful? How could a statement be judged true without having a meaning to be judged? And if a proposition is false, how do we know that it is false and not true except in terms of what it means? How could we determine between truth and falsity if what is meaningful must be ultimately true? Can not mean-

ings be both true and false and hence must there not be some real distinction between them? For example, a proposition may assert that y is related to x in some way. It may then be said: "If you mean by 'y' *this*, then your statement is true. But if you mean by 'y' *that*, then your statement is false." And even though an argument should develop as to what y is to mean, nevertheless is not this a question only of what the one intends to impart *upon which* a judgment of truth or falsity is to fall? Nor does it seem necessary that every sentence written or uttered express a proposition (or an expression which is capable of being judged true or false). A sentence may express wishes, desires, prayers, or even questions without involving assertions. It is one thing to wish you were in Dixie. It is another to assert you were there, or will be. Must not all this suppose a real priority of meaning?

Of course, the writer of this suggestion has warned against an over-simplification of what the identity of truth and meaning means, and perhaps this merely fails to heed the warning. Then, too, this identification of meaning and truth may be only another case of a derived instance of "meaning" such as that in which we employ the word "significant" frequently. If this is so, then it does not touch the problem of meaning proper, since it is again a narrowing of the term "meaning." However, since this writer proposes this in connection with the need of verification in order to get meaning, and since verification for truth is to give verification for meaning, then there would appear to be some basis for questioning such an identification. Nor, insofar as other principles of verification are concerned, does it seem any better by way of solution; it avoids the initial problem which must concern the very association of verification and meaning since it is certainly not immediately evident that they are related inseparably.

But supposing this association of meaning and verification, and supposing that meaning and truth are ultimately to be identified, this in turn implies that nothing less than a proposition is meaningful. Is there not, however, some difference between a word or a term and a proposition, and does not a

word separately have some meaning? Are there not words that can be taken separately which are not propositions (or sentences) in any way? This, however, has been denied, and a celebrated announcement has been made to the effect that only the proposition has sense, that only in the context of a proposition has a name a meaning.

Now if only the proposition has sense, this seems to imply that anything less than a proposition is not meaningful of itself but only as it is within a proposition. Is there anything less than a proposition? There seem to be names (words, terms) because names have meaning in a proposition. Then names must be parts of a proposition, for if names are in a proposition, or if a proposition is made up of names in some way, then it would seem safe to say that a proposition is composed of names as parts. And if names are the parts of a proposition do not the names have to be combined in a certain way to form a proposition? Not any collection or arrangement of names would seem to form a proposition. But if these names can be put together in more than one way, and if not any way results in a proposition but only some certain way, then must not the names themselves be meaningful in order to be combined in a propositional way? Would not names even have to be meaningful of themselves in some way in order to be combined at all? Hence, if names have to be combined in a certain way for a proposition to be formed, and if their combining must precede the proposition which is formed from their combination, and if we have to know *what* we are combining in order to be able to combine, then can it still be said that only the proposition has sense?

The point may still remain, however, whether a name can have meaning only as it is in a proposition. For if the name has no meaning of itself in the sense that it has meaning only as it is in the proposition, then it can have no meaning apart from the proposition, and if that name is used in another proposition it does not seem that there can be any similarity, much less identity, of meaning as it is used in one proposition and as it is used in another proposition. For example, " man " is a

name in the proposition "Man is witty," and "man" is a name in the proposition "Man has a wife." If "man" has meaning only as it is within a proposition can there be anything common between "man" in those two propositions? If it becomes meaningful only as it is within one proposition, can there be any meaningful connection with it as it is within another proposition? For if it cannot be something meaningful of itself (apart from any propositional function) then it would have to be strictly meaningless as a name and there could be no mere understanding of it as a name. For it can have meaning only as it means in something else or as connected with or related to something else. And yet is there not a meaning for "man" such that we use the name not only both for that which can be witty as well as that which can have a wife, but also for that which means the sort of thing we call "man"—regardless of the moment, of whether *X's* notion of "man" is the same as *Y's*? Is there not, then, something to "man" which permits "man" to be witty and to have a wife; and must it be something entirely different that is witty and that has a wife?

Cannot the *same* name, as a consequence, be meaningful in different propositions? And not only meaningful in different propositions but also meaningful of itself in order to be the same name that is used differently in different propositions? And must it not also be meaningful of itself by the very fact that it can be meaningful in different propositions, for how could it be said to be meaningful in different propositions without itself somehow being meaningful?

So when it is said that something has meaning only as it is combined with something else, this would seem to be letters, which of themselves have no meaning but which become meaningful by the name that is formed from them. For example, in the name "man" do not the letters *m a n* have meaning only as the name "man" is formed from them? It would seem to be in this way that parts which of themselves have no meaning are combined to form something which is meaningful, just as there is nothing meaningful in *m a n* as letters, nor is

there anything common in meaning between the *m a n* of "man" and the *m a n* of "many." Is not this the way in which parts have meaning only in combination?

And does it not seem that a sentence expressing a proposition is made up of names or words and not of letters? For do we not group names together, rather than letters, to form the expression of a proposition? But if we say that the parts of a proposition are meaningful only as they are within a proposition do we not make the proposition a name? As a consequence, does it not follow, then, that the proposition is not the primary unit of meaning because it itself is composed of units of meaning? And hence is there not also a problem of meaning that is prior to and apart from the problem of the meaning of a proposition?

There remains, however, this problem of the association of verification and meaning to which all the foregoing is largely subsidiary. It is necessary to understand this as the central problem in the writings that have been quoted above. Hence, what about this notion of verification as the principle or condition of meaning? How did the notion of verification happen to arise in connection with meaning? It is fairly obvious that it seems to have been for the purpose of discovering meaning, for the writers in general are maintaining that unless there is verification of some kind there is not meaning.[51] This may also have a bearing on how the proposition has come to be regarded as the element of meaning.

But as a matter of fact do we really get meaning as a result of verifying?[52] Does it not seem that, on the contrary, *what*

[51] Vd. especially Blumberg, Ayer, Stace, Carnap, and Urban as quoted above, and as in other writings of theirs which space prevents quoting here. Only Ewing seems to contest seriously verification as a principle of meaning. Perhaps the most explicit statement of the principle of verification is Blumberg's "A supposed proposition which is theoretically incapable of verification is meaningless" (cf. fn. 9 *supra*).

[52] Perhaps it is not too late to point out that I do not intend to be confusing with "meaning" any more than with "meaningless." Without indulging in its ambiguity, I mean by "meaning" what the various writers have meant, which I take to be the contradictory of what they mean by "meaningless." In other words, along with them, I depend upon the popular notion of "meaning," which will do here.

we verify is a meaning and that we do not verify in order to obtain a meaning? For how can a proposition be verified? Is it not only by supposing that some meaning is already constituted in the proposition? Do we not have to know *what* we are going to verify?

We can, however, speak of verifying words and propositions. Now if we must suppose that words and propositions already have to be meaningful in order to be something that can be verified—for it would seem safe to suppose that not anything is verifiable, nor even any sort of collection of letters or words—then does not the verification of words and propositions give something different from their meaning? Does it not give, instead, the way in which their meaning is to be applied or used? Is not the application of the meaning of words and propositions different from the obtaining of the meaning of words and propositions? Does not that which is applied or verified differ from that for which it is applied or verified?

But if the use or application of words must follow upon their meaning, then how do the words get their meaning? At the moment, this might seem an insoluble question because this is what verification is supposed to answer. But without complicating the problem unduly, can we not say that words are in some way substitutions for what *we* mean? Perhaps this is evident, but it does not seem evident in connection with the way the principle of verification has been proposed. And yet if we do not jump immediately to verifying words and propositions themselves, does it not seem obvious that both words and propositions are substitutions in some way for what we mean, and that it is for that purpose we use them as instruments?

Let us suppose that words are substitutions for what we mean; that is, words represent what we mean. For example, the word " man " would represent what I mean by that sensible appearance; it would be a substitution for my notion of " man." Whether my notion of " man " is the same as your notion of " man " is another question. Would it not be enough

to recognize first that this is how the word "man" comes to be used as a substitution?

This is one way in which we can use words as substitutions. It might also suggest that words, in the act of substitution, acquire meaning. But is there not also another kind of substitution of words? In addition to substituting a word for what I mean, can I not *further* substitute words so that they can be associated in connection with each other? If I put two or twenty words in some definite relation with each other, do I not have a different way of substituting than if I consider the substitution of each word individually and separately? In this further substitution of words in relation with each other, do they not have to stand together in a certain way in this combination? And are they not able to stand together in a certain combination because the meaning for which each word is substituted can be *further* substituted so as to be a related part of this combination? And is it not in this second kind of substitution, this further substitution, that verification would initially appear? Do not these words have to be verified for the further substitutiton which is made of the meaning they *have*? And would not this further substitution of the meaning of words in relation to each other, or in some additional use, need verification? That is, if the meanings of words are to be applied in relation to each other, does not this use of their meanings need to be verified or shown—would we not have to see if the meaning which the one word expresses can be related to the meaning which another word expresses, or, again, whether either can properly *stand* as a *part* in, for example, a proposition which is the whole? [53a]

This is only stating the difference between the word (or a term) and the word in a proposition since we have seen that there might be a difference between the two. It is in terms of that distinction we can suggest that the word itself is a substi-

[53a] Grammatically, this is only distinguishing the words themselves (the elements of grammar) and their use as parts of sentences, as "parts of speech." The parts of speech presuppose the meanings which the various words express. Thus the word "man," in virtue of its meaning, can be used as a noun.

tution for what we mean, while the word in a proposition is a further substitution, a substitution for what we mean as it is to be applied in a certain way, *i. e.*, as a part of a proposition.

" Man " is a word. " Man has two feet " is a proposition. Is there not a difference between " *man* " and " ' *man* ' has two feet " ? " Man " alone would be a word substituted to represent a notion I have. " Man " in " 'man ' has two feet " is further substituted so as to have a certain connection with the " has " and the " two feet." Will that connection or relation hold? Can the meaning which " man " represents be further substituted and employed in this way? Is not this where the meaning of " man " will have to be verified? And will not this verifying consist in establishing whether or not the meaning of " man " can be used in that way? In other words, has the meaning of " man " *application* in that proposition? In this case, it would seem that the meaning of " man " can be verified as a part of that proposition because it could be pointed out that what is meant by " man " is capable of " having " what is meant by " two feet " related to it in a certain way.[54] And it is in this way that a verification of " man " could be made—not to get the meaning of " man " but to get the use or application of the meaning of " man." Suppose the meaning of " man " could not be verified in that use. Would the verification result in making " man " meaningless? On the contrary, it would seem that it is because " man " has a meaning that this application of it could not be verified. The first substitution of " man " would remain; the further substitution of " man " would not be verified.

Is there not a difference, too, between verifying a word as a part of a proposition and verifying the proposition itself? Does not the verifying of a proposition consist in seeing whether what the whole proposition says is so or not? But in order to verify whether a proposition is true or false, do we not have to know first what the proposition says in order to know whether

[54] We shall see in a later article whether or not verification is formally related to the *copula*.

what it says is so or not? And hence does not the verification of a proposition follow upon the meaning of a proposition so that what results from the verification is not the meaning of the proposition, but the truth or falsity of that meaning?

Here it seems that we should recognize four distinct points. *First,* we have the word alone which is imposed or substituted to represent a notion I have. *Second,* we have the word or name which especially contributes to the making up of a proposition; not all words would have to contribute to the making up of a proposition. *Third,* we have the verification of names as parts of the proposition—the names are to be verified in relation to each other as forming special parts or functions of the proposition. *Fourth,* we have the verification of the entire proposition itself, which verification gives truth or falsity to the proposition. All these points are distinct and important, especially that the proposition is made up of words which have to be meaningful (hence, more strictly, words embody, logically, *terms*), that in virtue of their meaningfulness words can be verified as parts of the proposition, and that it is such a proposition, *thus* meaningfully formed and *thus* verified in its parts, that is itself verified entirely for truth.

So we can now ask again, how did this notion of verification arise in connection with meaning? Is it not because the writers who propose it as a principle of meaning also hold, in one way or another, that meaning arises only within a sentence or proposition? And in assuming that, would they not also suppose that there is only one way of substituting words, namely, as words are parts within a proposition or as words are used in special ways to make up a proposition? And when they think that this is the way words get *meaning,* are they not confusing the meaning of words with a further substitution and use of the meaning of words?

But even more so, is there not likewise a confusion of the verification of words in a proposition with the verification of the proposition itself, both of which are further confused in that it is assumed that this is the *only* way a proposition obtains meaning, and that consequently if there is no verification

in some way (especially of the proposition itself) there is therefore no meaning either? Would not the verification of words in a proposition—the establishment of words as distinct parts of the proposition—make possible the verification of the entire proposition, and would not *this* verification result in the truth or falsity of the proposition?

This may also explain the attempt to identify meaning and truth. For if it is supposed that the verification of a proposition gives it its meaning, is not it unavoidable that there will be a confusion of meaning and truth? It is perhaps easy to suppose that if there is no verification then there is no truth and hence the statements in question have no meaning *provided* " have no meaning " means " no *truthful* meaning." In this case, the question is not so much to discover what makes meaning truthful as to understand why such a derived notion of " meaning " is taken. It does not answer the difficulty continually present with verification; it ignores it. There is no problem of meaning; there is only the problem of truth.

Furthermore, this general confusion may likewise explain why frequently so many statements are dismissed summarily as " meaningless." Even if there is granted, in a very charitable moment, the claim of the empirical criterion of verification (admitting, also, its variously " weakened " forms), is it not fairly evident that there is still confusion? *Alice in Wonderland,* Kant's mighty *Prologomena,* or Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* do not forthwith vanish in their " meaninglessness " ; at most, they might fail to satisfy a narrow empirical criterion for "truth." They all would remain fairly significant.

As a matter of fact, it is in order to ask if *any* words, sentences, statements, or propositions can be " meaningless." It might seem evident, from the foregoing, that no word as a word can be meaningless, and hence, *a fortiori,* not sentences nor propositions either. Could a word be defined or described without meaning being involved? Could one abstract from the meaning present in a word? It would seem that one would then abstract from a word as well. There are both legitimate and illegitimate abstractions. An illegitimate " abstraction "

would be to ignore in a thing the sort of thing it is. It seems inconceivable that anyone could understand by " word " anything except meaningful sound in some way which, of course, is not complete but is, on the other hand, the absolute minimum. Hence it appears that to speak of meaningless words, provided " meaningless " means " no meaning " and provided words remain words, is to utter a flat contradiction.[55] It is just as impossible, though not as humorous, as seeing that famous grin without the cat.

With regard to sentences and propositions, the issue of meaninglessness has been, rather oddly, even more pronounced. We have seen wholesale instances of throwing out sentences as meaningless, even sentences whose meaninglessness is disputed because of their meaning. There need not be any more concern, perhaps, over sentences whose grammatical status is sound (which is, of course, purely a question of grammar). This point has been covered in the foregoing with reference to the general confusion there apparent. Besides, the particular semantic fanaticism on this point seems to be waning, at last. The more fundamental point here would concern the proposition as expressed in the sentence and hence whether there can be meaningless propositions. This, too, has been covered in the foregoing and will also be referred to again later.

This leaves for consideration such expressions as " The law of contradiction is yellow," " Quadratic equations go to race-meetings," " Quadruplicity drinks procrastination," and perhaps even " Procrastination drinks quadruplicity." [56] It may be laboring an obvious point to insist that these are not " meaningless " provided " meaningless " still means " no meaning." We might refer to them as nonsense provided " non-

[55] This should also take account of the difference between what is meaningless and what is vague, indefinite, absurd, or ridiculous. Some words, too, represent more meaning than others, a difference commonly recognized in the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words or terms, approximated grammatically in the parts of speech. Absurd meaning, vague meaning, indefinite meaning, or less meaning is not no meaning.

[56] Mr. Ewing has also argued that expressions of this kind are not meaningless. Vd. fn. 20 *supra*.

sense" does not mean, as it does etymologically, "no sense." If "nonsense" is to mean "ridiculous" then there is some intelligibility in calling such sentences nonsense. There would still remain, however, a vast difference between that kind of nonsense and what we might call strict nonsense. It is very important to note here that it is only in virtue of what those words joined together mean that we are able to say they are nonsense in the sense of ridiculous or absurd. It *would* be quite absurd to regard as absurd what has no meaning to be absurd.

It is likely a mistake, too, to regard syntax as the criterion of meaning. Syntax has a definite function, but by the nature of the case it must presuppose meaning, or the meaningful elements with which it is concerned. This would apply to syntax in its normal grammatical dimension or syntax as extended to logic, in which case it is only another name for determining the status of a proposition. It is unfortunate that "syntax" has come to have a special logical connotation as this only serves to increase the modern confusion of grammar and logic, particularly evident in the various schools of semantics and symbolic logic.

Grammatically, syntax can have nothing to say about the status of such expressions as "The law of contradiction is yellow." It is a complete sentence and is quite sound grammatically. This is because meaningful elements (words) are combined in the structure of a sentence and satisfy the rules of grammar. That is, words are used at least as nouns and verbs in the relation of grammatical subject and predicate, which is grammatical syntax. Logically (and here the concern is with the meanings or terms expressed through the words rather than with the words or verbalisms themselves [57]) the situation is different since the "syntax" now concerns whether such meanings can be put in such a relation in order for an act of judgment to fall upon them. Since what is meant by "yellow" and what is meant by "the law of contradiction" do not seem to admit a basis for a judgment, it could be argued that a

[57] This and the general question of the distinction between grammar and logic will be touched upon later. Vd. fn. 54 *supra*.

proposition is not being expressed through this sentence. Now supposing that is so, this would not imply that there is not a sentence present, and especially would it not imply that the sentence or expression is meaningless. All of these distinctions are possible only because of the meaning that is being expressed. Both grammar and logic must presuppose some meaning in order to determine the respective grammatical and logical status or form; it is in this sense that it becomes impossible to determine whether there is any meaning *because of* syntax. On the contrary, syntax must determine the grammatical and logical *form of* the meaning.

There are other types of expression which are perhaps more suitable to illustrate this point, such as " is a man," " Cambridge is between York," " are of fond not dogs cats," etc. Here there is grammatical violation as well as logical violation, but what there is *not* here is " meaninglessness," for it is only in virtue of the meaning that is *badly* expressed there that we can syntactically criticize it. To argue, for instance, that " Cambridge is between York " is meaningless because incomplete is *ipso facto* to admit meaning because of its incompleteness. How otherwise can the expression be known to be incomplete? The point is that the expression is syntactically incomplete because of the meaning that is present in the words given. In the case of " are of fond not dogs cats " the meaning is simply jumbled in expression, which is not at all the same as meaningless; in " is a man " the meaning, again, is incomplete to be a sentence.[58]

[58] Mr. Ewing argues (*op. cit.*) that " an expression may be said to be meaningless if it includes some word or words which do not stand for anything. . . . I do not mean merely 'for nothing existent' but for nothing of which we have any idea at all." This seems clearly impossible. How can there be words which " do not stand for anything " or " for nothing of which we have any idea at all "? Words to be words *must* refer to notions or ideas, as will be emphasized later. In fact it is only in virtue of this reference of words to notions that we can distinguish those collections of letters which form words from *any* collection of letters which, because they do not form something significant, are accordingly not words but mere gratuitous grouping of the material elements out of which proper words can be formed. " Kliss," for example, differs from " kiss " in that the former has no *acknowledged* significance (although it could be coined and, if accepted, recognized

This is not merely quibbling over how " meaningless " is to be used nor stretching " meaning " to extend to cases not ordinarily covered. As a matter of fact, it is a very crucial though small point. It is important because it is only at this level that the inherent absurdity of the current theories of meaning can be seen. It is only when ridiculous expressions are chosen that the current attempt to *add* meaning *to* language can be seen itself really to be ridiculous (though not meaningless). It is when dealing with ridiculous expressions that it can be seen most clearly how *stupid* it is to attempt to determine, once meaningful elements are present, how and when meaning is going to be discovered. Not that there may not be problems present, but that what are the problems do not get discussed. As far as meaning is concerned, it amounts to the same thing as looking for one's glasses with the glasses on.

Perhaps this singular situation can be explained in part by the undue emphasis of these writers upon words, by their devotion to the excesses of verbalism, and by the apparent ease with which almost everyone writes these days. How could there be an issue over the principle of verification unless there is question of how meaning is to be added to linguistic structure? If we suppose that the problem of meaning *originates* in verbal form, can the charge of verbalism be escaped? This may seem curious because most of these writers probably would like to think they are attacking verbalism and getting away from it. But if anyone takes the principle of verifiability seriously as the origin of meaning, or if he really thinks words and propositions need verification *for* meaning, must not he take verbalism as the starting point and can he ever hope to reach anything more ultimate than verbalism? This would seem to lead to the following question: *Why do we use words?*

Yet, since we all have to speak or write in words, it might seem as though we have to start with words. Can there be meaning without using words? Of course, I might point, if

as a word). Such collections of letters as " kliss " are the only cases to which the expression " meaningless words " might apply, and this only by sheer equivocation on " words."

what I mean can be pointed to. But is this really any different from using words? Do not both *show* meaning? On the other hand, there would seem to be a difference between showing meaning with words and trying to find meaning after there are words.

So it might seem that words can have no meaning unless we can show what they mean—not by taking words and hunting for their meaning but by hunting for the words with the meaning we have.[59] The word itself does not contain its meaning. Nor does the word of itself point to what it means. Nor is it wholly necessary that I point to what the word means—I can in some cases, but then I would just be duplicating the function of the word. Nor does what the word means contain or point to the word. In other words, there seems to be something arbitrary about words. But in the current problem of meaning, if we start from words—if the whole analysis depends upon words—do we not have to suppose them absolute, or do we not ascribe exaggerated importance to them?

Thus it appears that we must recognize that words have no meaning in themselves, that they have no direct reference to things, nor do things of themselves have direct reference to words or refer to them. Does not this imply that we must know what the word is to refer to *before* being able to use the word knowingly? Then what meaning words have, would they not have it from a mind, a knowing faculty, an intelligence, an "inner speaking," or whatever one wishes to call it? So it seems that in any case if words can lead to things they will do so through the intermediacy of mind. And so would not words depend upon the mind? But need the mind have to depend *completely* upon words?

Again, it does not seem that words of themselves lead to things through the mind. Nor, on the other hand, do things[60] of themselves lead to words through the mind. Does horse of

[59] There is a sense, of course, in which words may evoke meaning in the one communicated to, but this would have to depend upon the meaning already expressed or suggested in the words themselves.

[60] Is it necessary to quarrel about "things" as a word?

itself mean the word " horse " either directly or through the mind, or does the word " horse " of itself mean the horse, either directly or through the mind? And yet there must be some way in which words are meaningful, and this would seem to have to come from the mind. But does it not come from the mind somewhat arbitrarily?

Why do we recur to words if they are the source of so much trouble? Is it to *find* meaning? It does not seem so. Of course, if someone else is reading these words he has to use the words to get at the meaning. But he must not forget that I am putting the words on paper. If he does not find clear meaning, (will he not find *some* meaning?) should he blame the words? Should he not, instead, blame me? And does this not suggest the reason why we recur to words? Are not words *merely* for the purpose of communication? Are they not only to express what is already known and meant? Does not meaning become wordy when it becomes communicative? Is it necessary to talk and to write to have meaning? Is it necessary to have an audience in order to think? Is it words that give birth to knowledge? Is communicating the same as knowing?

The way most writers talk about words, symbols, and propositions seems to imply that to think is to be in communication only in terms of words and propositions. Consequently, if words and symbols are suppressed, then thinking is also suppressed. But is not the suppression of words only the suppression of the means of communication? Are not words, at most, necessary aids to thinking? If they are suppressed, would we not still have the meaning of what the words refer to? Does this not, then, bring out the intrinsic void of words and their complete subjection to something which can be independent of them? Does this not also indicate the impasse we are led to when from the start analysis of thought is conceived to depend wholly upon the analysis of words? When I communicate words to someone, do I expect him to extract what I am thinking from the words? Do I not, rather, expect him to evoke in himself a thought similar to my thought, and not a

thought similar to my word? And is this not all that can be expected from words?

But if someone wishes to harp upon words and sentences, can he not do so without any possibility of ever ending? For example, if I say that a word has a meaning, we could easily start the endless discussion about the meaning of the word " meaning " and in that way suppose that we are talking about the problem of the meaning of " meaning." Could we not also start an endless discussion about the word " word "? How might we agree on whether the word " word " is a word? Does not this suppose the notion of word? Is the notion of the word " word " a word? Would not any agreement on the word " word " presuppose an agreement upon the notion of word? Then would it not seem that the word " word " is used to impart the notion of word, which is not a word, but which nevertheless is agreed to be signified by the word " word " ? And is it not in this way that a verbal communication about the word " word " involves words? But do we have to suppose that we are trapped by the word " word " any more than we are trapped by the meaning of " meaning " ?

It might be said that in the case of the word " word " we could show what it stands for either by wordless pointing to the word " word," or by using other words. But can the pointing to the word be meaningful in the way we intend unless the notion of word is already had in order to make the pointing indicate what we mean? Is not pointing as such needless? Do we not point only because we already have meaning? In the case of the word " word," pointing to scratches on the paper can have meaning only if it can evoke a notion which the scratches are used to signify. When I point to the word " word " I am either pointing to the scratches on the paper, and then the word " word " could merely mean the scratches on the paper, or I am pointing to the word " word " as a *word,* and this would involve the notion which the scratches stand for—but then what am I pointing for?

And so it seems that communicators must have something

in common before using words, before words have any meaning. They must have in common what words are used to signify. If they have nothing in common prior and apart from the use of words, is not then the very use of words fruitless? Is not communication fruitless when there is nothing to communicate? Even here words could not be said to be meaningless, however, since they continue to express meanings but the meanings are not the same. Words are employed, but only equivocally.

Must not all verbal communication, then, start from the supposition that there is something common in the meaning that is expressed? Is this not what we spontaneously suppose when we use speech? When I use the word " horse " do I not already suppose that the person to whom I am speaking will think of what I use the word to signify? Should the word " horse " itself be expected to impart the notion of horse? If the one communicated with does not have the notion of horse, then must we not recur—not to other words primarily—but to other notions from which he should arrive at the notion of horse which we are signifying by the word " horse " ? If this does not succeed, then it does not seem that there can be any communication at all. For communication must presuppose some common element which is not a word, and for which words can never be used except to signify. We have to have some agreement in notions before there can even be possibility of agreement in words. Hence, if the one communicated with claims that the word " horse " is meaningless to him, this is either because he has no knowledge of a horse or because he is not aware that these scratches or this sound is to be used to signify it.

If this shows the use of words in any adequate sense, then the problem of meaning as so conceived does not even seem to be headed toward a solution. Instead, all that has been written so far at most may only begin to detect a problem of meaning. For all that has happened so far merely seems to show that these writers are not really talking about meaning, but

about what is posterior to meaning. It would show merely that it is really impossible for one writer to hold that the words of someone else are meaningless. It would show merely that the meaning of a sentence or proposition is not the starting point of the problem of meaning. It would show merely that while words may not be used correctly in a sentence, nevertheless words still have meaning though not an application of their meaning. It would show merely that the meaning of an expressed proposition depends first upon words separately meaningful and then upon words as they are in a proposition; and then that words must be verified in their relation in the proposition, which thereupon makes the proposition itself verifiable as true, or, if not, as false. And it would show merely that a word does not have to be in a sentence or a proposition to have meaning.

This would then indicate that not very much has been shown about meaning. We have been able to go only as far as words, and we have had difficulty even in going that far. And going to words does not at all unravel the problem of meaning, for there is nothing absolute or primary about the meaningfulness of words. Does this not also indicate how the special ambiguity of the English word " meaning " has been a source of confusion in its vagueness, which has been taken accordingly as the "problem of meaning " ? So do we not have to look farther and in some other way for the " problem of meaning " ?

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[*Another article from Dr. Oesterle, continuing this subject, will appear in an early issue.*—THE EDITORS.]

THE MEANING OF FAITH

FAITH IS a concept employed by all philosophers, yet an analysis of what faith really is, is far to seek. In fact, modern philosophers with the exception of the Neo-Scholastics for the most part do not even attempt to define " faith " with any clarity. It is the thesis of the present article that for an analysis of the concept " faith " one must turn to Scholasticism, where the treatment will be shown to be comprehensive and minute as to both faith's practical and its theoretical aspects. Faith is always a venture: to this Scholastics and non-Scholastics alike agree. Quoting William James, " Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible "; we shall however see that the character of the venture differs widely as between the Scholastic and the non-Scholastic philosopher, and that the practical aspect of faith to a greater or less degree overshadows the theoretical in modern treatments of the subject.

To cover all or even nearly all important modern usages of the term " faith " is manifestly impossible within the limits of a comparatively brief article; and the selection of philosophers here to be presented must be justified solely on the ground that their discussions seem to this writer to be both interesting and representative—if not completely so—of modern non-Scholastic viewpoints. The first section of the discussion will deal with the use of the concept " faith " by Santayana, Dewey, James, and Brightman, no one of whom accords the term careful analysis from its objective aspect. The four immediately fall into two groups with respect to what they hold to be the object of faith; Santayana and Dewey take certain natural occurrences to be this object; James and Brightman, on the other hand, would extend " faith " to include a transcendent Value, a Highest Good, which they in various terms describe as God. The second part of the discussion will deal with some aspects of the

treatment of " faith " by A. E. Taylor and H. B. Alexander, both of whom treat the concept from an objective as well as a subjective standpoint, and both of whom approach rather closely the Scholastic position. Finally, the Scholastic account of "faith" will be given, as being by far the fullest and most comprehensive.

A. Modern Non-Scholastic Treatments of Faith: Santayana, Dewey, James, and Brightman

The following accounts will of necessity be brief and rather meager, since these four philosophers simply do not give us any detailed analysis of the concept under discussion; they tend to describe " faith " in purely psychological terms, dealing with the state of the believing subject rather than with the metaphysical status of " faith " itself, and emphasizing practical rather than theoretical considerations.

Santayana, in whose treatment of faith from the sceptic's point of view the element of venture is severely restricted, nevertheless affirms that faith of a sort is absolutely essential. " There is no avenue to the past or future, there is no room for breath or for progressive life, except through faith in the intellect and the reality of things unseen." [1] Even the sceptic cannot escape believing. " Scepticism is a suspicion of error about facts, and to suspect error about facts is to share the enterprise of knowledge in which facts are presupposed and error is possible. . . . Scepticism is accordingly a form of belief. Dogma cannot be abandoned; it can only be revised in view of some more elementary dogma." [2] Santayana describes this indispensable, rudimentary belief which he calls " animal faith " as " a sort of expectation and open-mouthedness " which is earlier than intuition, intuition arriving subsequently " to help it out and lend it something to posit." [3] The unsophisticated man in the street needs not to consider this faith, he simply experiences it as a matter of course. In this unsophisticated state " faith hangs like a pendulum at rest." But when sophistication,

[1] *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 29. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 8. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

achieved through rigorous intellectual discipline, enters in, perplexity arises and causes the pendulum to " swing more and more madly." Eventually the pendulum " may for a moment stop quivering at a point of unstable equilibrium at the top; and this vertical station may be likened to a universal scepticism." [4] The unproductive state of universal scepticism is escaped by the sophisticated man through his conscious acceptance of the fact of " animal faith," the objects of which are simply " existences." " That such external objects exist, that I exist myself and live more or less prosperously in the midst of them, is a faith not founded on reason but precipitated in action, and in that intent which is virtual action, involved in perception." [5] With this faith scepticism is not inconsistent: " The admission that nothing given exists is not incompatible with things not given." [6] All that is ever present to the perceiver is what Santayana calls " essence." Essences are characters of things, both existent and possible: " The realm of essence is simply the unwritten catalogue, prosaic and infinite, of all the characters which all different things would possess if they existed." [7] The characters of things, present to the mind, are as such not illusory, but the instant they are " hypostasized," taken to be significant of definite *things*, the knower is " putting his trust in animal faith," not in his own *experience*. All truth is the object of faith, since " what everybody means by faith is the standard comprehensive description of any fact in its given relations," and such a description cannot be achieved through experiences. Facts, things, transcend experience; we *must* believe them, but they remain " things unseen." In terms of Santayana's analysis, faith is identical with perception and knowledge. " Perception," he says, " *is* faith." Also, " Knowledge . . . is belief; belief in a world of events, and especially in those parts of it which are near the self, tempting or threatening it. . . . This belief is native to animals, and precedes all deliberate use of intuitions as signs or descriptions of things." [8]

[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

Thus for Santayana faith is an obligatory venture, strictly required by the activity of knowing, from which it is inseparable, having as its object existences. Existences are transcendent of the intuition of essences through which we " believe " or " know " them. In Santayana's words they have ". . . a transcendent relation to the data of intuition, which in belief may be used as signs for them; the same transcendent relation which objects of desire have to desire, or objects of pursuit to pursuit." [9] Subjectively we may describe " animal faith " as a quasi-instinctive attitude, forced upon animals and men by the exigencies of their existence; no other description of what " faith " itself is, is given by Santayana.

Like Santayana, Dewey describes faith in naturalistic terms. But he extends faith's venture to include human ideals as potential values which eventually may be realized through intelligent cooperative action. He distinguishes carefully between faith in a body of propositions on the authority of a proposer whether human or divine, and moral faith. " Conviction in the moral sense signifies being conquered, vanquished, in our active natures by an ideal end; it signifies acknowledgment of its rightful claim over our desires and purposes. Such acknowledgment is practical, not primarily intellectual. It goes beyond evidence that can be presented to any possible observer." [10] This moral faith, which is in some cases only reached after long and arduous reflection, is based upon " the authority of an ideal over choice and conduct," and Dewey takes pains to emphasize that it is " the authority of an *ideal*, not of a fact, of a truth guaranteed to the intellect, not the status of the one who propounds the truth." [11] In keeping with the whole philosophy of instrumentalism, the authoritative ideals which control us are not possessed of antecedent actuality; indeed Dewey holds that when ideals are thought of as being imbedded in very nature of things, and for this reason requiring intellectual assent, *a lack of moral faith* is thus evidenced. " Faith that something should be in existence as far as lies in our power is changed into intel-

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 47. [10] *A Common Faith*, p. 20 f. [11] *Ibid.*, italics mine.

lectual belief that it is already in existence and when physical existence does not bear out the assertion, the physical is subtly changed into the metaphysical. In this way moral faith has been inextricably tied up with intellectual beliefs about the supernatural." [12] The metaphysical tie-up, from Dewey's point of view, militates against the realization of moral ideals, because in giving assent to values believed to be already existing, ". . . imagination merely *super*venes and is relieved from the responsibility of *inter*vening. Weak natures take to reverie as a refuge as strong ones do to fanaticism. Those who dissent are mourned over by the first class and converted through the use of force by the second.[13] Faith, to be practical or moral, must be antecedent to the truth which is its object: " all endeavor for the better is moved by faith in what is possible, not by adherence to the actual." [14] It is dependent upon imagination—an imagination which " intervenes " rather than " supervenes " in the course of events. This practical faith is the foundation of democracy; its object is the capacity of human beings to shape their own destinies toward desirable ends, *and it is the means of generating this power*: ". . . the foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human nature: faith in human intelligence and its power of pooled and cooperative experience. It is not belief that these things are complete but that if given a show they will grow and be able to generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective action." [15] It involves specifically faith in the *common man*—not merely in the gifted few: " While what we call intelligence may be distributed in unequal amounts, it is the democratic faith that it is sufficiently general so that each individual has something to contribute, and the value of each can be assessed only as it enters into the final pooled intelligence constituted by the contributions of all." [16] And Dewey thinks that faith in " the continued disclosing of truth through directed, cooperative, human endeavor " is " more religious in quality than any faith in a com-

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 21. [13] *Ibid.*, italics mine. [14] *Ibid.*, p. 23.
[15] *John Dewey's Philosophy*, edited by J. Ratner, p. 402.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 403.

pleted revelation." Having told us what faith does and can achieve, what has Dewey to say about what faith *is*? Subjectively, it would seem, faith is a determination to achieve that which is good; a dogged, firm conviction that human nature can progressively realize the democratic ideal. It is generated in the process of human association: without this association, it is *ipso facto* non-existent. As Dewey describes it, faith is not wholly subjective, since *human association* transcends individual human beings and their societies; but its objectivity is limited to its social in contrast to its purely individual significance.

We now turn to the treatment of faith by the two philosophers who make up our second sub-group of " moderns "—James and Brightman. William James extends the " will-to-believe " beyond natural occurrences, thereby enhancing its venturesome quality. " Faith," he says, " is synonymous with working hypothesis." [17] The religious believer wills to believe in the " religious hypothesis " by which the universe becomes " no longer a mere It to us, but a Thou." The hypothesis is justified, in the first place, as any scientific hypothesis is justified. The view of the world which appeals to man's power to trust and to risk commends itself strongly to the average person, and James thinks this power may be rationally extended in the direction of religious dogma " which we are tempted to postulate for our emotional interests, just as we are tempted to postulate the uniformity of nature for our intellectual interests." [18] The justification of the religious, as well as of any other, hypothesis, is the pragmatic one: " It matters not to the empiricist from what quarter an hypothesis may come to him. He may have acquired it by fair means or by foul; passion may have whispered or accident suggested it; but if the total drift of thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he means by its being true." [19] Further, in James' view as in Dewey's the human mind's activity is in a sense determinative of reality. Speaking of human values, he comments: " The desire for a certain kind of truth

[17] *Essays in Popular Philosophy: The Sentiment of Rationality*, p. 95.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 91.
[19] *Op. cit. The Will to Believe*, p. 17.

here brings about that truth's existence. . . . Who gains promotions, boons, appointments but the man in whose life they are seen to play the part of live hypotheses? . . . His faith acts on the powers above him as a claim, and creates its own verification." [20] Again, " There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming." [21] In opposition to Helmholz and others, James adds: "And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which would say that faith running ahead of logic is ' the lowest kind of immorality ' into which a thinking human being can fall." [22] The confidence that believing in God does the universe a service, on the contrary, justifies religious faith: " This feeling, forced on us we know not whence, that by obstinately believing that there are gods . . . we are doing the universe the deepest service we can, seems part of the living essence of the religious hypothesis." [23] And the following passage from the essay " Is Life Worth Living? " again suggests that in some sense belief is determinative of the nature of God Himself. " I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity." [24]

In James' account of faith there obviously appears a touch of the mystical which is quite absent in Dewey's—" this feeling, forced on us we know not whence," can hardly be a strictly " natural " phenomenon. There is also a difference between the two treatments in that James intends to " obstinately believe that there *are* gods," which Dewey would deplore, and that he suggests there is *a* God who may be modified by our belief. It is all hypothesis, behaving " *als ob*," to use Vaihinger's phrase, but it is free from Dewey's objection to *believing that there are* values imbedded in the nature of things.[25] James tries to reconcile scepticism with what seems to have been for him a rooted

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 61.
[25] Cf. p. 233, *supra*.

preference for theism. Subjectively—apart from the above-mentioned feeling "forced upon us we know not whence"—faith is straightforwardly described as a voluntary identification of the self with a hypothesis held to be fruitful. And so far as James is concerned the subjective description is all that he offers. For him faith seems to have no discernible objective aspect.

Edgar S. Brightman distinguishes explicitly between religious faith and the hypotheses of science as to their respective functions. However, he holds that the process of verification is the same in both cases. "The function of faith differs at a vital point from the function of a scientific hypothesis, for the latter aims at *the description of specific natural processes*, while the former aims at *discovering and adjusting our lives to the purpose and value of our whole existence*. This difference being granted, the hypothesis that there is a personal God seems to be verified by the same principles that the mind applies in testing any other hypothesis." [26] To be sure, Brightman's declared theism further distinguishes him from James, in that for him the object of faith is not projected by a self seeking to save itself from complete religious scepticism, but rather a personal God, whose nature is untouched by our projections. "God is what he is, whether we believe or doubt or ignore or blaspheme; and he seeks us whether we seek him or not . . . human error or inadequacy does not alter the structure of reality or prevent reality from acting on us." [27] In his book, *The Problem of God*, Brightman expressly condemns Dewey's humanism, and hypostatizes Deity as "an unseen Friend." Quoting, "Belief in God is . . . not any evasion of the difficulties of life; it is simply the confidence that behind the daily mystery of life that surrounds us, the human race can rely on a powerful Friend." [28] However, Brightman does not hold that faith should take as its object any formulated dogma concerning God. On the contrary, ". . . the essential element of faith is not a true doctrine of God, but a sincere search for God." In this searching activity faith allies itself with reason: "Reason certainly needs faith

[26] *Personality and Religion*, p. 62. Italics mine.
[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 108. [28] *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

if it is to reach beyond immediate experience; but just as certainly faith needs reason, if it is not to abandon all truth and value." [29] Authoritative creeds actually constitute a disvalue: "Implicit, blind faith; unquestioning belief in authoritative creeds as containing the essence of revelation; acceptance of tradition or Scripture as final standard, fear and distrust of science and philosophy—these are some of the bitter fruits of the overvaluing of the experience of revelation." [30] In keeping with liberal Protestant theology of today, Brightman seeks to make God reasonable, acceptable to the critical mind of modern man, by trying to solve in reasonable fashion the contradiction between the goodness of an alledgedly omnipotent God with the sufferings and evil of His creation. To reach this reasonable solution, he deprives God of His omnipotence and leaves Him His goodness. God is finite, limited by the given. Neither "omnipotent or omniscient or impassible" He remains "the perfectly benevolent Creator and the perfectly wise Knower of all actual existence." The given accounts for "natural evils and the 'mistakes' of evolution." Faith in such a God is "an imperative obligation to join in the task of making the world better." [31]

So, inasmuch as it is a "sincere search for God," faith as Brightman conceives it is practical, an aspect of reasonable activity which has transcendent Value as its especial goal. Subjectively described it is a hypothesis, differing from a scientific hypothesis only in its inclusive motive: that of "discovering and adjusting our lives to the purpose and value of our whole existence," rather than "describing specific natural processes." In spite of his careful distinction of purpose, as between the religious hypothesis and the scientific, Brightman does not actually offer any account of "faith" as distinct from a scientific hypothesis, nor does he supply any description of faith considered objectively.

[29] *Religious Values*, p. 21.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

B. A. E. Taylor and H. B. Alexander

A. E. Taylor and H. B. Alexander, while not analyzing faith in any such meticulous fashion as does the Scholastic, nevertheless treat it from an objective as well as a subjective standpoint. For both men faith is clearly belief resting on authority which transcends individual experience, and involving reciprocal activity as between the human soul and God. Their treatments therefore approach rather closely the Scholastic position.

In *The Faith of a Moralist* Taylor does not specifically analyze the term " faith," but he is explicit in his assertion that rational knowledge alone cannot apprehend the real. There is mystery in the universe, consonant with the presence in all our contacts with the objectively real of " an element of refractoriness to complete intellectual analysis which is the stamp of objectivity," " a never wholly removeable misfit between the real and the categories in which we try to confine it." [32] This discrepancy between the real and our feeble categories leaves room for an authority, the function of which is " to insist upon the reality and omnipresence in religion, as in all our contacts with the objectively real " of the element of refractoriness mentioned above. In so doing, " authority does not conflict with experience, but merely shows up the limitations of rational knowledge." Taylor is essentially opposed to a dogmatic authority, but not to supra-human authority as such. He writes, following a criticism of religious dogmatism, "And yet when all is said it is as hard to conceive of an adequate religion without mystery, and consequently without the note of authority, as it is easy to smile at the shifts to which the theorist is driven when he attempts to provide authority with its clearly defined seat and to compile a register of its declarations. It remains true that ' a God comprehended would be no God,' but a mere artificial construction of our own minds." [33]

The faith which Taylor has in mind is not wholly subjective. True, " We know our true good, which is no other than God himself, by obscure but none the less real and impressive, per-

[32] *Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 213. [33] *Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 211.

sonal contacts with God. Without this *real contact* the process of winning a true personality could not be begun." [34] *But* this mystical knowledge or " faith " has its objective side as well: it implies a movement from without, the initiative of God as well as the initiative of man: ". . . because God is the *lumen intellectus* . . . an Ethical Theism has then to conceive God as the ' efficient ' as well as the ' exemplary ' cause of the whole moral life. . . .

" If God is not only the goal, but the author and sustainer of moral effort, the whole moral endeavor of man must be a reponse to what we can only call *a movement from the other side*. It is, indeed, our own because it is the response of such moral personality as we already possess, but none the less it is a *response* to a divine initiative." [35]

So the faith of a moralist, insofar as Taylor describes its nature, is on the subjective side the reaction of the moral self to God; on the objective side it is the " divine initiative," acting as the " efficient " cause of the moral life. He does not distinguish as does, for instance, the Thomistic scholar, J. Maritain, between knowledge by faith and mystical experience.

H. B. Alexander, in *God and Man's Destiny*, analyzes faith " as between God and Man " as of three types. On man's part, there is first " that faith which is represented by the *credo* and which is no more than a *belief* in the existence of a divine being, no more than an intellectual assent to the presence and role of God in the world." [36] It is the faith of the mind—Alexander says that it is peculiarly the faith of the philosopher and the theologian—" and while it may pillar edifices of thought it is only rarely that it can kindle into a passion of understanding." [37] One notes particularly in Alexander's description of this type of belief that " *God is indifferent to it*," that is, it is wholly on man's side, and is accorded only a psychological description as a *subjective* assent to God's existence. A second type of faith is trust, and in contrast to the first " it moves in two directions.

[34] *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 238.
[35] *Ibid.*, italics mine.
[36] *Op. cit.*, p. 80.
[37] *Ibid.*

It is man's trust in God and it is God's trust in man; its truest image is that which is found in the relationship of persons mutually understanding and sharing in responsibility." [38] Man's movement of trust toward God is thus reciprocated by a movement of God toward man; faith in this sense is not purely subjective, but has objective reality in God, as well. Divine Person approaches human person even as human person reaches toward the divine.

The third type of faith described by Alexander is moral faith: the response of the whole moral personality to the demand of Perfection, a response which becomes overt in moral action. ". . . it lies between a man and his own soul, and it lies between God and his own nature." Continuing, " For in a moral world it is not alone man who must hold himself to account, but God also, facing his own standards of equity, purity and nobility. . . . This is the last and highest arbitrament of the good and the bad that man can conceive—God's faith kept with himself." [39]

Like A. E. Taylor, Alexander excludes dogma from his conception of faith. "Actual trust in God means something quite different from any dogma. It means a recognition of his character and person in a manner not at all dissimilar to that which prompts our trust in the character and person of our neighbor, which is assuredly not the outcome of any studied analysis, but arises directly from a familiarity that has bred confidence and has engendered love." [40] Man does not believe then in the dogmatic assertions of others, either churches or individuals, but rather in the validity of his own " personal experience of God." This faith must be described as mystical in quality, since it implies a direct contact of the soul with met-empirical Reality.

Thus far we have dealt with concepts of faith which, all of them, treat the subject without any reference to dogmatic authority, and also, one must admit, without any thoroughgoing analysis of the term. In Santayana's system faith is " animal " faith, an instinctive attitude required for the survival of living creatures. In Dewey and James it is a voluntary belief

[38] *Ibid.* [39] *Ibid.*, p. 85. [40] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

in the power of ideals to influence the course of men's lives and the very universe in which these lives are lived. In Brightman's theory it is belief in an Unseen Friend, a finite, personal God. Taylor introduces a note of authority, but not dogmatic authority; faith is the conviction that reality is beyond the reach of our limited categories; his conception of faith also includes the idea of " the divine initiative," " a movement from without," in addition to the initiative of the believer. Alexander's " faith " we have just discussed; it is the " faith " of an evangelical theologian, examined in what he thinks to be its three phases. We turn now to a concept of faith in which dogma is very much involved, but which, as a concept, is given very careful analysis.

C. The Thomistic Doctrine of Faith

A. E. Taylor has made a statement with which the writer does not wholly agree, but which affords a good introduction to the discussion of the Scholastic doctrine of faith. He writes: " The ' Liberal Protestant ' of 1927 would, no doubt, have been disowned as a mere ' deist ' by the ' Liberal Protestant ' of 1727, as our friends in the Roman fold like to remind us; but may we not equally suspect that an ' orthodox Roman ' of our own time, a Leo XIII for example, would have found it hard to talk theology with the Angelic Doctor, without discovering, for good or bad, the man of the thirteenth and the man of the twentieth century meant different things by the same phraseology? " [41]

The truth of the first part of this passage is not here disputed, but the second part, referring to the " orthodox Roman " of our day and the Angelic Doctor does not seem defensible. The twentieth-century Roman Catholic could have little or no difficulty in conferring with the theologian of the thirteenth, precisely because of the meaning and nature of " faith " in Scholasticism, the careful way in which its nature is described, and the

[41] *Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 98.

accurate, definite, and final fashion in which its object is defined. " Faith " as analyzed by St. Thomas has as its object *the* Faith of the Roman Catholic Church, the content of which is held to be divinely revealed. Roman Catholic theologians are trained in it, and in the precise terms in which St. Thomas defines it. Canon 1366 of the new Codex of Canon Law reads: " The study of philosophy and theology and the teaching of these sciences to their students must be accurately carried out by Professors "—(in seminaries, etc.)—" according to the arguments, doctrine, and principles of St. Thomas which they are inviolately to hold." [42] Neo-Scholastic philosophers doubtless have developed certain nuances of the doctrine of faith, but according to Roman Catholic teaching the permanent structure was built by Christ and faithfully guarded by His Apostles, Fathers, and Doctors among whom St. Thomas Aquinas was not the least prominent. This seems amply to justify the selection here of the Thomistic as typical of the Scholastic treatment of faith.

For St. Thomas, reason, faith, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost are the sources of our knowledge of God. It is necessary to stress the term intellectual in order to represent this essential quality of Thomistic faith, and also to exclude from the discussion any mystical apprehension of God. Such apprehension is direct knowledge through vision. ". . . to believe is immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act is the true, which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is the proper principle of that act, must needs reside in the intellect." [43] The concept of a twofold order of knowledge runs throughout Scholastic discussions, the following passages from the *Summa Theologica* and the *Summa Contra Gentiles* being typical: " It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason . . . because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason." [44]

[42] Cf. *Summa Theologica.* Trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. I, p. xxxiii.

[43] *Summa Theologica,* II-II, q. 4, a. 2.

[44] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1, a. 1.

" While then the truth of the intelligible things of God is two-fold, one to which the inquiry of the reason can attain, the other which surpasses the whole range of human reason." [45]

St. Thomas accepts the Pauline definition of faith, translating it to read, " Faith is a habit of mind whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent." [46] Faith so conceived is a *supernatural gift*, by means of which the truths of revelation are *voluntarily* accepted as true by the human mind: the power to believe is a free gift from God to the human soul which " moves " the soul to react in a certain way. " The act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God." [47] The writer is aware that the conception of faith as a supernatural gift or " grace " is not familiar to non-Scholastic philosophers, but as such St. Thomas certainly regards it. According to Scholastic teaching, when man gives his assent to matters of faith, he is raised above his nature. This is only possible through the action in him of a supernatural principle: this inwardly moving principle is none other than God. " Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace." [48] This supernatural grace is not needed merely to make man's assent possible: it is necessary because the *object* of faith is supernatural and therefore a supernatural means must be employed in its apprehension.

Faith is a less satisfying activity to the intellect than reason, since it requires a humiliation of the intellect's power, and a submission to the experience of " seeing in a glass darkly." When the intellect, through faith, deals with the divine Object, it requires " evidence of things unseen." Evidence is of three kinds: self-evidence, evidence deducible from premisses, and evidence accepted on " grave authority." Now this " grave authority " may be human authority in a scientific field, giving us interesting knowledge about our mysterious universe which

[45] *I Cont. Gent.*, 4.
[46] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 4, a. 1.
[47] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 2.
[48] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 6, a. 1.

is not self-evident, nor within the reasoning power of most of us. The evidence so obtained is an example of what St. Thomas calls " human faith." Or the grave authority may be God Himself, in which case there is certitude through divine faith. In either case, faith involves taking another's word for some statement; in the first, that of a fallible human being, in the second, the word of God. (Faith in the latter sense is the faith meticulously analyzed by St. Thomas in the second part of the *Summa Theologica*.) The evidence, in divine faith, is *extrinsic* as *evidence* to the proposition believed, and reached usually under the disposing influence of such intrinsic evidence as is furnished in the propositions: a) this person is competent and truthful; b) this person has vouched for the truth of this or that statement—a proposition which is implied in " human " faith as well. Supernatural faith, then, has the certitude of Divine authority based on divine evidence: " Faith has not that research of natural reason which *demonstrates* what is believed, but a research into those things whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance, that such things have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles." [49] Of course this certainty immediately distinguishes the Thomistic concept of faith from the non-Scholastic descriptions considered in the present article.

The believing subject accomplishes the assent of faith by the will's consenting to the intellectual acceptance of a statement as true on the authority of the witness. Faith so conceived is not *un*reasonable: on the contrary, faith and reason are in fundamental agreement since their joint object is truth. But faith is *non*-reasonable—a process other than reason giving intellectual knowledge, and, like reason, requiring analysis and synthesis, issuing in a proposition. Faith is not a subjective feeling, but a voluntary intellectual act made into supernatural certainty by an objective factor, supernatural grace. " Motives of credibility," intrinsic with respect to reason, are the extrinsic evidence arrived at by direct reasoning; they antedate, and are antecedently necessary to, the act of faith. But for this very

[49] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1. Italics mine.

reason they do not constitute the essence of the act of faith. This act, as has been said, is a voluntary consent to the intellectual acceptance of a statement on the authority of a witness. The reasons for believing which would make the non-Scholastic philosopher commit himself to one set of beliefs rather than another do not affect the Scholastic: for him faith in its objective totality *IS* the sum of the truths revealed by God in the Scriptures and in tradition. The extraordinary history of the Jewish people, the fulfillment in the New Testament of the prophecies of the Old, the human life of Christ, the survival of the Church and the constancy of its doctrine in spite of heresy, schism, and the treachery of its own leaders—these facts are admitted by Scholastics as giving strong reasonable support to the theory that the Scriptures are divinely revealed, but he who says these "motives of credibility" are necessary to faith, or for that matter in any way enhance its natural brilliance, is anathema. For the Scholastic there can be no selection by the reason of a preferred hypothesis, no self-determination to commit oneself to one hypothesis rather than another; his position requires an absolute, naive acceptance of a truth divinely given and divinely certified—requiring, it is true, the cooperation of the intellect and the will, the latter perhaps motivated by the promise of eternal reward, but initiated by God and withdrawn, in some instances, at his pleasure.

From the foregoing it is evident that a subjective analysis of an act of faith must presuppose the presence of an objective element, supernatural light. Through the action of supernatural light a subjective, voluntary act of assent is made possible. The object of his belief is then apprehended by the believer in a manner analogous on the one hand to the phenomenon of ocular vision and on the other to the intellect's apprehension of its proper object. In sight there are involved the eye or visual faculty, a colored object, and light serving as medium.[50] Color is the formal object of sight—the *objectum formale quod*. Light is the formal reason of sight—the *objectum*

[50] This discussion follows very closely the article on "Faith" by Hugh Pope, in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*.

formale quo. In the apprehension of the proper object of intellectual knowledge, the intellectual faculty elicits the act, the *objectum formale quod* is the intelligible object, and the evidence presented for assent is the *objectum formale quo*. In the act of faith the object primarily attained (*objectum formale quod*) is God as He is in Himself under the aspect of First Ontological Truth (*Prima Veritas in essendo*) and the evidence (*objectum formale quo*) on which it ultimately rests is God under the aspect of authoritative revealer Who can neither deceive nor be deceived, that is, God from the standpoint of His unfailing veracity and omniscience (*Prima Veritas in dicendo et in cognoscendo*). Both the *objectum formale quod* and the *objectum formale quo* are therefore divine, in divine faith. Quoting H. Pope's article in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, " Just as the formal object of Divine Faith is the First Truth itself, so the evidence of the First Truth is the First Truth describing Itself."

In reviewing the Thomistic philosophy we recall that there are two orders of knowledge, knowledge by reason based on evidence and knowledge by faith based on authority. There are also two orders of faith: since faith is always based on authority, and there are two sorts of authority, human and divine. The higher order of faith, namely the divine, is given by God as a " grace," and assented to by man through an intellectual act. The lower order requires only assent to human authority, and carries with it no constraint or obligation to believe any given authority rather than any other; the higher order, carrying with it divine certitude, *ipso facto* leaves only the option of assent or non-assent. We may also distinguish correspondingly two orders of objects: the object of divine faith is the First Truth, the divine, the Wholly Other. The object of human faith is scientific truth.

St. Thomas teaches that it is possible for the same thing to be the object of reasonable knowledge for one man and the object of faith for another. To the simple, revelation brings knowledge about God which these could never attain by philosophic inquiry. The proofs for God's existence, for instance, can hardly be understood by those of limited intellectual

capacity, yet these same limited intelligences may know the truths concerning God by faith: ". . . it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God which human reason could discover would (else) only be known by a few, and after a long time and with the admixture of many errors." [51] Also, ". . . while then the truth of the intelligible things of God is twofold, one to which the inquiry of the reason can attain, the other which surpasses the whole range of human reason, both are fittingly proposed by God to man as an object of belief. We must first show this with regard to that truth which is attainable by the inquiry of reason, lest it appear to some that, since it can be attained by reason, it is useless to make it an object of faith by supernatural inspiration." [52] The text of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* then goes on to show three disadvantages which would result if the divine truth were left solely to the inquiry of reason: " few men would have knowledge of God " because of limitations of temperament, lack of intelligence and laziness; and those who arrived at truth would do so only after a long lapse of time; there would be " an admixture of many errors."

The disparity between the detailed account of faith offered by St. Thomas and the slight treatment accorded the subject by our modern philosophers makes comparison difficult. Yet this very disparity is of significance, and has a cogent psychological reason. The sanctions of heaven and hell do not influence the modern philosopher; faith is, for him, a convenient term for describing a certain intellectual experience, ranging in importance and significance all the way from bare certitude that he exists in an existing universe to a unique, personal experience of God. For the modern, faith is an intellectual adventure involving risk, without any certitude, or, at best, a certitude based on personal conviction. St. Thomas, on the other hand, is vitally concerned with faith as a requisite for salvation, through the possession or non-possession of which men are forever saved or damned. Such a faith, once possessed, involves

[51] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 1.
[52] *I Cont. Gent.*, 4.

no risk, and gives utter certainty since it is based on the word of God. There are degrees of seriousness in the risk which a modern philosopher takes. In science and metaphysics, he simply risks a mistake, risks making a fool of himself to a greater or less degree. However, when the same modern takes the risk of faith in practical matters, such as social idealism or religion, the jeopardy is grave, because of the importance of the practical issues involved, and the possibility of objective certainty is still ruled out, even though the specific Protestant theism of an H. B. Alexander gives *subjective* certainty. For St. Thomas, faith is likewise a risk, a venture: but it is a venture with a certain outcome, once the grace of God is vouchsafed. And there is no " higher order " of faith, no " divine " faith, until this grace is given, this divine element enlisted. Without the divine ingredient, there is merely faith in *human* authority—since without the authoritative element there can be *no* faith in the Scholastic sense: " The disposition of a believer is that of one who accepts another's word for some statement, because it is fitting or useful to do so." [53] The Scholastic, like the non-Scholastic, may be deceived in his " human " faith; but not in the faith which is divine.

John Henry Cardinal Newman wrote in *Loss and Gain*: " Certainty in the highest sense is the reward of those who by an act of will, embrace the truth when nature, like a coward, shrinks. You must make a venture; faith is a venture before a man is a Catholic, it is a grace after it. You approach the church in the way of reason; you live in it in the light of faith." [54] This quotation seems to summarize the Scholastic position: faith is belief in authority. He who would have divine faith must approach the pronouncements of the Church in an attitude of receptivity toward authority; then, by divine action, faith as a *virtue* becomes possible, for grace inclines the will to move the intellect to assent to the divine truths which the Church teaches. Thus " human " faith is a psychological venture, full of risk, of doubtful certainty; divine faith is a virtue, having

[53] *De Veritate*, xiv, 1, quoted by Hugh Pope, *op. cit.*
[54] P. 309.

objectivity and perfect certainty, a gift of God, like all gifts dependent on his good pleasure, impossible of attainment by thought or effort, directed toward one transcendent Object, the First Truth. St. Thomas, as we have shown, defined this faith clearly, definitely, and with intent to make of it a bulwark for Catholic doctrine. Small wonder that his system became the official philosophy of the Roman Church. But with equal clarity and distinctness he distinguishes the provinces of faith and reason, and declares that the former has no place in metaphysical discourse.

ILSE FOREST

New York City.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Part IV

5. The Principles of Justice: Constitutionality

(Continued)

IN ORDER to clarify the notion of the mixed regime, as distinct from the mediaeval *regimen regale et politicum*, we found it necessary to expose the inadequacies and errors which make the " traditional " classification of the forms of government capable of representation in a sixfold bi-columnar diagram. Aristotle's conception of the polity as a mixed regime cannot be understood except in terms of Aristotle's theory of Constitutional government, which he sharply distinguishes from Royal or absolute government and which he divides into subordinate forms according to the criteria for admission to citizenship and other public offices. For Aristotle there is *only one* mixed regime—the well-tempered constitution that results from an amelioration of the injustice of the oligarchical constitution, on the one hand, and of the contrary injustice of the democratic constitution, on the other.

It will be seen at once that Aristotle's classification of the forms of government, involving this conception of the " middle constitution " and based upon the fundamental opposition between Royal and Political regimes, cannot possibly be represented schematically by the familiar diagram, which scholastic political theory perpetuates and which modern political writers both use and abuse. That diagram delineates the classification to be found in the *De Regimine Principum* of St. Thomas (Book I, Ch. 1, 3). It is as follows:

GOOD FORMS *(Rule for the common good)*	PERVERSIONS *(Rule for private interests)*
(1) By one: *monarchy* ------	(6) By one: *tyranny*
(2) By a few: *aristocracy* ----	(5) By a few: *oligarchy*
(3) By the many: *polity* or *good democracy* --------	(4) By the many: (*bad*) *democracy*

We have already shown—in the preceding installment of Part IV, Section 5[535a]—that the theory schematized in the foregoing diagram is neither Platonic nor Aristotelian. The picture here presented is a caricature of the much subtler analysis to be found in Plato's *Statesman*.[535b] And though it can be defended

[535a] Vd. *The Thomist*, VI, 1, pp. 49-118.

[535b] It is true that in *The Statesman* Plato makes a sixfold division of the forms of *human* government, all of which are contrasted with a seventh form of government—the perfect government which would occur if a god were to administer the affairs of the human community, governing without laws because, possessing the true art or science of government, he could mete out absolute justice in each case. As contrasted with this model of perfect government, which Plato regards as mythical in character, all human political institutions are seen to be essentially imperfect, in that general rules or positive laws are required as a substitute for the true art of government, so that justice may be done, albeit imperfectly by the application of general rules to particular cases. It is this fact which gives Plato a criterion for determining when the imperfect government, that is the only government practicable on earth, achieves the excellence proper to its type. Good human regimes are those in which the administrators rule according to laws instituted, through custom or otherwise, by the people, the whole community. The rulers or administrators are not law-makers. They are servants of the law. Human government becomes perverted and unjust when the magistrates try to substitute their own rule for the rule of law, or when they try to legislate by issuing decrees which lack the authority of public institution. Though Plato's conception of constitutional government is inadequate, it does contain the primary note of the supremacy of positive law over all men, rulers as well as ruled. For Plato, then, all the good forms of human government are constitutional, and all the perversions are degrees of despotism, i. e., an absolute rule by men. The subordinate distinction among the three good forms (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) is based entirely on the numerical criterion (one, few, or many administrators), and monarchy is the best simply because *the most* efficient in administration; tyranny is the worst of the three perversions because the most efficient in *maladministration*. Democracy, according to Plato, is both in the good and bad column. The least efficient administration of the laws is by the many, the least efficient maladministration, or violation, of the laws is by the many.

This summary of *The Statesman* reveals some points of resemblance between the Platonic analysis and the "traditional" six-fold bi-columnar picture. But the "traditional" picture obscures the central point in Plato's theory, namely, that all of the good forms of government, differing *inter se* only accidentally, are alike as constitutional regimes, and equal in justice. None of them is more like the Divine government than any other. In none of them is the ruler also a legislator or above the positive laws in any way. On Plato's theory, there could be no mixed regime resulting from a combination of rule by the one, by the few, and by the many. This is the acid test which shows that the "traditional" classification is a confusion of Platonic and Aristotelian analyses.

as a simplified version of the classification Aristotle reports as *current opinion* in Book III of the *Politics* (Ch. 7, 8), the remainder of the *Politics*, especially Books IV, V, VI, repudiates the six-fold bi-columnar picture.

This we have already shown by an extended examination of the relevant texts, but so far we have proceeded negatively—demonstrating that the "traditional" picture is neither Aristotelian nor true to the facts of political history. To complete our discussion positively, we must now set forth a classification of the forms of government that is truly Aristotelian and also true as an analysis of the concrete historical record—that is, analytically true as far as it is possible for an ancient theory to account for the political facts that could have been known, and the possibilities that could have been guessed, in the ancient world. This positive task can best be accomplished by the construction of a diagram that will immediately reveal the radical differences between Aristotle's theory and the "traditional" diagram given above.

In constructing this table we shall try to picture the subordination of accidental to essential distinctions, and of specific essential distinctions within the generic sphere of Constitutional government. We shall also try to indicate by spatial arrangement and direction, the order of the various regimes with respect to justice. In order to make the diagram represent the classification which occurs in the *Politics*, we have parenthetically indicated the intermediate regime, the *regimen regale et politicum*, which was a mediaeval development, and also the characteristically modern development of Democratic government. The latter introduces a new specific subdivision within the generic sphere of Constitutional government to replace the threefold division which Aristotle makes. In the modern world, there are no Constitutional governments of the sort the Greeks knew as *pure* oligarchy and *pure* democracy; and the Greek mixed regime, the polity, becomes with some alterations the modern Republic which, in Part V, we shall analyze and compare with Democracy, which is more just than the Republic even as the Greek polity was more just than Greek

oligarchy or democracy, though the reasons are not the same in the two cases.

The diagram as here presented is, then, incomplete and remains to be completed in Part V. But, as here presented, it conforms to the Aristotelian analysis, and to the Aristotelian vocabulary as well, with one exception, namely, our use of the words "benevolent despotism" and "despotic tyranny" to distinguish the two characteristic perversions of Constitutional government from "simple tyranny" as the only perversion of Royal government. Though this language is ours, it is thoroughly justified by Aristotelian principles, and especially by what is said in Book IV of the *Politics* (Chapters 4, 5, 6) concerning the two stages in the corruption of oligarchy and democracy—first the overthrow of the constitution itself, and then the tyrannical use of despotic power. (By the addition of these two perversions, the classification becomes *eightfold* instead of sixfold.) Since the perversion of Royal government is the same for both its accidental modes, and since the two perversions of Constitutional government are essentially the same for its several species, we have not deemed it necessary to complicate the diagram by indicating all the routes of corruption in detail. And in general we have omitted from the diagram most of the accidental subdivisions or accidental elements, in order to make the main structure of the classification stand out as clearly as possible. A full understanding of this diagram depends, of course, upon all the points in our prior discussion, as well as upon noting its differences from the "traditional" sixfold picture.

ARISTOTELIAN EIGHTFOLD CLASSIFICATION OF GOOD GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR PERVERSIONS



NOTES ON FOREGOING DIAGRAM

1. The unbroken arrows indicate the absolute directions within the field of justice and injustice. The direction of the broken arrows indicates the motions of progress and corruption. Thus, of the three just regimes (monarchy, aristocracy, and polity), two are equal in justice, and this is indicated by their being placed on the same vertical level; and the remaining one is absolutely more just, for polity is a species of Constitutional government, and the transition from Royal to Political government is a motion in the direction of progress. Of the three ambivalent regimes (democracy, oligarchy, and benevolent despotism), democracy is nearest to polity in the horizontal dimension, and this indicates that it is the least unjust of the partial perversions; oligarchy is more unjust, and benevolent despotism, being the corruption

of Constitutional government itself, is more unjust, while at the same time being somewhat just. Because they are ambivalent, it can be said of these three regimes, that the most just is the least unjust, and the most unjust is the least just. This is indicated by the order of the numbers—(4), (5), and (6)—(4) being to the left of (5) and (6), and (6) being higher in the vertical dimension than (5) and (4). Of the two complete perversions (simple tyranny and despotic tyranny), simple tyranny is less unjust than despotic tyranny because the latter is the complete corruption of a superior good regime, but neither of these two regimes has any justice; therefore here we do not say that the less unjust is the more just. That benevolent despotism is, however, less unjust than simple tyranny is indicated by the fact that (6) is lower in the vertical dimension than either (7) or (8). And that it is less unjust than despotic tyranny is indicated by the fact that (6) is, in the horizontal dimension, to the left of (8).

2. We can, therefore, read off the order of the eight numbered regimes, by placing their numbers in three series, as follows. *First*, the order of regimes which are simply just, i. e., have no element of injustice relative to the conditions which justify them: here (1) and (2) are coequal, and inferior to (3). *Second*, the order of ambivalent regimes, which are both just and unjust: here the order is (4), (5), and (6)—from the less to the more unjust. *Third*, the order of regimes which are simply unjust, i. e., no element of justice: here the order is (7) and (8), from the less to the more unjust. And if injustice is alone considered, the order from less to more is (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8).

3. The diagram also shows how the ambivalent regimes are both perversions of simply just regimes and subject to further corruption into absolutely unjust regimes. Thus, oligarchy and democracy, as pure species of the Republican form, are perversions of polity as the mixed constitution; and both are subject to further corruption, first into benevolent despotism, and then into despotic tyranny. The diagram does not consider a change from democracy to oligarchy, or its converse, as a motion of corruption or progress, even though democracy is more just, and oligarchy more unjust.

4. What is represented by [I/II] indicates the place of the intermediate *regimen regale et politicum* in the order of justice, but not in the order of temporal development, since both purely Royal and purely Political government are historically prior in their occurrence to government which is imperfectly both Royal and Political.

5. We have added [III. Democracy] merely to indicate where the third of the three major regimes would come in the order of justice. This is also its place in the order of historical development; but this diagram does not adequately represent how the Democratic and Republican regimes differ and are related within the generic sphere of Constitutional government. In an adequate diagram, the Roman number II would be used for Republic, including here all the sub-species of Republican government (i. e., polity, democracy, and oligarchy); and the Roman number III would be used for Democracy. It would be understood that II and III together differed from I, as purely Constitutional from purely Royal government.

6. In the Aristotelian scheme, the distinction between pure and mixed regimes is possible only within the realm of Constitutional government, though, as we have indicated, it may also be relevant to the constitutional aspect of the *regimen regale et politicum*. When the distinction between Republic and Democracy is made in Part V, it will be seen that the distinction between pure and mixed regimes is relevant only to the Republican form of Constitutional government.

To complete our understanding of this classification of the forms of government, with its several orderings of regimes according to justice and injustice, it is necessary to remember that an Aristotelian analysis involves the distinction between the relatively just and the absolutely just. A regime, such as purely Royal government, can be just relative to inferior circumstances, and with respect to these circumstances in no way unjust; yet, absolutely considered, it is less just than purely Constitutional government. Absolutely considered it is lacking in justice, though relatively considered it may not be actually unjust. Because of this, the words " absolute regime " are ambiguous, for both Royal government and benevolent despotism are absolute regimes, and both are just with respect to the common good, but benevolent despotism is a regime which is actually unjust relative to superior circumstances because they do not justify its absolutism, whereas relative to inferior conditions, the absolutism of Royal government is not actually unjust.

It is not possible to represent these facts in a two-dimensional diagram, but our diagram will not be fully understood unless these qualifications are remembered, for the only difference between purely Royal government and benevolent despotism depends on the circumstances—inferior conditions justifying the one, superior conditions making the other actually unjust. In the temporal order of development, a regime may become actually unjust without undergoing the sort of perversion which consists in the violation of some element of justice which enters into its character. It may become unjust because it remains unchanged in character after the inferior conditions, which justified it relatively, have given way to superior conditions. We must remember, therefore, that our diagram indicates only one sort of perversion—the familiar sort which consists in the negation or violation of a principle of justice already actually present in the regime being corrupted. But there is this other sort of perversion, which the diagram cannot represent, namely, the sort which consists in the failure to actualize a principle of justice when changing conditions de-

mand that that principle become actually realized. At a prior time, when inferior conditions prevailed, no actual injustice was done by the regime in which that principle was only potentially present. If it remains in potentiality after conditions have changed, however, then actual injustice occurs.

This will, of course, be understood by the reader who has followed our discussion of the relative justification of the Royal regime (in Section 3 *supra*) by reference to the difference between primitive conditions (in which one or a few men are radically superior to the many) and civilized conditions (in which the many are radically equal in virtue or political competence). In this connection, however, it is necessary to repeat a word of caution already spoken.[536]

The Aristotelian theory of the *relative* justification of inferior regimes depends upon an hypothesis about historic fact. If that hypothesis is false—if there never has actually been, nor now is, a difference among civil communities of the sort supposed—then the several inferior good regimes cannot be relatively justified. Rather they are all ambivalent regimes, both actually just and actually unjust. Only the best of the good regimes is completely just, without any element of actual justice. And only the ultimate corruption of good government is completely unjust, without any element of actual justice. Between these two extremes there are several ambivalent regimes, each of which is less just than the perfectly just and less unjust than the completely unjust; and considered among themselves, one ambivalent regime may be more or less just, less or more unjust, than another. On this hypothesis, moreover, one of the most striking analytical consequences is the eradication of any distinction between Royal government and benevolent despotism. These are merely two names for the same ambivalent regime, which is unjust in so far as it is absolute government, and just in so far as it is benevolent and thus avoids the injustice of tyranny. If the analysis is completed by adding the distinction between the Democratic

[536] Vd. Part IV, Section 3, *supra*, in The Thomist, IV, 3, pp. 520-2; and Section 4, *supra*, in The Thomist, IV, 4, pp. 694-6.

and Republican forms of purely Constitutional government, it will be found that there is no distinction between a Republic (Constitutional government with unjust distribution of the status of citizenship) and the perversion of Democracy which we have decided to call *oligarchy*.[537] There is, in short, no relative justification for Republican government, to distinguish it from *oligarchy* as a corruption, as there is no relative justification for Royal government, to distinguish it from benevolent despotism as a corruption. This analysis eventuates in a much simpler classification and ordering of the forms of government, presented in the following diagram. All the Aristotelian distinctions remain, though they are transformed by the obliteration of any *relative justification* for inferior regimes, on the hypothesis that no inferior conditions have ever existed historically to justify them.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT HISTORIC CONDITIONS ARE ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE THE SAME



[537] Vd. Part IV, Section 5, *supra*, in THE THOMIST, VI, 1, p. 110-1, and fn. 527.

NOTES ON FOREGOING DIAGRAM

1. The unbroken arrows indicate the order of progress from the less just to the more just regime. The broken arrows indicate the order of corruption from the perfectly just regime through the ambivalent regimes to the ultimate perversion of good government, which is completely unjust.

2. The Roman numbers indicate the three regimes which have some justice, and the Arabic numbers indicate the three regimes which involve some injustice. The three regimes which are indicated by Roman numbers can, therefore, be called good regimes; and the three regimes indicated by Arabic numbers can be called perversions. Two regimes, of course, can be classified both as good regimes and perversions, according as their ambivalent character is separated into elements of justice and injustice. With respect to these two, we have indicated the names by which they are called when they are regarded as good and when they are regarded as perversions. These alternative names are, of course, strictly synonymous *in denotation*.

3. Among the good regimes, the order from less just to more just is: I, II, and III. Among the perversions, the order from less unjust to more unjust is 1, 2, and 3.

4. If by "good government" is meant a regime which is actually completely just, then Democracy is the only good government; similarly, if by "corrupt government" is meant a total perversion of government, then Tyranny is the only corrupt government.

5. As tyranny virtually includes the two less grave injustices (despotism and *oligarchy*), so benevolent despotism virtually includes the less grave injustice which is *oligarchy*. Vd. fn. 528 *supra*. No confusion need result from the double use of the word "oligarchy" to name the type of injustice which is peculiar to the ambivalent character of Republican government, and also to name a subordinate type (i. e., an essential species) of Republican government, divided against democracy and polity. These subordinate distinctions, as well as the distinction between monarchy and aristocracy, are the same in this diagram as in the preceding one on page 255.

If the hypothesis as to historic fact, on which the foregoing diagram is based, be true, then there is no need to prove that regimes which are justified only in relation to inferior conditions are absolutely less just than those which superior conditions demand. But if the hypothesis on which the Aristotelian analysis rests be true, then we must prove that very point. Since we have decided to complete our whole discussion on the Aristotelian hypothesis before undertaking to consider the issue of fact which these contrary hypotheses generate, we must now turn to the last problem which concerns us in this part of our work—to argue explicitly the absolute superiority of Constitutional government.[538]

[538] The argument for the absolute superiority of the Democratic form of Consti-

6. Though the reasons have already been indicated,[539] they must now be collected and ordered to demonstrate that Constitutional government is *absolutely* more just than Royal government. There is no need for us to consider here the intermediate *regimen regale et politicum*, for if the demonstration is made, it must follow necessarily that Royal *and* Political government is intermediate in the absolute scale of justice.

To begin with, we must observe that the problem of absolute gradations in justice concerns only those regimes which can be just *relatively* to certain circumstances. Only such regimes can, in relation to other circumstances, be called *relatively unjust* or *relatively inexpedient*. The real perversions of just government that we have so far considered (despotism and tyranny taken simply or in combination) are *always* unjust. Moreover, when we say that one of these perversions is more unjust than another, the measurement is determined by (1) whether it is the perversion of a more just regime, or (2) whether it is a more complete corruption than some less drastic perversion of that same just regime. Hence we could not compare distinct perversions as more or less unjust according to the first sort of measurement, *unless* one form of just government is *absolutely* more just than another; or, according to the second sort of measurement, *unless* some just governments involve two separable principles of justice, one of which can be violated without the other, or both together to result in a more complete corruption of this just regime. This shows conclusively that there is a scale of absolute justice

tutional government is reserved for Part V. Only after that has been presented will we consider the merits of the two hypotheses about historic fact. But we have revealed enough of the analytical consequences of the hypothesis which denies *relative justification* to show that the classification and ordering of the forms of government on that hypothesis diverges as radically from the "traditional" classification (of six so-called "pure" regimes in two columns, the regimes in each column being equal in justice or injustice), as does the classification based on the contrary hypothesis. Neither hypothesis supports the position taken by Father Parsons and others, because the analysis based on each involves the same fundamental insight—the distinction of three separable and cumulatively combinable elements of political justice.

[539] Vd. Section 3, *supra*, in THE THOMIST, IV, 3, pp. 513-16.

on which just regimes can be hierarchically placed. Moreover, it indicates that the absolutely more just regime, being one that is subject to partial or complete corruption, must involve separable elements of justice, for otherwise its progressive corruption could not occur through the cumulation of distinct types of injustice. Our prior validation of the distinction between despotism and tyranny, and between simple and despotic tyranny, is therefore by itself almost sufficient proof that Constitutional government is, absolutely speaking, more just than Royal government.

There are, however, several other ways in which this conclusion can be proved, differing from one another only in that each looks at the same fundamental truth from a different angle, and so they tend to confirm one another. Since prior discussions have prepared the way, we can now briefly summarize these arguments.

(1) The social conditions or circumstances of civil life may not only be diverse, but their diversity may also support the judgment that one set of conditions is inferior to the other. The grounds for making this judgment will be argued subsequently (in 2 below). Here let us merely stand on the judgment that the conditions of a primitive community (as already defined) are inferior to the conditions of a civilized community (as already defined). Now we have previously shown two things to be true about Royal government, because of its essential nature as the absolute rule by one or a few men radically superior in virtue to the rest, the rest being without sufficient political competence to decide things for the common good: (a) that Royal government is justified *only* by the inferior conditions of a primitive community; (b) that relative to the superior conditions of a civilized community, absolute government is unjust and hence, if absolute rule does occur under such circumstances, it is not Royal, but despotic, government. The second of these points leads necessarily to a third point, viz., (c) that by its very nature Constitutional government (as the limited rule by office-holders who are radically equal in virtue with the ruled, all of whom have sufficient, though not

the same degree of, political competence to decide things for the common good) is not only justified by the superior conditions of a civilized community, but also required in justice by such conditions. If this were not true, it could not be said that, relative to such conditions, absolute government is unjust —not Royal, but despotic. Finally, there is a fourth point: (d) that Constitutional government is not, for the most part, *unjust* relative to primitive conditions; it is only, for the most part, *inexpedient*. It is not unjust to give men functions or responsibilities which they are incompetent to exercise, but it is certainly practically unwise to do so. The reason for the qualifying *ut in pluribus* is that, with respect to the one or few superior men in the primitive community, injustice is done by treating them only as equals with the rest.[540] This qualification does not, however, affect our argument. From the four points noted, we must conclude that that form of government which is justified only by inferior conditions and is actually unjust relative to superior conditions, is absolutely less just than a form of government which justice requires in relation to superior conditions.[541] The conclusion is here stated with complete generality. It obviously applies to Royal and Constitutional government, for they are so related.[542] Hence we conclude that Royal government is inferior to Constitutional government on an absolute scale of justice.

(2) We shall now argue the truth of the judgment that diverse social conditions can be compared as inferior and supe-

[540] Vd. fn. 362 *supra*.

[541] To understand what is here being said, we must carefully distinguish two comparisons which can be made of diverse regimes. (1) We can say that one form of government is better than another *relatively* because it is *more expedient* for these particular conditions, i. e., will more efficiently preserve the existential common good. (2) We can say that one form of government is better than another relatively because it is *more just* for people who are in these particular conditions, i. e., the other and inferior regime would be actually unjust for them. A superior regime *may* be inexpedient for a people in an inferior condition; but an inferior regime will *always* be unjust for a people in a superior condition.

[542] The generality with which the conclusion was first stated reveals it to be applicable to the comparison of the Republican and Democratic forms of Constitutional government as well.

rior. Furthermore, we shall now show that there is no further element of relativity in our comparison of diverse regimes, because it is by the very nature of the state or civil community that we must regard one set of social conditions as *absolutely inferior* to another. The ultimate end of the state or civil society is the happiness of *all* men—not a few men, some men, or most men. The natural happiness of men consists in a good social life, the fullest realization of man's capacity for social living, both intellectually and morally. The inferiority of the domestic and village communities to the civil community resides in the fact that, though they can provide for the daily needs of life, they cannot provide the conditions of the good life, a human life. The good life, in short, can only be led by *civilized* men, and the superior goodness of the civil over all other natural communities lies in the fact that it, and it alone, can civilize men. If this is its ultimate purpose, one measure of its success is the number of men it does in fact civilize—of all those who can be so cultivated. Excluding persons with *abnormal* deficiencies, all the rest of mankind can be civilized. That is the very meaning of normality in any sound view of human nature. Hence it follows that what we have called a civilized community is absolutely superior to what we have called a primitive community. The measure of this superiority is found in the nature of man and in the nature of the state or civil community as an indispensable means to every man's perfection. We must conclude, therefore, that the form of government which justice requires for a superior community is absolutely more just than the form of government which is just *only* in relation to inferior conditions. This conclusion applies to the comparison of Constitutional and Royal regimes.

(3) The foregoing argument is supported by the view we are now taking concerning the facts of historical progress. According to our understanding of the unequal goods which can be achieved by the family, the village, and the state, we must say that there is progress in human affairs when men pass historically from domestic or village communities to civil society. Furthermore, on the Aristotelian hypothesis, there is

progress in civil life according as the state progressively achieves its ultimate aim—to civilize all normal men. Now in its historical occurrence, absolute government first shows itself in domestic and village communities, and passes thence by natural extension to the state in its primitive formation.[543] But though absolute government is naturally proper in the family, and even in the village as an extension of the family, it is anomalous in the civil community because of the ideal condition or end which defines the very nature of the state. Hence it is justified in the state only by the earliest stages of civil development. Unless we deny the reality of progress in human affairs, we are compelled to say that one form of government is absolutely better than another according as it is proper to a higher stage of human progress. But Royal government is proper only at an earlier stage of progress, and Constitutional government is an inevitable accomplishment of later stages. We must conclude, therefore, that Constitutional government is absolutely better than Royal government, and since the goodness of government is to be found in its justice, this means that Constitutional government is superior on an absolute scale of justice.[544]

(4) We have previously separated the generic moral quality common to every form of good government from the special moral qualities with which the particular forms of good government are endowed. That we have done by distinguishing the

[543] Vd. fn. 371 *supra*. Cf. John Locke, Second Essay *Of Civil Government*, Ch. VIII "Of The Beginning of Political Societies," esp. ¶ 105-112, wherein Locke repeats the Aristotelian account almost in identical terms.

[544] The argument from the facts of progress can also take the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*. The dominion of freedom under absolute government is imperfect; the dominion of freedom under limited government is perfect. Perfect freedom being better than imperfect freedom, it cannot be indifferent whether people pass from perfect to imperfect freedom, or from imperfect to perfect. Since the latter transition is morally better, the transition from Royal to Constitutional government must be hoped for; and, for the opposite reason, the transition from Constitutional government to absolute government must be feared. Hence there is political progress and political regression. But this is impossible unless one form of government is absolutely more just than another. Hence we must conclude that an absolute scale of justice exists, whereon Royal government is inferior to Constitutional government—and it is this which was to be proved.

ideal common good, as *finis causa* and the ultimate term of political progress, from the existential common good, as *finis effectus* and the proximate term of political activity on the part of the rulers and ruled in a particular state. The political agents in any community must not only work to preserve the existential common good, but, so long as improvement in human affairs is possible, they must work to achieve the highest condition of civilization that is attainable—i. e., the ideal common good and, with it, the most complete happiness of mankind.[545] Now by the very nature of Royal government, the rulers are the principal political agents in the community, and are chiefly responsible for the common good. But it is not sufficient if they merely maintain the existing common good. If they make no effort whatsoever to work toward the ideal common good, their government cannot be regarded as just in the generic sense of justice which is the same for all good governments. Absolute rulers who make no effort to improve the condition of their subjects are no better than tyrants, for even though they preserve the existing common good they are exploiting it for their own class interests, for they are trying to maintain their own superiority by doing nothing to reduce the inequality between themselves and the ruled. Tyrants also must preserve the state in existence in order to exploit the fruits of the common good. These things being so, it belongs to the generic goodness of the Royal regime as just, for absolute rulers to work for political progress, i. e., to elevate the condition of their subjects, to provide for a wider and more effective distribution of the benefits of civilization, gradually to reduce the original inequality between themselves and the ruled, and so to prepare for the transition from Royal to Constitutional government, and with it the elevation of the ruled from the imperfect freedom of subjection to the perfect freedom of citizenship. In brief, Royal government, like all government, must work for political progress. The point of the argument is that in the case of Royal government, political progress means the elimination of Royal in

[545] For the adequate statement of this analysis, vd. Part II, *supra*, in THE THOMIST, III, 4, pp. 621-24; 635-52.

favor of Constitutional government. Royal government, in other words, is unjust unless it strives to replace itself by Constitutional government.

The fact that such changes cannot usually be accomplished within the lifetime of a single Royal ruler, and not perhaps in any period of time short of centuries, does not affect the argument. The force of the argument remains so long as two premises are true: (a) that just government must work for the improvement, as well as for the preservation, of the common good, i. e., must aim at the ideal common good which is the ultimate term of the state's development in its mission to provide all men with the benefits of civilization; (b) that all normal men are capable of being civilized, which means that the radical inequality in competence, as between rulers and ruled in a truly Royal regime, must be understood as an inequality in habit, not in power, and so is capable of being reduced to an inequality in the degree to which the same habits are shared by all. On these two premises, it must follow that Royal government is just only if it works to supplant itself by Constitutional government, doing so by gradually elevating the society from primitive to civilized conditions, and gradually effacing the radical inequality in habit as between the one or the few and the many. But if it is just for Royal government to seek to replace itself by Constitutional government, and if Royal government is unjust unless it so endeavors, then we must conclude that Constitutional government is absolutely superior to Royal government on the scale of justice, for unless this were so, it would be unthinkable that Constitutional government should be the proximate goal toward which Royal government is morally obliged to work.[546]

[546] We have said that absolute rulers who do not attempt to improve the conditions of the ruled even though that necessarily means the ultimate demise of Royal government are like tyrants who preserve the common good only to exploit it for their own interests. This enables us to see another way in which the injustice of despotism can occur. Up to this point we have defined despotism as the first corruption of Constitutional government—the injustice of substituting an absolute rule over a community whose conditions demand the justice of Constitutional government. But now we can see that despotism may also occur if Royal govern-

The truth of this conclusion requires us to deny the prevalent supposition that every form of just government has a right to do everything it can to maintain itself. Quite on the contrary, if it is not the most just form of government it must do everything it can to replace itself by a superior regime. To fail in this, or worse, to violate this obligation, is a tyrannical misuse of power, for it is acting against the ideal common good. The historical record is, unfortunately, replete with evidence of such tyranny on the part of Royal rulers who not only failed to foster education, but strove to prevent the dissemina-

ment refuses to give way to the demand for Constitutional government at that point in the development of a community when a sufficiently large part of the population has been prepared for citizenship, and when there is no longer a radical inequality in competence between the absolute rulers and a large number of their subjects. In such a situation, the absolute rulers cease to embody the goodness of the Royal regime, justified as it is only by inferior conditions which no longer exist, and they must be regarded as despots. This is the despotism of unjustified absolute government, even though it is not the corruption of Constitutional government. As absolute government can be tyrannical by failing to work for progress, so it it can be despotic by refusing to acknowledge progress once achieved. The application of these two points throws great light on the moral aspects of the great struggle between absolute and limited government with the progressive dissolution of the *regimen regale et politicum* in the transition from mediaeval to modern times. Vd. 446 and 454 *supra*. There can be little question that the kings of England and France who tried to be absolute rulers by dissolving the *regimen regale et politicum* into what they conceived as a purely Royal regime were both tyrannical and despotic.

Vd. *Essay on Representative Government*, where at the end of Chapter II, Mill writes: "It is, then, impossible to understand the question of the adaptation of forms of government to states of society without taking into account not only the next step, but all the steps which society has yet to make; both those which can be foreseen, and the far wider range which is at present out of sight. It follows, that to judge of the merits of forms of government, an ideal must be constructed of the form of government, most eligible in itself, that is, which, if the necessary conditions existed for giving effect to its beneficial tendencies, would, more than all others, favor and promote not some one improvement, but all forms and degrees of it. This having been done, we must consider what are the mental conditions of all sorts, necessary to enable this government to realize its tendencies, and what, therefore, are the various defects by which a people is made incapable of reaping its benefits. It would then be possible to construct a theorem of the circumstances in which that form of government may wisely be introduced; and also to judge, in cases in which it had better not be introduced, what inferior forms of polity will best carry those communities through the intermediate stages which they must traverse before they can become fit for the best form of government."

tion of culture, repressed the beginning of popular engagement in political discussion, exercised a self-serving censorship over books and other avenues of communication, and regarded the printing press as the fountainhead of sedition.[547] The enlightenment of the people can be called "subversive" only by tyrants. Absolute rulers who are truly Royal, neither tyrannical nor despotic, must undertake the civil cultivation of their subjects, not in spite of its tending to undermine absolute government by removing the need for it, but precisely because of such tendency. Now the first effect of such cultivation is to prepare a large enough number of men—though perhaps far from all—for the status of citizenship by giving them the political competence which before only the rulers had. When this happens, Constitutional government is not only possible, but necessary. Continuing past this point, absolute government ceases to be Royal and becomes despotic.[548]

(5) Confirming the previous argument is the fact that the sort of competence which absolute rulers are supposed to have, the virtue needed to decide things for the common good, is not

[547] To take the most glaring example of many in modern history, the absolute rule of the Czars of imperial Russia was not despotism during all the centuries in which the vast masses of the Russian population were totally unprepared for Constitutional government. But it was more than tyrannical in the usual sense of reducing the people from the imperfect freedom of subjection to the indignity of servitude. It was vicious in the more profound sense that the Czars opposed every motion toward enlightenment on the part of the people, arising from whatever source. Instead of working for the peaceful evolution from Royal to Constitutional government, their repressive measures, unable to curtail the underground spread of political education, inevitably culminated in the violent revolution of 1905. At that point, their refusal to see, except at the point of a gun, that some portion of their subjects (however small against the vast background of the silent masses) were now ready for a measure of Constitutional government, is a flagrant example of the despotism of an absolute regime unwilling to recognize that its community has now progressed to a condition which demands, at least, the intermediate *regimen regale et politicum*. Cf. fn. 546 *supra*.

[548] Vd. fn. 546 *supra*. The general principle here enunciated applies to the *regimen regale et politicum*, as well as to purely Royal government. At a certain point, even the persistence of the intermediate regime, when it should be dissolved in favor of purely Constitutional government, indicates the attempt of kings to preserve the absoluteness of their powers, and so the *regimen regale et politicum* becomes despotic in part—i. e., in its Royal aspect. Cf. Section 4, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 751 ff.

so abnormal that only one or a few men in any community can ever be expected to possess or attain it. We shall not here argue what we think to be true, namely, that all men who are not abnormal are endowed with a human nature whose normal powers can be cultivated by habits which are the virtues of citizenship—of *actively* participating in government for the common good. The whole truth need not be argued until we undertake to prove that Democracy is the ultimate term of progress in the development of Constitutional government. Here, considering only the Constitutional regime generically as the term of progress at which Royal government must aim, we need simply argue that a large enough number of the men who are subjected by absolute rule can become radically equal in habit with their absolute rulers, to make unjust the inequality of status that is the essence of absolute government. The proposition we must appeal to is, therefore, less difficult to prove than the proposition we have previously stated as a premise in our argument.[549] The proposition we must appeal to seems to us to be amply proved by the facts of history. Communities have been able to advance from a primitive to a civilized condition precisely because the virtue of ruling as well as obeying for the common good has been attainable by more than one or a few men.

To think that the Royal regime need never be superseded by Constitutional government is not only to deny such facts, but also to become involved in a profound theoretical error. That

[549] Vd. the premise marked as (b) in (4) *supra*: "that *all* normal men are capable of being civilized, which means that the radical inequality in competence, as between rulers and ruled in a Royal regime, must be understood as an inequality in habit, not in power, and so is capable of being reduced to an inequality in the degree to which the same habits are shared by all." Furthermore, it should be noted that an inequality in the intensity of the same habits is granted as always remaining, always irreducible because of individual differences in the degree of human powers. But such inequality is the basis, not for the distinction between absolute rulers and their subjects, but for the distinction among men, all of whom rightly enjoy the equality of citizenship, which deserves for some of these the honor and obligations of governmental office. To say that the virtue proper to citizenship enables all who possess it actively to participate in government for the common good is not to say that any citizen is equally competent with any other to discharge the duties of every governmental office set up by the constitution.

error consists in supposing that absolute rule is necessitated and justified by a *fixed,* natural inequality among men, rather than by an alterable inequality, due not to nature but to the development of nature's powers. In the domestic community, the absolute rule of the father over his children is necessitated and justified by the immaturity of those he governs for their own good. But how is immaturity to be understood except as a developmental condition, a privation of the habits which, with time and training, can be formed, because the powers of the normal child are radically equal with the powers of the parent. The duties of the parent are not only to care for the child during his immaturity and to protect him against his lack of prudence, but also—more positively and most essentially—to educate the child to become a man. The child is simply an imperfect man, which would not be true were there a radical inequality in power between child and adult.[550] The imperfect freedom of subjection is proper to the developmental condition of the child as an imperfect man.

What is thus seen to be true in the domestic community is no less true in the civil community, though it is less likely to be seen because the development of a people out of political immaturity may take many generations, even centuries, whereas the growth of a child is a phenomenon so obvious that it cannot be overlooked by anyone. The slowness of the comparable development of a people, the length of time required and the magnitude of the growing pains, have caused many astute thinkers and honest observers in the past to overlook the parallel between the growth of a child and the maturation of a people.

[550] As we have previously seen, the parent who is unwilling to acknowledge that his children have become mature and his equals, hence no longer subject to his absolute rule, is a domestic despot. Vd. fn. 312 *supra.* But he is a tyrant if, during their childhood, he does nothing to develop their powers, or even interferes with their education because it threatens his absolute domination over them. Cf. fn. 547 *supra.* The parental obligation to serve the good of his children involves more than caring for them during the period of their insufficiency; it involves the requirement that he do everything he can to remedy their incompetence. Vd. John Locke, Second Essay *Of Civil Government,* Ch. VI "Of Paternal Powers," and especially ¶ 67, 69, 74.

Looking only at the situation in their own day, and lacking sufficient historical perspective, they supposed that the politically immature were, unlike the child, not merely undeveloped, but incapable of development. They naturally concluded that political progress was impossible, because the type of regime required and justified by the existing inequalities among men would always be requisite and just. In the light of historical information now available, no person alive today can be excused for holding this false conclusion on a supposition so plainly contrary to fact. We can see that a politically immature people are like children, not in age, but in stage of development. Though they are chronologically adult, all sorts of *contingent* factors have cooperated to prevent their normal powers from being normally developed—economic hardships which gave them little or no leisure, fixed social stratifications which restricted their opportunities and set up barriers to communication, educational inadequacies, and cultural superstitions. That such factors are contingent means that they are remediable. They are rooted in the contingencies of history, not in the necessities of nature. Whereas the maturation of a child is partly a matter of natural growth, and only partly dependent on extrinsic influences, the maturation of a people through the centuries is entirely a matter of historical growth, entirely dependent on the efficacy of the cultural and civilizing forces that can be brought to bear.

So long as a people is, for the most part, culturally immature, the imperfect freedom of subjection is proper to their imperfect stage of development. The absolute character of Royal rule is justified, for what Yves Simon has called "substitutional authority" must be exercised in the government of those who cannot govern themselves—the child, for his own good; an immature people, for their common good.[551] But the very aptness of the name Simon has applied to the sort of authority exercised by a father in the household and a Royal regime in the state

[551] Vd. our prior discussion of Simon's distinction between "substitutional authority" and "essential authority" in Section 4 *supra*, in THE THOMIST, IV, 4, pp. 715 ff.

indicates that it *should* disappear. It is a *temporary substitute* for the prudence lacking in the immature. When with maturation—in the short span of childhood or in the centuries of historical growth—the ruled attain the habits of their rulers, no substitute for their deficiency is any longer needed, and the substitutional authority of absolute government should vanish, leaving in its place the essential authority of government, which is required by the fact that, even in a community of equals, there always remains the need for some unity of decision concerning the common good. As we have seen, the substitutional authority of the Royal regime *virtually* contains, and so conceals, the essential authority which belongs generically to every type of just government. The very nature of a civil community makes government indispensable, and so requires the institution of essential authority. But substitutional authority is not required by the *nature of the state*, any more than it is required by the *nature of the ruled.* It is warranted only by a phase in the historical development of both the state itself and its people.

Hence we must conclude that, even as subjection is an imperfect condition of freedom in the ruled, so Royal government is an imperfect form of civil government because, due to historic contingencies and not to the nature of the state itself or the essential nature of government, it requires the rulers to exercise substitutional as well as essential civil authority. By the same reasoning, we know that Constitutional or Political government, exercising only an essential authority, is proper to the nature of the state, and perfectly embodies the essence of civil government. But the nature of the state and of government provides us with an absolute standard for measuring the goodness of diverse regimes. Therefore, our conclusion that the Royal regime is imperfect government for a civil community, and Political government perfect, is equivalent to the proposition to be proved, namely, that Constitutional government is absolutely superior to Royal government, and such superiority must be expressed in terms of greater absolute justice.

(6) In an earlier discussion we argued against those who might say that absolute government is not just at all—that it

is never Royal but always despotic—on the ground that it violates certain conditions which must be respected by every type of good government: namely, that the ultimate source of civil authority is naturally vested in the community, and must be derived therefrom for the rulers to have it justly; that in this sense there must always be popular sovereignty; and that the ruler must always, therefore, operate as a vicegerent. We defended the Royal regime as having the goodness common to all just government by applying Yves Simon's distinction between substitutional and essential authority to show how Royal authority is, at least in part, derived from the community in so far as it is essential, and in part derived from the superiority of the rulers in so far as it is substitutional. And this led us furthermore to see the distinctions between perfect and imperfect modes of popular sovereignty, and between a perfect and an imperfect exercise of vicegerency.[552] Because it involves popular sovereignty only in an imperfect mode, and because it involves a sovereign man who is imperfectly a vicegerent, we must conclude that the Royal regime participates incompletely in the goodness common to all just government. That absolute government can have such goodness to some extent shows it not to be despotic by its very essence, but only so when conditions do not justify it. But that absolute government has such goodness *only to some extent*, even when conditions justify it, shows that Royal government is essentially imperfect, and so absolutely inferior to the Constitutional regime which perfectly embodies the goodness of government.[553] These considerations,

[552] Vd. Section 4 *supra, loc. cit.*, at pp. 713-19.

[553] Vd. *Essay on Representative Government*, where at the opening of Chapter III on the ideally best form of government, Mill writes: "It has long (perhaps throughout the entire duration of British freedom) been a common saying, that if a good despot could be ensured, despotic monarchy would be the best form of government." Mill means by "despotic monarchy" an absolute form of government, which would be a truly Royal regime on the supposition of a "good despot." He goes on to say: "I look upon this as a radical and most pernicious misconception of what good government is; which, until it can be got rid of, will fatally vitiate all our speculations on government."

It is this very misconception which prevails throughout the history of political theory, originating with Plato and Aristotle in so far as they permitted themselves

therefore confirm all our previous reasoning and make unavoidable the conclusion that Royal government is absolutely less just than Constitutional.

(7) Finally, we return to the argument with which we began this discussion. The fact that Royal government can become corrupt *only* through the injustice of simple tyranny, whereas Constitutional government can become corrupt through the injustice of despotism as well as the injustice of tyranny, and through these two injustices combined in despotic tyranny, conclusively shows that the justice of Royal government must be simple, i. e., determined by a single principle; whereas the justice of Constitutional government must be complex, i. e., determined by at least two principles which, furthermore, are separable from one another, and cumulatively combinable. If these two principles were not separable and combinable, despotism could not be separated from tyranny, as in fact it can be, nor could they be combined in despotic tyranny, as in fact they

to speculate about an impracticable ideal of government—impracticable because based on a fallacious supposition, namely, that the perfection possible in Divine government is a measure of the goodness in imperfect human government. When Mill formulates the ideal of government, he projects a thoroughly practicable ideal, capable of being achieved by human beings as they are or can be. "The ideally best form of government," he says, "is that in which the sovereignty . . . is vested in the entire aggregate of the community, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to take actual part in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general" (*ibid.*). These words define only the generic form of Constitutional government, but if they are understood to imply, as in Mill's view they did, that every normal man is entitled to be a citizen, then they define the ultimate ideal of Democracy as the highest species of Constitutional government. That generic Constitutional government is absolutely superior to Royal government is only the first step in the demonstration that Democracy is supreme.

What is most important about Mill's style of thinking here is, first, that he conceives the ideal as a *practical possibility*, and not in terms of fictitious suppositions, or by reference to a purely *theoretic* comparison of Divine and human; and second, that in praising one form of government as the ideal he does not regard all inferior forms as totally corrupt. These two qualities make him truer to Aristotelian principles than Aristotle was, or, shall we say, than certain passages in Aristotle's *Politics* were. They show his thinking about political problems to be thoroughly practical and with an eye on history, never deflected by the mirage of what the state might be like if men were not men, nor confused in its ordering of human regimes by purely *theoretic*, and therefore irrelevant, comparisons between Divine and human government.

have been. These things being so, it must follow that a regime, the goodness of which combines two principles of justice, is absolutely superior to a regime which is good through only one of these; and so we conclude that Constitutional government is absolutely more just than Royal.

The reason why we left this argument until the end is not that it is the weakest. On the contrary, it is the strongest, going to the very essence of the matter, because it argues in terms of the principles of justice which are intrinsic to the goodness of diverse regimes. But the argument cannot be adequately stated without a fairly elaborate inquiry into the nature of political justice.

It is not enough to name and distinguish the injustice of tyranny and of despotism, to show that they are separable and combinable. It is necessary to name and distinguish the principles of justice to which tyranny and despotism are respectively opposed, and to explain how they can exist separately and how they can be combined. There are two sorts of difficulties to be clarified here: (1) those arising from the fact that the justice of diverse regimes must be considered both relatively and absolutely, whereas the injustice of perverted govrnment is always to be understood relatively to the government being corrupted and the conditions which justify that form of government at a given time and place; and (2) those arising from the traditional theory of justice, with its conventional distinctions between general and special justice, commutative and distributive justice. In this second connection, it will be necessary to separate justice as a subjective virtue from justice as the objective quality of law, constitutions, and governmental institutions generally; it will be necessary to distinguish natural from conventional justice; to show the relationship of justice to the common good, on the one hand, and to its foundation in objective equalities and inequalities on the other; and, above all, to expand the account of distributive justice beyond the field of economic goods to which it is usually restricted.

Since our analysis of the moral hierarchy of the forms of

government cannot be completed here; since it remains to be proved that Democracy is most just absolutely, because it is more just absolutely than Republican government, even as Constitutional government generically is absolutely more just than Royal government; and since the truth of the historical hypothesis underlying the theory of the *relative justification* of inferior regimes, remains to be examined; we think it advisable to postpone the solution of these difficulties, of the two sorts aforementioned, until we have completed our analysis in Part V, there undertaking the final steps in our demonstration of Democracy. Thus we shall avoid needless repetition. Moreover, we shall have before us in Part V all the remaining arguments concerning the superiority of one regime over another which, with those now completed, will need to be understood in terms of an adequate theory of political justice.

That such understanding has not yet been achieved does not, however, invalidate the distinction between the Royal and Political regimes, the analysis of which we have now finished; nor does it diminish the probative force of the arguments we have presented, in the light of that analysis, proving that Constitutional is absolutely more just than Royal government. The demonstration of that conclusion, taken together with our argument that, relative to certain specified conditions, absolute government is justified and has, *to some extent*, the goodness common to all just regimes, sufficiently answers the objection of Father Parsons and others who, faithful to the fallacious sixfold classification of the much too simple "traditional picture," erroneously suppose that the several good regimes are morally indifferent, more or less expedient under different circumstances, but never absolutely more or less just than one another.

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(*To be continued.*)

BOOK REVIEWS

Archaeology and the Religion of Israel. By WILLIAM F. ALBRIGHT. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942. Pp. 238, with index. $2.25.

This companion volume to *From the Stone Age to Christianity* presents to the reading public the 1941 Ayer Lectures of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School. The author purposes "to follow the evolution of the human mind in the Near East . . . nothing less than the ultimate reconstruction, as far as possible, of the route which our cultural ancestors traversed in order to reach Judaeo-Christian heights of spiritual insight and ethical monotheism" (p. 4).

Any insistence upon the many excellent features of this book would be superfluous, for here as always the author maintains his high standards of work. It would be difficult to find elsewhere such a competent, thorough, and palatable presentation of archaeological data connected with the Scriptures. The bibliography is exhaustive and the index all that it should be.

The first chapter, dealing with the Near Eastern mind, is followed by a valuable account of the various archaeological and epigraphical discoveries at Ras Shamra, Mari, Accad, Gezer, Lachish, Egypt, Boghazköy, etc.; these form the background for the subsequent discussion of Old Testament religion, which alone is dealt with in this book. Next comes a study of the religion of the Canaanites, with its many and mysterious gods, Baals, and the goddesses Astarte, Anath, and Asherah; the chapter then concludes with some indications of the mythological developments and religious practices of these neighbors of the Israelites. The remaining two chapters deal with the religion of the Israelites such as it was at the time of the conquest, as it was during the brilliant period of organization under David and through the commercially splendid reign of Solomon up to the end of the dual monarchy. The temple which was a powerful unifying force in the nation receives a rather detailed description in a section which provides much information concerning the function of the Sea and of the twin pillars Jachin and Boaz, etc.

In conclusion, the author holds that the substantial historicity of the Old Testament tradition has been generally confirmed by archaeology. Judaeo-Christianity stands out as a phenomenon of the historical order, and the Israelite faith was "much closer to Christianity and rabbinic Judaism, than to the basically prelogical religions of the ancient Near East" (p. 177). The traditional position has always been that the faith of Israel was of a superior ethical content and deeper spiritual insight than the religions of the surrounding nations; similarly traditional is the position that there was a doctrinal development in Judaism, culminating in the revelation made by Christ, in Whom the old religion is fulfilled. Much of the great value of this book lies in the fact that these positions

are confirmed by the latest developments of research. As in his previous volume, the author holds that "monotheism formed an essential part of Mosaic religion from the beginning," but it did not become explicit "until after the dawn of the logical age about the sixth century B. C." (p. 177). He likewise declares that the prophets of Israel were reformers and preachers of penance, not religious innovators. In these opinions regarding monotheism and the rôle of the prophets, Mr. Albright differs sharply from most of the non-Catholic Biblical scholars, who arbitrarily hold that monotheism was the result of prophetical activity and therefore quite late in Israelite history.

The astonishing mass of details and facts contained in this book is informed by a rational spirit which while it may at times approach the Faith, nevertheless inevitably leads to conclusions which are opposed to those of the Faith, and consequently cannot be rational. In other words, Mr. Albright's explanations are not always commensurate with the Faith, a fact which does not obligate him to accept the Faith, but should at least indicate that his scientific study is not carried out in its light. This is important for the readers, and for the author too, for this book deals much with religion, revelation, and primitive theology. From a purely natural or rational point of view, theology would only be the result of a rational evolution, of which man would be the beginning and end; the supernatural therefore would be either a myth or something irrational, and in any case, negligible. Actually the supernatural is something superior to reason but not destructive of it, and its recognition is essential for a correct evaluation both of man and of religious history.

The initial chapter states that primitive man, upon leaving the world of everyday activity, "enters the magical world of prelogical thought, a world where the logical principles of identity and contradiction are flouted constantly." The proof of this extraordinary statement would be in the reading of the many recently discovered or deciphered texts of a religious nature. Thus, for example, the mythological texts present deities who are male and female, god or goddess, etc., at different times or simultaneously (p. 27 *sq.*).

To conclude from such texts that primitive man was prelogical in the sense just mentioned, and further to add that religion would not have come into being but for this preliminary prelogical probation (p. 29), is not only contrary to the Faith, which teaches that Adam was created a perfect man endowed with grace and the gifts of the Holy Ghost, but also illogical and a purely arbitrary conclusion which cannot be the correct interpretation of facts. It overlooks the simple but important fact that symbols proper to religious thought (words and names both being symbols) cannot adequately exhaust or represent the idea of God, since they signify things by concepts which are not proper to them. Thus when we speak of the "arm of God" we cannot take these words in their proper literal signification,

for God is a spirit; yet the meaning is clear, for the words do express a real perfection or quality of God, namely His power. An " arm " is not proper to Him, but it is to us, and we understand something of God by using this term which is proper to us but not to God.

It is true that primitive man spoke of his god as being at one and the same time male and female, or lord of death and giver of fertility, healer and destroyer, etc. To understand these words literally would indeed eliminate the principle of contradiction, but there is no reason to assume that primitive man intended so to be understood. If he was always a rational animal—as we hold—and did not first acquire the characteristic of rationality and then proceed to transmit it, then there is reason to suspect that he had great respect for the principles of identity, contradiction, and causality. In no case do we attempt to prove that he acquired these principles, which are so self-evident that they defy proof; and yet the most naive child can appreciate them. To discover that primitive writers refer to a god now as a father, now as a mother, or both together, is no proof that they were unaware of the basic principles so essential to thought, since their words are susceptible of another explanation.

Thus, a supernatural truth held only symbolically is understood in a confused way, not " prelogically." The perfection of literal truth, in which alone there is no literal contradiction, is not commensurate with rationality, but with the consideration of science. But by " prelogical " Mr. Albright means prerational, and so is wrong inasmuch as the principle of contradiction is not the fruit of logical perfection, but the first principle attained in the natural consequences of this principle as it relates to second intentions as they are ordered to demonstrative science. Man is *per se* logical, not as a being who by his nature *has* the perfection of logic, but as *able* to attain this perfection by his nature, i. e., reason.

If then primitive man referred to his god as a man, or father, he meant simply that his god was strong and powerful, as a man is strong; if the same god was called woman or mother, it meant that the god was fecund as a mother. He possessed in himself and in an eminent way all the perfections which men and women possess separately. Certainly primitive man was not to be taken in by his own symbols, and the fact that he used them as he did does not constitute proof that he flouted the principle of contradiction. On the other hand, all the evidence, according to our explanation which is commensurate with the teachings of the Faith, points to the existence of a primitive revelation. By this is meant that there was once a time when man, Adam, closer to God and made in His image, was taught directly many things by divine revelation. Such knowledge became progressively obscured in the course of time, and when we peer into the past by means of the inscriptions provided by archaeology, we discover that some of those we call primitives, instead of applying to one God all due perfection, had lost the idea of one God and had distributed

His perfections over the personnel of a whole pantheon. From time to time, at intervals determined by divine Providence, the primitive belief concerning one God received fresh impetus by renewed revelations; it does not seem necessary to hold that the true idea of God ever completely died out at any one time. One of these revelations was that granted to Moses, and its importance lies in the fact that this revelation is preserved clear and unique, shining like a single star in the gloomy heavens, in the Scriptures.

We have gone to some length in discussing primitive revelation, because it may be advanced as consonant with the Faith and as an adequate explanation of the facts; whereas the proposed theory of evolution is not. Instead of evolution pursuing a steady upward course, there might well have been another type in which there first occurred a deterioration or fall, followed by repeated rises and falls. However, Mr. Albright states: " I do not mean to place prelogical mentality on a lower plane than logical, except with reference to their relative positions in the scale of human evolution " (p. 184, n. 64).

If now he means (apparently he does not) that prelogical man was no different from a brute, then there can be no question or discussion of principles, for however much a brute may approach the perfection of man, there remains always an infinite distance between mere animality and rational animality. If, however, he means that prelogical man is capable of reasoning, but only in a crude or elementary fashion, that among men there is a difference of degree but not of kind of rationality, this can be admitted, but then the merest prudence demands that his basic theory be proved, principally that part of it which is contrary to the Faith, namely, evolution, which, however often affirmed, has never yet been demonstrated to satisfaction.

The real issue, however, which is not of Faith but in the natural order as a preamble to the Faith, is the question: is theology a product of the developed human intellect, having its beginnings in the crude explanations of " primitive man " or is it, as Faith, a gift from God? In the first case we should have man as the principle and end of all theology, which is a species of idolatry; in the second, we should have God as complete and supreme ruler of His universe, and man as His creature to whom intimate revelations have been made concerning God Himself. Of the two positions, only the latter is defensible, truly rational, and specifically Christian, and it is not the position of Mr. Albright, who is rather a " Liberal," which means that his book lacks the integration of a single principle.

However, aside from the philosophical and theological implications of his work, *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel* deserves high praise and is a worthy companion to *From the Stone Age to Christianity*.

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BRIEF NOTICES

A History of Social Thought. By Paul Hanly Furfey. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. Pp. xiii + 468. $2.75.

Father Furfey gives two reasons for attempting to summarize the whole history of social thought in a single volume. The first is that social thought is an enormously important subject, both theoretically and practically, and no one has previously written the history of social thought so broadly conceived as it is in this volume; and secondly, even among those works which have given the subject a narrower definition, none has been written from the Catholic viewpoint. These are excellent reasons, and ample justification for a book ambitiously conceived and painstakingly written.

According to the author, the history of social thought is "the crystallized social experience of the race." It may be either formal or informal—the formal embracing books written with the conscious purpose of discussing society, the latter including "all social thought which is not explicitly labeled as such," as a code of laws, literature, a campaign speech or international treaty. This concept of social thought at once sharply differentiates the history from others bearing a like title, and obscures, by its very enormity, the field of investigation. The criterion of selectivity is the historical importance of the doctrine; those doctrines are included which have influenced a considerable number of human societies through the course of history.

Beginning with primitive social thought as revealed in the dim light of prehistoric archaeology and ethnology, Dr. Furfey surveys the ancient Near East, examines the social doctrine of the Old Testament, the Far East, Greece and Rome, the New Testament. After a too brief treatment of the thought of the Church Fathers through the medieval synthesis in St. Thomas Aquinas, the author treats the rise of bourgeois and scientific naturalism, the Age of Reason and the Revolutionary Epoch, Democracy, Nationalism, Industrialism and the Era of "Progress," to attain contemporaneity with chapters on the rise of academic sociology and the period of "The Great Disillusionment" (1914-1939). A very helpful bibliographical essay concludes the book.

Is Modern Culture Doomed? By Andrew J. Krzesinski, Ph. D., S. T. D. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1942. Pp. xiv + 158. $2.00.

The author points out the coexistence of two cultures which underlie the surface of modern Western Civilization. One of these, tra-

ditional culture, finds its highest development in Christianity; the other, anti-traditional or materialistic culture, is fundamentally different since it discounts all spiritual values and seeks the enjoyment of earthly goods as the sole aim of human existence. The author then reviews briefly the historical development of materialism from the ancient Hindus to the belligerent materialism of Communism.

The major portion of his work then follows and endeavors to clarify the characteristics of materialistic culture. The features of modern materialistic culture as discoverable by an analysis of modern man with reference to himself are: 1. anthropocentrism; 2. autonomism; 3. individualism. Consequent upon man's relation to reality they are: 1. limitarianism, by which the author designates modern man's phenomenalism or lack of transcendentalism; 2. mechanization, which is seen to be detrimental to man; 3. atheism; 4. egoism, which is the chief cause of the social problem and the hostility of nations towards each other; 5. solidarity or collectivism, which is caused by man's recognition of his individual weakness and his attempt to fight against the menacing individualism of the powerful and wealthy. The ideals of modern man reveal the following features: 1. scientism; 2. realism in literature and art; 3. the cult of money; 4. the cult of the body; 5. hedonism; 6. sexualism; 7. the cult of collectivism; 8. the cult of nation. The psychic state and mental disposition of modern man are characterized by 1. inconstancy; 2. dissatisfaction; 3. lack of joy.

Modern materialistic culture is in an extremely critical condition, despite the apparent progress as measured by technological developments, because it has deprived man of his spiritual and moral values. So tragic is its predicament that many philosophers such as Spengler see only a complete collapse and place their hope for the future in the culture of the Far East. The author, however, takes an optimistic view of the situation which is based on two reasons. First, there is an innate instinct of self-defense in nations as well as individuals which reacts against the enemy of their well-being. He finds this law confirmed by the history of every nation although he admits that in some nations the crisis terminated fatally because the nation advanced beyond the stage where an internal restoration was possible. Secondly, the bankruptcy of materialistic culture is the best possible justification for Christian culture. Furthermore, divine providence brings good out of evil. The author interprets this to mean that the human race will develop more perfectly, religion will take deeper root, Communism and Nazism will accelerate the reconstruction of a just social order. Germany and Russia will emerge with greater respect for religion and moral values. Signs of a religious revival are discernible in Europe and America. The darkness of the present hour is that of the hour before dawn.

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THE THOMIST

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PEN AND SWORD VERSUS GOD

PEN and sword used to mean two different things. This is no longer the case in the dominant thought of our times. Swords and pens, and the diversities of created perfections generally, have all been levelled off to one thing. That thing is a very indefinite one, but it does not permit of a plurality of being. The comparative, which of its nature implies at least two things, and which was employed so forcefully by Bulwer-Lytton in his aphorism, "The pen is mightier than the sword," has been suppressed so that only the element common to all things now remains. This sort of mutilation is being perpetrated consistently in every department of modern thought. Whether it be a question of the arts, such as music, painting, and literature; or of philosophy, as in psychology, mathematics, and metaphysics; or whether it be a question of theology and essential education, the results are ever the same, namely, a suppression of the diversity of created perfections with the consequent fusion of all things into one thing. It is neither necessary nor opportune within the limited scope of a single article to verify this assertion in all the afore-mentioned

departments of modern thought. We shall confine ourselves here to the realm of theology.[1]

We select theology on account of its peculiar adaptations for the designs and devices of the moderns. They see the thread of unity, namely, the unity of order to an ultimate in all created things, and in this they are entirely correct in their appraisal; but they close their eyes and minds to the multiplicity of created perfections upon which that order must necessarily be founded, and in this they are perniciously erroneous. For theology, as St. Thomas and the Fathers of the Church conceived it, is a science about God and all His creatures as ordered to Him under the supernatural viewpoint of faith.[2] It is the business of theology, therefore, not merely to penetrate the ultimate order of things which refers them all to the common source and end, namely, God, but also to show a scrupulously just regard for the essences of things in their created reality as generically, specifically, and individually distinct from each other. It is especially on account of theology's concern for this order in things that it lends itself so readily to the logical manipulations of the moderns.

However, to neglect either of the aforesaid phases of reality can lead only to a sterile and perverse theology. This is precisely what the modern despoilers of truth are doing with a diabolical cleverness inherited from the past four or five centuries of ruinous thought and rhetoric. They dwell upon the ultimate order of things, therefore they are theologians.[3] Theirs

[1] The other extreme opposing this source of modern errors is to rest or linger unduly on the created essences of things, by emphasizing their special diversities to the neglect of their order to the *Maximum*, and thereby suppressing the true concept of analogy from the opposite angle in making all things, including God and creatures, univocal or else equivocal. This is a mistake which even those who profess themselves Thomists frequently fall into. To verify this tendency, however, among modern Thomists is outside the purpose of this particular article.

[2] *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 7.

[3] "The new philosophy . . . , being evolved from the nature of religion, has in itself the true essence of religion,—is, in its very quality as a philosophy, a religion also." Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, translated from the 2nd German Edition by Marian Evans (George Eliot), New York, 1855. Preface to the Second Edition, p. 13. (All references to the Preface are taken from this transla-

is, however, a perverse theology not only because their ultimate is a vague, indefinite something akin to prime matter, nature or their unqualified absolute and not the One True God, but also because they proceed to level off the diversity of created perfections in things and confuse them with their indeterminate ultimate. With such a simple device as this the moderns have carried forward a ceaseless campaign of exploitation of the truths of faith and reason. Their conspiracy has all of the plausibility of a church revival on account of its supporting element of truth, namely, the order that really exists in things, which they play up with a great show of modesty only to dupe the unsuspecting reader or listener into their skeptical and ruinous frame of mind. The poisonous pen and the bloody sword on account of their potentiality for coordination have lost their peculiar identities in the single cause of the modern revolutionaries, which is avowedly or unavowedly none other than the ruin of Christianity.[4] With what measure of success they have accomplished this evil purpose is manifest on every front of modern life.

In order that we may not be summarily accused of indulging in harmless generalities with our heads in the clouds, we shall take a concrete case typical of almost innumerable other possibilities with the purpose of verifying the above thesis. The case we propose for analysis is a book really existing and authentically traceable to an historical person who was undoubtedly a crusader in the cause of modernism. "There are certain books, now lost in the libraries, which three centuries ago caused the revolution which we now behold before our eyes." These words of Lacordaire could very well be applied to the book on which we have decided to base our discussion, even though it dates back only to the last century. We refer to the work of Ludwig Feuerbach entitled *The Essence of Chris-*

tion, because of the impossibility of procuring the German text. The references to the remainder of Feuerbach's work are taken from *Das Wesen des Christentums*, contained in *Sämmtliche Werke, 6 Bd.*, Stuttgart, 1903.)

[4] "Certainly my work is negative, destructive, but, be it observed, only in relation to the *un*human, not to the human elements of religion." Feuerbach, *op. cit.*, Preface, p. 7.

tianity.[5] There are two points, then, to be made concerning this book of Feuerbach's which epitomizes so nicely his entire contribution to modern thought: 1) the method which he employed to accomplish the evil purpose already stated above as identical with the modernistic trend of thought; 2) the allocation and logical function of his work in reference to its bloodline descendants and forebears. These two points once properly evaluated will, we think, not only establish our thesis as enunciated above but will also serve as standards of criticism for other departments of modern thought.

I.

The Method of Feuerbach

Feuerbach's method, in perfect conformity with the best traditions of the moderns, must be labelled as one of exploitation. In other words his major points all usually contain a modicum of truth, just enough, however, to render palatable the poisonous drug of error without impeding its deadly effects upon the uncritical mind. This charge can neither be ignored nor put down as a gratuitous statement.

Note, for example, his point of departure. "My work," says Feuerbach modestly, "contains a faithful, correct translation of the Christian religion, out of the oriental language of imagery into plain speech. The general principles which I premise in the Introduction are no apriori, excogitated propositions, no products of speculation; they have arisen out of the analysis of religion. The ideas are only conclusions, *consequences* drawn from objective facts."[6] He repudiates with horror an absolute, immaterial speculation which is sufficient unto itself. For his thoughts he demands the senses, especially sight. He draws the matter of his thought from the activity of the senses. He calls himself a natural philosopher in the domain of the mind.[7]

[5] *Das Wesen des Christentums*. First published in 1841.

[6] Preface, p. 3.

[7] Preface, p. 4.

"The present work," he says, "contains nothing else than the principle of a new philosophy which has been practically verified, i.e., *in concreto*, in application to a special object, . . . namely, to religion."[8] Thus he enlists the sympathy of the orthodox reader by pretending to ground himself upon fact, experience, and the veracity of the senses. The reader, however, who perseveres to the end of this book will meet more than enough evidence to convince him that Feuerbach's bold stand upon reality is only an attitude, a pretense.

A case in point is his explanation or rather elimination of miracles. He says: "I only show *what* a miracle is, . . . not *apriori*, but by examples of miracles narrated in the Bible as real events. In doing so, however, I answer or rather I preclude the question as to the possibility or reality or necessity of miracle."[9] The result of a miracle, for example, the wine at the marriage of Cana, is not miraculous; it is the procedure which is. "What suggests to man the notion that miracle is conceivable is that miracle is represented as an event perceptible by the sense, and hence *man cheats his reason by material images* which screen the contradiction."[10] The miracle of turning water into wine, for example, implies nothing else than that water is wine. (!) The transformation is only the visible appearance of this identity of two contradictions. This procedure also demands that one transgress specific differences. But this is impossible. (We shall presently see how, in spite of this apparent regard for specific differences, he succeeds in levelling off the diversities of created perfections to one common denominator.) Therefore miracles are impossible. Therefore they are a product of the imagination. But a whole crowd of people have witnessed the same miracle. In that case there is a

[8] Preface, p. 5.

[9] The confident attitude which Feuerbach takes is visible in the lines preceding these words: "I do not inquire what the real, natural Christ was or may have been in distinction from what he has been made or has become in supernaturalism; on the contrary I accept the Christ of religion, but I show that this superhuman being is nothing else than a product and reflex of the supernatural human mind." Preface, p. 13.

[10] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 156. (Italics ours.)

general hallucination. "Miracle presents absolutely nothing else than the sorcery of the imagination which satisfies without contradiction all the wishes of the heart." [11] Miracles, prayer, Providence—the conviction of man of the infinite value of his *own* existence, creation—the first and fundamental miracle, are nothing other than the supernaturalized freedom from Nature, the dominion of self-will over law. This, to Feuerbach, is the essence of Christianity, namely, the exaltation of individuality, egoism, self-will into a God, as against the true divinity and infinity of the species of Nature. This supernatural principle is no other than the principle of subjectivity which in Christianity exalted itself to an unlimited universal monarchy.

Such statements as these on miracles clearly discredit the veracity of the senses as well as Feuerbach's alleged footing upon sensible reality. If a comparison of sense data observed by many individuals is not a secure corrective for the errors of hallucination, then there is no corrective and the reports of our senses are nothing but phases of nature's general conspiracy to delude us in our efforts to penetrate reality. Moreover, a miracle, as we know from St. Thomas [12] and the Vatican Council [13], is a phenomenon whose nature is not directly accessible to the investigation of natural reason. Certainly Feuerbach's attempt to prove the impossibility of miracles by his purely logical device, namely, the supposed impossibility of transgressing specific differences as he puts it, cannot be based upon sensible reality, because sense data cannot yield any such principle. No rational principle drawn from sense channels can establish the impossibility or repugnance of a miracle with respect to divine agency, its proper cause. Therefore this is only a ruse when Feuerbach says he bases himself upon the testimony of the senses. The sound Scholastic principle that all knowledge comes through the senses is, therefore, proposed by Feuerbach

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

[12] *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 105, a. 7; q. 110, a. 4; *De Potentia*, q. 4, a. 2.

[13] *Concilium Vaticanum*: "Miraculum est factum divinum luculenter Dei omnipotentiam commonstrans." Denz., 1790.

not from a conviction of its security as a base of operation but for purposes of exploitation.[14]

This ruse is all the better concealed by his apparent repudiation of other exploiters. He insists, for instance, that the primary postulate in his philosophy is not the *Substance* of Spinoza, not the *Ego* of Kant and Fichte, not the *Absolute Identity* of Schelling, not the *Absolute Mind* of Hegel; it is nothing abstract. It is the *Ens realissimum*—man; its principle is therefore in the highest degree positive and real.[15] We shall have ample occasion to test the sincerity of this testimonial of philosophic orthodoxy later. In his own words he places philosophy in the negation of philosophy.[16] Just what philosophy it is, the negation of which furnishes him with his original postulate, is not difficult to identify. It is not the philosophy of Kant or Hegel or any of the revolutionaries. It is Scholastic philosophy. This new philosophy built upon the negation of philosophy, he tells us, must no longer undergo the temptation of old Catholic Scholasticism or modern Protestant Scholasticism which consists in wishing to prove its agreement with religion by proving its agreement with Christian dogmas.[17] Here indeed is a manifestation of his propensity to deny the diversity in all things, namely, his agility in giving the impression that Catholicism and Protestantism are on an equal footing in their attitude toward dogmas and religion. This is a pretty bit of irony and subtle exploitation as well. He implies that Scholastic philosophy on account of its affinities with Christian dogmas has severed all moorings to the *Ens realissimum* and floats on the dreamy

[14] *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 6, *et passim.*

[15] Preface, p. 6.

[16] "This philosophy does not rest on an Understanding *per se*, on an absolute, nameless, understanding, belonging one knows not to whom, but on the understanding of man; . . . though not, I grant, on that understanding of man enervated by speculation and dogma. Yes, both in substance and in speech it places philosophy in the *negation of philosophy*, i. e., it declares *that* alone to be true philosophy which is converted *in succum et in sanguinem*, which is incarnate in Man; and hence it finds its greatest triumph in the fault that to all dull and pedantic minds . . . it appears to be no philosophy at all." Preface, p. 5.

[17] Preface, p. 13.

clouds of speculation, the very domain in which Feuerbach himself is most at home. These introductory notes upon his primary postulate and point of departure clearly forecast what is to follow in the detailed fabric of his new philosophy.

Religion was assigned as the special object of his work, but this, too, turns out to be fertile soil for exploitation. In the first part of his book he sets out to show what there is of truth in religion: religion is the mirror of humanity.[18] Of course, no treatise on religion can with any show of ease and grace totally ignore Christianity and its founder, Christ. So Feuerbach to make the travesty all the more devastating places the word Christianity in the very title of his book. "My analysis of Christianity is not simply historical," he tells us, "it is rather historico-philosophical."[19] By this he means that the rationalists felt it necessary to attack the historical person of Christ in their efforts to devitalize Christianity, whereas Feuerbach had no need of this expedient since he allows no distinction between the historical or human Christ and the divine Christ.[20] In other words he considers only the order which both the divine and human nature have to the single personality in Christ and levels off the difference between the human and divine natures in Him. The critics and the Christians, therefore, to his way of thinking are substantially in agreement since the human Christ and the divine Christ are entirely the same. Thus Feuerbach can judge all things without leaving his library and carry on his work of exploitation out of the reach of all criticism.

In the second part of his book he continues the role of exploiter by professing to show what there is false in religion.[21]

[18] The work "is therefore divided into two parts. . . . The first exhibits religion in its *essence*, its *truth*, the second exhibits it in *contradictions*. . . . That into which I resolve religion, which I prove to be its true object and substance, (is) namely *man,—anthropology* . . . Preface, p. 8.

[19] Preface, p. 12.

[20] Cf. Note 9 above.

[21] "In the first part I prove that the Son of God is in *religion* a real son, the son of God in the same sense in which man is the son of man, and I find therein the *truth*, the *essence* of religion, that it conceives a profoundly human relation as a divine relation, on the other hand in the second part I show that the Son of God—

Religion, he explains, attributes to a personal God what it should attribute to man himself. This is really a synthesis of Feuerbach's thought: the true sense of theology is anthropology. Thus his levelling device is applied indiscriminately to philosophy and theology, to God and man. On numerous pages of the book is displayed his motto: *Homo homini Deus*; Man is God to himself.[22] By this time it has already become evident in spite of his claims to being a natural philosopher that he is a theologian, but a perverse one. There is, however, a shred of truth in all of this. It is true that religion taken materially and subjectively, that is, what has the appearance of being religion, sometimes attributes to God what should be attributed to man. It is not true that this should always be the case with religion considered objectively and formally, as Feuerbach in his mania for confusing the diversity of created perfections would have us believe. A demented or extremely ignorant person can order blasphemy to God under the influence of a subjective conviction that he is offering up a prayer, but everyone knows that objectively and formally this is not a prayer. It is also true that religion subjectively taken for human activity is a sort of mirror or reflection of human nature. Objectively, however, and from the viewpoint of its motive it is a standard of virtue according to which man's activity must be measured. Thus in his concept of theology Feuerbach has replaced the term analogy with the term anthropology. In his concessions to the

not indeed in religion but in theology, which is the reflection of religion upon itself—is not a son in the natural, human sense, but in an entirely different manner, contradictory to nature and reason, and therefore absurd, and I find in this negation of human sense and human understanding, the negation of religion." (Preface, p. 8.) "I change the object as it is in the imagination into the object as it is in reality." Preface, p. 10.

[22] ". . . God, . . . , the Trinity . . . , the Word of God . . . , are not that which the illusions of theology make them,—not foreign, but native mysteries, the mysteries of human nature." (Preface, p. 9.) "Das Bewusstsein Gottes ist das Selbstbewusstsein des Menschen, die Erkenntnis Gottes, die Selsterkenntnis des Menschen." (*Das Wesen des Christentums*, pp. 15 and 22.) "*Homo homini Deus est*—dies ist der oberste praktische Grundsatz,—dies der Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte." (*Ibid.*, pp. 326, 406, and elsewhere).

truth he always sees to it that error predominates and smothers the truth.

A discussion on religion necessarily implies some idea of the nature of man. So Feuerbach in conformity with his principle makes man God in a few lines and then goes on to create the world. Here again we meet a major travesty on the truth which merits closer attention.

One must begin with the essential nature of man, he informs us correctly, since religion has its foundation in the essential difference between man and the brute, a difference which he will not fail to obliterate in the end. But what is this essential difference? It is the consciousness of self, not the consciousness of self as an individual, because animals have this. Consciousness of self, says Feuerbach, belongs strictly to a being to which its species, its essential nature, is the object of thought. Therefore man has a double life: he has the consciousness of himself as an individual—this is practical life; he has the consciousness of his nature, of his species—this is the life of the intellect.[23] Marx is going to eliminate this distinction between these two lives by reducing man to the level of a beast and the beast to the level of absolute matter according to the Hegelian synthesis. For the moment, however, let us observe how Feuerbach makes error capitalize upon the morsel of truth he has just proposed about man.

Religion, then, he continues, is identical with man's consciousness of his specific nature. However, since religion is nothing but the consciousness of the infinite, man also is infinite in nature.[24] A few lines previous, religion was merely founded

[23] " Die Religion beruht auf dem wesentlichen Unterschiede des Menschen von Thiere. . . . Bewusstsein im strengsten Sinne ist nur da, wo einem Wesen seine Gattung, seine Wesenheit Gegenstand ist. Das Thier ist wohl sich als Individuum—darum hat est Selbstgefühl—aber nicht als Gattung Gegenstand. . . . Im Leben verkehren wir mit Individuen, in der Wissenschaft mit Gattungen." *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.

[24] " Das Wesen des Menschen im Unterschied von Thiere ist nich nur der Grund, sondern auch der Gegenstand der Religion. Aber die Religion ist das Bewusstsein des Unendlichen; sie ist also und kann nichts Anderes sein als das Bewusstsein des Menshen von seinem und zwar nicht endlichen, beschränkten, sondern unendlichen Wesen." *Ibid.*, p. 2.

on the difference between man and brute which consists in consciousness of specific nature on man's part; but now so soon religion becomes identical with this consciousness. From the premise, then, religion is consciousness of the infinite (which, incidentally, contains an element of truth, namely, from the viewpoint of ultimate term it is true), he proves the infinitude of man's nature.

But what is this infinite nature of man? It is, we are told, Reason, Will, and Affection—in capital letters.[25] In one short sentence he erases all distinction of faculties among themselves and between faculties and the nature of man. Here he exploits to its very limits the truth which St. Thomas expresses so succinctly by saying that intellect and will are *quasi*-infinite, that is, on the part of their object.[26] Of course, Feuerbach undermines the foundation for that truth by denying the distinction between subject and object in this case.

[25] "Die Vernunft, der Wille, das Herz. Der Mensch ist, um zu erkennen, um zu lieben, um zu willen. Vernunft, Wille, Liebe oder Herz sind kiene Kräfte, welche der Mensch hat—denn er ist nicht ohne sie, er ist, was er ist, nur durch sie." *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[26] *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 86, a. 2, ad 4: ". . . sicut intellectus noster est infinitus virtute, ita infinitum cognoscit. Est enim virtus ejus infinita, secundum quod non terminatur per materiam corporalem. Et est congoscitivus universalis, quod est abstractum a materia individuali, et per consequens non finitur ad aliquod individuum, se, quantum est de se, ad infinita individua se extendit." Cir. also I-II, q. 2, a. 8. In keeping with his practice of perverting truth to his own ends, Feuerbach himself quotes a similar passage in St. Thomas to prove by the Angelic Doctors own words that knowledge and consciousness of the infinite is none other than knowledge and consciousness of one's own infinite nature. Thus after having cited the following passage: ". . . In habentibus autem cognitionem sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprius esses naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum; sicut sensus recipit species *omnium sensibilium*, et intellectus *omnium intelligibilium*. Et sic *anima hominis fit omnia* quodam modo sensum et secundum intellectum, in quo cognitionem habentia *ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant* . . ." *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 80, a. 1, c. (Italics ours), Feuerbach simply says that this psychological infinity is the ground of theological or metaphysical infinity. God's immensity and omnipresence are nothing but the objectivated immensity and omnipresence of the human imagination: "Die psychologische Unendlichkeit ist der Grunde der theologischen oder metaphysichen Unendlichkeit. Die Unermesslichkeit, die nicht auf Ort und Zeit eingeschränkte Existenz, die Allegegenwart Gottes ist die vergegenständlichte Allegegenwart und Ermesslichkeit der menschlichen Verstellungs und Einbildungskraft." *Ibid.*, p. 337-338.

He goes on to consider the end of man, but here again we are face to face with the most brazen exploitation. Reason, Will, and Affection are ends in themselves, he tells us. We think for the sake of thinking, we love for the sake of loving, we will for the sake of willing, that is, in order to be free. Man does not possess these powers. They possess him. They are divine, absolute. He cannot resist them. They are the elements of his nature.[27] Certainly, then, man is nothing without an end, without a goal. The great men of history are those who had a goal which was the object of all their activity. But this object is necessarily none other than the proper nature of the subject, which is at the same time an objective nature.[28] That is to say, it is the proper nature of the particular man, but it is at the same time the nature of the whole species. Feuerbach gives an example: the Sun is the common object of several planets: Mercury, Venus, the Earth, etc., but each planet has different relations to the Sun. It is, therefore, another Sun which illuminates Mercury than the Sun which illuminates the Earth.[29] But it may be well to pause here and search out from this heap of chaff blown over the nature of man, the grain of truth of which Feuerbach avails himself.

St. Thomas justifies many distinct aspects in the ultimate end of man. Subjectively considered, man's ultimate end is a created reality existing in man himself; it is the highest activity of his highest faculty bent to its ultimate capacity upon the loftiest object.[30] Part of the truth in this pattern furnishes Feuerbach the necessary base for his campaign of destruction. Of course, he makes out the activities, faculties, and nature of man to be one and the same thing, but seems in his statements to be contacting the truth that man's end consists in his ultimate perfection. Objectively, however, man's end consists in

[27] Cf. Note 25 above.

[28] " . . . der Gegenstand, auf welchen sich ein Subject Wesent lich, notwendig bezieht, ist nicht Anderes, als das eigene aber gegenständliche Wesen dieses Subjects." *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[29] " Jeder Planet hat seine eigene Sonne." *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[30] *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2, c.

no creature but only God. Although this would offer no difficulty for Feuerbach, since he has already identified God with man, still he does not seem anxious to exploit this aspect of the ultimate beyond the point of confusing the formal and material aspects of the ultimate end objectively accepted.[31] His exploitation of the difference and sameness of the individual and specific nature of man goes on, however, to further extremes.

In knowing objects, says Feuerbach, man knows himself.[32] He does not mean that the common note of being is detected by comparison and predicated of object and self. That would contain too much truth for him. No, each object is a mirror of the subject after the manner of effect with respect to its cause.[33] Here, as in several instances above, he is applying the false principle that makes knowledge measure objects and not objects knowledge. This principle frequently operates instrumentally under the superior impetus of his more radical error of indiscriminately denying the diversity of created perfections, as will become evident from his further statements on the nature of man.

Man, he states, perceives within himself reason and will as being infinite because the finite and nothingness are identical.[34] Certainly man is other than nothingness, so he is infinite; man's existence is infinite. Nevertheless, he feels himself limited. But it is precisely in this that the distinction between himself and the brute consists. The brute is limited and does not know it. Man, however, knows that he is limited, because he perceives his individual nature. Yet he is infinite, because he perceives within himself the perfection, the infinite perfection of his species, and this by his feeling as well as by his reason.[35]

[31] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 7.

[32] " An dem Gegenstande wird daher der Mensch seiner selbst bewusst." *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[33] Cf. Note 28 above.

[34] " Endlichkeit namlich und nichtigkeit sind eins; Endlichkeit ist nur ein Euphemismus für Nichtigkeit." *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[35] " Wohl kann und soll selbst das menschlichle Individuum—hierin besteht sein Unterschied von dem thierischen—sich als beschränkt fühlen und erkennen, aber

Each thing must conceive of itself as that which is best in it. Each thing has its God in itself. Man also has his God in himself.[36] It is his infinite divine nature, a nature shared by all the species but which at the same time is his own. The human species has an infinite nature; each individual man has an infinite nature.

Is all of this a welter of contradiction? Feuerbach does not think so. Just as there is one Sun which becomes as many different Suns as there are planets according to its relations with each planet while it still remains one Sun, so there is an infinite species which is united in all its fullness with each particular nature and which is recognized by the consciousness which each particular nature has of it. So now there no longer remains any appreciable difference between individual and specific nature—one can be many, being is non-being,[37] and the door is wide open for the entrance of Marx and Engel.

Everything that man proclaims as great, as divine, is nothing other than an emanation of his own divine nature, of his nature projected outside of itself and becoming conscious of itself in contact with objects.[38] "Take music, for example," says Feuerbach,

> if you have no feeling for music, you perceive nothing in the most beautiful music no more than in the wind which whistles by your ear or in the brook which babbles at your feet. What is it, then, that acts upon you when you are moved by a melody? What do you perceive? What else but your own heart? Feeling speaks only to feeling . . . the object of feeling is none other than feeling. Likewise the object of the intellect is nothing other than the intellect objective to itself. Divine nature perceived by feeling is nothing

es kann weil ihm die Vollkommenheit, die Unendlichkeit der Gattung Gegenstand ist." *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[36] "Das absolute Wesen, der Gott des Menschen ist sein eigenes Wesen." (*Ibid.*, p. 8). "Im Bewusstsein des Unendlichen ist dem Bewusstsein die Unendlichkeit des eigenes Wesens Gegenstand, sei es nun als Gegenstand des Gefühls, oder des Gewissens. . . ." *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[37] This is quite in keeping with Hegel's famous dictum: "Pure being (i.e. being without intermingled non-being) is nothing."

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

other than feeling ravished, in ecstasy with itself, feeling drunk with joy, blessed in its own fullness. Such is man, divine man.[39]

From what has been seen, the thought of Feuerbach can be summed up in a few sentences. Man only knows himself. But he can know the infinite, in fact, he does know the infinite. Therefore he is himself infinite. It is evident that all depends upon the thesis that man knows himself only. Feuerbach does not prove this. To him it is evident. Kant had proved it. In view of this, one wonders what Feuerbach's comment would be upon the words of Pius XI: "'Our intellect naturally knows being and those things that essentially belong to being, and upon this knowledge the knowledge of first principles is founded.'[40] This phase does away, root and branch, with the erroneous opinions of those modern philosophers who hold that, in the act of understanding, it is not *being* that is perceived, but a suggestion or impression of the percipient himself."[41] Feuerbach would probably pretend to agree with them and then begin to exploit them.

Having thus reduced all intellectual experience, or rather all experience, to man in the act of becoming conscious of himself, there remains to be examined the notion of God, of a personal God, in human consciousness. One would naturally expect to find here another case of exploitation, the supreme travesty of all. He will not be disappointed.

God is nothing other than the projection of man himself. Man alienates himself, makes God of his own divine nature. From the beginning of the world, men, even geniuses as great as Feuerbach, have believed in God. Yet it required our German philosopher to explain to them that they were only believing in themselves. No one before him had fully realized this, or if any suspected it, only Feuerbach has the courage to proclaim it loudly and boldly. It is at this stage that one begins to wonder whether Feuerbach got enough fresh air. Others have been

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.
[40] *Summa contra Gentes*, II, c. 83.
[41] *Studiorum Ducem*, Pope Pius XI.

locked up for calling themselves Napoleon, but such was the fallen state of common sense around Feuerbach that for proclaiming man was God he was hailed as a genius.

According to the system of Feuerbach we see without any difficulty that the consciousness of God is nothing other than consciousness of oneself.[42] It is only those who ignore this who adore a God other than themselves. The divine attributes are simply the attributes of human nature. "You believe in love as a divine attribute," says Feuerbach, "because you love; you believe in God as a being wise, benevolent, because you know of nothing better in yourself than wisdom and benevolence. You believe that God exists, that he is a subject—everything that exists is a subject, because you yourself exist, are a subject." [43]

The attributes of God are anthropomorphisms, because they they are the product of man's thought.[44] But one does not immediately comprehend that this is also true of the existence of God, because this is something immediate which arises necessarily from one's own existence. But one must realize that the subject and the predicate are identical, not only in God, but everywhere. It follows that if the divine attributes are the product of human nature, necessarily the subject of these attributes must arise from human nature.[45] Thus Feuerbach proves logically that man is God.

At this point Feuerbach draws attention to a remarkable phenomenon of religion. Since everything in God is human, the more the religious man reflects upon God, the more he wishes to glorify Him, the more he strips himself, the more he annihilates himself, the more he gives to God his own humanity.[46]

[42] "Das Bewusstsein Gottes ist das Selbstbewusstsein des Menschen, die Erkenntnis Gottes, die Selbsterkenntnis des Menschen." *Ibid.*, pp. 15 and 22.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[45] "Das Geheimnis der unerschöplflichen Fülle der göttlichen Bestimmungen ist daher nichts Anderes als das Geheimnis des menschlichens als eins unendlich verschiedenartigen, unendlich bestimmbaren, aber eben deswegen sinnlichen Wesens." *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

What he renounces in himself, he enjoys in an infinitely greater measure in God. The more he renounces sensuality, the more his God is sensual.[47] Mysticism is nothing other than egotism.[48] What man denies in himself, he finds again in God, who is nothing other than himself conceived in a supremely egotistical way, needing nothing, no other creature, isolating himself from the species.

Feuerbach does not combat God. He reduces him to the level of human nature, a degradation which is far more odious. At the same time he insults humanity by telling it that until his time it was ignorant of the true nature of God. In a single paragraph he reconciles Pelagianism and the doctrine of St. Augustine.[49] One exalted man, the other God. Without knowing it they were both exalting the same thing. Man—this is the mystery of religion, Feuerbach tells us—projects his being into objectivity. Then he makes himself an object before this projected image which he transforms into a subject. Thus, while man apparently humbles himself as low as possible before God, in reality he is exalting himself to the highest.[50] Never before Feuerbach did anyone have the slightest suspicion of the complicated procedure which a man must follow who believes in God. In order to accomplish this, Feuerbach does not baulk before the necessity of attributing a fundamental egotism to the whole human race except Feuerbach. But there is nothing shameful in this. Pascal had said: "The ego is hateful," but for a whole race of philosophers, the ego was to become the moral center of the universe. Feuerbach ends his Introduction by saying: "What yesterday was religion is no longer so today; and what is today atheism will be religion tomorrow."

If one should pause here to try to sift the true from the false, he finds the following points verified beyond reasonable doubt. The parent error of this entire brood is Feuerbach's

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[48] "Gott die Selbstbefiedigung der eignenen, gegen alles Andere missgungstigen Selbstbesuch, Gott der Selbstgenuss des Egoismus." *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

proclivity to consider the ultimate order of things and totally ignore the things themselves on which this order is necessarily founded. The truth which he holds before us as bait is that borrowed from Christian doctrine to the effect that man is an image of God and the more he tends to God the more godlike he becomes, always, however, within the laws of analogical participation. Only Feuerbach with his purely logical device hurdles or rather levels off these barriers of analogy, entering in where the good angels fear to tread in order that he may reap the evil fruits of exploitation.

Descending now to the more articulated dogmas of faith, he becomes if possible even more perverse. In the course of this examination he constantly cites the Doctors of the Church in his support and, even more frequently, Luther, as if all were of the same spiritual and doctrinal stature.[51] Whatever they say of God, he attributes to man. If St. Augustine says that God is closer to us than sensible, corporeal things, that proves that God is indeed the consciousness of oneself.[52] If God is infinite, necessary, that is because reason is infinite, necessary.[53] Reason is infinite because it measures all things. Reason is necessary because if there were no reason, there would be nothing. Without pausing for breath, he eliminates the necessity of a Creator. Why does anything exist? Why does the world exist? It is because " if something did not exist, nothing would exist." (Note here how cleverly a mere relative opposition is substituted for the opposition of contradictories which really exists between something and nothing.) But " if nothing existed, reason would not exist." But if reason did not exist, everything would be without reason, unreasonable, absurd. Thus, if the world did not exist, it would be absurd. In the absurdity

[51] " For example, in considering the sacraments, I limit myself to two, for, in the strictest sense (see Luther, t. xvii, p. 558) there are no more." (!) Preface, p. 8.

[52] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 15.

[53] " Das reine, volkommene, mangellose göttliche Wesen ist das Selbstbewusstseins des Verstandes von seiner eigenen Volkommenheit," (*Ibid.*, p. 42.) " In dem unbeschränkten Wesen versinnlichst Du nur deinen unbeschränkten Verstand." (*Ibid.*, p. 48.) " Der Verstand oder die Vernuft ist endlich das nothwendige Wesen." (*Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.)

of its non-existence is found the true reason of its existence. Existence is the absolute necessity; reason the profoundest and most essential necessity.[54]

The doctrine of the creation of the world is thus explained: man feels himself limited by the world. In order to escape from this he makes of God a being completely superior to the world, who creates it from nothing.[55] But we know that the world came from itself.[56] Fundamentally God is none other than the expression of reason comprehending the world; he is the thinking world.[57] Thus all is in agreement. There is no need to explain whence things came, since nothing comes from nothing; everything must come from itself. Specific difference prevents one thing coming from another.[58] From these few examples may be seen whither a logic can lead that takes it upon itself to transform states of consciousness into universes. One may also see the lack of true knowledge of the Christian religion displayed by Feuerbach despite his parade of erudition fit to deceive those who do not know any more about it than he.[59] It is thus that reading Feuerbach becomes more and more monotonous, because he does not even have striking reasons for rejecting what he rejects. He drowns the difficulty under a flood of ambiguous words, or else he sets it aside as unworthy of attention.

Feuerbach's powers, however, are not yet exhausted. He proves the necessity of the world in still another way. What is the cause of life? the need of life? Whence, then, came the world? The world is come from necessity, not from a necessity

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 53. [56] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 364 sq. [57] *Ibid.*, p. 99. [58] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[59] Other examples of Feuerbach's lack of understanding of simple Christian doctrine are innumerable. For instance, to him the doctrine of original sin is none other than the doctrine of the sinfulness of the act of generation: "The mystery of original sin is the mystery of sexual desire. . . . The act of generation is, insofar as it is pleasurable, sensual, a sinful act." ("Das Geheimnis der Erbsunde ist das Geheimnis der Geschlechtslust. . . . Der Zeugungsact ist, als ein genussreicher, sinnlicher, ein sundiger Act.") To prove this he quotes the Fathers, among them St. Bernard, who says: *Homo natus de muliere et ob hoc cum reatu.* (!) *Ibid.*, p. 374.

in a being other than itself (this would be a *contradiction*), but from its own necessity, which is not a contradiction. How is it from necessity? This is because if there were no world, there would be no necessity; if there were no necessity, there would be no reason, no understanding. Therefore the world comes from the necessity of necessity. It is true that, thus, negatively, as the speculative philosophers express themselves, nothing is the cause of the world . . .! It is true that the world springs out of a want, out of privation, but it is false speculation to make this privation an ontological being. This want is simply the want which lies in the supposed non-existence of the world. But the necessity of the world is the necessity of reason. Reason is existence objective to itself as its own end. That which is an object to itself is the highest, the final being. That which has power over itself is almighty.[60] These convulsions of a reason running wild, these logical nightmares, seem, perhaps, puerile. Marx and Engels received them with tears of joy.

Religion exalts divine love; Feuerbach praises it as human love. Love is the union between God and man, of spirit and nature, makes a man of God and God of man. Love is materialism, immaterial love is a chimera. Love makes the nightingale sing, gives the plant its corolla . . . a love which has flesh and blood, which vibrates as an almighty force through all the living. Only " The love which has flesh and blood . . . can absolve from the sins which flesh and blood commit." Mercy is the justice of sensual life.[61] It must be conceded that this is somewhat obscure, but it is pure Feuerbach.

The mystery of the Incarnation gives Feuerbach the opportunity to perform several new feats. Here again the author uses the principle: *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* In order that God might become man, it was first necessary that man should be God.[62]

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 53. This passage, while again demonstrating Feuerbach's ignorance of the Scholastic term *ex nihilo,* is a further example of Feuerbach's reconciliation of contradictories by turning contradictory opposition into purely relative opposition.

[61] " Liebe ist Materialismus, immaterielle Liebe ist ein Unding. . . ." *Ibid.*, p. 59. " Die Barmherzigkeit ist das Rechtsgefühl der Sinnlichkeit." *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

The exploitation is patent. The principle is universally true when qualified with the distinction: from nothing, i. e., nothing in the sense of an efficient cause, nothing is made, concede; from nothing, i. e., a material cause, subdistinguish; by a created agent, concede; by the Creator, deny. But Feuerbach suppresses this necessary qualification.

It is subsequently said that God is love. A distinction is made here between the subject and the predicate. God is therefore other than love. There is a conflict between the two. But then it is said that God by love is become man, that is to say, love (i. e., projected human love) determined God to renounce his divinity (i. e., austere, abstract, moral rectitude) to become man. "Who then is our Savior and Redeemer? God or love? Love, for God as God has not saved us, but Love."[63] Therefore, since God has renounced Himself by love, we also should renounce God through love. Feuerbach confirms his conclusion by citing St. Bernard, who says: *Amor triumphat de Deo.* To reason run wild, all blasphemies are permitted in the name of truth.

The Trinity must also be reduced to the level of an intellect wallowing in matter. Man's consciousness of himself in its totality is the consciousness of the Trinity.[64] The idea of a solitary God is repugnant to the need of love, of community, which human nature has. Religion must, therefore, divide God into two persons.[65] This idea of community is in turn represented by a third person. But Feuerbach eliminates the third person, because two persons are sufficient to the idea of love; among three love is dissipated.[66] The Father represents intellect, the Son, the heart, love. These are the two parts of man, the one specific, the other individual. Together they reflect the whole man, also the divinity of love and friendship. The Blessed Virgin is associated with the two first persons in place of the third in order to give the perfect idea of the family,[67] of the species, and also because maternal love is the greatest, the

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 82.
[66] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[67] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

first yearning of men toward women.[68] On this score Feuerbach reproaches the Protestants with having neglected the Mother of God. Thus he reduces the most cherished realities of the Christian religion to mere symbols drained of all truth except what man's puny mind deigns to impart. But the role of exploiter he refuses to drop for a single moment, and so he upbraids the Protestants in this matter only to win the sympathy of Christians to his perfidious cause.

The Second Person of the Trinity is called the Word, because words are sacred, divine. They are the result of the imagination, a divine impulse, that of man's nature.[69] The ancients, because they were the children of the imagination, made of the Word a being. But the Word is divine, because it manifests human thought which is divine, all-powerful. The word makes man free, because he who cannot express himself is a slave. (!) [70]

In his last chapter, which follows six other chapters on the contradiction between alienated Christian dogma and the divine identity of man, Feuerbach demolishes the personal God and preaches his god, which is the human species. It is, above all, this positive part of his doctrine which attracted Marx and Engels. In it may be seen the more or less perceptible descent of man into matter. The great turning point in history—which coincides with Feuerbach—consists in the admission that the consciousness of God is none other than the consciousness of the species.[71] Man must rise above himself, but not above the laws of the species. There is no other essence that man can think, dream, imagine, feel, believe, desire, love, and adore than that of human nature itself.[72] Feuerbach says that only by uniting man with Nature can we combat the supernaturalistic

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 87. Does Freud owe Feuerbach the "Oedipus complex?"

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[71] "Der nothwendige Wendepunkt der Geschichte ist daher dieses offene Bekenntnis und Eingestandnis, dass das Bewusstsein Gottes nichts Anderes ist als das Bewusstsein der Gattung." *Ibid.*, p. 325.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

egoism of Christianity.[73] The species comprises brute nature as being the essence of that nature—a distinction calculated to exclude pure materialism. At the same time nature belongs to the essence of man—a distinction calculated to exclude subjective idealism. These were vain precautions. Engels treats Feuerbach as an idealist and reduces him by contradiction to pure materialism. Feuerbach himself provided the excuse for this in saying apropos of the Eucharist that eating and drinking were in themselves religious acts. He ends his book by saying: "Let bread be sacred to us, let wine be sacred, let water be sacred. Amen."

As to the species, its individuals are to be united by love. The first law is the love of man for man which is of itself religious.[74] Love is not divine because it is an attribute of God. On the contrary, it is an attribute of God because it is itself divine. Marriage is sacred in itself, not by any external restriction.[75] Man and woman complete each other; together they represent the species, the perfect man. The basis of morality is the distinction of the sexes.[76] The sins of the individuals are lost in the species. The sum of all the various individuals constitutes the species. The community alone constitutes humanity. God does not exist, because one has no corporal sensation of Him. But the species is not an abstraction, because it exists in feeling, in the moral sense, in the energy of love. Whence comes this feeling? Feeling comes from the participated sensation, from words, looks, sensible contacts. This is

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 326. Footnote.

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 327.

[76] "Die Basis der Sittlichkeit ist der Geschlechtunderschied." *Ibid.*, p. 111. This apparently mysterious statement is thus explained. Nature, as we have seen, i. e., the sensible world, is the very core of reality. Thinking man is nothing but conscious Nature, consciousness of oneself as an individual, of the species as infinite. Nature is the basis of personality (*Ibid.*, p. 111). But Nature in turn is corporeal. Thus the body is the basis, the subject of personality, and the sexual impulse (*Geschlechtsgetrieb*) the strongest in Nature (*Ibid.*, p. 109). Feuerbach concludes: "What is virtue, the excellence of man as man? Manhood. Of man as woman? Womanhood. . . . The basis of morality is the distinction of sex."

the last word of the man who reproached religion with being lacking in culture, of knowing none of the joys of the thinker, the seeker in nature, the artist. Religion remits all that to the other world; Feuerbach wishes to give it to us in reality, and to this end he reduces man to the level of pure sensation. In other words, he reduces man to matter, since the world is the sum of all reality and the cause of all, including reason.

Thus we see that the sum and substance of his book rests in the ruthless exploitation of the truths of faith and reason through the purely logical device of dropping the diversity of created perfections while retaining their order to an ultimate, the *Ens realissimum* which he first proposed as man, but which, in due time, he levelled off to the ignoble condition of matter.

II.

The Position of Feuerbach

In examining more carefully the position of Feuerbach in modern thought, we are not, therefore, scattering the ashes of the sacred dead; neither are we indulging the idle pastime of flogging a dead horse. We are not, because Feuerbach represents a stage in the march of Hegelian dialectics. This is a march which leaves behind it nothing but ruins, the ruin of Kant, the ruin of Hegel, the ruin of Feuerbach, which is not astounding since the march itself leads to ruin, the ruin of humanity, its swallowing up in prime matter at the point farthest removed from God. Each stage represents the cutting of another link between man and God. Feuerbach has had the unenviable distinction of cutting one of these most important links, the precise link between the divinity and man. In order to mount again towards God, man must reconstitute these links. We have exposed magic, the magic which Feuerbach used to rid himself of God. We have pointed out errors which the Hegelian man will be obliged to dissipate in order to know his Creator once again. In order to knit up the ravelled thread of reason again, we tried to lay our finger on the places where that thread has been broken.

Ludwig Feuerbach is not an insignificant ruin along the Hegelian road. He is an imposing, grandiose ruin, one to rejoice the hearts of the destructive geniuses of humanity. Witness these words of Friedrich Engels at the time when the Hegelian creative struggle seemed upon the point of dying out:

Then came Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity. With one blow it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocution it placed materialism on the throne again. . . . Nature exists independently of all philosophy; it is the basis upon which men, themselves products of nature, have grown up . . . nothing exists outside of nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. . . . The spell was broken . . . , the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. . . . Enthusiasm was general; we all became Feuerbachians on the spot. How enthusiastically Marx greeted this new conception and how much—despite all his critical considerations—he was influenced by him, can be read in *The Holy Family*." [77]

Taken up by Engels and Marx, Feuerbach was associated with the genesis of Communism. Lenin himself sets Feuerbach down as one of the philosophical sources of Marxism when he describes this system, which he qualifies as the greatest accomplishment of scientific thought, as "the system of Hegel which, in turn, led to the materialism of Feuerbach.[78] It is clear that

[77] " Da kam Feuerbachs ' Wesen des Christentums.' Mit einem Schlag zerstaubte es den Widerspruch in dem es den Materialismus ohne Umschweife wieder auf den Thron erhob. . . . Die Natur existirt unabhängig von aller Philosophie; sie ist der Grundlage, auf der wir Menschen, selbst Naturprodukte, erwachsen sind; ausser der Natur und den Menschen existirt nichts, und die höheren Wesen, die unsere religiöse Phantasie erschuf, sind nur die phantastiche Ruckspiegelung unsers eignen Wesens. Der Bann war gebrochen . . . , der Widerspruch war, als nur in der Einbildung vorhanden, aufgelöst . . . Die Begeisterung war allgemein: wir waren alle momentan Feuerbachianer. Wie enthusiastich Marx die neue Auffassung begrüsste und wie sehr er—trotz aller kritischen Vorbehalte—von ihr beeinflusst wurde, kann man in der ' Heiligen Familie ' lesen." Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, Stuttgart, 1895. p. 11.

[78] " Marx did not stop at the materialism of the eighteenth century, but moved philosophy forward. He enriched it by the achievements of German classical philosophy, especially by Hegel's system, which in its turn led to the materialism of

the revolution to which Feuerbach helped to set the spark was not an ordinary revolution. Would Feuerbach himself even recognize it? It is, therefore, as an indispensable stage in the Hegelian march, as a saint in the Marxist heaven, that Feuerbach or rather the study of Feuerbach imposes itself. He had the talent not only of incarnating within himself the errors of the past: denial of the validity of the senses with the consequent arbitrary autonomy of reason working in a void, but also of sowing in his work, so subtly calculated to overthrow Christianity, the germs of future chaos. Hence the enthusiasm of Engels: in a single man to have the synthesis of the past, the campaign plan of the future.

In characterizing Feuerbach as a ruin, one does so in the proper sense of Hegelian dialectics, for Hegelian dialectics are a ruinous system, a system which lives on destruction, where each stage is brought forth by the destruction of the preceding one, just as the new single class is supposed to be brought forth by the destruction through class warfare of all the previously existing classes. This procedure somewhat resembles a man going down a well on a ladder and taking care to destroy each rung after him, thus eliminating his only means of return. Kant cut the link between the external world and the mind. Hegel dissolved being and non-being in divine becoming. Feuerbach dissolved the divine into the human. His successors dissolved man into matter. For them it is not just the body which returns to dust; it is the whole man.

But this philosophy bears within itself, so to speak, its own chastisement. Kant by opposing knowledge and reality turned the mind away from the external world. In revenge he lost the knowledge of the God in Whom he wished so much to believe. It is said that he invented the God of practical reason to con-

Feuerbach. Of these the main achievement is *dialectics*, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fuller, deeper form, free from one-sideness,—the doctrine also, of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter. . . . The historical materialism of Marx represented the greatest conquest of scientific thought. . . . V. I. Lenin, *Marx, Engels Marxism*, New York, 1935, p. 51.

sole his heartbroken servant. In the end Kant was to ask himself whether he was not himself God, a thought hardly calculated to rejoice the critical mind of the philosopher of Koenigsberg. Hegel resolved the contradictions of Kant by making contradiction the cause of becoming. He traced the evolution of this divine becoming down to the Prussian state, which recompensed him by making him its official philosopher and the most respected professor of the University of Berlin. But the disciples of Hegel reproached him with believing that the culminating and final point of this universal process coincided with his existence at Berlin, a halt which his own system forbade. Consequently his disciples of the left went over to revolutionary ideas, towards Russia, and Hegel was to complain before his death of having been understood by only one man, and he did not really understand him. The same fate was reserved for Feuerbach. He extolled the divine grandeur of man, but his disciples made a materialist of him and destroyed him in his own name. Thus Marx was to write:

> His [Feuerbach's] work consists in the dissolution of the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing his work, the chief thing still remains to be done. . . . Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be theoretically criticized and radically changed.[79]

The internal coherence of his system had already pushed Feuerbach towards materialism. In a review of Moleshott's book, *The Theory of Alimentation,* he was to write:

> Food is transformed into blood, blood into the heart and the brain, into thoughts and feelings. Human alimentation is the basis of culture and human opinion. Do you want to reform the people? Give them, instead of declamation against sin, better food. Man is what he eats.

[79] " Seine Arbeit besteht darin, die religiöse Welt in ihre weltliche Grundlage aufzulösen. Er ubersieht, dass nach Vollbringung dieser Arbeit die Hauptsache noch zu thun bleibt. . . . Also z. B., nachdem die irdische Familie entdeckt ist, muss nun erstere selbst theoretisch kritisirt und praktisch umgewälzt werden." Friedrich Engels, *Ibid., Anhang: Marx uber Feuerbach, N. 4.*

[80] *Ibid.,* p. 4.

To this end he recommends peas instead of potatoes. By freeing man from God he subjects him to vegetables.

The theories of Feuerbach, which smoothed the Hegelian road for Engels and Marx and which contributed to the spirit of world revolution, were not spontaneous products but the fruit of several generations of warped thinking. The predecessors of Feuerbach, even Hegel, still had a God distinct from man to Whom they gave a name such as the Absolute or Mind. It remained to give some sort of form to this God. Feuerbach settled the problem very simply by making God identical with man. This was a perfect Hegelian synthesis.

The philosophical ancestry of Feuerbach explains much. His onslaught upon Christianity, however, remains a personal triumph. He was born in the beginning of the nineteenth century, of a father who was a celebrated Bavarian jurist. He had several very gifted brothers. Ludwig Feuerbach began by studying theology at Heidelberg, where Hegel had been several years before as a professor of philosophy. It is a remarkable fact that so many anti-Christian geniuses have begun by studying theology. Hegel and Schelling studied theology together at Tubingen. Feuerbach soon went on to Berlin to study philosophy under Hegel, whom he was to call his second father. Schopenhauer was giving courses there at the same time, mostly to empty class rooms since he had rashly chosen the same hours as Hegel. Despite their diverging ideas, all these philosophers struggled in the same void in which Kant had enclosed them, that of knowledge which had no longer any direct connections with the outside world. They evaded one contradiction only to fall into another. It is, no doubt, thus that contradiction became at length a creative principle.

Once he had made the thought of Hegel his own, Feuerbach withdrew to a factory in the country of which he owned a part by the dowry of his wife. Lacking facility in oral exposition, he restricted himself to writing and became known for his polemical style. Having withdrawn from the world, he could overturn it at his ease without being annoyed by reality, like

Kant, who never left Koenigsberg, and who, during his daily walks—so regular that the neighbors could set their clocks by them—never spoke in winter for fear of having to breathe through the mouth instead of the nose; like Schopenhauer, who preached the tyrannical power of the will while living peacefully in a boarding house at Frankfort with his dog; like Nietzsche, who vaunted war and fainted at the sight of blood. It was from Feuerbach's retreat that there appeared in 1841 his mental masterpiece, *The Essence of Christianity*.

In 1845, four years after its appearance, Marx jotted down some notes on Feuerbach's work while he was sojourning with Engels at Brussels after having been expelled from Germany and then France. Of these notes Engels was to say that they were of fundamental value as the first document to contain the germs of the brilliant new view of the world—that of Marxism. Forty years later, in London, Engels wrote a long review of a book on Feuerbach, a review which contained a complete exposition of Marxism, in payment of the debt which dialectical materialism owed to Feuerbach.

According to Engels in this review, the contribution of Feuerbach consisted in bringing Hegelian dialectics out of the impasse in which they were at the death of Hegel in 1831. Hegel saw in the world the work of a divine Idea which little by little had disentangled itself from matter into which it had somehow fallen and was taking up its abode with men. At his death it was identified with the Prussian state, and Hegel, the official philosopher of Prussia, did not see why it should go any farther. It was still a God, though a very indistinct one.

But his own system called for perpetual becoming, constant progress emerging from the strife of contradiction.[81] Hegel was willing to stop, but his system would not allow it. To Feuerbach belongs the distinction of setting dialectics in movement

[81] "In the course of progress all earlier reality becomes unreality, loses its necessity, its right of existence, its rationality; in place of the dying reality comes a new vital reality, peacable when the old is sufficiently sensible to go to its death without a struggle, forcible when it strives against this necessity." *Ibid.*, English translation, Chicago, 1903, p. 40.

again. He perceived the contradiction between the divine Idea and man, and he synthesized them by making man divine. He melted the divinity and nature together into a single world, a world of which man is the superior, reasoning side. Why did Marx and Engels receive this work with cries of joy as a deliverance? It was because, by a single stroke, Feuerbach had disposed forever of the idea of God, and with Him went the last remains of any spiritual principle. He had once again set materialism upon the throne. But this was not all; he had demolished the notion of the divine State in the sense of Hegel. He had opened the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Despite this accomplishment of Feuerbach, he fell into the same defect as Hegel. He thought that with him all had been said. He had transformed the religion of God into the religion of man and wished to remain there. But in the Hegelian meaning it was necessary that he, too, should be sublimated, liquidated for progress. The form of his philosophy was to be annihilated by criticism while its content would be maintained. Engels undertakes this criticism and he is very clairvoyant.

The merit of Feuerbach for Engels consisted in this: he had proved that matter is not the product of the spirit, but rather that the spirit is only the highest product of matter. His defect consisted in not recognizing that he had proved materialism and in still wishing to remain an idealist. He did not see that matter regulated all things, even man. By playing the angel, he had played the beast and refused to see it, but Engels saw it very well. The misfortune of Feuerbach was that he was not practical. The ingratitude of men had pushed him into a little village where he was ignorant of the great discoveries on the creative power of matter as expounded in the Darwinian theories and where he was obliged to conceive of man in the abstract.[82]

Still he did not dare to disengage himself completely from the idea of religion. Having noted that love between the sexes

[82] Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassichen deutschen Philosophie*, p. 21-22.

is a fundamental thing, for him the most fundamental thing, he made a religion out of it.[83] He does not see, says Engels, that this man who loves all other men, this love which governs the world, is an abstraction. In practice, and practice is the sole criterion of truth, it is the struggle between the classes, the struggle for economic power which governs the world, which rules men.[84] This struggle is none other than the manifestation of matter in evolution towards a proletarian equilibrium. All comes from matter. Feuerbach had proved it himself. Feuerbach, who wanted to make man God, sees himself accorded the sad glory of having reduced man to matter. He talked of love, but he lives only as the basis of a philosophy of world revolution. Truth has taken revenge upon him.

Once rid of God as the supreme being, rid of man as God, reduced to matter as the sole reality, the mind still remains a faculty of order. It must put order into the world. It must make a system out of existence and hasten the coming of this order which is seen as the inevitable evolution of matter. Marx said that the philosophers had only interpreted the world, whereas the essential thing was to change it. In Lenin he found the man to put this changing to work. Since there no longer existed any God, or any rights of man derived from his spiritual nature, since there was only matter, one could cause blood to flow as one wished, and it was done. One could allow oneself all outrages, and they were allowed. As long as this philosophy exists, its logical consequences will always be in a position to reappear.

The development of philosophy from Kant to Feuerbach is well expressed in the personage of Goethe's Faust. Goethe studied Kant and was a contemporary and friend of Hegel. Doctor Faustus expresses himself thus: " The great Spirit has repulsed me with disdain, nature has closed herself to me, the thread of my thought has been broken, I am disgusted with all science." (This is Kant.) He finishes: " Open then the depths

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[84] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

of my sensuality and let the ardent passions which ferment there be sated." (This is unacademic Feuerbach.) [85]

Like Kant, Doctor Faustus begins by saying: "It is ten years now that I have been leading my stupid students through an inexplicable labyrinth. I understand at last that we can know nothing." Like Feuerbach, he ends by crying to Marguerite: "Is not the bond which attaches us one to the other a mystery, eternal, invisible and visible? Give to this feeling whatever name you wish: name it felicity, heart, love, god. . . . Feeling is all; names are only noise, a vain mist obscuring the clarity of the heaven." [86]

From this same angle of feeling the German philosophers rejoin Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose *Emile* had given Kant the idea of a god felt rather than known. Feuerbach later on, like a good pedant, was to give a rational foundation for the primacy of feeling and blind force. Rousseau led to the French Revolution; Feuerbach's revolution is not yet ended. For according to the Hegelian dialectic the conflict between the divine State and creative matter can just as easily be resolved in favor of the former. Whichever wins will be right since, according to Hegel, all that is real is also reasonable. Then, in the name of its divinity, the State may claim for itself all that matter claims, and it does so as we know well. Blood flows again and man is outraged once more.

For those, therefore, who would stem the tide of this revolution it is no longer a question of choosing your weapons. The sword alone taken up in the cause of right is not sufficient. Sometimes it is not enough to die for a cause, but necessary also to live, think, and work for it. They who would defend the right must tear a page from the book of modern lore by coordinating both sword and pen as one instrument in the defense of truth. His Holiness Pope Piux XI told us that it is in errors that lies the source of all the miseries of our time, and on the same occasion he assured us that "St. Thomas Aquinas

[85] Goethe, *Sämmtliche Werke, 2 Bd.*, Stuttgart, 1863, p. 434.
[86] *Ibid.*, p.457.

has altogether overthrown the modernists." [87] Those defenders of the truth, therefore, who are earnestly concerned about the wholesale perversion of modern thought will make the doctrine of St. Thomas their very own and apply its revitalizing correctives at the hidden roots of modern errors. In this they will make a good beginning by carefully weighing these words of the Angelic Doctor: "Sciences are diverse according to the different orders that reason properly considers. The order which reason makes in its own act of consideration belongs to rational philosophy, or logic, whose function is to consider the order of the parts of speech to one another. Natural philosophy, or physics, considers the order of *things* which human reason considers but does not create, so that under the heading of natural philosophy is comprised metaphysics." [88] "But theology considers all things from the viewpoint of God, either because they are God himself or because they have an order to God, as principle and end." [89] For our modern errors stem largely, as the foregoing study shows, from the false principle which suppresses the divinely created hierarchy in being by considering the order in things and dropping the things on which this order is founded.

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[87] *Studiorum Ducem,* Pope Pius XI.
[88] *In X Ethic.,* l. 1.
[89] *Sum. Theol.,* I, q. 1, a. 7.

THE UNITY IN THE UNIVERSE, ACCORDING TO ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD

[*Second Installment*]

III

The Unity of the Universe

IN discussing the unity of the universe according to Mr. Whitehead, one meets with a fundamental difficulty. He distinguishes between that universe which is "our present cosmic epoch," and the larger environment in which the present epoch is placed.[90] The latter would have to be included in the usual sense of the term "universe." He also holds that the present universe is only a stage in the dynamic development of things. The present type of order in the world has arisen from an unimaginable past, and it will find its grave in an unimaginable future.[91] Concerning the larger universe it is admitted that we know but little, and of that little, less is known with certainty. We have only the realm of eternal objects, creativity, and God, upon whose wisdom all forms of order depend. These we may know with certainty. For Mr. Whitehead's purposes, however, the inquiry must necessarily be limited. He is an empiricist in philosophy, just as he used empirical methods in physics and the natural sciences. Since what is known empirically is the only certainty, one has no right to extend his conclusions concerning the present cosmic epoch to what is only suspected or surmised concerning the whole larger universe.[92]

The only course open to us is to consider the doctrine as it is presented by Mr. Whitehead, concerning the present cosmic

[90] *Process and Reality*, p. 135.
[91] *Religion in the Making*, p. 160.
[92] *Ibid.*

epoch. Hence the term "universe" as used in this study will be taken to mean the present cosmic epoch, unless it is clearly seen that it is to be referred to the ensemble of the unimaginable past and future and the known present.

The question will be treated in three parts:

1. The unity found in individual actual entities of the universe.
2. The order of nature, a unity of external relations.
3. The universe as prehensively one in the consequent nature of God.

1. The Unity of Individual Actual Entities in the Universe

According to Mr. Whitehead, the business of philosophy is to explain the emergence of the more abstract things from the more concrete things.[93] Hence philosophy is primarily interested in explaining the unity of the universe which results from the union of its component elements. The theory is dynamistic in character. It begins with the multiplicity of actual entities which become one. "It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity."[94] The task of philosophy is to explain the emergence of the one from the many, rather than the process by which the many are derived from one. Since, however, the many do not simply become one, the flux is also in the opposite direction. The one becomes many, and the many become one. Mr. Whitehead devotes his efforts mainly to the explanation of the former process, the concrescence of the multiple into unity. The purpose of this study is limited to the same process: How is the multiplicity united to form one universe?

In the first place this activity should be considered in microcosm, as the single actual entity evolves from the multiplicity of its component data. The process of "objectification" then continues until all the individual entities of the world are uni-

[93] *Process and Reality*, p. 27.
[94] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

fied in the one consequent nature of God. The process does not stop there.

> For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies the world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For the Kingdom of Heaven is with us today. The action of (this) fourth stage is the love of God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular occasions. What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation the love in the world passes into the love of heaven, and floods back into the world.[95]

It is hardly necessary to point out that the "perfected actuality" which is the consequent nature of God is by no means transcendent in the strict sense of that term. God is not an entity outside the world but present to the world. He is in the world and a part of it. True to his dynamistic tendencies, Mr. Whitehead emphasizes the process to such an extent that God is not statically complete. The process continues. Between God and the world there is a mutual real relation. The false notion of creation shows itself again. Having denied that the created world is the action of the creating God, holding that God is really related to the world in the same way that the world is related to God, one is naturally inclined to consider the two as entities *mutually* interacting.

Ultimately the unity of the universe is a unity of prehension, by which God prehends the world. Seemingly the prehension of God by the individual entities is the opposite process by which the one becomes many. In any case, prehension is similar to the classical theory of knowledge, according to which the thing known is intentionally in the knowing subject in such a way that the two are united really, intentionally, although they are not physically identical. One must make some distinctions: in the philosophy of organism a subject in the sense of a substance is definitely excluded. The object "known" and the "knowing" subject become physically one, since the resulting

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 487.

actual entity is nothing more nor less than the prehensive process of its own becoming. Moreover, this prehension of objects is not necessarily conscious. Even the lowest entities in the scale of things prehend the data which concresce in the production of those entities. One could enumerate other differences, but these are the most striking.

Before we take up the process of concrescence it is necessary to recall that Professor Whitehead is expounding a monistic philosophy. He protests against the " bifurcation " of nature into body and mind, matter and spirit. At the same time he introduces physical and mental poles from which the actual entities arise. Stallknecht [96] says that this is a more complete bifurcation than the division into body and mind. This criticism is partially justified, although Mr. Whitehead attempts to prove that the physical and mental elements both arise from one source. The objection to the distinction is more properly directed against the weak foundation of this division into mental and physical poles, and against the insufficient principle which is said to effect the unification of the two. In his attempt to save the monistic system, Professor Whitehead has recourse to " hybrid feelings." In a *pure physical feeling* the datum is objectified by one of its own *physical* feelings. In a *hybrid physical feeling* the datum (an actual entity) is objectified by one of its *conceptual* feelings. Through the medium of a hybrid feeling, the conceptual feeling passes into the class of physical feelings. According to the Category of Conceptual Valuation, physical feelings give rise to conceptual feelings. In a secondary fashion, according to the Category of Conceptual Reversion, conceptual feelings may give rise to other conceptual feelings. A hybrid *physical* feeling originates for its subject a conceptual feeling with the same datum as that of the conceptual feeling of the antecedent subject. This hybrid feeling is termed " physical " because it feels the preceding actual entity. It is termed " hybrid " because the actual entity is objectified by one of its own conceptual feelings.[97]

[96] *Studies in the Philosophy of Creation*, p. 148.

[97] *Process and Reality*, pp. 36 and 347-49.

According to the Category of Transmutation, one and the same conceptual feeling may be derived impartially from analogous simple, physical feelings. Then, in a later phase, the prehending subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a character of some nexus containing these prehended actual entities among its members, or it may be made a character of some part of such a nexus. Thus a subject, whose conceptual feeling arises from a number of physical feelings, transmutes the simple physical feelings into one physical feeling of a nexus as a whole.[98] In this way Mr. Whitehead attempts to avoid "the disastrous separation of body and mind."

> Conceptual feelings are primarily derivate from physical feelings, and secondarily from each other. In this statement the consideration of God's intervention is excluded. When this intervention (i. e., God's Conceptual Valuation) is taken into account, all conceptual feelings must be derived from physical feelings.[99]

This explanation is a fine web of words, but the question of how a hybrid physical feeling can really unite the physical and the conceptual remains unsettled. If it were one substance there might be some reason to accept this physical feeling as a unifier. Mr. Whitehead denies that there is any such thing as substance. In a more reasonable philosophy the task of uniting the material and spiritual is given to man, who is one substance, composed of the two elements, "body and mind," to use Mr. Whitehead's expression. It is impossible that a hybrid *physical* feeling can be affected by that which is conceptual. The old problem of how the physical (matter) and the conceptual (spirit) can interact is left unsolved. The "bifurcation of nature" remains what it was.

The explanation of the role played by feelings in this monistic system is only one part of the doctrine of concrescence or prehensive unification. In general the process may be divided

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 36 and p. 355.
[99] *Ibid.*, p. 349.

into four stages or phases: 1) the Datum, 2) the Process, 3) the Satisfaction, and 4) the Decision.[190]

(1) *The Datum.* The datum in the process is the multiplicity of eternal objects or particular actual occasions in an actual world. Since an actual entity prehends the whole universe, positively or negatively, the whole universe must be its datum. The datum is strictly multiple; each occasion is itself and is no other occasion. The occasions have relations of compatibility and incompatibility one with the other. Nevertheless, they come together in such a way as to have the unity of a datum for the concrescence. In acquiring this connection or unity "their inherent presuppositions" of each other[101] eliminate certain elements in their constitutions (the incompatibilities) and elicit into importance other elements (the compatibilities). In this way the many occasions become one complex datum. It is said that certain elements are "eliminated": taking into account the doctrine and work of negative prehensions, this evidently means that certain elements remain but enter into the constitution of the datum negatively; they are not of importance for the process.

The question inevitably arises: What is the principle of this unification of multiple actual occasions and eternal objects as individuals in the one unity of a complex datum? The many do not become one of themselves. The principle must be either an external force or the mere internal constitution (the nature) of the individual entities by which they are capable of unification and by which they are actually united. Very probably, the external principle is the primordial nature of God, by which

[100] On pages 300-301 of *Process and Reality* three phases are enumerated as constituting the process: 1) the responsive phase, 2) the supplemental phase, and 3) the satisfaction. On page 208 of the same work, the enumeration is as given above. Evidently, in the later classification the author has omitted the datum, divided the process into two phases (responsive and supplemental) and retained the satisfaction, including within it the decision. Such a method of procedure does not help the reader to understand the doctrine, but the two classifications seem to be related as here stated. The division into four stages is clearer and more complete. For that reason it is followed in this description.

[101] *Process and Reality*, p. 298.

and in which all eternal objects and occasions are relevant to the process. Even if it be held that the principle is internal to the constitution of the entities, that constitution is ultimately due to the primordial nature of God, without which there could be no order and, therefore, no constitution. Unfortunately Mr. Whitehead weakens his system by making the primordial nature of God a "condition" but not a determining element of order, and by emphasizing that the order comes from the data themselves as of themselves.

(2) *The Process.* In the second phase these data, unified in some way or other, are received or "felt" as belonging to external centers. This is the phase of mere, pure reception of the actual world in its guise of objective datum for the aesthetic synthesis. One may properly ask: What is the receptive or feeling thing? It might be thought that it is the concrescent actual entity itself. On the contrary, Mr. Whitehead does not indicate that any complete entity can be found in that phase of pure reception. So far only the unification of the actual occasions into one complex datum has been described. The "feeling thing" must be drawn out of the blue. To say that the data are felt or received by each other does not settle the difficulty. Such reception is said to constitute the datum as one, though complex. The entity itself does not appear as a unifying force, because it is constituted by this very unification. The multiple becomes one without the aid of an adequate efficient principle. And yet, Mr. Whitehead has already told us, "A multiplicity is a type of complex thing which has unity derivate from some qualification which participates in each of its components severally; but a multiplicity has no unity derivative from its various components."[102] He has stated the truth, but fails to follow it in his detailed explanation.

(3) *The Satisfaction.* The third stage is governed by the private ideal or subjective aim, gradually shaped in the process itself. By it the many feelings, derivately felt as alien, are transformed into a unity of aesthetic appreciation immediately felt

[102] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

as private. Here again would be the place for the action of a substantial form. As a matter of fact, the private ideal or subjective aim is said to be derived ultimately from the primordial nature of God—but the process is not fully determined by that nature. There are indeterminations awaiting the action of the concrescent entity. The determinations which are made are conceptual in nature. They arise from eternal objects as their immediate datum. It has been seen in the section on creation that the being or becoming of the eternal objects is not satisfactorily explained. Their origin violates the ontological principle. They float in from nowhere, and are merely *ordered* in God's Conceptual Valuation.

In this stage there are two subordinate phases, an aesthetic supplement and an intellectual supplement. Both of these phases may be trivial, in which case there is a definite negation of individual origination, and the process passes passively to its satisfaction. The actual entity is then the mere vehicle for the transference of inherited constitutions of feeling.

When these phases are not trivial, the element of individual origination plays a part. In the first or aesthetic supplement,

> there is an emotional appreciation of the contrasts and rhythms inherent in the unification of the objective content in the concrescence of one actual occasion. . . . It is the phase in which blue becomes more intense because of its contrasts and shape acquires dominance by reason of its loveliness. What has been received as alien is recreated as private.[103]

This re-creation is accomplished by the influx of conceptual feelings and their integration with the pure physical feelings (of the datum). Up to this point the process is "blind," in the sense that it is not yet determined to the negation or admission of intellectual "sight"; that is to say, the dismissal into irrelevance of eternal objects in their abstract status of pure potentials, or the acceptance of the same into the process. In the first case, no "intellectual" operations are involved, although conceptual operations always take place, even in the first phase

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 303.

or aesthetical supplement. The intellectual operation of accepting the eternal objects constitutes the second phase or intellectual supplement.

The satisfaction which is the final phase of the internal constitution of the entity is one complex freely determined feeling. The phase is fully determined, or rather, the entity is then fully determined as to its genesis, its objective character for the transcendent creativity (i. e., for its objectification in a succeeding actual entity), and its prehension, positive or negative, of every item in its universe.[104]

(4) *The Decision.* The decision marks the very end of the subjective constitution of the actual entity. The end of phase three has been reached when the conceptually originated novelty has been accepted or rejected. At the same instant the fourth stage or decision is begun. The "satisfaction" is the culmination marking the evaporation of all indetermination; so that, in respect to all modes of feeling and to all entities in the universe, the satisfied entity embodies a determinant attitude of "Yes" or "No."[105] The distinction between the two terms lies in the fact that the decision has to do with the entity and its becoming in the sense of a transition from the settled world to a *new* actual entity. The decision is associated with the entity in its "private" character, the becoming of the actual entity itself, without explicit relation to the future entity. In a word, satisfaction and the process refer to the entity in its character of "*subject.*" The decision and the datum refer to the entity in its character of "*subject-superject.*" The former emphasize the subjective, the latter the objective, phases of the process of concrescence.

Considering the concrescence from the point of view of final causality, there is one item of special interest. According to the Aristotelian conception, the final cause determines the efficient cause to act. It is that for which the agent acts. It is a determining principle, in the sense that the agent is determined

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 301.

to that end and not to another. There can be no question of a progressively determined final cause. In any given action the agent is completely determined for that action, or it is not determined. The determining element is the final cause. The terms " determined " and " determining " are to be used with clarity. In the philosophy of organism the progressively determined final cause is one which is progressively defined and made clear, but at the same time new elements are added according to the decisions of the concrescing entity concerning new propositions. In the Aristotelian system, the final cause determines the agent to act. Before that determination he is potentially capable of performing any one of an infinite number of acts, and he also may act or not act. The final cause is the object which reduces this potency to act. If the final cause were not such a determining element, the agent would ever remain in potency to act, and ever remain in potency to the infinite number of possible acts. Thus the object of any given act is finally determined in the sense that the agent has that end in view and no other, and that during that action there is only one possible outcome, the attainment of that definite object. It would seem that, because the object is sometimes vague and unclear, Mr. Whitehead thinks it undetermined. For example, if a man begins to build a house he may have in mind simply a house, *any* house. Such a man is not acting in an intelligent manner, but he is determined to one end, the building of *a house*, not an automobile or a factory. The object is in that aspect determined, although vague. Moreover, inasmuch as the agent is intellectual and uses his intelligence, he begins building a house, with a complete plan in mind.

Mr. Whitehead confuses the two meanings of the term, making it possible that a final cause may be progressively determined in the sense that it may be made clearer and less vague, but he adds to that the notion that the agent is not in the beginning completely determined to the one object of his action. The first part of his interpretation is possible. The added notion is quite contrary to the truth.

The same subjective aim, the progressively determined final cause, is the principle of unity in the process. God is the mental pole of the process, while the datum is the physical pole. The subjective aim is derived from the primordial nature of God—but with the indeterminations mentioned above. Thus,

> God and the actual world jointly constitute the character of the creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence. The subject, thus constituted, is the *autonomous* master of its own concrescence into subject-superject.[106]

It must ever be recalled that this subjective aim is only incompletely derived from the primordial nature of God.

> He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire. His particular relevance to each creative act as it arises from its conditioned standpoint in the world, constitutes Him the initial "object of desire" establishing the initial phase of each subjective aim.[107]

The initial phase and the final end of the object are confused in this expression; nevertheless it is clear enough that God establishes only the *initial* phase of each subjective aim. Although the world tends towards Him, it is not *completely* determined to this tendency from the beginning.

Whatever arises from God, arises first conceptually in the primordial nature of God. It then becomes physical, because as evaluated in God it is part of an actual entity. Hence when prehended in any other further concrescence, the prehension is of the actual entity and, therefore, physical. The passage from conceptual to physical is accomplished by means of "hybrid feelings" as described previously.

As it is explained [108] according to the Category of Subjective Unity, the subject is inherent in the process. (This does not mean that the subject is the substance and the process is the accident. It is merely another way of saying that the subject and the process are identical.) In the primary phase a conceptual feeling of subjective aim is found. The ultimate source of such an aim is God. The conceptual feeling is originally very

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 346. [107] *Ibid.*, p. 487. [108] *Ibid.*, pp. 316-318.

complex, with conditional alternatives; by successive decisions it is reduced to coherence. In each phase the corresponding conceptual feeling is the " subjective end " characteristic of the phase. In any " incomplete phase " the unity is propositional. At the physical level of consciousness propositions constitute a source of origination of feeling which is not tied down to mere datum.[109] Hence the propositional unity is the unity of a proposition presented as conceptual. The conceptual is an element in the lure for feeling which is always beyond, beckoning the concrescent entity to further unification. In the process the propositional unity retreats before the growing grasp of real (i. e., Whitehead's physical) unity of feeling. Each successive propositional phase is a lure to the creation of feelings which promote its realization. In other words, there are many alternatives in the subjective aim as first derived from God. These alternatives are reduced to coherence or unity by the decisions of the concrescent entity; the subjective aim, in its subjective modifications, remains as the unifying force or factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings, The decisions are impossible for the entity in its process of becoming, before the novelties are proposed in propositions. The propositions, on the other hand, cannot be made until the entity has reached a stage of development at which it can receive such a conceptual proposition. The proposition is said not to exist *for that entity* until the entity is capable of receiving it.

It is further explained, " With this amplification, the doctrine that the primary phase of a temporal entity is physical, is recovered." A " physical feeling " is defined to be the feeling of another actuality.[110] On the preceding page we were told that there must be in the primary phase of the subjective process a conceptual feeling of subjective aim: the other conceptual feelings and the physical feelings originate as steps toward the realization of the conceptual aim through their treatment of initial data. The answer to this paradox lies in the doctrine of

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 317.

hybrid feelings. The conceptual feeling mentioned in the subjective aim is derived from the conceptual evaluation of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God. The physical feeling is the hybrid physical feeling by which the nascent entity feels the actual entity, God; but the actual entity, God, is objectified by His conceptual evaluation of the eternal objects. In this place Professor Whitehead fails to make the distinction which he makes later, when he writes that the primordial nature of God is *deficiently* actual. God lacks the perfection of feeling since His evaluation of eternal objects is only conceptual. He also lacks the "perfection" of consciousness.[111]

The derived conceptual feeling, therefore, which reproduces for the subject the data and valuation of God's conceptual feeling, is the initial conceptual aim referred to in the preceding section. In this sense God can be termed the "creator of each temporal entity." "But the ultimate creativity in the process is not due to God's volition." It is clear enough what is meant: God is not the one creator of the world, in the sense that He produces it out of nothing. He does not create creativity, nor does He create eternal objects, as was seen in the section on creation. "He is truly the aboriginal instance of the creativity; and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action. It is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity, and God is the eternal primordial character."[112] It is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity; the operation is performed by the *deficiently* actual God!

Thus the source of the subjective aim is in God's primordial nature. Its function is evident. It is the one determining element in the process, but it is not identically the same when it carries on the determination, since the aim is itself progressively defined.

Process is the growth and attainment of final end. The progressive definition of the final end is the efficacious condition (sic) of its attainment. The determinate unity of one actual entity is

[111] *Ibid.*, p. 486.

[112] *Ibid.*, p. 318.

bound together by the final causation towards an ideal progressively defined by its progressive relation to the determinations and indeterminations of the datum. The ideal, itself felt, defines what "self" shall arise from the datum: and the ideal is also an element in the self which arises.[113]

Mr. Whitehead fails to realize that the final cause and the efficient cause are really distinct, although the final cause is intentionally present to the agent and motivates that agent to act. He denies the doctrine of substance and as a result he identifies the process with the actual entity arising therefrom. Thus he can make the end, precisely as end, not only the final cause motivating the agent to act, but also the efficient cause working immediately upon the process. Since both the actual entity (the efficient cause of its own becoming, as we saw in the section on causality) and the process are identified, the final cause not only acts upon the entity, but also exerts an efficient causality directly upon the process itself. It is a very confusing doctrine. The data are called the efficient cause of the process. In fact, they are both material and efficient causes. The entity itself is its own efficient cause. Now we see that even the final cause is an efficient cause. Mr. Whitehead is sincerely interested in saving final causality, but he refuses to give it the necessary basis and ends by making it an efficient cause as well as a makeshift final cause.

On the other hand, when Mr. Whitehead describes the process of feeling, i. e., *positive* prehension, he emphasizes the separation of the process and the subject of the same. The whole action of feeling is analyzable into five factors: 1) the "subject" which feels, 2) the initial data which are to be felt, 3) the "elimination" in virtue of negative prehensions, 4) the "objective datum" which is felt, 5) the "subjective form" which is how the subject feels.[114] The "subject which feels" is no longer identified with the process of feeling. It suits the purpose of Mr. Whitehead to ignore the identification and to have recourse to a more reasonable position, namely, that the two

[113] *Ibid.*, p. 209. [114] *Ibid.*, p. 312.

are really distinct. "There is a transition from the initial data to the objective datum effected by the elimination"—in virtue of negative prehension.

The initial data constitute a "multiplicity" or merely a "proper" entity, while the objective datum is a "nexus," a proposition or a "proper entity" of some categoreal type. The concrescence of the initial data into the objective datum is made possible by the elimination and is effected by the subjective form. The objective datum is the perspective of the initial datum.[115] The subjective form receives its determination from the negative prehensions, the objective datum and the conceptual origination of the subject. The negative prehensions are determined by the categoreal conditions governing feelings, by the subjective form, and by the initial data. This mutual determination of the elements involved in a feeling is one expression of the truth that the subject of the feeling is "*causa sui*."[116]

It is most disturbing to the reader to find that one factor in a positive prehension is elimination, which is carried on by negative prehension. As it is stated, the doctrine is quite incomprehensible. Most probably it is to be understood that the elimination is a step preparatory to the true feeling or positive prehension, and that the true feeling consists in the "feeling" of the "objectified datum" which results from the elimination among the initial data effected by negative prehensions. We have already examined the difficulty in the unification of the data into a datum, in that the author fails to posit a sufficient efficient principle for this elimination. Just as the subject is the efficient cause of it's own becoming, so the incompatible data are the cause of their own unification into one datum. We are forced to point out again the fundamental error of the philosophy of organism in denying the existence of substance, and of a subject, really distinct from the data, distinct from the datum, distinct from the process and distinct from the resulting actual entity, which will be the true efficient cause of the whole process and of the actual entity. The identification of subject

[115] This probably should read "data."

[116] *Process and Reality*, p. 312.

and process leads to a multitude of difficulties. Mr. Whitehead apparently realizes the difficulty and attempts to separate the two at the same time that he unites them. He fails to explain the process of unifying the data into one resultant entity because of this confused attempt to identify the two and at the same time keep them separate.

2. The Order of Nature a Unity of External Relations

For Mr. Whitehead, the principle of unity in the process of constituting an actual entity is the subjective aim, which partakes of the nature of an efficient cause as well as that of a final cause. This aim is partially determined by the primordial nature of God and is progressively determined by the decisions of the concrescent entity concerning propositions which become relevant and existent to the process as it developes. Serious defects weaken this theory. First of all, as was seen, the successive determinations which escape the influence of a First Cause lack any ultimate causal explanation. Secondly, the progressive determination of a final cause of any action is impossible. The cause may be made clearer and more definite, but it is the same cause, the same object with no additions. Especially is this true of an ultimate final cause, whether it be taken in an absolute or a relative sense. The same erroneous doctrine is extended to the final cause of the universe as a whole. As is well known, this position is metaphysically unsound. The end must be determined once and for all by the Creator. Since the Creator is the First Cause, and Himself uncaused, He must also be the last end. Outside Him there can be no being, while being determines the will under its aspect of Good. God is the perfect Good. In truth, the unity which one finds in the world is due to the fact that the creatures within it are truly creatures, produced by the One Cause, tending to the One End.

It is clear to Mr. Whitehead, as it is to any intelligent observer, that the world is one, that there is an ordered multiplicity which constitutes the world as it is. The order of nature is one of the "stubborn facts" which confront us. Certainly

the unity arises proximately from multiplicity. The one universe is made up of many creatures. According to Mr. Whitehead this unity is a "physical" one. Each of the entities prehends every other actual entity, so that the universe is one because it is prehended by that one entity. The term "physical" is used. It may be limited to the strict meaning of the word in the philosophy of organism, according to which it means simply that an actual entity physically prehends another actual entity and not an eternal object. Nevertheless it certainly is more than an *intentional* union of the object prehended and the prehending subject. In the process of prehension, the prehended thing is objectified, and made an integral part of the subject. If the unity attained were limited to the intentional unification of knower and thing known, as in intellectual cognition, the doctrine would have some basis. In fact, *every entity* is said to prehend other entities and to receive them into its physical constitution. Therefore, the doctrine must be rejected.

Apart from this unity of subjective prehension there is a real unity of order. The many entities of the universe are really related one to the other in such a definite and settled fashion that they constitute one whole, the order of nature. Within this order one sees a subordination of entities which makes it possible to term the group a hierarchy in the sense in which that word is used in St. Thomas. The philosophy of organism and the doctrine of St. Thomas are by no means identical in this respect, but there is a similarity between the two. The difference comes especially because the organic system fails to posit a relation of all to one, with a sound principle for that relation. According to this system all things in the world tend to *physical* oneness in the consequent nature of God. Moreover this tendency is without a sufficient reason. The unity attained is really an accident, due rather to chance than to design. Of course it is not difficult for Mr. Whitehead to hold to a physical union of the world of creation and God. Matter and spirit do not exist, nor could there be any real distinction between the two. God and the world are of the same composition. Ultimately God *is* the universe as prehended by Him.

This question will be treated in greater detail in the next section. It is sufficient to note that one of the two elements in order of the world is insufficiently explained. The order *ad unum* will be discussed later. For the moment we shall consider only the order *ad invicem*.

As everyone sees, the things of the world consistently attain their ends, and the same ends, acting in the same way. Consider the growth of a plant. It begins as a tiny seed, carries on the process of germination and growth, and produces fruit just as all the other members of its species and class. For that process there is an internal order within the seed and the growing plant which is evident enough. But there is also an external order of the elements of the environment of that plant, the sun, water, soil, temperature and so on. Seemingly these entities are ordered to the plant, in which case each of them is externally ordered. At the same time each would be found to be internally ordered to its own good, according to its own nature. Each member of the society which constitutes the world has an internal end which may be easily recognized. The external end which it has is often more difficult to find. One often asks: What is the external end of the cancerous growth which destroys the living thing on which it lives?

The organic doctrine is not at all contrary to this description. Internal and external relations are not so clearly distinguished, and hence comes a difficulty. But the definition given by Mr. Whitehead is as follows: "Order applies to the relations among themselves enjoyed by many actual entities which thereby form a society." [117] The emphasis is placed upon the relations of one entity to another, that is, the external relations. The internal order is not considered in the notion as here expressed.

As a result of the relation of entities a "society" is formed, which may be termed an "order," or group of ordered entities. The term is applicable to a society which is composed of a number of men united for one aim, a moral society, as well as a

[117] *Process and Reality*, p. 123.

physical " society," a living cell. The cosmic epoch as a whole may be considered as a society of electromagnetic occasions. The notion of " society " is a rather vague one because Mr. Whitehead does not point out the real cause of the union. He considers the fact that there are societies but fails to make clear the relations between the members and the principle, which make the society one entity, either physical or moral, the relation *ad unum*. A number of entities may be related one to another, but there must be something common to all before they can form a unity. They remain strictly multiple, un-united. As such they do not form one entity but a number of entities. *Unum et ens convertuntur*. The multiple as multiple does not exist. If the society, *quid unum*, is to have being, the various members must be brought together by a principle of unification. The multiple as multiple does not become one of itself. The efficient cause of the unification does not act without an end. *Omne agens agit propter finem*. That which impels the agent to act is the end, or final cause. Thus the society has a duplex relation, to the one efficient cause and to the one end toward which the society tends. The simple relations among themselves cannot constitute a true society.

In theory Mr. Whitehead admits the necessity of such a principle. He writes, " Order involves the attainment of an end since it is differentiated from mere ' givenness ' by the introduction of adaptation for the attainment of an end." [118] His " subjective aim " in the concrescence of a single actual entity partakes of the nature of both efficient and final cause. Thus he speaks of the order reigning in an actual entity as well as the order in the entire universe. More than that, he definitely says that the order in the world of nature demands a principle. His principle, however, is a deficient one.

> The order of the world is no accident. There is nothing actual which could be actual without some measure of order. The religious insight is the grasp of this truth: that the order of the world, the depth of reality of the world, the value of the world, in its

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

whole and in its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of life, the place of life and the mastery of evil, are all bound together—not accidentally but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is God.[119]

The doctrine is clear enough. At first sight it would seem to be an alternative expression of the fifth way of proving the existence of God according to St. Thomas. As a matter of fact, it is not. It is true that Mr. Whitehead holds that there is nothing actual which could be actual without some measure of order, and without a principle of the same. The principle to which he refers, however, is the "completed ideal harmony" which is God. The expression is rather ambiguous. It may refer to Him in two senses, in the primordial or consequent nature. The adjective "ideal" suggests the antecedent nature, the Conceptual Valuation of eternal objects, the source of the subjective aim of creatures. The term "completed" seems to be synonymous with "realized ideal" (which, of course, is no longer a true ideal). In other words, this would be the consequent nature of God. On the other hand it may refer to the "completed ideal" or conceptual valuation in God's primordial nature, by which the eternal objects are ordered, and made relevant for the process.

One finds it difficult to accept the term as meaning that the consequent nature of God is the efficient cause of unification. For it is emphasized that "God as conditioning the creativity with his harmony of apprehensions, issues into the mental creature as moral judgment according to a perfection of ideals."[120] One must take this statement in connection with another description:

> The consequent nature of God is His judgment of the world. He . . . saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of His own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can

[119] *Religion in the Making*, p. 119.
[120] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

be saved. God's role lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization.[121]

The whole statement is in accord with the general trend of the philosophy of organism, that the consequent nature of God is the terminus, the result of the concrescence of the universe.[122] Therefore, the completed ideal harmonization, the source of order, and the principle of concretion, are all the primordial nature of God. The consequent nature is the result of the process and, in a limited sense, the final cause of the process, not by any means the efficient principle.

The efficient cause of the universe must be the primordial nature of God, which was shown to be a very unsatisfactory cause when creation was being discussed. A divine causality which is limited to the ordering of eternal objects that have no complete dependence on God's creative action is hardly a true divine causality. The creativity also lies outside this divine cause, which only characterizes it. Moreover a *deficiently* actual God is supposed to make actual that which was not actual. The effect has a perfection not contained in its cause. Moreover, the world is " self-creative " and *causa sui* by means of its own decisions, in accordance with a subjective aim which is only partially derived from the divine cause. In a word, the primordial nature of God is said to be only a partial cause of the becoming of the ordered entities. Although the necessity of a principle is admitted, we find no sufficient principle or efficient cause of the world and its order in the primordial nature of God. The doctrine is not another way of expressing the fifth way of St. Thomas, because it denies the first and second ways which are essentially connected with the fifth.

The description of the order of nature as it is found to be empirically, is more satisfactory. Mr. Whitehead is then on his own ground, the field of empirical science. He describes a hierarchical order of nature which is a hierarchy of expanding circles rather than the more or less pyramidal Thomistic order. Perhaps the image which best approximates to this hierarchy is

[121] *Process and Reality*, p. 490. [122] Cf. *Modes of Thought*, p. 128.

that of a nest of boxes, in which the smallest is enclosed within the next larger and so on until all are enclosed in the largest one. This image is by no means perfect or complete, because the hierarchy is not strictly serial. If the "smallest box" be called A and the intermediate "boxes" bear the letters of the alphabet up to Z; A may be directly enclosed within C, as well as related to C through the mediation of B. This would be the simplest example of the complexity of relations. It can easily be imagined what the entire nexus would be like.

The characteristic of this hierarchy is an increase in unity as one progresses higher in the grouping. A stone possesses unity for it is all stone. If one were to go deeper in the scale of entities and consider the unity of the atom, for example, an atom of hydrogen, a greater unity is seen in the fact that the whole atom is one, hydrogen. If one were to consider the electrons and protons which are thought to make up an atom, the unity would be said to be greater, that of an electric charge. Since the atoms and electrons and protons refer to the theory of physics and chemistry, and since, while they are seemingly well-founded hypotheses, they still remain such, we can take as an example the stone, and call its unity a unity of homogeneity, of oneness of composition. Certainly a living being shows greater unity; the various organs of the body are dynamically united in the performance of functions which are for the good of the whole. In the rising scale of living things one is faced with an ever greater unity of composition and of action. The whole world is one in composition, in its make-up of matter and form. But the higher entities are very complex entities. The higher the entity in the material world, the greater the *complexity* which it exhibits, but also the *greater* the *unity*. From the purely colonial algae, through the simple sponges like the hydra, to the highest class of vertebrates, there is certainly a progression and increase in unity. We are not speaking of an evolutionistic progress but we only note that in the ordered grouping which scientists make, the classes are arranged beginning with the lowest and least complex to the highest and most complex world entities. In

this ordering the entities become more complex but they also become more one. In the complex body of one of the higher vertebrates each organ has its own proper end, but it is also ordained to the good of the whole body, so that that body forms one whole.

The same growth in unity is recognized in the philosophy of organism. The actual entities themselves have a oneness of prehensive composition. They are the final things of which the world is made up.[123] The simple actual entities may be united to form a complexity, a nexus of things which possesses greater or less unity. As a society it possesses a defining characteristic which produces the " causal laws " which dominate its social environment. The origin of the defining characteristic would offer a very interesting subject of discussion, since it is not " created " by the society but " elicited into importance " for its members. It would finally be seen that it, too, lacks a proper causal explanation.

For the moment, however, we are limiting the discussion to the hierarchy of order in the universe. In the description of the order, mention is made of societies, whose nexus possess " social " order, then come the " enduring objects," which are endowed with " personal order."[124] Division is also made into " corpuscular " and " noncorpuscular " societies. The former are analyzable into strands of " enduring objects "; the latter are not so analyzable.[125]

Later on Mr. Whitehead introduces the notion of a society which includes subordinate societies and nexus with a definite pattern of structural interrelations. These he terms " structured societies."[126] Within such a society some of the important groups of occasions are called subordinate *societies,* which could have retained the dominant features of their defining characteristics in the general environment apart from the structured

[123] *Process and Reality,* p. 24.

[124] That is, societies in which the genetic relatedness of the members orders them serially, and the nexus of which forms a single line of inheritance of its defining characteristic. *Process and Reality,* pp. 46-47.

[125] *Ibid.*

[126] *Ibid.,* p. 137.

society, although they would not then be quite the same. Other groups are labelled " subordinate nexus." These, excepting the general systematic characteristics of the external environment, present no features capable of genetically sustaining themselves outside of the structured society. For example, molecules are structured societies, and so in all probability are electrons and protons. A molecule is a subordinate society in the structured society which we call the living cell. The nexus which is the empty space within a living cell is called a subordinate *nexus*, not a subordinate society.[127]

The gradation of society is indicated according to the traditional form when the more special societies of the present electro-magnetic world are enumerated:

> The most general examples of such societies are the regular trains of waves, individual electrons, protons, individual molecules, societies of molecules such as inorganic bodies, living cells, and societies of cells such as vegetable and animal bodies.[128]

We may rightfully conclude that the higher orders possess the perfections of the inferior members, since Mr. Whitehead holds to the doctrine of " objectification " of the entities which form the datum in the subject of the process. Moreover, the higher entities prehend the data positively rather than negatively. God is the highest member of the world hierarchy, and an integral part of it, not truly transcendent. As such He possesses all the perfections of the world entities, for He is constituted by the prehension of them.

Within the entire order of nature, the philosophy of organism admits no specific differences. Everything is reduced to a unity of process. No distinction can be made between material and spiritual beings; they are one in process. Nor is there a specific difference between intellectual and non-intellectual entities. The distinction between the mentality enjoyed by living and non-living, intellectual and non-intellectual actual entities is one of degree, not of kind. Mentality is simply more developed

[127] *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

[128] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

in the higher entities. " Mental activity is one of the modes of feeling belonging to all actual entities in some degree but only amounting to conscious intellectuality in some actual entities." [129] A veritable evolution of reason or mentality is described in some detail in *The Function of Reason,* especially on pages 27 and 28.[130]

Serious difficulties are found in the more complete description of the world hierarchy. Each society is not simply an entity in itself; it depends upon the wider environment in which it is set.[131] In effect, every society is a part of a wider society. Finally one must arrive at the existence of one wide society which includes the whole world. When he reaches this stage of things, Mr. Whitehead's expressions and doctrine become very vague.

> In the general properties of extensive connection we discern the defining characteristic of a vast nexus extending far beyond our immediate cosmic epoch. (This vast nexus) contains in itself other epochs, with more particular characteristics incompatible with each other. Thus, from the standpoint of our present epoch, the fundamental society in so far as it transcends our own epoch seems a vast confusion mitigated by the few elements of order contained in its own defining characteristic of " extensive connection." We cannot discriminate its other epochs of vigorous order, and merely conceive it as harbouring the faint flush of the dawn of order in our own epoch. This ultimate vast society constitutes the whole environment in which our own epoch is set, so far as systematic characteristics are discernible by us in our own present stage of development. In the future the growth of things may endow our successors with keener powers of discernment.[132]

If we can know so little about this wider society, how can we arrive at definite, true principles? If our knowledge is only true of the present epoch, and uncertain concerning the widest world, it may be completely changed when our successors attain to the keener powers of discernment of which mention is made.

[129] *Ibid.,* p. 77.
[130] Cf. also *Modes of Thought,* pp. 104-106.
[131] *Process and Reality,* p. 137.
[132] *Ibid.,* p. 135.

Is that widest society also a process of concrescence? Does it also "create" God? The answers given by Mr. Whitehead indicate that he remains ever an empiricist. Philosophy is only a system of hypotheses which unites all the other empirical sciences, and connects one with the other. Metaphysics is a *general* science, which has no more certainty than the natural sciences, the conclusions and findings of which it generalizes. Philosophy is concerned with the proximate causes of things, rather than the ultimate causes. Metaphysical necessity has no meaning. Metaphysics, philosophy, and generality are synonymous terms.[133]

In our present cosmic epoch

> the physical relations, the geometrical relations of measurement, the dimensional relations, and the various grades of extensive relations involved in the physical and geometrical theory of nature, are derivative from a series of societies of increasing width of prevalence, the more special societies being included in the wider societies. This situation constitutes the physical and geometrical order of nature.[134]

In an attempt to explain this unity according to a monistic system, Mr. Whitehead is led to affirm:

> Our present cosmic epoch is formed by an "electromagnetic" society, which is a more special society contained within the geometric society. . . . The electromagnetic society exhibits the physical electromagnetic field which is the topic of physical science. The members of the nexus are the electromagnetic occasions. But in its turn, the electromagnetic society would provide no adequate order for the production of individual occasions realizing peculiar "intensities" of experience unless it were pervaded by more special societies, vehicles of such order. The physical world exhibits a bewildering complexity of such societies, favouring each other, competing with each other.[135]

[133] Cf. "Science should investigate particular species and Metaphysics should investigate the general notions under which those specific principles should fall." *Process and Reality*, p. 167.

[134] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[135] *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.

The expression " bewildering complexity " is of special interest, for that complexity is a natural result of the theory that

> beyond these societies there is disorder, where " disorder " is a relative term expressing the lack of importance possessed by the defining characteristic of the societies in question beyond their bounds. The term " disorder " refers to a society only partially influential in impressing its characteristic in the form of prevalent laws.[136]

Societies arise and evolve from chaos, as they manage to impress their defining characteristics on the environment. Thus there is a conflict and complexity. The societies " favour each other and compete with each other " in impressing their characteristics (either complementary or opposite) upon the environment. And these societies constitute the order of nature!

The bewildering complexity is due not merely to the incomplete unification caused by the societies. Elements of chaos are found in the environment itself.

> Spread throughout the environment there may be many entities which cannot be assigned to any society of entities. The societies in an environment will constitute its orderly element, and the non-social actual entities will constitute its element of chaos. *There is no reason, so far as our knowledge is concerned, to conceive the actual world as purely orderly or as purely chaotic.*[137]

In other words, *although the universe is tending toward unity, it is not fully unified in fact.* The world can be considered a " society " only in a derivative sense. The world contains ordered entities or societies but it is not itself purely ordered. If it is neither purely ordered nor purely chaotic it is simply not orderly, nor is it one in itself.

Here there is no question of internal finality. Mr. Whitehead does not deny that the entities of the world attain their own proper internal ends, *sicut in pluribus*.[138] The point at issue

[136] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

[137] *Process and Reality*, pp. 154-55.

[138] In accordance with the " self-creative " nature of the entities, the satisfaction which they reach as their internal ends does not always coincide with the plan as

is that, since the world is not purely orderly, it is not completely ordered, and therefore it cannot be truly one. It is supposed to be an entity constituted by the relations of its members among themselves. Since those relations do not lead to the *unification* of the relata, the world cannot be truly one.

And yet, the universe is prehensively united in the consequent nature of God. According to the doctrine seen so often, the process and the reality resulting from the process are the same. The entity is nothing but the process. If God is the actual entity resulting from the process, He is the process itself. In fact God prehends the world. Since there is no such thing as a substance, and since the prehension and the prehender are one, we are forced to conclude that the process of prehending the world constitutes the consequent nature of God. This is the explanation of the statement: "It is as true to say that God creates the world as that the world creates God." [139] What then can be said of the entities which have attained a satisfaction outside of, if not contrary to, the aim of God? What is to be said of those entities which cannot be assigned to any society? Somehow, they are brought into the unity of prehension, although it cannot be said that God prehends them merely negatively. As one rises in the scale the entities prehend negatively less and less, and prehend positively more and more. God is admittedly the highest of entities. In Him one should find a minimum of negative prehension.

From the point of view of attainment of end there is nothing new in Whitehead's doctrine. The distinction between internal and external finality, between proximate and ultimate causality, was made long ago. That the universe is ordered in such a way that some entities fail to attain their internal ends is evident.

outlined in God's primordial nature. The satisfaction so attained is sometimes opposed to the plan of God. This fact is the foundation of Mr. Whitehead's solution of the problem of evil, that God is not responsible for the evil in the world. As a result, the Principle of Concrescence and the Harmonizer of the Universe must "save what can be saved"; He must introduce such harmony as He can among the more or less unruly entities.

[139] *Process and Reality*, p. 492.

As St. Thomas says, things attain their internal ends, *sicut in pluribus*. The human mind is led nevertheless to think that the world is certainly ordered to the attainment of unity. The external finality of a given entity may sometimes escape us, but the external finality of all entities together, the ultimate end of the universe as a whole, must be attained. This is metaphysically certain. If it were not so, it would indicate an imperfection in the creator. Mr. Whitehead cannot use this argument because his " creator " is admittedly imperfect. He is correct in saying that the entities of the world co-operate in the attainment of the ultimate end of the world. As a matter of fact, it is exactly in attaining its own end that a world entity co-operates in attaining the end of the world. Finally just as the fact of becoming or change in the world demands that there be an unchanged entity as the principle of it, so also the fact of finality proves the existence of the principle of finality, an Intelligent Being who directs the things of the world in the adaptation of means to their ends. Mr. Whitehead cannot accept this conclusion in its entirety because he fails to make the Principle of Concretion a true creator, who is unmoved and unchanged, uncaused, simple, perfect, and who directs all things to their proper end; who is Subsistent Being. Because the Principle of Concretion is none of these, world entities can attain ends contrary to the general plan as outlined in the primordial nature of God. He is a " persuader " rather than creator of the universe, or ruler of the world. " He does not create the world, He saves it: or more accurately, He is the Poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by His vision of truth and goodness." [140]

> The image under which the operative growth of God's nature is best conceived is that of a tender care that nothing be lost. . . . The Consequent Nature of God is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage.[141]

[140] *Ibid.*, p. 490.

[141] *Ibid.*

This is the fundamental weakness of the philosophy of organism. If God is not the true creator, there is no necessity that He should be the ultimate end of things. An article which is not made entirely by a given man does not necessarily form a part of his possessions. Much less is it ordered uniquely to him and his good. For the same reason any order in the world is purely accidental. Disorder must be expected in the world since the world itself escapes divine causality. It has been known for centuries that there can be no order without a principle of order. Two elements are required, an ordered distinction, and the communication of the distinct entities in the whole.[142] As it has been summarized: " Order requires unity among diversities."[143] Hence one must consider that whatever order may be found in nature, it is due ultimately to the relation of creature to creator. The fact that the world entities are ordered *ad invicem* in the wonderful way that we see is only an indication that there is some real relation, not only of the things among themselves, but of all created entities to their principle. The relation is twofold: first, in that the creatures are caused by God and depend upon Him as the principle of becoming and being; secondly, in that these creatures return to God as their end.[144] The two aspects of the relation are correlative. If the creature owes its entire becoming to the creator, the creator must be the ultimate end of the creature. If one rejects the solid foundation of creationism, he casts aside the only solid basis for making God the ultimate end of things. If things then attain to God as their end, it is purely by accident.

Evidently Mr. Whitehead realizes this truth. For this reason, probably, he makes his Harmonizer of the Universe the poet *leading* creation by his vision, " persuading " the world into the

[142] St. Thomas, *In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 12 (Ed. Marietti), n. 2637.

[143] Cf. Comte Amedée de Silva Tarouca, L'essentiel du tout ordre est l'unité des relations au principe commun. . . . L'ordre est donc un devenir " pour " la fin de l'ordre, " à cause " du principe d'unité, " afin " de realiser cette unité. From his article, " L'idée d'ordre dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas," *Revue Neo-Scholastique de Philosophie,* XL (1937), 359.

[144] *Summa Theologica,* III, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1; *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate,* 19.

unity of his prehension. Seemingly God is given the function which is more properly allotted to man. Man brings the physical world, with all its multiplicity and diversity, into the intentional unity of his knowledge. The unity of prehension is then a unity of experience. We could say " unity of knowledge " because, for Mr. Whitehead, there is no difference between the two. Certainly the unity effected in knowledge and experience is one form of unifying the world. One must distinguish clearly, however. There is a *real order* in the universe, consisting in the relation of things *ad invicem. This order exists in reality, independent of all prehensive or perceptive knowledge* (except that of God which causes both the entities and their order). Secondly, there is also a real relation of all the entities *ad unum*, which is their first cause and last end. Mr. Whitehead tries to separate the two, whereas they are really inseparable. Things are ordered among themselves because they are ordered by and to the creator. Mr. Whitehead sees the effect, although he does not recognize the cause. He realizes that the things of the world are adapted to attain their ends; that is, that there is order in the world. Hence he affirms the principle of final causality. Yet, the final causality which he describes is not complete. He does not go to the bottom of the question. It is true that every existing thing has an end. The reason for this fact is found in the more complete expression: " Every agent acts for an end." That which exists has an end because the agent which gives it existence acts for an end, which is to be attained as the true final cause of that entity. If God exists, and has created, it is then metaphysically necessary that all His creatures have Him as their ultimate end. If God is not truly God, and not a true creator, it is purely accidental that the world comes to Him. And any order in the world is also due to chance. As Garrigou-Lagrange points out, " Chance is merely the absence of an explanation for things, of a *raison d'etre* of intelligibility." Consequently it is absurd to try to explain the order of things by chance.

In a word, we may judge the fact of the order of nature ac-

cording to the principles of natural empirical science. We are not considering that aspect of the philosophy of organism. Concerning the causal *explanation* of that order, Mr. Whitehead gives us a doctrine which is by no means satisfactory. The order *ad invicem* which he admits requires an order of real relation *ad unum* which he does not accept in its entirety. Therefore, his explanation must be rejected.

3. The Universe as Prehensively One in the Consequent Nature of God

The order of nature is, then, imperfect, since disorder is found within it. It is an order of multiplicity in which the multiple remains multiple, in spite of a certain amount of unification. A more complete unity is found in the universe as it is prehensively united in the consequent nature of God.

The unity of each individual entity is a unity of "satisfaction." This "satisfaction" is the last step in the process of concrescence or "prehension." Thus, "The notion of 'order' is bound up with the notion of an actual entity as involving an attainment of something individual to the entity in question." [145] In describing the Ontological Principle, Mr. Whitehead writes that it (the Ontological Principle) "constitutes a first step in the description of the universe as a solidarity of many actual entities. Each actual entity is conceived as 'feeling' the many data so as to absorb them into the unity of one individual 'satisfaction.'" [146]

This process then continues. Not only does each actual entity prehend the whole universe and so unite the world in a system of positive and negative prehensions; but the consequent nature of God is also constituted by His prehension of the entire universe. In the highest sense, therefore, the unity of the universe is attained in His prehension of it. The multiplicity which is the universe passes into the unity of the consequent nature of God, and is reduced to the unity of His primordial aim.[147]

[145] *Process and Reality*, p. 116. [146] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[147] *Ibid.*, p. 494: At the same time it is asserted that the unity of God becomes

The element of purpose in the universe is the aim of God in relation to the universe as a whole.

He, in his primordial nature, is unmoved by love for this particular or that particular . . . His aim for it (an immediate occasion) is depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step toward the fulfillment of his own being. His tenderness is directed toward each actual occasion as it arises.[148]

The universe is aimed at God, but only *in a general way*. The particular entities of the world enjoy a certain measure of freedom in their concrescence.

God's unity of conceptual operation is a free creative act, untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things. It is deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact comes to pass. The particularities of the actual world presuppose it; while it merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of the creative advance, of which it is the primordial exemplification.[149]

The element of individual freedom in the entities within a general, loosely-ordered orientation toward God has been emphasized so frequently that there is no need to repeat it here. Nevertheless it is a fundamental point, and a fundamental weakness, of the philosophy of organism, and it must be kept in mind even when it is said that the unity to be attained by the world is a unity of prehension in God. What is prehended into that unity of God's consequent nature is really multiple, physically multiple. Each actual entity of the world seeks its own end freely, and attains its own individual satisfaction. Thus it attains its own internal end. An external end is superimposed, as it were, by God upon the constituted entity. Because of the "overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization" he can patiently bring about unity in his prehension of the

multiple because of His absorption of the many entities of the world into Himself. One may explain this paradox by remarking that God is multiple because He is composed of a multiplicity of entities. He is one because that multiplicity is one in Him. Mr. Whitehead does not give this answer.

[148] *Process and Reality*, p. 147.

[149] *Ibid.*, p. 487.

world. The whole scheme suggests the Bergsonian conception of finality in the process of evolution—a progressively defined aim.[150]

Mr. Whitehead has attempted to "rationalize" Bergson's philosophy but the Bergsonian denial of true finality has such great force that the "rationalizer" could not bring himself to admit complete finality. Ultimately, therefore, he falls into the same error as the philosopher whose system he attempts to rationalize.

Finally, the unification by prehension is analogous to that brought about by cognition in Thomistic philosophy. The term "prehend" is admittedly analogous with the expression "to know." It is, however, merely analogous. "Perception" is construed as meaning "taking account of" the essential character of the thing perceived. (This is *not* the perception of the essence of the thing perceived.) The "sense" of Francis Bacon's *Natural History* becomes cognition for Mr. Whitehead. ("It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no *sense*, yet they have perception.") It is emphasized: "We certainly do take account of things of which at the time we have no explicit cognition. We can have a cognitive memory of the taking account without having had a contemporaneous cognition."[151]

Mr. Whitehead takes great pains to avoid the position that prehension means *cognitive* perception or *cognitive* apprehension. "I will use the word prehension for uncognitive apprehension; by this I mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive."[152] He emphasizes that prehension which is like

[150] Cf. "Le chemin a été crée au fur et à mesure de l'acte qui le parcourait. . . . Jamais l'interprétation finaliste, telle que nous la proposerons, ne devra être prise pour une anticipation sur l'avenir. C'est une certaine vision du passé à la lumière du present. . . . La théorie des causes finales ne va pas assez loin quand elle se borne à mettre de l'intelligence dans la nature, et elle va trop loin quand elle suppose une préexistence de l'avenir dans le present sous forme d'idée. . . . L'avenir n'était donc pas continu dans le present sous forme de fin representé.'—Bergson, *L'Evolution Creatrice* (Paris: 1912), pp. 55-56.

[151] *Science and the Modern World,* p. 101.

[152] *Ibid.*

apprehension and perception (in the sense of "taking account of") is not necessarily either conscious or cognitive. There is no essential distinction between prehension and intellectual cognition. The latter is merely a species of the former genus. In his note to Chapter IV of *Science and the Modern World*, he quotes from Descartes' *Reply to Objections — against the Meditations*:

> Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky but objectively, i. e., in the way in which objects are wont to exist in the mind; and this mode of being is truly much less perfect than that in which things exist outside the mind, but it is not on that account mere nothing, as I have already said.

Mr. Whitehead continues,

> I find difficulty in reconciling this theory of ideas (with which I agree) with other parts of the Cartesian philosophy.[153]

According to this statement one is justified in concluding that just as the object is in the mind of the knower, so also the object prehended is in the prehending subject. Only, in the process of prehension the object—the data—really becomes the subject. Logically, therefore, Mr. Whitehead should conclude that the object becomes one with the knowing subject. The object is in the mind of the knower, not "formally" but "objectively."[154]

[153] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

[154] The reader may object that we are here reading into Whitehead's words the idea of substance, the subject whose knowledge is an accident, while Mr. Whitehead's doctrine specifically denies substance. In reply, it must be stated that Mr. Whitehead himself makes the subject the substance. In spite of his formal denial of the doctrine, he necessarily admits it in practice. This is clear in his example of a feeling (positive prehension): "As a simple example of a feeling, consider the audition of sound. In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, let the sound be one definite note. The audition of this note is a feeling. This feeling has first an auditor, who is the subject of the feeling. But the auditor would not be the auditor that he is apart from this feeling of his." (*Process and Reality*, p. 330). As may be seen, the idea of a substance pre-existing, and subject of the feeling, is implicitly admitted. The feeling modifies the subject so that he is the auditor that he is because of his feeling. Certainly it cannot be asserted that this is opposed to the doctrine of substance. The feeling subject is certainly modified by his feeling. It

The theory of prehension should be considered also in the light of the "monadology" of Mr. Whitehead. "This theory of monads differs from that of Leibnitz in that his (Leibnitz') monads change. In the organic philosophy they merely become. Each monadic creature is a mode of the process of feeling, in every way determinate."[155] This statement applies especially to the unity of the universe which is due to the fact that the whole universe is prehended in the unity of each actual entity. There are far more negative than positive prehensions in the constitution of the lower entities. As they grow in complexity and ascend in the scale of things, there are fewer negative and more positive prehensions in them. One may, therefore, conclude that in God the universe is positively prehended, with a minimum of negative prehensions. The knowledge of God (Whitehead calls it his "judgment") includes the whole world. All is included in his "judgment." The whole world must be "objectively" in God. The multiplicity of the consequent nature of God is due to the fact that the monadic entities are united in Him. This is the unity which is to be found in His prehension of the universe. The actual entities are "formally" individual, atomic and monadic. They are "objectively" one in God.

The explanation of this "objective presence" of the object in the prehending subject is the main task of the philosophy of organism.[156] All that we have seen leads up to this "objectification" of the world in God. It is the *perceptive* constitution of the actual entity which presents the problem.

How can the actual entities, each with its formal existence, also enter objectively into the perspective actual entity in question? This is the problem of the solidarity of the universe. The classical doctrine of universals and particulars, of subject and predicate, of individual substances not present in other individual substances, of the externality of relations, alike render the problem incapable

is an accidental modification, but the subject feeling is not quite the same as the same subject not-feeling.

[155] *Process and Reality*, p. 111. [156] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

of solution. The answer given by the organic philosophy is the doctrine of prehension, involved in concrescent integrations, and terminating in a definite complexity of feeling. To be actual must mean that all actual things are alike objects enjoying objective immortality in fashioning creative actions: and that all actual things are subjects, each prehending the universe from which it arises. The creative action is the universe always becoming one in a particular unity of self-experience, and thereby adding to the multiplicity which is the universe as many. The insistent concrescence into unity is the outcome of the self-identity of each entity. No entity—be it " universal " or " particular "—can play disjoined roles. Self-identity requires that every entity have one, conjoined self-consistent function, whatever be the complexity of that function.[157]

There is, therefore, a unity or togetherness of things in experience. The whole theory is a theory of unification by concrescence or prehensive experience, a process which is carried on by all actual entities, living and non-living, intellectual and non-intellectual. Hence, Mr. Whitehead can give us his " reformed subjectivist principle " which denies that togetherness can have any other meaning than its " experiential togetherness." This " experiential togetherness " of things considered " formally " makes knowledge possible—even God's knowledge. The very possibility of knowledge should not be an accident of God's goodness; it should depend on the interwoven natures of things. After all, God's knowledge has equally to be explained.[158]

As a result of this doctrine, Mr. Whitehead must find a togetherness or solidarity of the universe. In spite of his denial of a real unity or complete order of nature, he must find some kind of unity. He turns for this purpose to the " extensive continuum " which is " that general relational element in experience, whereby the actual entities experienced, and that unit of experience itself, are united into the solidarity of one common world." [159] The world as a " continuum " is the world as a potential. The physical world is incurably atomic. Hence,

[157] *Ibid.*, p. 78. [158] *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269. [159] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

the actual entities atomize the extensive continuum, and thereby make real what was antecedently merely potential. The atomization of the extensive continuum is also its temporalization, that is to say, it is the process of the becoming of actuality into what is in itself merely potential.[160]

This unity of the universe which is due to the extensive continuum, or extensive relations of things, the primary relationships of physical occasions, might be thought to exist independently of the consequent nature of God. In this connection it is necessary to recall the general doctrine of organic philosophy. The process *is* the entity, and the actual entity *is* its process. The actuality of the universe is brought about by a process of experience or prehension. The entity which is formed by the process of experiencing the universe of God, in His consequent nature. So God experiences the universe, but God prehending the universe is the universe as prehended, just as any other actual entity is the prehension of its data. In that way the world creates God!

Yet there is an antithesis. God creates the world. The explanation of this may be found again in the " extensive scheme," which

> is nothing else than the generic morphology of the internal relations which bind the actual occasions into a nexus, and which bind the prehensions of any one actual occasion into a unity, coordinately divisible. These extensive relations do not make determinate *what* is transmitted, but they do determine conditions to which all transmission must conform. They represent the systematic scheme which is involved in the real potentiality from which every actual occasion arises. This scheme is also involved in the attained fact which every actual occasion is.[161]

The most important question arises in connection with the " real potentiality " from which every actual occasion arises. Ultimately these occasions arise from the concrescence of eternal objects, each of which has an individual and a relational essence. The individual essence is merely the essence con-

[160] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[161] *Ibid.* p. 408.

sidered in its uniqueness; it is the particular individuality of an object, and cannot be described otherwise than as being itself. The relational essence determines how it is possible for the object to have ingression into actual occasions.[162] Finally, " the general relationships of eternal objects to each other . . . are the relationships in God's conceptual valuation. Apart from this realization there is mere isolation indistinguishable from non-entity." [163] In this way, the extensive scheme which conditions transmission depends on God's primordial nature. The ordering of eternal objects depends on God. The subjective aim of each entity is only partially determined and derived from God, as we have seen previously. In this sense God is the creator of the universe.

The antithesis is thus explained! The world comes from God and is progressing toward God, and in the process the world creates God. This must be the character of the unity of the universe. It is a unity of prehension, but that prehension creates God. So is the world one with God and in God.

The concrescence of the world into God, like the concrescence of data into any other actual entity, is a unification without an efficient principle. The primordial nature of God, as was seen above, is a very imperfect and partial efficient cause. In his consequent nature God is only prehending the created universe. He is not responsible for the being of the world. The doctrine that God is the end of the universe—as far as a dynamic creation according to organic philosophy, with its constant flux in two directions, can have an end—is unfounded. That " end " is a progressively defined aim. Whitehead has advanced little beyond the " finality " of Bergson, which is not true finality.

Since the process of unification is the same for all entities, God included, the world is no more necessarily destined to unity in the knowledge of God than in the experience of other actual entities. The knowledge of God is more perfect, in that there are more positive and fewer negative prehensions in its con-

[162] *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 229-230.

[163] *Process and Reality*, p. 368.

stitution. For that reason the unity of the universe is greater in the divine prehension than in that of other actual entities. Nevertheless the fundamental error of the system remains. God is not the First Cause, Himself uncaused, of the world, therefore He is not necessarily its last end. Only by accident does the world attain to unity in His knowledge. Even in that purely accidental unity one cannot find an efficient principle.

On the other hand, if God is the true First Cause of all that is, having no pre-existing material cause from which He may produce the world, and if God *is* Subsistent Being, there is no other possible end of creation than Himself. With such a foundation, one can prove that it is metaphysically necessary that the world be ordained to unity in Him.

The method of attaining that unity remains to be seen. The theory of prehension may be accepted if it be limited to true perception or knowledge. Whitehead admits a hierarchy of entities in which the inferior is contained within the superior entities. This is true in the hierarchy of being, in that the higher contains within itself the *perfections* of inferior entities; as, for example, the sentient animal possesses all the perfections of vegetative life. An intellectual being has all the perfections of the lower non-living, vegetative, and sentient orders.

In knowledge, however, there is a greater unification of the thing known and the knowing subject. Mr. Whitehead says that the object known is not " formally " but " objectively " in the knower. If knowledge is to be possible the object must be united to the subject. Otherwise the two remain radically separated, so that we cannot know things, as they are in themselves, by our own activity. Knowledge is simply limited to the appearances of things; or it may be a pure creation of the mind, with no true connection with reality, if there is any reality outside the mind. If there is any agreement between things as they are and as we know them, it is due to some pre-established harmony. Our certainty is due to a confidence in the veracity of God, who would not permit us to be deceived.

Mr. Whitehead wishes to avoid the Cartesian and Kantian

theories of knowledge. His doctrine of "objectification" is supposed to be the means of avoiding them. Still, he goes too far. In order that the object should be in the subject it is by no means necessary that it should be present *physically* in the subject. It is only necessary to be present intentionally, *secundum modum cognoscentis*. In the purely sense knowledge of an animal, the object is present, but the representation or form of that object is purely material. When known by an intellectual being, composed of matter and spirit, though united in one being, it is possible that that material perception can be spiritualized, because the knowing subject is both material and spiritual. The material is thus spiritualized in the act of intellectual cognition, by which the subject becomes one with the thing known. Although the object is intentionally present to the subject, it is not perfectly identical with the subject, nor is it radically separated from the subject. There is a real but imperfect identity of the two.[164] The divided world is thus united. The fact of the existence of material and spiritual entities is not denied. The problem of how the one can act on the other is settled. The problem of how the material world can return to the Pure Spirit, who is God, is answered. Man is the bridge. The world is made for him, that he may lead it to God. He reduces the universe to unity by knowing it and making it a part of himself. As the highest type of entity, he already possesses all the perfections of the lower orders of creation. He is a living creature composed of body and soul, material and spiritual elements. Matter and spirit are united in his one being. By his material faculties he is in contact with the world of matter. By his spiritual faculties of intellect and will he is in contact with the world of spirit. Since he is only one being, passage from matter to spirit can be effected. The act of knowledge is not unlike *cognitive* prehension. It is understood that we cannot follow Mr. Whitehead in giving the power of cognitive knowledge to non-living entities. Moreover, he is mistaken in

[164] Cf. Hayen, "Intentionalité de l'etre et Metaphysique de la Participation," *Revue Neo-Scholastique*, XLII (1939), 385-410.

maintaining that there is no essential distinction among magnetic attraction, sense perception, and intellectual knowledge. There is a bifurcation in nature. Matter and spirit are stubborn facts. The simple denial of this condition of the created world is useless. Employing the very theory of prehension and reducing it to reasonable limits, we arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the unity of the universe. Mr. Whitehead gives to God the task of uniting all the entities of the world in His consequent nature. This is impossible. The fact is that the unification is brought about through the mediation of one creature, composed of matter and spirit, uniting both elements in the unity of his one being. The world comes from God and must return to God. It is made to be known by man. Through him the material world is spiritualized, and by the exercise of his spiritual faculties, the intellect and will, he can offer all that he is, and all that he knows, to the Creator. Here is the true unity of the universe toward which Mr. Whitehead has taken several hesitating steps in his theory of prehensive unification.

CONCLUSION

Unity of Finality in the Universe

As a man looks back upon the past years of his life he is often surprised by the great unity which he observes therein. He sees and marvels that events and actions which at the moment seemed absolutely opposed to any unification or general purpose have really been keystones in the harmonious building of his days. He marvels all the more because that coherence of events is so little due to his own planning. Things which he tried most resolutely to avoid have actually been most essential to the general scheme. The occurrences which caused him the greatest sorrow and pain were quite necessary to his present good and joy. He may very properly wonder at the manner in which the many events have united to form one integral whole. For he sees that while he himself may have had a definite plan, another unifying element has also been at work, interweaving

the seemingly extraneous and contradictory facts into one complete unity. He has used his limited intelligence while another intelligence seems to have ordered the thing as a whole.

Much more must a man wonder at the harmony of the universe. From the time of Plato and Aristotle the question asked has not been, "Is there unity in the universe?" but "Whence does it come?" Unity or oneness has been defined as undivided being. Hence the elements of being and absence of division are essential. That there is being in the world goes without saying. All that is, is being. That there is an absence of division is also clear. The universe is one continuum. It is one in composition. Dynamic unity is so evident that scientists posit the principle of the conservation of energy. Some monists even consider the universe as one being, and even one "animal," i. e., one animate being. There is unity of action inasmuch as the activity of each body seems to be transmitted to the limits of the whole world. This is one of Professor Whitehead's fundamental principles. Lastly, there is unity of finality inasmuch as the whole universe comes from one and tends toward one. It is with this last element that this paper is concerned. Professor Whitehead definitely holds final causation but his final causation is not quite our finality.[165]

The fact of unity must be admitted. There is certainly an order in the universe, for we see how all the individual elements generally attain an end. Although not all seem to attain their own proper end, even in such a failure they aid other elements to attain their end. Each individual thing, each "event," is a composite; and the universe is a composite of these constitutive parts. The most striking fact, proving the unity of the whole, is that each individual seeks not merely its own good but that of the whole universe. For example, if one were to put aside the universal ordering, it could hardly be considered a good for the animal to be eaten by man. Continued existence and further perfection of that state would seem to be the good of any living thing. But when one considers the complex of nature he sees as a constituent part carnivorous animals for whose growth,

[165] *Function of Reason*, p. 9; *Process and Reality*, p. 118.

development, and functioning other animals are necessary as food. The animal which is destroyed really fulfills its purpose, attains its end, in that very destruction. An animal exists for its species, while the species exist for the universe. Thus, in preserving and continuing its species the animal realizes its end. Dissolution and decay are not necessarily retrogressive steps in the order of nature, but steps in the perfection of it. The lower is subordinate to the higher. In their destruction, the lower things of the world often lose their own proper existence in order to enter into a higher life. The hierarchy in the order of nature is so clear, and it is so evident that man is the highest member of that hierarchy, that many philosophers have declared man to be the king of the universe. Some have done this to the exclusion of every theocentric aspect of the universe, making it exclusively anthropocentric. Certainly man is to be placed at the top of the world hierarchy. But *why* does he hold that exalted position? Why, for example, does the sunlight serve him, while he is not bound to worship the sun?

In order to understand the reason for this ordering one must go back to the fundamental question of creation. To consider the one to which the world tends and to neglect the one from which it proceeds, would leave the problem unsolved. Certainly Professor Whitehead's idea of creation is not in conformity with the true doctrine. The latter system is founded on the evidence that the present universe is an effect, and no effect can come into being unless it is produced by a cause which is prior to it in nature. This may be what Professor Whitehead terms the " Semitic theory of a wholly transcendent God creating out of nothing an accidental universe," [166] but it is the only reasonable and satisfactory explanation. To create means to produce from absolutely nothing. It is the production of being from non-being. To place God as only one element among several component elements in creation is absurd. God *is*, and outside Him there can *be* no other. He possesses the fullness of being. Hence there can be no other being which He can use as a pre-existing material or with which He can co-operate in creation.

[166] *Process and Reality*, pp. 132-3.

He alone produces the totality of the effect. If He does not do so, either there is no creation or He is no true God. He is the First Cause and is Himself uncaused. He is the sufficient reason of His own existence. He is the totality of Being of whom all other being is only a participation. It is by no means necessary to deny an evolution of the world because one holds to the fact of creation. One is not required to maintain that at the moment of creation the world appeared in its present form. Nor does one defend the statement that the world was created in six days of twenty-four hours each. One must maintain that there was this production of being from non-being. The one essential is that no matter how or when the world reached its present state, it was created from absolutely nothing. The First Cause of all is God. If there is one effect in the world there is a First Cause communicating being to that effect. If any potency is actualized, there must be a Pure Act which is the moving force of that actuation. If there is one contingent being in the world, it follows that there is a Necessary Being through whom that contingent being is. In other words, the world began to exist and it began in virtue of the creative act of God, communicating to it *being*.

Causality is essentially the production of existing being. A cause is the positive principle from which a thing really proceeds according to a dependence in being. The more perfect the effect, the more perfectly does it participate the being of its cause. Moreover, the nearer it approaches to its cause in its development the more perfectly does it participate the being of that cause. Hence, if an effect is to tend to perfection it must tend to unity by assimilation to its cause. Creation is a form of efficient causality and, in creating, the First Cause communicates being to the world. It must also be remembered that an efficient cause can only act in virtue of an end which is known and willed. Otherwise it would ever remain undetermined to the production of this or that effect. The First Cause is necessarily perfect; it must contain all being in itself. Moreover no agent can act except to attain a good. But good is being. Hence the First Cause cannot seek anything outside Itself but rather the

end to be obtained in the act of creation can only be Itself, its Own Being, under the aspect of Good. Naturally this is the ultimate end, first in the order of intention and last in the order of execution.

As a matter of fact, we know that a multiplicity of beings has been created in the universe. Can the Creator have produced this multitude merely for the sake of multiplicity? The answer must be in the negative. He who is perfect Being is perfectly one, for one and being are convertible. Unity must therefore will oneness primarily, and cannot will multiplicity for its own sake. Thus in the act of creation the Creator primarily wills the entire universe and its perfection. The component parts are willed only secondarily. Their perfection is to lead to the perfection of the whole.

It is well known that the good is the object of the will and that, therefore, the ultimate end of the divine will must be perfect Good. Since God is His Goodness, it also follows that the ultimate end of creation can only be Himself, perfect, subsisting Being. Subsistent Being is, therefore, the end; first in intention although last in execution. Hence it is easy to understand that in communicating being to creatures, the Creator wills that they should attain their perfection by union with His own perfect Being. This is the aim of the universe—assimilation with Subsistent Being.

In fact, within the multiplicity of the created universe there is a hierarchy of being. In the first and lowest place there is inanimate being, the chemical elements, air, water, rocks, which possess mere existence without any form of life. Above them are the plants with vegetative life, capable of immanent activity. In the next grade is sentient life or the being of animals. Finally there is man, endowed with an intellect and a will which place him immeasurably above the lower creatures. These inferior creatures necessarily tend toward their end. Even the higher animals act because of instinct, conscious of what they are doing but not knowing the purpose of their action. Man alone in creation knows what he is doing and he alone can will the attainment of an end. Within this hierarchy

there is an order of subordination of inferior to superior. According to this hierarchy, each attains to its own end and in so doing tends toward the perfection of the higher members and so to the perfection of the whole universe.

As was seen above the only ultimate end of created things is a return to the Creator, for the perfection of an effect is to return to its cause. The more nearly it approaches to the Being of which it is a participation, the more perfect does it become. Whatever proper end the individual creature may attain, it must always be in subordination to the end of the whole universe, union with Subsistent Being, God. The question at issue is: How can the universe attain this end? It is evident that each part of the created world has its own proximate and particular end, and that in general that end is attained. Each being attains its own particular end by its own activity. At the same time, the lower orders of the world serve the higher. The superior entities possess the perfections of their inferiors. The plant is not merely vegetative. It also possesses the perfections of the non-living world. Man, a being composed of both spiritual and material elements, is endowed with the perfections of the lower orders of nature. He makes use of those inferiors in attaining his own proper ends. In his nature, he is a microcosm, with all the perfections of the world. Yet he is not merely a microcosm; he is also a metacosm. By his spiritual nature he stands outside the world. He is a person, with all the independence which personality demands. In the lower orders of creation the members of a species are simply individual, and as such, they are ordained to the good of the species. Man is not merely an individual. He is not only an individual existing for the species and for the universe: he is also a person, independent of both species and universe, with an end proper to himself. That end must be attained, at all costs. Over and above the perfections of the lower beings of creation, man is endowed with an intellect and a will. By his intellect he knows that his ultimate end is union with the Creator. By his voluntary faculty he wills that union, and so returns to Being.

It is not, however, merely because man actually possesses all

the grades of being within himself that he can fulfill the duty of returning nature to God. The object of his intellect is universal being, under the aspect of truth. By that faculty he can know all the universe. The material world, being known by him, is intentionally in the mind of man; the whole universe is really intentionally present in the spiritual faculty, the intellect. The knower becomes the thing known; the union thus arising is perfectly real, although there is not a physical identity of the two. This is the element of truth upon which the philosophy of organism is founded. It is expressed in the doctrine of prehensive unification. Unfortunately, Mr. Whitehead ascribes mentality and the power of prehensive unification to *all* the entities of the world. This is an exaggeration. Mentality cannot be characteristic of *all* created things. True intellectual cognition is the operation of a spiritual faculty, and cannot be found in purely material entities. The material things lose their materiality and are spiritualized by man's knowledge of them. Yet man's intellect seeks all truth; he knows that he can find his ultimate end in none of the created things of the universe, nor in the universe as a whole which he spiritualizes by his knowledge. All these things are for him. He is not for them. He must look higher for his end and he finds the object of his search in Truth itself, Subsistent Being, the All-Good Creator. Every created thing which he knows, is only an image of the Deity. Therefore, being reasonable, man is not satisfied with the image. He seeks rather the reality behind the image, Subsistent Being. His intellect presents that Being to the will under the aspect of Good. Then, by the act of this other spiritual faculty, man turns to God the All-Good, offering all that he is by his nature and through his intellectual knowledge to the Giver of all.

Thus the cosmos returns to its Creator through the intellect and will of the highest creature. The effect is perfected by return to its cause. This is the duty of man in the universe. There is a subordination of things, and an order among themselves, in order that all lower nature may be subject to man. The whole well-ordered creation is subject to him as its king

in order that, through his intellect and will, it may attain to its ultimate end. For this reason the earth yields up its richest treasures for the use of man. Therefore do the plants and animals serve him in the myriad ways of nature. Therefore do the mountains raise their rugged peaks skyward in his sight. Therefore do the waves, in his hearing, lash in majestic fury the rocky barriers of the sea. They are to be known by man and so raised to the higher spiritual level of his knowledge. Therein they take on a new existence. The universe loses its material character as man by his knowledge spiritualizes it. Then, by man's voluntary act, God is recognized and all creation is offered to its creator in grateful and loving union.

Thus the creative act of God is rendered perfect by return to Him. Man was made, for this purpose, a constituent part of the world. The continual return to Being must go on as long as man is man and as long as the world remains. Philosophers can certainly come to the conclusion that the universe attains its ultimate end through the intellect and will of man rendering to Being all the beings of the world. Herein lies the explanation of the unity of finality, the order of things in the world. The order of aesthetic development of nature is not an end in itself but it is directed to the one ultimate end of all, union with Being. If one is mistaken in the matter of creation he cannot understand its ultimate end. As Professor Whitehead himself says, "The sheer statement of what things are may contain elements explanatory of why things are."[167] Hence, it is not to be wondered at if one makes a mistake concerning the end of the world when he is mistaken concerning its cause. Mr. Whitehead is to be admired because he has dared to re-introduce finality into the world. It only remains for him to realize that finality must be found in the very beginning in intention, as well as in the end in execution. His philosophy will then be complete in that respect.

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[167] *Science and the Modern World,* p. 134.

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Part V

The Principles of Justice: Citizenship and Suffrage

WE have proved that Constitutional government is absolutely more just than a Royal regime. In the motion of human affairs, the step from Royal, or even from Royal *and* Political, government to the purely Constitutional commonwealth is a step of progress; and once these advances have been made, every tendency in the opposite direction indicates the corruptive force of injustice at work. The struggle in which the world is convulsed today draws its light from this truth which, again and again in twenty-five hundred years of European history, has made battlefields and bloody revolutions more than empty conflicts between opposing mights.

The leaders who united the Greek city-states in their defense against the Persian aggressor could identify their cause with that of liberty and justice, for their fellow countrymen were fully conscious of the advantages which Constitutional government had over despotic absolutism. The victories at Thermopylae and Salamis were not empty even though twenty-five hundred years later the same fundamental issue had to be refought in the same mountain passes, on the same plains by the sea, and in the same waters; nor do we believe they were in vain because the recent battle of Thermopylae was a defeat at arms. In the twenty-five hundred years between the Persian and the present war, the fight for Constitutional government has been lost as often as it has been won, but each time that it has been lost, the efforts which men will always make for liberty and justice have brought about a rebirth of constitutionalism, and in each new incarnation the principle of con-

stitutionality has been better understood and embodied with greater practical wisdom—hence more firmly established and more surely protected against dissolution from within, if not from external assault.

It is necessary only to mention the names of Demosthenes and of Cicero to remember that the Greeks succumbed to the Macedonian despots after vanquishing the Persian kings, and that the Romans expelled the Tarquins only to surrender their liberties to the Caesars. But we must also remember that, when human history is looked at in the large, the Roman Republic succeeded the Greek city-states and, by political institutions and legal provisions of great practical intelligence, embodied the principles of Constitutional government in a way that not only surpassed any other example of this form in the ancient world, but set a model to guide the constructive efforts which followed all of the modern revolutions against despotism. Nor should we forget that the *regimen regale et politicum* in the middle ages—though absolutely inferior to the Roman Republic—was another rebirth of constitutionalism *after* the absolute dominion of the Caesars and *in* the transitional centuries when the social and economic arrangements of feudalism demanded a form of government peculiarly adapted to such conditions. As the imperfect embodiment of any form naturally tends toward its own fuller realization, predisposing the matter in which it is received for the perfection it anticipates, so the *regimen regale et politicum* prepared the way for the purely Constitutional governments that began to arise again in the eighteenth century. From the thirteenth century on, from Magna Carta and the revolt led by Simon, Earl of Montfort, to the Great Rebellion and the Bloodless Revolution in seventeenth-century England and the uprisings in America and France in the eighteenth century, whose meaning is set forth in Bills of Rights, Declarations of Independence, and written constitutions, history records a development of constitutionalism, albeit a development punctuated and made tortuous by the degeneracy of kings (and, in a later day, of the nobility also), seeking to extend Royal prerogatives into despotic power.

The Republics which grew up in England, in America, and on the Continent, even in the more backward countries, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were not conceived as new forms of government. Their authors were explicitly conscious of a return to Greek and especially Roman models, in some cases even acknowledging a debt to mediaeval precedents or principles. They realized that by its very nature the *regimen regale et politicum* made any attempt to return to absolute government a resurgence of despotism rather than an institution of Royal justice. And it should be noted that in such politically undeveloped countries as Prussia and Russia, revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth century established constitutional regimes only in the sense that kings and czars were forced to accept the limited power of constitutional monarchy. In these countries, the tide of political progress had not yet reached the level of Republican, or purely Constitutional, government, but the condition of the people demanded, at least, the imperfect constitutionality of a *regimen regale et politicum*. In no case, however, is the political achievement merely a return to ancient or mediaeval models. Whether they be perfect or imperfect embodiments of the principle of constitutionality, modern governments have given that principle more explicit definition in the understanding of men, and greater force in practical application, by the formulation of written constitutions and the provision for their amendment, by the invention of politically enforceable sanctions, and by the public debate of constitutional questions which has acquainted an ever-increasing number of people with the jurisprudence of constitutional law.

We have briefly recounted twenty-five centuries of history—the history of actual motions in political life, not of shifting winds of doctrine in political theory—in order to account for the struggle that is now going on in the world, and in order to grasp its double portent for the future.

Looked at in one way, the present war is simply the latest stage in the struggle of Constitutional government against despotism. It is certainly true that the military dictatorships

of Germany and Japan, and the fascist regime of Italy, are despotisms. The peoples of these countries are no longer in a condition which justifies Royal rule, and any absolute government must, therefore, be despotic. Again, though the inclusion of Russia and other countries such as Greece and China in the ranks of the United Nations complicates the picture and makes the political issue ambiguous, it is certainly true that England and its associated free dominions, and the United States, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway, champion the principle of constitutionality, which has been the hard-won prize of their political careers. And, on the side-lines, in such countries as France and Spain, in many ways as firmly rooted in mediaeval precedents as England, and as vigorously awakened by as many centuries of political debate, there is incipient civil war between republicans and the forces of fascism which cannot disguise the despotism that is involved in any abrogation of truly Constitutional government.

To view the war as a conflict between constitutionality and despotism in government is not to ignore the economic and territorial issues, the problems made by imperialism on the one side and by state-idolatry on the other, which complicate the political issue; for capitalistic imperialism detracts from the merit of one side in this conflict almost as much as false worship of the deified State increases the despotism of a Fuehrer or a Duce and their parties by making an absolute ruler the mouthpiece of an absolute state. The despotism of the kings who claimed absolute rule by Divine right was, if anything, weakened by the true religion in whose name they spoke, whereas the despotism of the present dictators is strengthened by the false religion which erects the State into a Moloch, before whose high priests the people lie prostrate. Nor are we forgetting that the totalitarian regimes have used their despotic powers tyrannically, enslaving their own peoples as well as those they have conquered; any more than we neglect the fact that a rampant individualism and a false liberalism in England and the United States have dissipated the vigor of Constitutional government as a means to the common good,

by romantically glorifying the anarchy of *laisser-faire*, by regarding limited government as only less of a necessary evil than absolute government, and by supposing that individual liberty is encroached upon by any degree of civil authority.

Despite all these qualifications, we still insist that the first and most important, though not the only, issue in the present war must be defined in terms of the opposition between Constitutional government and despotism. If the United Nations lose, juridical institutions and the blessings of liberty have less chance of surviving anywhere, and more chance, if they win, of extending their domain. At this awful moment, it would be rash to predict either event, but it is not blind hope to say where victory will ultimately rest. Out of twenty-five hundred years of history arises the confidence that the human spirit will not endure despotism, even when imposed by crushing might, and that man's love of liberty and devotion to justice will always revive Constitutional government as it always has in every earlier phase of the long struggle, no matter how complete be its annihilation by the temporary ascendancy of might divorced from right. To believe otherwise is to believe that merely human ingenuity can contrive enough force or guile to blot out right from the hearts of men. To believe this is to forget that right is not a human invention, but the natural law which God gave man when He armed him with reason. Despots can abolish constitutions, but not the natural law from which they spring, and so, unless one deny the Providence of God in human affairs, or minimize His power, one must believe that despotism is fighting a losing battle.

There is one other ground for confidence in the ultimate outcome. There is a new struggle in the world today, a new striving which reinforces the age-old effort to set up and preserve Constitutional government. Whatever may be the earlier anticipations in theory, the actual steps of constitutional amendment, whereby the Republican form of government has been gradually transmuted to Democracy, were first taken within the last hundred years. These changes have, of course, taken place and endured only in countries where Constitutional

government, in its Republican form, was already firmly established. Their development elsewhere depends upon the prior establishment of Constitutional government. In the countries which can claim to have achieved some slight measure of Democracy, the fuller fruition depends upon the preservation of a Constitutional regime. Apart from the principle of constitutionality in government, Democracy is impossible. But the reverse is not true, for *Constitutional government which is not Democratic is quite possible and has, in fact, been the best form of government that men have known and fought for in all but the last century of political history.*

This new struggle for Democracy is virtually contained in the defense of Constitutional government, but the two objectives must not be confused or identified. Both, it is true, draw their strength from the natural law; both can hope for God's help in their cause because both bear the divinely wrought emblems of justice and liberty upon their shields. But one promises a greater justice than the other, a justice which does not augment freedom in its intensity, but extends it as widely as the fellowship of man. From the point of view of the common man, the defense of Constitutional government now involves higher stakes than ever before, because now as never before the promise of Democracy, whether in its bare beginnings or in its progressive realization, means justice for all, not for some.

In those two words—" for all "—are contained the spirit, if not the precise definition, of the essential difference between the Republican and Democratic forms of Constitutional government. In every one of the great revolutions or struggles of the past, the advantage to be gained has been *for some* only. But the Democratic revolution which began little more than a century ago turned men's eyes toward the universal brotherhood of man as something having political, as well as spiritual and theological significance.

Though the present war masks for the moment the progress of that revolution, men of vision see that we are fighting not merely to be worthy of the best in our past, but to be guardi-

ans of a better future that is about to be born. We seek not merely to preserve a political heritage, but to bequeath one which will be the beginning of a new fortune in human affairs. We have reached a turning point in history—as epochal as that one in the remote past when men first fought for Constitutional government. Today we stand side by side with those men, and with all their successors, but though our hands are linked with theirs, our eyes are toward the future.[554]

After a century in which the idea of Democracy has taken hold of our imaginations, after a century in which the phrases needed to articulate it have formed upon our lips, after a century in which stumbling steps towards its realization followed a stammering declaration of its distinctive principle, we can at last clearly cut through all the jargon and all the limited perspectives of traditional political theory to say and see what Democracy is. The fact that the word "democracy" is as old as Constitutional government no longer blinds us to the fact that Democracy, properly conceived, is a new form of government, one which is as essentially different from the Republican form of Constitutional government as that is from the Royal regime.

Moreover it is a form of government which will not exist in fact until social and economic and even cultural changes that have not yet occurred, take place. Though he is the Vice-President of a government which operates under a written constitution that is *almost* Democratic, Mr. Henry Wallace speaks of the century of the common man—the Democratic century—as a thing of the future.[555] In its legal provisions, a Democratic

[554] "Man's social life," said Burke, "is a partnership in all Science; a partnership in all Art; a partnership in every virtue; and in all perfection. As the end of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born" (*Reflections on the French Revolution*).

[555] "Some have spoken of the 'American century.' I say that the century on which we are entering—the century which will come of this war—can be and must be the century of the common man" (*The Price of Free World Victory*, New York, 1942, p. 19). Though the more obvious implication of Mr. Wallace's remark is that Democracy must begin for peoples everywhere, the very terms in which he

constitution makes Democratic government possible, but for that possibility to be realized the form must fructify in a matter that is no longer intransigent. Though there have been in certain countries conditions predispositive to the reception of the Democratic form, in none have the conditions been unmixed with contrary or antagonistic factors. Hence it is true to say that, on its formal side, Democracy has shown its face to the world before it has been fully embodied in working institutions or in actual practice. We must distinguish, therefore, between formal or legal Democracy—a form of government which can be created by constitutional enactment—and concrete or real Demoracy which will exist only when, social, economic and cultural impediments having been overcome, the spirit of the practice fulfills the letter of the law.

In this Part of our work, we shall deal only with the formal distinction between Republican and Democratic government in terms of the constitutional provisions which make the one only imperfectly just, and the other perfectly so. In Part VI to follow, we shall consider the factors upon which depend the

understands the Democratic fulfillment show that he is also thinking of what remains to be done in his own United States.

" This is essentially what Woodrow Wilson had in mind," writes Professor Edman, " when he pointed out, in his famous ' New Freedom,' that under the conditions of modern industrial society, men must be equipped socially to be free. . . . The relativity of freedom and its dependence upon social arrangements is illustrated historically. The Emancipation Proclamation and the end of the Civil War rendered Negroes free. It did not assimilate them, nor has it yet done so, to equal freedom politically and economically with the white population in the South—or, for that matter, in the North. The freeing of the serfs in Russia did not make the serfs economically emancipated. Workers not able to bargain collectively or to unite have the nominal liberty to quit their jobs, but they have not the economic freedom to do so. The rich and the poor are equal legally, but not economically or—in a society where wealth is also prestige—morally and socially " (*Fountainheads of Freedom,* New York, 1941: pp. 187-88).

In the light of such observations, Professor Edman quite properly concludes that " the conditions of democratic society have only begun to be established in education, industry, and international relations. The resources of the common man have only begun to be tapped. What funds of vitality and genius a relatively free and just society might promote outruns imagination bred in an inequal world. . . . The reason men feel the democratic world must survive is not that it is perfectly realized; it is scarcely realized at all " (*ibid.,* p. 192).

concrete realization of the plenary justice of the Democratic constitution.

We shall begin here with a definition of the terms necessary for understanding the distinction between Republican and Democratic forms, and with a brief survey of relevant passages in political theory to show how recent has been the awareness of the elements of this distinction. We cannot insist too much upon the inadequacy of past political theory, as well as upon the imperfection of past political institutions. We are involved in the strange work of writing a political treatise which is concerned with a form of government that belongs to the future. It has so recently taken shape in the affairs and in the minds of men, that it is still but a shadow of what it will become. The Theory of Democracy will not be understood by anyone who persists in supposing that Democratic constitutions are older than yesterday or who fails to realize that the tomorrow in which Democracy will really exist may be a hundred or a thousand years off.

1. " The constitutional regime," said Aristotle, " is a government of free men and equals." [556] This statement does not imply that *all* men should be ruled as free men, or that *all* men should enjoy the equality of status that is involved in citizenship under Constitutional government. The essence of Constitutional government abstracts from the distinction between *some* men and *all*. If this were not so, the generic traits of Constitutional government could not be understood as common to its several species which are differentiated primarily by reference to this distinction.

But the distinction is far from being as simple as the two little words " some " and " all " might lead one to think. The Greek distinction between the oligarchical and the democratic constitution did not suppose that all men were free men, nor did it use the word " man " to signify the female human being as well as the male. The controversy between Greek oligarchs and democrats was not whether some or all members of the

[556] *Politics*, I, 7, 1255^{b}20.

total population should be admitted to citizenship, or should in some way be eligible for office. Both sides agreed that resident aliens could not be naturalized, that women need not be considered as qualified for political status, and that those who were in fact slaves—whether "by nature" or "by convention" (i. e., by conquest or purchase)—did not belong to the political community, any more than domestic animals or other chattels. The issue, therefore, concerned only a small part of the total population, probably less than one-sixth of its human beings. That issue, as we have already seen, was made by the question whether all of "the people" or only some of "the people" should be admitted to citizenship and office, both sides agreeing as to who "the people" were—those who were left when slaves, metics, women (and, of course, children) were excluded from the political community.[557]

The distinction with which we are here concerned—the essential difference between the Republican and Democratic forms of Constitutional government—must not be confused with the Greek opposition between oligarchy and democracy as two types of constitution. The question now is whether all or only some human beings must be considered with regard to qualification for citizenship and public office; or, in other words, whether "the people" shall be co-extensive with "the population." The Republican answer may go further than the most extreme form of Greek democracy, for it may permit the naturalization of aliens, or it may deny that any man can be treated as property wholly or even in part, and yet it remains Republican if it keeps women in a condition of political inferiority, or if it allows inequality in wealth to determine inequality in political status. On the other hand, the Democratic answer does not hold that every person who is biologically classified as human should be a citizen, for it may exclude the criminal, the insane, and the feebleminded members of the

[557] Women, children, and most of the slaves belonged to the domestic community; but all the resident aliens (i. e. the metics) and some slaves were attached to the political community, not as members, but as foreign bodies existing in a living organism, or as tools in its hands.

total population; and it need not go as far as Greek democracy in regarding all citizens as so equally eligible for office that appointment to office can be determined by lot rather than by election.

By these criteria it is clear that all the Constitutional governments in the ancient world were Republican rather than Democratic, the Greek democracy as well as the polity and the oligarchy and, of course, the Roman Republic as well as the Greek city-states. But it is also clear that the Democratic constitution cannot be defined as one which gives "liberty and equality" to everyone in equal measure—certainly not in the egalitarian sense in which Greek democracy tried to give liberty and equality to all "the people," i. e., all the members of the political community.

The words "some" and "all" will not enable us to define the distinction between Republican and Democratic constitutions unless we ask the right questions and understand the terms of the answers precisely. In the first place, we must always keep separate the problem of qualification for citizenship and the problem of qualification for governmental office. Though the one may be included in the other (i. e., no one but a citizen being eligible for office), we shall show that a just constitution can never identify the two; for that necessarily results either in too high a standard for citizenship or in too low or indiscriminate a standard for public office. Inequality in *degree* of competence cannot justly be made the basis for excluding some men from citizenship, any more than *radical* equality (i. e., possession of the same competence in some degree) can justly be made the basis for opening all offices to all men. Hence we see that a proper consideration of equality in relation to the justice of a constitution must (1) observe the distinction between political status (citizenship) and political office (governmental function) and must (2) make equal status available to all who are radically equal and respect inequality in degree in providing for appointments to office.[558]

[558] By this test, none of the Greek constitutions were free from injustice. Though better in certain respects than either oligarchy or democracy, the mixed constitution

Furthermore, the consideration of human equality should never be separated from the consideration of the inequalities among men. Undue or exclusive emphasis on one or the other was, according to Aristotle, the cause of injustice in oligarchies and democracies.[559]

or polity nevertheless retained some of the injustice peculiar to each. And all three were equally injust, as we shall presently show, in their treatment of women, slaves, metics. It must be remembered, of course, that we are here speaking in terms of absolute justice. Whether or not the imperfect Republican constitution can ever be justified relative to inferior social and economic conditions is a question we shall postpone until Section 5 *infra*. We shall there consider it as we have previously considered the relative justification of the least perfect of all regimes—the absolute or non-constitutional (Royal) form of government. Vd. Part IV, Section 3, *supra*, in The Thomist, IV, 3, 505-20. Nor are we forgetting the qualification with which we concluded that discussion, taking account of the possibility that the conditions which could justify absolute government may never have existed, and so such government is always actually unjust. Vd. *loc. cit.*, pp. 520-22. For similar reasons all Republican constitutions may be actually unjust as well as absolutely imperfect.

As we shall see, there have been modern Republican constitutions which, while remaining imperfect, are more just absolutely than any known to the ancient world. They tend to approach the perfection of the Democratic constitution as an ideal limit—albeit a practicable ideal and an attainable limit. The fact that there is something like a continuum, made by variation in degrees of justice among all the varieties of Republican constitution, does not destroy the integral and essential character of the distinction between every Republican constitution—the best as well as the worst—and the Democratic constitution. Among political forms, as among natural species, the highest degree of the lower form tends to approximate the higher form in its lowest degree. We shall return to this point later.

[559] Vd. *Politics*, III, 9, 1280^{a}30. Though he himself does not apply it, Aristotle's point applies to every type of Republican constitution. Even constitutions which respect inequalities in the distribution of offices, and which grant to *some* who are equal equality of status, may refuse such equality of status to others whose equality deserves it. It is in this last respect that Aristotle's polity is as unjust as democracy, though it corrects the democratic injustice of awarding offices by lot. In this last respect, moreover, Greek democracy was obviously more just than Greek oligarchy, because the latter, setting up a property qualification for citizenship, excluded from such status the poor who were equal in competence, if not equal in possessions, with the rich.

It is unfortunately necessary to add that the state which Aristotle regarded as "ideal"—a thoroughly practicable ideal—was not as just in the constitution which Aristotle formulated for it, as either Greek democracy or the polity. Unlike the democratic or the mixed constitution, the "ideal" constitution, according to Aristotle, is one which excludes from citizenship all the laboring classes—husbandmen and traders, mechanics and sailors, etc. Vd. *Politics*, VII, 8, 9. The Aristo-

In the second place, the notions of liberty and equality, so frequently evoked in discussions either of democracy or of Democracy, have no political significance apart from the theory of justice. Men are by nature equal and unequal in many different respects. They are also equal or inequal as a result of social or economic accidents, or by the acquisition or loss of qualities and possessions through their own voluntary efforts. All of these equalities and inequalities (natural, accidental, or voluntary) are antecedent to political equality and inequality. Only the latter are caused by the form of government under which men live. Democracy cannot be judged the best consti-

telian prejudice against working men as members of the political community is confirmed by his praise for the oligarchical features of the Spartan, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions in Book II, Chapter 9-11. An attempt may be made to defend Aristotle against this criticism by saying that his "ideal" constitution was aristocratic, not oligarchical—that it excluded the working classes from citizenship because the life of labor was incompatible with the life of virtue. This defense, however, merely reveals the source of the Aristotelian error at this point, namely, a false conception of the life of virtue, a conception of human happiness which makes it attainable only by the few. We shall return to this point later in our criticism of Aristotle's views on slavery. Our criticism, it will be seen, applies equally to the standard which he sets for citizenship in his "ideal" constitution.

The principles of justice which Aristotle employs in Books III-VI to criticize democracy and oligarchy, and to show the superiority of the polity as a mixed constitution, he does not apply in Book II or Book VII. What he says about such actual states as Sparta and Crete in Book II and what he outlines as an "ideal" state in Book VII cannot be defended against the criticisms which he himself applies to constitutions in the basic middle books of the *Politics*. If the polity or mixed constitution is more just than the oligarchy, then it is also more just than the actual constitution of Sparta or Crete, and more just than the "ideal" constitution Aristotle formulates in Book VII. In what sense, then, is Aristotle using the word "ideal" here—if it neither signifies the most just constitution that is practically attainable, nor an impracticable regime which is "ideal" only by reference to the Divine model? We are forced to one of two conclusions: either Aristotle is using the word "ideal" in Book VII in a manner that is like his use of the word "ideal" to refer to the absolute regime of the godlike man, namely, to describe a state in which only men of superior virtue are admitted to citizenship; or he is simply expressing his oligarchical prejudices against the laboring classes. The first explanation reduces to the second when one realizes that there is no intrinsic or essential connection (except in the mind of a Greek oligarch) between freedom from manual labor and the life of virtue. Though Aristotle's prejudices may be explicable and even somewhat excusable, the errors from which they arise, and the false judgments to which they lead, should not be tolerated.

tution, therefore, simply because it regards all men as politically equal; for if they were not antecedently equal in some respect which justly deserved equality in political status, the Democratic constitution would be unjust in its distribution of political equality.

The problem is to determine the respects in which *antecedent* equalities and inequalities deserve *consequent* equality and inequality in political treatment.[560] When the respects are rightly determined, then the actual facts about the human beings living together in a given community must be observed, and a reasonable margin of error must be allowed in the making of such difficult observations about the equalities and inequalities among men. Only then can one judge what form of government is just for that community. With respect to constitutions, therefore, it cannot be said that one is more just than another because there is *more equality* under one than the other. *The amount of equality by itself is no criterion.* Rather that constitution is more just which distributes political equality and inequality more nearly in accordance with the merits or just deserts of the community's members. If we say that the Democratic constitution is most just, we mean, then, that under it *all* who are *in fact* equal in respects which deserve political equality are so treated; and that such equality in political status does not prevent inequalities in other respects from receiving the political recognition which they merit.

Similarly, the form of government or the type of constitution

[560] Furthermore, it should be observed that some of these antecedent conditions of inequality are natural, whereas others are not natural, but caused by the operation of social and economic forces. Such social and economic inequalities may be contrary to the dispositions of nature. To the extent that these social and economic inequalities are themselves subject to voluntary control, there may be a question of justice about the antecedent conditions of inequality from which political consequences flow. As an immoral act which is based on ignorance of relevant circumstances is excusable only if the ignorance itself is not voluntarily avoidable, so certain antecedent conditions of inequality can justify certain political apportionments only if these conditions are not themselves the result of voluntarily avoidable injustice. We shall return to this point subsequently. It is obviously relevant to the whole problem of the relative justification of the imperfect Republican constitution, which we shall discuss in Section 5 *infra*.

does not make men free. The natural freedom which men have—the freedom of choice which they have through reason, or the autonomy which attaches to their personality—can neither be given nor taken away by government. It is only political liberty, or its lack, which men owe to the government under which they live. But the grant of political liberty, like the award of political equality, is a problem of justice which must be solved in the light of the facts. It is not true to say that that government is best which gives liberty to the most men or to all men, unless it is also true that most men or all men deserve it; for if there were, in fact, some men who are natural slaves, it would be unjust to rule them as if they were free men; and no one would say that criminals should be given the same liberties as law-abiding citizens. Nor is it true to say that that government is best which gives the maximum liberty to men; for, in the first place, not all men may deserve the same degree of liberty; and, in the second place, if the "maximum degree of liberty" means "doing what one likes" it ceases to be political liberty and becomes anarchic freedom. This indicates that political liberty is always measured by justice; it is a condition of being ruled in a certain way, not the total absence of being ruled or governed. When Plato and Aristotle caricatured Greek democracy by attributing to its exponents the notion that democratic liberty consists in everyone doing what he likes, they described an impossible anarchy, not a form of government.[561] The tyrant who does not consider the com-

[561] After describing democracy as "a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike," Plato caricatures the democratic citizen as "living from day to day, indulging the appetite of the hour. . . . His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom. . . . He is all liberty and equality.' (*Republic*, Book IX). Vd. *Politics*, VI, 2, 1317^{b}12; and also V, 10, 1310^{c}30-36, where Aristotle says: "Men think . . . that freedom means doing what a man likes. In such democracies everyone lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides 'according to his fancy.' But this is all wrong. Men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for that is their salvation."

Indeed, it is all wrong, but Pericles, the great Greek democrat, would have said it was all wrong, as readily as Aristotle and Plato. The Greek oligarchs are not

mon good or the good of others is a man who does what he likes. This false notion of " democratic liberty " would convert every man into a tyrant, and a " community " of tyrants would know no other law or peace than that of the jungle.

Political liberty is the freedom which men have in relation to government, but it does not consist in freedom *from* government. It is, on the contrary, nothing more or less than the condition of those who are justly governed. Now government is just if it gives a man the status he deserves and safeguards all the rights and privileges attached thereto. Hence we see that political liberty, deriving as it does from just government, depends upon antecedent conditions of equality and inequality, for it is these which determine the justice of a regime or a constitution. The question whether *all* men should be given political liberty or whether *all* should be given the *same degree* of civil freedom is a question of justice which cannot be answered except in terms of the natures, powers, virtues, and perhaps even extrinsic accidents, of the men under consideration. In our earlier discussion of the distinction between the dominion of servitude and the dominion of freedom,[562] we made

the only ones to know the folly of libertarianism. To charge the eighteenth-century exponents of political liberty and equality with the errors of libertarianism and egalitarianism is to perpetuate this unfair caricature. Locke and Montesquieu, for example, are as sound on the nature of political liberty and equality as are Suarez and Bellarmine, or St. Thomas. Vd. Second Essay *Of Civil Government*, Ch. IV, No. 21, where Locke says: " Freedom, then, is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us: ' A liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws,' but freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common to everyone of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it." Cf. *ibid.*, Ch. VI, No. 57: " Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be where there is no law. . . . For who could be free when every other man's humour might domineer over him? " And vd. *Spirit of Laws*, Book XI, Ch. 3, where Montesquieu writes: " Political liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In government, that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will. . . . Liberty is the right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow citizens would have the same power." With regard to the folly of egalitarianism, vd. Locke, *op. cit.*, Ch. VI, No. 54; Montesquieu, *op. cit.*, Book V, Ch. 5. Cf. fn. 633 and 645 *infra*.

[562] Vd. Part IV, Section 2, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 465-91.

clear that to be ruled as a slave is to be ruled as a means to the good of the ruler, and that to be ruled as a free man is to be ruled for one's own good.[563] But nothing can be justly treated as a means to the good of another thing unless the greatest perfection which it can achieve is essentially different from and radically inferior to the perfection of the being which it serves as an end. This, in turn, depends upon the nature and consequent powers of the thing in question. Man is justified in using inanimate things, plants, and brute animals as means to his own end because these substances are inferior in essence and power, and their greatest perfection is clearly less than the human good which they serve when they are properly used.

The difficult question of justice is whether the *use* of one man by another can ever be justified. In our subsequent discussion of the problem of slavery, natural or conventional, we hope to be able to show that the enslavement of men is never justified. Here we are only concerned to make the conception of political liberty precise by connecting it with the notions of equality and justice.

The problem is complicated by the fact that there seem to be different and unequal degrees of political liberty. If the only element in the liberty of the governed were his status as an end (i. e., ruled for his own good, either immediately or through the mediation of the social common good), then children would be *as free* under parental government as citizens are under constitutional government; and there would be no difference between the liberty of such citizens and the freedom of subjects under the absolute regime of a benevolent king. But we know that this is not so. Therefore, we must distinguish between perfect and imperfect liberty under government, (1) according as the ruled has or lacks *legal* right or *juridical* power to resist unjust commands,[564] and (2) according as the ruled does or does not exercise an effective voice in his own government.

[563] If government is for the common good, it is also for the individual good of each member of the community thus governed; for the common good is itself a means to the happiness of each individual.

[564] We have seen that neither *natural* right nor *natural* power can be used as a

If these two elements are inseparable, then there are only two degrees of political liberty (the imperfect liberty of subjects, the perfect liberty of citizens), having one note in common, namely, that the governed be ruled as ends for their own good, and distinguished by the two elements which *together* may or may not be added. But if these two additional elements are themselves separable from one another, then there are three degrees of liberty, and we shall have to find a name for that which lies intermediate between the liberty of subjection and the liberty of citizenship. The intermediate status will be determined by the fact that, in addition to being ruled as an end, the governed has certain legal rights and juridical powers, but he does not have an effective voice in his own government. We shall, in the course of all our further discussions, use the word "suffrage" to signify having an effective voice in one's own government. We can, therefore, speak of citizenship without suffrage and citizenship with suffrage, and for brevity of reference we can call the latter "citizenship" simply or without qualification, and the former "second-class citizenship."

The precise definition of suffrage as an element in complete citizenship will be one of our major undertakings, but for the present it is sufficient to point out that "an effective voice in one's own government" means *at least* a share in the constituent *or* amending power by which a constitution is made or changed, a direct or represented voice in the deliberations of government and, in the second alternative, a direct voice in the choice of one's representatives. Thus we see that suffrage does not consist simply in having a vote; nor does it, at the other extreme, consist in having a share in all the offices of government.[565]

definitive element in political liberty. Vd. Part IV, Section 2, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 487-90, and especially fn. 323, 328.

[565] In some of the Greek democracies, notably the Athenian, the principle of appointment to most of the major offices by lot was regarded as indispensable to democratic liberty, because the Greek democrats wrongly supposed that perfect freedom consisted in something more than suffrage, namely, in being able to participate in every aspect of government. Vd. W. R. Agard, *What Democracy Meant to the Greeks,* Chapel Hill, 1942: pp. 70-72: "It is clear that the legisla-

The general principle we have observed in the case of servitude and freedom applies to the several degrees of freedom as well. Since each degree of freedom is a different condition of being ruled, a different status of men under government, the problem of a just distribution of political liberty cannot be solved apart from the facts of equality and inequality, for it is these which determine what men deserve. It is necessary, therefore, to summarize here distinctions already made.[566]

There are four *possible* relations of equality and inequality among men.

(1) Equality in specific nature combined with inferiority in natural power, the defect in power making it impossible to form certain habits of mind or character. Let us call this " radical equality in nature " and " radical inequality in power."

(2) Radical equality in specific nature and in natural power combined with inferiority in the development of power (for whatever causes—whether immaturity or deprivation of opportunity and exercise), the inferiority consisting in the lack of habits possessed by others. Let us call this " radical equality in power " (which, of course, implies radical equality in nature) and " radical inequality in habit."

(3) Radical equality in specific nature, natural power, and habit combined with inferiority in the intensity or degree to which habits are developed in one individual as compared with another (again for whatever causes—whether due to natural

tive, executive, and judicial functions of Athens were in the hands of all the citizens; there was representation in the executive and judicial bodies, to be sure, but on the extreme democratic principle of annual selection by lot. . . . There were no appointive offices, and only in the case of the Board of Generals did the people actually elect their representatives rather than choose them by lot, the principle being that military and naval strategy was a highly technical job which could not be wisely entrusted to any person whose lot might be drawn. In practical terms this meant that every citizen of Athens during the course of his life had been engaged in public service. . . . It is obvious, therefore, that the ordinary citizen of Athens had an extraordinary opportunity for participating in political life; freedom to him meant, not so much the lack of restraint as the privilege of sharing in community enterprises."

[566] Vd. fn. 309 and 387 *supra*.

and unalterable differences in degree of power, or to the degree to which natural powers are exercised). Let us call this "radical equality in habit" (which implies both radical equality in nature and radical equality in power) and "inequality in degree of habit." It should be noted, furthermore, that inequality in degree of habit may or may not imply inequality in degree of power, and if not, the extent to which it is due to exercise may reflect either voluntary causes or external impediments or accidents.

(4) Radical equality in specific nature, natural power, and habit combined with equality in the intensity or degree of habit. Let us call this simply "complete equality."

We have enumerated four *possibilities*. The enumeration is intended to be analytically exhaustive, not to correspond simply with the actual facts. We know, for example, that *all* men are not completely equal. We know, therefore, that there must be some men in the third of the above classes, that is, men who are inferior to others in degree of habit. We know that children are radically inferior in habit, but there may be some question whether this second class is also occupied by some chronologically adult men and women. We know that the first class is occupied by subnormal or feeble-minded individuals, but whether any normal individuals can be so classified is another question, and upon the answer will depend the position we take concerning Aristotle's conception of the "natural slave." A just determination of the political status of women must also be made by approaching the problem of equality and inequality between the sexes in terms of these four basic categories. Controversy about diverse races of men, sometimes regarded as superior and inferior, must be similarly resolved. In short, every problem of justice concerning political equality and inequality, political liberty in its several degrees and political servitude, requires us to examine the antecedent facts about the natural or acquired equality and inequality among men.

Now, furthermore, we can see the correlation between political equality and political liberty. The highest degree of politi-

cal liberty (the freedom of complete citizenship) should be enjoyed by those who, because of radical equality in habit with their rulers, deserve equality in status with them, even if residual inequalities in degree of habit do not entitle every citizen to participate directly in every function of government. The lowest degree of political liberty (the freedom of subjection) should be enjoyed by those who, because of radical equality in essence and power, must be ruled as ends rather than as means, even if radical inferiority in habit does not entitle the ruled to equality of status with their rulers. Equality of status between rulers and ruled is, therefore, not a necessary accompaniment of the freedom of the ruled under government, for imperfect freedom can be enjoyed without it, as in the case of the just Royal regime. Similarly, equality in function is not a necessary accompaniment of equality of status as between rulers and ruled, for perfect freedom can be enjoyed without it, as in the case of Constitutional government.

But two questions remain. (1) What about the intermediate degree of liberty which attaches to the status we have called second-class citizenship, or citizenship without suffrage? Here there seems to be inequality of status and of freedom between different portions of the citizenry, for wherever there are second-class citizens, there must also be citizens with suffrage.[567]

[567] Constitutional government cannot exist unless some men have suffrage. This is its minimal condition. Hence it is impossible for there to be only second-class citizens, though of course, the reverse is not impossible. There may be no second-class citizens. All who are citizens may have suffrage. At the other extreme, it is impossible for all who live under some just form of civil government to be ruled as slaves. Hence we can enumerate all the possibilities with regard to divisions of a given population under civil government: (1) all are citizens with suffrage; (2) all are citizens, some with and some without suffrage; (3) all are politically free, but some are citizens (with or without suffrage) and some are subjects; (4) some are politically free (either citizens or subjects) and some are politically enslaved; (5) some are politically free, but none are citizens, and some are politically enslaved; (6) all are politically free, but none are citizens. Now of these six possibilities the last two can occur only under a Royal regime; the first four can occur only under Constitutional government. Of these four, the first (with some qualifications to be added later) can occur only under a Democratic constitution; the remaining three exhaust the possible situations which can occur under a Republican constitution.

What antecedent condition of inequality can justify this inequality in political status and degree of liberty? It would seem as if there had to be something between radical inferiority in habit (which justifies subjection and the lowest degree of freedom) and inferiority in degree of habit (which, since it implies radical equality in habit, can justify nothing less than citizenship). But there can be no such intermediate condition, for either men do not share the same habits, or if they do, they can differ only in the degree to which they possess them. Perhaps, then, it will be said that only those who possess a certain sufficiently high degree of the habits common to all should be admitted to the privileges (i. e., suffrage) as well as the rights of citizenship. There are reasons for rejecting this suggestion also. This is one of the most difficult problems connected with the definition of Democratic justice. We shall, of course, deal with it subsequently,[568] and we hope to show that there are no conditions which can justify citizenship without suffrage, even if there are conditions which can justify subjection.

(2) Is the status of subjection the same when it occurs under Royal and under Constitutional government? Ignoring the condition of slavery for the moment, *essentially* the same under any form of government which deprives some portion of the population of political liberty, we see that it may make a difference whether no men are citizens and all free men are subjects (as under Royal rule), or whether those who are subjects are deprived of the citizenship to which others in the same community are admitted (as under Constitutional rule). It may, for example, be the case under Constitutional rule that no man who is free (i.e., not enslaved) lacks all legal rights or juridical powers, yet some of these may be deprived of suffrage. The ground for such deprivation may be a supposed radical inferiority in habit. Were this to occur for this reason, then what we have called second-class citizenship would be identical with subjection under Constitutional government, and subjection under Constitutional government would differ from sub-

[568] In Section 4 *infra*.

jection under Royal government in that, in the latter case, the ruled is also without legal rights or juridical powers. The point here being considered has an obvious bearing on the previous problem about citizenship without suffrage. It also has a bearing on another sort of subjection which can occur in relation to Constitutional government—the condition of a subject people living in a conquered province or in a dependent colony. Strictly speaking, such people are not living under a Constitutional regime, even though they are ruled by a state which is itself Constitutional. One need only consider the dependencies of Athens and Rome, or the condition of the English colonies in the New World before the American Revolution, to see that a Constitutional government may have subjects that do not differ in status from the subjects of a Royal regime.[569]

We have raised this second problem, not to solve it here, but to suggest that the crucial words of this analysis, "slave," "subject," and "citizen," are unavoidably ambiguous. Not only may "subject" have a different meaning under Royal and Constitutional governments, as well as the same meaning under both; not only may there be variations in the meaning of "citizenship" which overlap variations in the meaning of "subjection"; but there may even be variations in the meaning of "slave" which permit us to distinguish between slaves who have some attenuated legal rights and slaves who are without any. The former is a condition of slavery which verges on the status of subjection, even as there is a condition of subjection which verges on the status of citizenship. To deny that such a continuum exists from the extreme of unmitigated slavery to the extreme of perfect and complete liberty would be to deny the unquestionable facts of political history. The existence of this continuum does not, however, prevent us from reaching clear definitions, even though we may have to use the same

[569] Vd. Hobbes's observation that, though Rome was itself a republic, the people of Judea, or any other conquered province, did not enjoy republican government: *Leviathan*, Part II, Ch. 19. Cf. John Stuart Mill, *Essay on Representative Government*, Ch. XVIII, "Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free State," which considers the case of India under British domination.

words in several carefully distinguished senses; nor does it affect the principles of justice which must be applied in the classification and gradation of distinct forms of government. If, for example, slavery is always essentially unjust, the essential injustice is not removed by the mitigation or amelioration of the slave's condition in accidental respects. Similarly, if and when all normal men deserve to be citizens with suffrage, then their subjection is unjust despite the fact that, under Constitutional government, they may have *some* of the rights of citizenship.

But it may be objected that if there is a continuum among the several dominions (i. e., the several conditions of being ruled), there is also a continuum among the several regimes (i. e., the several modes of ruling), in which case it may not be possible to separate two or three distinct forms of government. We have already faced this objection,[570] but it is worth reiterating that an essential distinction of forms is quite compatible with an *apparent* continuum among the accidental varieties to which these forms give rise in their concrete embodiments. The continuum is only apparent, for every accidental variety of one form is distinguished from every accidental variety of another form by some definitive trait that is involved in the essential differentiation of the two forms. Thus, in the order of natural species, every brute lacks reason, no matter how high the degree of sensitive power and no matter how much an anthropoid ape may resemble the least intelligent man. Similarly, in the order of political forms, purely Constitutional government is marked by perfect popular sovereignty and perfect vicegerency, so that no matter how closely the intermediate *regimen regale et politicum* approaches Constitutional government we know that it is not a Republic (or purely Constitutional regime) by the fact that a king still retains some degree of personal sovereignty and that *all* the ruled are in some respects still in subjection. Unless every governmental function is discharged by a mere office-holder and unless *some* of the ruled are truly and completely

[570] Vd. fn. 558 *supra*.

citizens, the minimum of purely Constitutional government (i. e., a Republic) does not exist.[571]

Nevertheless, the objector may continue, the very nature of Constitutional government makes any further essential distinction impossible. There is an integral difference between absolute and limited government which no variations in degree can efface, but within the sphere of Constitutional regimes there is only a difference in the *number* of men who are admitted to citizenship with suffrage. Whether all, many, or only a few are, every essential characteristic of Constitutional government remains the same. Hence there can be no form of government which stands to the Republic as Constitutional government stands to the Royal regime—specifically distinct and hierarchically superior.

The objection is overcome when two points are remembered. In the first place, in the order of political forms, as in the order of natural species, both of two superior forms can differ from one which is inferior to both by the same generic traits, and yet differ from each other specifically. The fact that men and brutes are both cognitive, and thus differ in the same way from plants, does not prevent brutes from lacking reason. So the fact that both the Republican and Democratic forms of government are Constitutional, and so differ generically in the same way from the Royal regime, does not prevent the Republic from having defects which specifically distinguish it from Democracy, even as defect of reason differentiates brute from man. In the second place, we must remember that the forms of government are in a moral, not a natural, hierarchy, and that the defect which differentiates one species of government from another must be a defect in justice. We have already explained how the Royal regime can be said to *lack* an element of justice when compared with Constitutional government.[572] It follows,

[571] Vd. Part IV, Section 4 *supra*, in THE THOMIST, IV, 4, pp. 711-18, 732-34.

[572] Vd. Part IV, Section 6 *supra* in THE THOMIST, VI, 2, pp. 273 ff. The comparison must, of course, be made absolutely, and not relatively to particular conditions. Only when they are absolutely considered, can inferior forms of government be said to lack elements of justice actually present in more perfect regimes. Fur-

therefore, that if a constitution can be perfectly just, absolutely speaking, any defect of justice in a constitution will determine an inferior form of Constitutional government. Republican government is constitutional, but with a constitution that is defective in justice. Democratic government is constitutional, but with a constitution that is perfect in justice.

Whereas, in Part IV, our problem was to define the principle of constitutionality as a differentia, and to prove that Constitutional government was superior to the Royal regime, in the absolute scale of justice, our problem here can be looked at in two ways: we can define the perfectly just constitution or we can define Democracy and show that it, and it alone, is the perfectly just constitution. Let us consider these alternatives.

(1) Suppose we say that the perfectly just constitution is one which distributes freedom and equality to *all* members of the population according to their *just* deserts. Since this is a tautology, no further argument is needed. Any other constitution would be actually unjust in some respects. There is certainly no need to argue that one constitution is better than another if one is just in every respect and the other is unjust in some respects. Furthermore, to proceed in this way not only makes the identification of Democracy with the perfectly just constitution purely verbal, but violates our distinction between an absolute and a relative consideration of inferior regimes. If we were to identify the Republican with the non-Democratic constitution according to this definition, it would follow necessarily that every Republican government must be *actually* unjust. While that may be the case in fact (if the hypothesis is false that inferior conditions exist which justify inferior regimes relatively), it should not be necessitated by purely formal or analytical considerations. We must, therefore, define the Democratic constitution and prove that it is perfectly just, rather than define the just constitution and call it " Democratic." [573]

thermore, defect of justice need not be the same as actual injustice relative to a particular set of conditions.

[573] We might similarly speak of brute and man as defective and perfect cognitive natures. In both cases, the defect and the perfection occur in the very trait

(2) We propose to define the Democratic constitution as one under which *all normal and mature human beings*, regardless of sex, race, wealth, or other similar accidents, are admitted to the status of complete citizenship, and can enjoy its rights and privileges unless they forfeit their suffrage or their liberty by a crime of sufficient gravity to warrant such penalty. This means, negatively, that a Democratic constitution abolishes political slavery, and that it abolishes subjection for all except those whose unripe years or natural defects place them in the care of a home or an institution, or those whose anti-social behavior requires them to be taken into custody. This does not mean, positively, that citizenship *by itself* qualifies a man or woman for any public office, not even that of a juror, for additional qualifications may be needed for every governmental function, or special factors of disqualification may enter into the selection.

We shall presently increase the precision of this definition, but it is clear at once that there is need to prove that the Democratic constitution, thus defined, is perfectly just. We must prove, for example, that there are no natural slaves, that neither criminals nor prisoners of war can be justly treated as slaves, and that no man can be justly permitted to sell himself into slavery or purchase other men as slaves. We shall make this step of our proof in Section 3. We must prove also that all normal adults, of whatever sex or race or economic fortune, can and should become citizens exercising suffrage, and that the status of subjection (or second-class citizenship) must be restricted to minors, the incurably incompetent, and criminals. We shall undertake this step of our proof in Section 4. When these things have been demonstrated, we shall have shown that, taking man as he is or can become, anything less than the Democratic constitution is lacking in justice, even though it may not also be actually unjust relative to social, economic or cultural conditions which prevent some men from being all they can become. In Section 5, we shall consider the relative justifi-

(cognition) by which the two forms are differentiated from what is inferior to them both.

cation of Republican government, and the various perversions to which Democracy is susceptible. And in Section 6, we shall expound the theory of political justice in terms of which all our comparisons of diverse regimes have so far been made.

Let us complete this preliminary discussion by making certain that the definition is clear, and that its implications are precise. Unless such clarity and precision are attained, it will not be possible to judge whether the proposition to be proved—that Democracy is the most just form of government—has been demonstrated.

In the first place, it is necessary to show why there cannot be more than three major forms of government, for if there were more than three, Democracy might be more just than the Republic and the Kingdom, and yet not be the most just regime. This can be shown as follows. The distinction between absolute and limited government is exhaustive. Even though the intermediate *regimen regale et politicum* reveals these terms not to be exclusive, it can be truly said that every form of government either is or is not *purely* Constitutional. Now this twofold division of all regimes is capable of only one major subdivision. On the side of *purely* Royal government, there are only accidental subdivisions—such as the numerical distinction between absolute rule by one (called " monarchy ") and absolute rule by a few (called " aristocracy "). No gradation in justice is here involved. But on the side of *purely* Constitutional government, there can be essential subdivisions according as the constitution is less or more just. We have already seen that, within the range of Greek constitutions, the polity can be said to be more just than democracy or oligarchy, and these three terms represent an essential subdivision of Constitutional government because principles of justice are involved.[574] It would, therefore, appear that the hierarchy of political forms contains more than three terms, for if Democracy is distinct from the three Greek constitutions, and is more just than any of these, as all of these are more just than Royal

[574] Vd. IV, Section 5, *supra*, in The Thomist, VI, 1, pp. 81-93.

government, then there are at least five terms in the hierarchy. But all the Greek constitutions, along with the constitution of the Roman republic and the constitutions of many modern governments, are alike in one essential respect. From the point of view of absolute justice, they are all imperfectly just. Even though they differ *inter se* in the degree of their imperfection or in the cause and locus of the particular defect of justice which they exhibit, they all agree in *failing to extend citizenship and suffrage as far as it can be justly granted.* The perfectly just constitution is, therefore, exhaustively divided against all these. Now since every form of government is either Constitutional or not, and since every constitution is either imperfectly or perfectly just, there cannot be more than three major terms in the hierarchy of political forms. This does not prevent us from recognizing that there can be more or less effective embodiments of the Democratic *form.* In fact, the Democratic *form* is an ideal which can be progressively approached by more and more adequate realizations of its principles in practice. This distinction between formal and real Democracy, previously acknowledged, does not alter our conclusion that Democracy is the most just *form* of government.[575]

In the second place, we can now see how difficult it is to draw the line between Republican and Democratic constitutions. In earlier discussions we have been content with imprecise formulations of this distinction. We have said that the mark of the Republican constitution is restricted suffrage, whereas the Democratic constitution is defined by universal suffrage. But this is neither adequate nor accurate. The opposition between giving political liberty and equality to some men and giving it to all conveys the spirit of the difference, but without further qualification the words " some " and " all " express only a rough approximation of the truth. The real trouble is with the word " all." Unqualified, it signifies children as well as

[575] Vd. p. 374, *supra,* where we pointed out that in this Part of our work we were going to consider Democracy formally, reserving for Part VI the discussion of the progressive steps by which this ideal or best form can be more and more adequately materialized in concrete historic embodiments.

adults, the feeble-minded and insane as well as the normal, the criminal as well as the law-abiding members of the population. Without here attempting to make precise the limits of immaturity, abnormality, and criminality, we can, nevertheless regard these three classes in any population as *justly* excluded from suffrage. Moreover, on this point there is no difference whatsoever between the Republican and the Democratic constitution: both agree that *at least* these three classes are justly disfranchised. With this point understood the word " all " can be used to signify the universality of suffrage which characterizes the Democratic constitution. In contrast, " some " expresses the restricted suffrage of the Republic.

The line between the Republican and the Democratic constitution can, therefore, be drawn by regarding the disfranchisement of any members of the population, *except* the three classes indicated above, as the distinguishing mark. The Republic enslaves *or* subjects men who can and should be citizens. The existence of a slave class, countenanced by the constitution as a legitimate political category, is not indispensable to the definition of Republican government, for even with the abolition of slavery as a political category, human beings who are not in the three justly disfranchised classes may be excluded from suffrage for one of the following reasons: because they are females, because they are foreigners for whom naturalization is not made available; because they lack sufficient property; because they are illiterate as a result of insufficient education; because of color, creed, or previous condition of servitude.

What is indispensable to the definition of the Republican constitution is that it does distinguish between subjects and citizens and places in subjection human beings who are not children, abnormal, or criminal. The Democratic constitution, on the other hand, gives the equality of complete citizenship and the perfection of political liberty to all except these. This distinction being clear, the problem of demonstrating its validity consists in proving that all except these justly deserve political equality and liberty of the sort which attaches to citizenship with suffrage. We must prove, in short, not only that

enslavement is unjust, but also that every disfranchisement which is based on sex, property, the accidents of birth, etc., is *absolutely* unjust.

In the third place, it must be observed that the various criteria of disfranchisement which can be employed by a Republican constitution fall into two groups. They are either traits which are inseparable and unalterable accidents of human nature or they are purely extrinsic accidents capable of voluntary modification. Thus, for example, sex, race, or color, are inseparable and unalterable accidents of birth. In contrast, poverty and illiteracy are accidents due to causes which are within the voluntary control of the individual and of the society in which he lives. Either a child is feeble-minded or normal. If incurably feeble-minded, then no voluntary efforts on the child's part or on the part of the community can cultivate the child's powers by education; but if not *incurably* feeble-minded, then either the abnormality, if one exists, can be remedied, or if the child is normal, he can be educated. His lack of education is a voluntarily avoidable deprivation, for which the home and the state can be held responsible. Hence the problem of whether illiteracy (or total lack of education) is just ground for disfranchisement must be viewed in two ways: (a) taking the population as it is, it may be just to disfranchise those adults who are illiterate or who lack a certain minimum of education; but (b) since the existence of such human beings in the population is the result of social, not natural, forces, and since these forces are themselves voluntarily controllable by the agency of government, it cannot be *permanently* just to disfranchise men who, but for causes beyond their own control and within the power of government to remedy, would not be disqualified for citizenship.

By observing the difference between these two points of view, we can see how it may be possible to justify a Republican constitution relative to an existing state of affairs (in which, for example, some portion of the population is uneducated or illiterate), and yet at the same time to say that, absolutely speaking, illiteracy cannot be a just disqualification in the case

of normal men because government can, in the course of time, remedy the defect, and should make every effort to do so. Whether, at a given time, the government is fully responsible for the illiteracy that then exists, and so can be charged with actual injustice, is an extremely difficult question which must take into account a variety of social and economic causes. These may be so complex in their historic contingency that the deplorable situation to be remedied may not be sufficiently under the voluntary control of government to warrant the charge of injustice on the ground of malfeasance.

We shall return to this difficult problem in Section 5 when we consider the historic conditions relative to which the imperfect justice of Republican constitutions may be justified, that is, shown to be *not actually* unjust, though lacking in a point of justice that is ultimately attainable in the course of historic developments under the voluntary control of men and societies. We have said enough here about this one factor (illiteracy) to show how the general principle also applies to poverty and to foreign birth. The application must, of course, be made differently in each case. In the case of the resident alien, signifying a desire to become a citizen, the problem is one of providing just naturalization proceedings. In the case of the pauper, the problem is one of distinguishing between criminal indolence and incapacity for self-support, on the one hand, and lack of economic opportunity, on the other. And here the problem of justice requires us to define the minimum amount of property, or more generally, the economic condition of the person, which is relevant to a just distribution of suffrage. The amount must not be so large, or the condition so special, that it is *impossible* for *all normal* and *willing* persons to qualify, social and economic impediments being ultimately removable by the voluntary efforts of just government.

In contrast to these remediable disqualifications, such traits as sex and race present a different problem. Either the members of the female sex and the members of certain racial groups are by nature inferior, so that their condition is beyond voluntary control, or no such natural inequalities exist in any way

that has political relevance. We shall try to prove that the second alternative is true, showing that the contrary supposition reduces to the absurdity of regarding women and certain racial groups as incurably subnormal. Nevertheless, it may be necessary to consider here whether social and economic impediments can cause a remediable inferiority which, so long as it exists and is not immediately alterable by governmental action, may justify the Republican constitution which disfranchises these human beings at a given time in history.

In the fourth place, we must note that a just abridgement of political liberty is not equivalent to slavery. The insane who are taken into protective custody or otherwise confined in hospitals, the feeble-minded who are incarcerated in institutions as charges on the public care, are not free, but neither are they slaves, for they are being taken care of for their own good and the common good, not being used as means to the good of other individuals or of the state. They are not *property* (i.e., chattel) in any sense or respect. This holds true also for the *just treatment* of prisoners of war or enemy aliens who must be interned for the public safety. And it is equally true of the punitive justice which condemns criminals to death or to imprisonment, for life or for a term of years. In the latter case especially we see that the criminal has voluntarily forfeited his right to life, or to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The insane and the feeble-minded do not forfeit their rights, for theirs is not a loss of rights due to voluntary misconduct on their part; rather the rights which never cease to be potentially theirs, they cannot actually claim, because of natural impediment or defect. In a sense, these rights are always held in trust for them by society, as against the day when medical science may be able to restore them to normal manhood.[576] Their

[576] Any child of human parentage must be presumed to have the potentialities of human nature, regardless of the pathological factors which operate against their development, and even tend to conceal their existence. It can never be presumed that these pathological factors are absolutely incurable, even though, in the present state of medical knowledge, successful therapy may be very unlikely. If the first presumption did not prevail, and if the second were not untenable, there would

political status, with its consequent liberty, is, therefore, in abeyance. It is for the time being abridged, but it is not nullified or permanently lost. Similarly, the criminal who suffers incarceration for a term of years, rather than death or life imprisonment, also has his rights and liberties temporarily abridged. When he has paid his penalty, they may be restored to him upon his return to the community. But here distinction may be made among crimes, according to the gravity of the felony or misdemeanor and the moral turpitude it reflects, which defines certain crimes as just cause for the permanent forfeiture, not of all political rights, but of suffrage. Such disfranchisement is, of course, an irremediable loss of perfect liberty, but it is neither enslavement nor unjust subjection.

On all these points, there is no necessary difference between Republican and Democratic justice, for either sort of constitution may make the same provisions for the insane and the feeble-minded and for enemies of the state, from within or without, during peace time or in war. But if, as many historic examples reveal, a Republican constitution treats any of these classes as slaves, converting them into the property of individuals or of the state, it is going beyond just disfranchisement and committing an actual injustice, an injustice which no conditions can excuse. We shall return to this point in Section 3 where we shall attempt to prove the actual injustice of slavery *as a legal category*. The theory of natural slavery is not the only error to be corrected. Nevertheless, it is important to observe here that such errors about justice are not essential to the defect of the Republican constitution, though they may be an additional blemish upon its character.

Similarly, there is no necessary difference between Republican and Democratic principles of liberty, so far as these classes in the population are concerned. Despite their fundamental difference on the qualifications for suffrage, the Republic and the Democracy both understand constitutional liberty—the per-

be no violation of natural law in killing off the unfit on the specious pretense of serving the common good by removing a burden from society.

fect liberty of complete citizenship—in the same way. For both, liberty is not an absolute right, but a privilege to which obligations are annexed, and which is limited by the ends that justify it. If constitutional liberty can be justly granted or justly withheld, abridged, or forfeited, then such liberty is itself the creature of justice. Divorced from considerations of justice, there is no such thing as political liberty, any more than there is political equality. There is only license and anarchy. The two ends which regulate the justice of liberty are the common good and happiness. *No man deserves more liberty than is compatible with the common good, nor less than he needs to lead a good life.*[577] Liberty is not an end, coordinate with happiness. It is rather linked with happiness as a condition indispensable to its pursuit. So far as liberty is thus justly conceived, there is no difference between freedom under Democratic and under Republican government. Being constitutional, both can be called " free governments " in contrast to absolute regimes which severely limit the freedom of the

[577] John Stuart Mill's *Essay on Liberty* is misread by those who charge him, as they charge Locke or Rousseau, with being a libertarian. Vd. fn. 561 *supra*. His theory of civil liberty can, in fact, be summarized by the italicized sentence in the text above. The end which justifies every degree of civil liberty is happiness; the end which limits civil liberty and draws the line between it and anarchic license is the common good; for, according to Mill, the prohibition of acts which injure others or transgress the common good in no way infringes on political freedom. The problem of civil liberty, he says in his opening sentences (*op. cit.*,) concerns " the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual." Mill's position throughout is like that of St. Thomas, who held that the positive law cannot command virtue or prohibit vice except in so far as the *acts* of virtue and vice *affect the common good* (general justice) or in so far as they injure other persons directly, and so are violations of particular justice. Cf. *Utilitarianism,* Ch. V, " On the Connection between Justice and Utility."

Maritain identifies what he calls the freedom of autonomy with happiness. This is the terminal freedom toward which all other freedoms operate as means. The initial freedom is the natural freedom of man's free will. Intermediate between the natural freedom of free choice and the terminal freedom of autonomy is civil liberty, which is neither natural nor terminal. Civil liberty is the freedom of men under law or government to exercise their power of free choice in such a way that they not only work toward happiness or spiritual autonomy, but so that they also do not interfere with others in the same process. Cf. Maritain, *The Problem of Freedom in the Modern World,* pp. 29-46.

ruled.[578] But though the *quality* of freedom (its intensity) is the same in a Republic and in a Democracy, differing in the same way from the *quality* of freedom under a Royal regime, the *quantity* of freedom (i. e., distributively) is greatly enlarged by the superior justice of the Democratic constitution.

These considerations about the relation of political liberty to justice will have a bearing on our subsequent demonstration of the injustice of any degree or kind of enslavement. Furthermore, the relation of perfect liberty (i. e., the dominion of citizenship) to the pursuit of happiness will enable us to prove, in the light of our conception of natural happiness,[579] why no normal adult should be subjected, much less enslaved. But it may be objected at once that we have omitted moral virtue in all our enumerations of traits relevant to citizenship and suffrage; yet the moral virtues are indispensable to the pursuit of happiness and should, therefore, be made a condition of granting liberty to men as something which should be exercised for the common good and the life of virtue. Suffice it here to answer that the notion of moral virtue has been tacitly involved in our discussion of the habits relevant to political status, and that, moreover, it is obviously implied in the disfranchisement of children, the insane, the feeble-minded, and the criminal elements in the population.

The really difficult problem here is whether moral virtue can be made a positive condition (i. e., of enfranchisement), as well as a negative condition (i. e., of disfranchisement). We know, for example, that children have unformed characters, or

[578] If the word "freedom" is used to signify the dominion of imperfect freedom (subjection) as well as the dominion of perfect freedom (citizenship), then the Royal regime must be called "free." Only tyrannical government is enslaving government. Any regime which is just in its direction to the common good is "freeing." But as the word has come to be used, both in ancient and modern discussions of Constitutional government, emphasis is placed on the perfection of political liberty which is inseparable from citizenship, and so only Constitutional government is called "free," as only Constitutional government is called "popular." Both appellations can be applied to the Republic, as well as to the Democracy, despite the essential difference between the imperfect distributive justice of the one, and the perfect distributive justice of the other.

[579] Vd. Part III, Section 3, in THE THOMIST, IV, 1, pp. 147-81.

that criminals are vicious and unjust men, for that is signified by the moral turpitude involved in serious injuries to other men or violations of the common good. So far we can go in using obvious lack of moral virtue, or obvious presence of vicious inclinations, *negatively*—as a condition of disfranchisement. But can we go further and demand evidence of a well-formed moral character as a positive condition of enfranchisement? The question is not whether such a criterion would be desirable or just. Certainly it would be. The question is a practical one, namely, whether such evidence is sufficiently available, or ascertainable with sufficient accuracy, to permit the practical employment of this criterion in the distribution of citizenship and suffrage. If not, it can have no place in the practical science of politics, or in the practical affairs of government. With all due respect for the "idealism" of ancient and mediaeval political theory in this respect, we must nevertheless insist that it is *only capacity* for the moral virtues and prudence and never the *actual possession* of them which can be made a *positive* qualification for citizenship and suffrage. No actual constitution has ever set up such a qualification (*actual possession* of virtue) because it is so obviously impracticable. The point can have no relevance to the distinction between Republican and Democratic government, though it inevitably arises in connection with the so-called "ideal" constitution that Aristotle proposed in Book VII of the *Politics*. It also has a bearing on his theory of natural slavery and the disfranchisement of the laboring classes.[580] We shall, therefore, return to a fuller consideration of it in Sections 3 and 4.

[580] Vd. fn. 559 *supra*. According to the "ideal" constitution set forth in Book VII of the *Politics*, Aristotle saw nothing wrong with recommending that the laboring classes be—worse than disfranchised or refused citizenship—reduced to the condition of slaves of the state, comparable to the condition of slaves in the household. Vd. *loc. cit.*, Ch. 9 and 10 "Husbandmen, craftsmen, and laborers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of the state, but the members of the state are the warriors and councillors" (1329ª35). The laboring classes are, in short, to be *mere means*. "But where there are two things of which one is a means and the other an end, they have nothing in common except that the one receives what the other produces. Such, for example, is the relation in which workmen and tools stand

In the fifth place, the essential distinction between the Republican and the Democratic constitution must not be confused by the addition to either of extraneous elements which have manifested themselves historically, but which do not belong to the essence of either constitution. We have in mind here two things especially, the one peculiarly characteristic of Greek democracy, the other a characteristic of Greek oligarchy (or even the polity), of the Roman republic, and of many modern Constitutional regimes.

The first is the principle of appointment to offices (some or all) by lottery. This can never be justified because it either requires too high a qualification for citizenship, thus unjustly disfranchising many, or if the standard is rightly set with

to their work; the house and the builder have nothing in common, but the art of the builder is for the sake of the house. And so states require property, but property, even though living beings are included in it, is no part of the state, for a state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals aiming at the best life possible" (*Politics,* VII, 8, 1328[a]27-38).

With respect to the main point under consideration in the text (i.e., the inutility of virtue as a positive prerequisite for citizenship), two things should be noted. In the first place, even as in the administration of justice we presume the innocence of a man until he is proved guilty, so in the practical science of politics we must presume that a man has "civic virtue" until the contrary is evidenced by his conviction for violation of the law. We use the phrase "civic virtue" to signify virtue in relation to the common good. It is only such virtue which the positive law can command. Vd. *Summa Theologica,* I-II, 96, 2, 3. Hence a serious violation of the positive law marks a man as sufficiently lacking in civic virtue to be unfit for citizenship. In the second place, God, who can see into the hearts of men, is able to judge the goodness of a man absolutely—in regard to every virtue, and with respect to its interior as well as its exterior acts. But one man cannot, and therefore should not presume to, judge the virtues of another man absolutely. Some judgment of a man's virtue is necessary, of course, as in the administration of law, but as we have seen, this goes no further than our knowledge of exterior acts, and only concerns acts which are affected with the public interest. The same limitations apply to the provisions of constitutional law: because men cannot judge the virtue of their fellow men absolutely, human government cannot employ virtue as an absolute criterion in the distribution of civic honors. A just constitution can go no further than to disfranchise criminals because they have *by their acts* shown themselves to be *vicious with respect to the common good.* This does not mean, of course, that the rest of the non-criminal population are genuinely men of virtue, civic or otherwise. But who shall set himself up to judge the virtue of his fellow men, and what tests can be practically applied? Cf. Section 4 *infra,* where this problem is treated more fully.

respect to a just enfranchisement, then the principle works injustice by disregarding inequalities in degree of competence with respect to the hierarchy of governmental functions. Greek democracy (considering its various disfranchisements and its acceptance of slavery, etc.) neither has the justice of the Democratic constitution, nor does it represent a relatively just Republican constitution, because it involves an actual injustice which cannot be excused by reference to historic conditions.[581]

The second is the principle that special political privileges belong to persons of noble birth or of more than average wealth. This principle may operate with respect to qualification for political office, or with respect to political powers granted a special class in the population, such as the Roman patricians, who had access to the legislative authority of the Senate from which the plebs were excluded, or the British peerage, which exercised an undue influence on legislation before the House of Lords was diminished to its present powers; or it may operate, as in the old Prussian constitution, by proportioning the number of votes to the amount of property held by an elector. This oligarchical principle—it should never be called "aristocratic" by anyone who has respect for that word—can be separated from Republican criteria for citizenship and suffrage. It is highly questionable whether it can ever be justified, as the

[581] Confusion results from supposing that Greek democracy is merely an incomplete achievement of true Democracy. Professor Agard, for example, knows that Democracy can recognize "no validity in the prejudices of class or race" and that the Democratic conception of equality is "that all men deserve equally to be respected as human beings and given a fair chance to express their ability" (*What Democracy Meant to the Greeks*, p. 7). But he is, nevertheless, willing to say, in answer to the question whether the Athenian constitution is genuinely Democratic, that "it is, *in many respects*" (*ibid.*, p. 63; italics ours), even though "Athens denied political rights to important groups of residents" (p. 75). Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 79-82. Above all, he fails to note that the principle of appointment to office by lot is an actual injustice which cannot be condoned. To speak of Greek democracy as a limited or incomplete achievement of the ideal constitution is, therefore, both misleading and erroneous. It would be more accurate to say that Greek democracy anticipates this ideal primarily, if not exclusively, in one respect—its overthrow of oligarchical privileges and oligarchical restrictions.

latter perhaps can, by reference to special historic conditions. But whether or not it is always actually unjust, this oligarchical principle is *separable* from the essence of a Republican constitution, as the original constitution of the United States indicates, although we must recognize the historic fact that most Republican governments have been more or less flagrant in the embodiment of it.

This enables us to see that one of the properties which flows from the essence of a Democratic constitution is the abolition of all politically privileged classes. The Democratic commonwealth is identical with the classless society—in the precise sense of *no social or economic classes having special political rights or privileges, powers or immunities*; but never in the sense of total egalitarianism which violates the hierarchy of governmental functions, for that is the (Greek) democratic fallacy which has no place in the truly just Democratic constitution. The Republican commonwealth, on the other hand, is always a society in which the classes are set against the masses; for even when certain social or economic classes do not have special powers or privileges, rights or immunities, *over and above* those granted to the ordinary citizen, the disfranchised masses under Republican government always belong to certain under-privileged social or economic groups.[582] The ideal of Democracy can, therefore, be defined as that of the *free and politically classless* society.[583] It repudiates the oligarchical

[582] Vd. *Politics*, VII, 10: "It is no new or recent discovery of political philosophers that the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the warriors should be separated from the husbandmen" (1329[b]). Cf. Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*, Book II, Ch. 2.

[583] The Republican society, in contrast, is one in which freedom is hampered by the constitutional preservation of illegitimate class distinctions.

Precisely because the Democratic constitution abolishes the political classes that the Republican constitution recognizes and retains, there can be no such thing as a mixed Democratic constitution. The mixed constitution, properly understood, can occur only under Republican government, effecting some sort of compromise between the opposed social and economic classes which, if their desire for power is unchecked, naturally tend to the extremes of oligarchy or democracy. Cf. Part IV, Section 5, *supra, loc. cit.*, and esp. fn. 500, 502, 508, 511, 513.

Cf. Maritain, *Freedom in the Modern World*, pp. 57-58: The ideal society "would

prejudice in favor of giving *special* privileges, or withholding *basic* privileges, according to the accidents of birth or wealth. The perfect justice of the Democratic constitution will be fully realized in the concrete only when all the counteractive *oligarchical* forces—whether social or economic—are extirpated from the body politic.

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(*To be continued.*)

in effect be a society *sans classes,* that is to say one in which the distinctions between classes which have been heretofore observed in our Western civilization would have disappeared, such distinctions having been founded in earlier times chiefly on the inheritance of blood, in modern times on the inheritance of money. But a fresh differentiation would inevitably arise in a community of human beings all of whom were alike included in the category of workers, for there is no order without diversity and inequalities of rank; and in a world where social values would depend not on birth or on riches, but on work" . . . there would be "a true aristocracy of popular choice closely bound to the service of the community by the very object of their office." Cf. Jefferson's distinction between the true and the false "aristocracies." Vd. fn. 649 *infra.* In a recent article on the Jeffersonian tradition (entitled "Education for a Classless Society"), President Conant of Harvard described England as a free but socially stratified society, Russia as one not free but aiming to be classless, and the United States as approximating a classless and free society (*The Atlantic Monthly,* Vol. 165, No. 5, pp. 593-602).

BOOK REVIEWS

T. Lucreti Cari de Rerum Natura Libri Sex. Edited with Introduction and Commentary by William Ellery Leonard and Stanley Barney Smith. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. Pp. ix + 886. $5.00.

Lucretius is an author about whom opinions have greatly differed and one whose study has fluctuated to a great extent during different periods. Some writers have assigned him the primacy among the poets of Rome. No less capable a Latin scholar than Denys Lambin wrote the following tribute to his use of language: *non dubitanter affirmabo, nullum in tota lingua Latina scriptorem Lucretio latine melius esse locutum, non M. Tullii, non C. Caesaris orationem esse puriorem.* Yet he never attained the prominent place in later Roman education that was justly granted to the bards of Mantua and Venusia.

As a philosopher, Lucretius has failed to make a great mark. His hexameter poem *De Rerum Natura* is the best Latin exposition of Epicureanism; but his school lost the Roman field to Stoicism, which, for all its errors, appeared more worthy of acceptance to the minds of Romans. The middle ages looked upon him as a scientist more than as a philosopher; and even in science he was not held in the same esteem as Pliny or Seneca, to mention only the Latin authors.

Modern philological study of Lucretius began with Lachmann in the last century. Munro in England, Brieger in Germany, and Giussani in Italy carried on further researches into the interpretation of his poem. In our own century, Ernout and Robin, Bailey, Merrill, Diels, and Martin have published useful editions and commentaries of *De Rerum Natura.*

The present edition is a cooperative project, "the result of nearly life-long interests of two scholars, which some fifteen years ago became merged in a cooperative enterprise." Professor Leonard has contributed the General Introduction on "Lucretius: The Man, the Poet, and the Times"; Professor Smith has contributed the Latin text, the Commentary, and the Introduction to the Commentary, but "in a broader sense they are jointly responsible for the whole" (p. v).

Such a cooperative project has the obvious advantage of two heads instead of one, but in one instance at least it has led to overlapping. Witness the treatment by Leonard of Mss. (pp. 84-91) and the fuller treatment by Smith (p. 95 ff.), where there is necessarily some repetition. Usually, however, this overlapping is happily avoided.

Leonard's introduction is pleasantly written and sufficiently informative. It shows first-hand acquaintance with the Latin writings of the contemporaries and predecessors of Lucretius. His years are given as 99-55 B. C. on the basis of St. Jerome's Chronicle. The question of his madness is discussed, and Leonard is unable to agree fully with Postgate and Conway who considered V. 1308-49 as a "madman's dream." The poem itself is used with advantage to obtain a view of the author's personality, but some of the conjectures are rather fine spun and unconvincing. The treatment of Epicurus, his influence on Lucretius, and the independence of the latter in certain instances, is excellent. Leonard deals roughly with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (p. 42); especially with the last, whose scientific interests in the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms receive scant mention. A student would get the erroneous idea that Aristotle was a mere deductive logician with a distaste for experiment. Again, Epicurus is mentioned as "perhaps the founder of inductive (as distinct from deductive) logic" (p. 47), although Aristotle is more deserving of such a title from the viewpoint both of time and of merit. It is admitted (p. 48) that Epicurus and Lucretius "smuggled into" their system both reason and ethical judgments which are not accounted for by their system of materialistic atomism. The strong influence of Empedocles in addition to (and sometimes even distinct from) that of Epicurus is rightly insisted on. The agreement between the philosophical atomism of Lucretius and the modern scientific atomic theory is greatly overstressed. Leonard has a prejudice against teleological thinking, upon which his information seems very limited (p. 60). He fails to appreciate the value of divine revelation as a guardian against error, and so naively speaks of "religious myth" as blocking free speculation on early man (cf. pp. 61-2, 73). No mention is made of the inconsistency of Lucretius in rejecting the tales of gods as mere mythology, and then using that same mythology to point out, in the sacrifice of Iphigenia, the evils that religion could produce.

Professor Smith has a clear discussion of the Mss. all of which go back to an archetype of the fourth century. His treatment of "Textual Errors" is very helpful. He has a useful sketch of the diction and style of Lucretius which sums up neatly the results of several works: Ernout, Cartault, Deutsch, and Spangenberg. He falls into the old error about the shifting quantity of a *vowel* preceding a mute or liquid (pp. 160-1). It is taught by philologists that the quantity of the *syllable*, not of the vowel, differs in such instances (cf. Kent, *The Sounds of Latin*, 2nd ed., p. 62). The wrong date is assigned for the death of Isidore of Seville (p. 104). There are a few other minor errors, showing lack of acquaintance with modern views on quantities.

But I have no desire to go into a list of errors. I feel justly grateful for the useful information assembled into this one volume. The commentary,

which is really helpful, shows that the authors have in mind the needs of our sad generation of college students who have little Latin and less than less Greek. Where Merrill cites the original Greek, this edition gives a good translation, often original. Much has been done since Merrill's edition in 1907, and this work offers a convenient synthesis. If it does not displace Merrill in our American courses, it will at any rate be a welcome addition to his fine volume. The University of Wisconsin Press can well be proud of this finely printed and well-indexed book.

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The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. By PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER (Trans. by Virginia Conant). New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. xiv + 441. $4.50.

The philosophers of the Renaissance are little known. The textbooks usually pass over the two centuries which mark the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of modern times with a few perfunctory remarks. The overthrow of the medieval system and the rise of the new science seem to them more important than the work done by thinkers who, after all, form the link between the past and the present. Thus, we welcome any study which makes us better acquainted with the personalities who fashioned thought in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Among these thinkers, Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) holds a prominent place. He was the founder and the head of the "Platonic Academy" at Florence and exercised a great influence on many people. Pico della Mirandola, for instance, was his pupil. Ficino, who was ordained a priest in 1473, attempted to work out a synthesis of Christian doctrine and Platonic, or rather Neo-Platonic, philosophy, although he took account, even to a large extent, of Aristotelian and Thomistic ideas. He was thoroughly opposed to Averroism which, at his time, dominated many of the philosophical schools. Ficino's translations played an important role in the "humanistic" movement; the one he made of Plotinus is still highly regarded. Notwithstanding his dependence on ancient and medieval philosophy he was not without ideas of his own. His work is well worthy of consideration. Accordingly, one opens Dr. Kristeller's book with great expectations. That one is disappointed, in a measure, is the result of several defects, two of which are of a rather serious nature.

The many quotations from Ficino are mostly given in English translation only. This is in itself a drawback. It becomes the more so when the reader realizes that the translations are open to objections. Terms are

used for which it is difficult to imagine the original expression, e. g., " the peculiar end of a thing " (p. 143), " charm " (p. 265), " model " (p. 95). Sometimes the translation is definitely mistaken: p. 37 where *sufficientia subsistendi* is rendered by " capacity for existence "; the phrase *universi natura possibilius* . . . (p. 72) is mistranslated; *demens* on p. 165 does not mean " mad " but " lacking mind," or " not mindlike "; *secretio* (p. 217) is not " secretion " but rather separation, what Eckehardt called *Abgeschiedenheit*, nor does *vacatio* mean " vacation " but being free for, having a mind emptied of other things. It is hardly correct to translate *affectio* (of will) by disposition. On p. 39 *decuit* is rendered by " it was convenient," *decet* by " meet," although the use of the past and present tense is obviously significant. *Princeps* becomes " prince " on p. 80, and " head " on p. 83; neither of these words gives exactly the sense. Act and action are not distinguished (pp. 77 and 236). Twice one comes across mistakes which, perhaps are printing errors, p. 21 *desiderant*—denying, p. 296 *laetus in praesens*. The phrase " the angel has a number " (p. 88) is to say the least, clumsy and not to be understood by anyone not acquainted with Neo-Pythagorean speculation. *Complexio* is not a " sum " (p. 82) but something like an integration, an organic togetherness, and must be read in the light of Cusanian philosophy.

Ficino mentions Cusanus, the author tells us, only once, and the editors of the great edition of Cusanus' works refer to only one passage which might be, but probably is not, taken from the writings of the Cardinal. However, the absence of literal quotations and of the name does not constitute a sufficient proof for the absence of any influence. *Complexio*, for instance, is a Cusanian term. Also, Ficino speaks—the author does not mention this but it is reported by Fr. Olgiati—of *docta religio*, an expression sounding much like an intentional echo of *docta ignorantia*. There are other passages in which one is strongly reminded of Cusanus. These parallels ought to be investigated.

They are, however, as little considered in this work as are many other obvious references, on Ficino's part, to his predecessors. To characterize the thought of any philosopher it is necessary to view him against his intellectual background. To have omitted this, constitutes the other serious defect of this work. Many ideas are presented as Ficino's own, perhaps even as original, which are simply repetitions of statements contained in various writings of the past. It is of a minor importance that the use of *latitudo* is, hypothetically, traced back to the *Calculationes* of Suiseth, though the *Tractatus latitudinum formarum* by Nicholas Oresme was printed in 1486 at Padua. The author rightly emphasizes the influence of St. Augustine—as well as of Plato and the Neo-Platonists; he also mentions occasionally St. Anselm. But there are many passages which obviously stem from Thomistic writers. Curiously, the only work of Aquinas ever

referred to is the *Contra Gentes*; one may, however, presume that Ficino was not ignorant of the rest of Thomistic literature. He was a canon at the Cathedral of Florence; from 1446 to 1459 St. Antoninus, a Dominican, was Archbishop there; he is the author of a once famous *Summa*, written *ad mentem doctoris*. This book figures also among those contained in the library of Pico della Mirandola. It is highly improbable that Ficino should not have been acquainted with this work and other Thomistic treatises. In fact, there are many passages in which notions occur which are well known to any student of Thomism. To mention only a few examples: pp. 44, 125, 138, 176 the concepts of *actus immanens* and *transiens*, pp. 51 and 242 of ontological truth, pp. 63 and 138 of *bonum diffusivum sui*, p. 120 the principle *anima quodammodo omnia*, p. 166 the *argumentum ex gradibus*, and so on.

No reference is found to St. Bonaventure, although his exemplarism apparently influenced Ficino. Nor is it mentioned that many of Ficino's principles are common to all his predecessors. The reader is led to overrate Ficino's originality.

Dr. Kristeller only refers in a general manner to Ficino's indebtedness to his predecessors. It is, therefore, left to the reader to find out what are the truly characteristic contributions of the Florentine thinker. The author emphasizes mainly two notions which, if this reviewer understands correctly, he considers as Ficino's most personal ideas. One is the *primum in aliquo genere*, which is discussed pp. 146-170. The second is the notion of *appetitus naturalis*, pp. 171-200.

Concerning the first, the author correctly refers to similar notions, *perfectum in aliquo genere*, as found in St. Anselm, St. Thomas and others. One may consider also another writer who, at this time, was highly regarded: Thomas Bradwardine, *doctor profundus*, who in *De causa Dei* (1344) says *quod nullus processus infinitus in entibus, sed est in quolibet genere unum principium*. This *primum* is the perfect realization of the *genus* (which, it seems, should be considered, ontologically, as a *species*), and the other members are relatively imperfect and impure. The *genus* reproduces, as it were, within its structure the plan of Being as a whole, with its hierarchy; so also there exists a last and lowest member in every *genus*. The *genera* thus become definite spheres of reality, reproducing each the structure of the universe. The conception later developed in Leibniz' monadology, that each particular being mirrors the universe, can be traced back to Plato and the Stoics, and is found with various modifications in many writers (*minor mundus*); sometimes it is referred to man alone, sometimes generalized so as to apply to any being whatsoever. Here, again, the relation to Cusanus needs clarification.

Ficino holds, with many of the medieval "Platonists," that the universe is an animated being, also that the celestial bodies have their own souls

around which it is "natural" to them to revolve. It is furthermore in accordance with this tradition that man is considered as the very center, the point where the sensible and the intelligible world touch one another. It should be noted, incidentally, that this view has nothing of the often mentioned "anthropocentrism" of the medieval system, nor is the idea that man is the "crown" of sensible creation indicative of a lack of humility. Contrary to the ideas often expressed by the enthusiastic admirers of "modernity," it was the medieval mind which was humble, and it is the modern scientistic mind which is not.

In his anthropology Ficino appears to be not quite consistent. On one hand he held that "man is the soul" (p. 328), a view reminiscent of older ideas, e. g., of Hugh of St. Victor; on the other hand he has an argument for the necessity of resurrection of the body gathered from the notion that soul and body are ordained to one another.

In his psychology one may note the notion of the *formulae innatae*—adumbrating the idea of "inborn ideas"—which *formulae* seem to become actualized much in the same manner as is the case with the first principles in Aquinas. The intellectual substances are credited with a direct knowledge of the particulars, by an argument *ex eminentia*.

The notion of symbolic cognition plays an important part. The image is related to the "idea" it represents as the thing directly pictured to the thing symbolized. We know things by the accidents and also symbolically; lower things are symbols of higher ones the nature of which becomes visible in the symbol (p. 95 ff.).

The nature of man and mind is conceived on the basis of the same ontological principles on which the whole order of being rests. These principles are, in the main, Neo-Platonic with, however, the difference that, contrary to Plotinus, it is not the higher emanation which brings forth the next one, but they all are created by God. Ficino apparently does not apply the notion of analogy to being, since he asserts that the One is above Being (p. 45).

The homogeneity of Being leads to the theory of the *appetitus naturalis*, which on the other hand is related to Ficino's conception of love and of human relations. Dr. Kristeller believes that Ficino took this term and idea from Epicurus, who elaborated the Aristotelian doctrine of orexis. However, it should be noted that term and notion belong to traditional teaching and that Ficino must have come across them elsewhere too. In fact, there seems to be little in Ficino's ideas which would go beyond the traditional views.

Ficino seems to be the father of the notion of "Platonic love," although the author is obviously mistaken in his belief that medieval philosophers knew of love only as existing either between the sexes, or—as friendship—between individuals of the same sex. Even a superficial study of Aquinas' remarks on *amor amicitiae* might have shown the falsity of this interpretation.

Notwithstanding the many criticisms this work calls forth, we must gratefully acknowledge our debt to Dr. Kristeller for having made accessible the philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. Our gratitude would be greater still if the author had found ways to add a chapter on the further influence of Ficino, beyond the circle of his immediate pupils and friends. If there are many conceptions in this philosophy which link it definitely to the past, there are others pointing to the future. The " ancestry " of what is called " modern " philosophy is still known but incompletely, and Ficino may well be an intermediary between medieval Scholasticism and more recent philosophies. To evaluate his influence would appear as an important and attractive task.

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